

95 Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd

by

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Philosophy gives an account of our experience

1. Philosophy does not begin with rational propositions or presuppositions, but rather with our experience. Dooyeweerd begins *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* by contrasting the continuity of our pre-theoretical experience with the way that theoretical experience splits apart this continuity.¹ He says later, “The *apriori* structure of reality can only be known by experience. But this is not experience as it is conceived by immanence-philosophy.”² Human experience is not limited to our temporal functions of consciousness.³ Our experience is not an ‘*Erlebnis*’ of mere psychological feelings and sensations,⁴ but rather “a conscious *enstatic*⁵ ‘*Hineinleben*.’”—the experience of our supratemporal selfhood entering into and living within all aspects of temporal reality.⁶

2. Our theoretical Ideas (whether in philosophy, theology, or in any science) “give an account of”⁷ our pre-theoretical experience. Dooyeweerd distinguishes between subjective theoretical propositions [*vooronderstellingen*] and the supra-theoretical ontical presuppositions on which such propositions are based [*de vooronderstelde*—“that which is presupposed”].⁸ In other words, our world and its structure are *given*⁹ and *not constructed*.¹⁰ Dooyeweerd opposes what is “given” in pre-theoretical experience with the product of theoretical analysis in the *Gegenstand*-relation.¹¹ Theoretical Ideas are not themselves the ontical conditions, the ‘ontic *a prioris*’¹² of which Ideas give an account.¹³ We must not confuse the ontical with the epistemological.¹⁴

3. Our philosophical Ideas point towards the ontical conditions that make both pre-theoretical and theoretical experience possible; these ontical conditions are “infinitely more than Idea.”¹⁵ This is what Dooyeweerd means by calling his philosophy ‘transcendental.’¹⁶ Ideas relate the diversity of the modal aspects to their central and radical unity and to an Origin.¹⁷ By so anticipating¹⁸ the concentric identity¹⁹ of our temporal and supratemporal experience, Ideas approximate what cannot be comprehended in a concept.²⁰ The theoretical Idea is always a philosophical Idea of the totality and unity of the modal aspects, which have been split apart in theory. In contrast, the theoretical concept is oriented to distinguishing the various aspects.²¹

The horizons of our experience

4. There are four dimensions or horizons²² of our experience: (1) the religious or supratemporal horizon, (2) the temporal horizon of cosmic time, (3) the modal horizon of the temporal aspects, and (4) the plastic²³ horizon of individuality structures.

The religious (supratemporal) horizon

5. By religious (i.e. supratemporal) self-reflection, we obtain “cosmic consciousness”²⁴ of our supratemporal selfhood and its relation to the temporal world, including our temporal body.²⁵ Our supratemporal selfhood recognizes the modal functions as “our own in

cosmic time.”²⁶ Modern thought often dogmatically rejects the possibility of religious self-reflection because it wrongly believes in the autonomy of theoretical thought.²⁷ But self-reflection is the only way to discover the true starting-point of theoretical thought,²⁸ and all human experience is rooted in the transcendent unity of self-consciousness.²⁹ This self-knowledge cannot be proved theoretically, since it exceeds the limits of theoretical thought and is rooted in the heart, the religious center of our existence.³⁰ Furthermore, this central self-knowledge can only be the result of the Word-revelation of God operating in our heart.³¹ Our selfhood, as the religious concentration point of our entire temporal existence) stands in immediate relationship to God as the absolute origin of all things. Religion is immediately related to the absolute origin.³²

6. Our selfhood transcends cosmic time.³³ Man is “able to not only relatively but radically go out above all temporal things.”³⁴ We are therefore aware of a distinction between cosmic time and our selfhood that transcends time. We do not have any experience of ourselves as merely a temporal pre-functional unity.³⁵ We could not have any consciousness of time unless our selfhood were above time.³⁶ Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the Idea of cosmic time is the basis of his philosophical theory of reality.³⁷ The religious or supratemporal horizon of experience is different from the temporal horizon. Dooyeweerd avoided using the term “central trans-cosmic time,” because that still refers to cosmic time; it would be a duplication of the temporal horizon.³⁸

7. The transcendence of time in our supratemporal heart is not just a future reality after death, but a present reality. Even now we are both supratemporal and temporal beings.³⁹ We live in both cosmic time and the supratemporal *aevum*, which is the created intermediate state between eternity and cosmic time.⁴⁰ In fact, Dooyeweerd says that this is what it means to be the image of God: “...it is just this possession of a supratemporal root of life, with the simultaneous subjectedness to time of all its earthly expressions, that together belong to the essence [*wezen*] of man, to the “image of God” in him...”⁴¹ In the body, we are universally bound to time. But our selfhood is not in time. So our experience is limited *by*, but not at all *to* time.⁴²

8. We pre-theoretically experience our supratemporal selfhood as restless, and the temporal world as restless in our heart.⁴³ Our heart in turn refers beyond itself to an eternal Origin that transcends it. We are therefore aware of a distinction between the temporal cosmos, our supratemporal selfhood, and God’s eternity.

9. Our selfhood stands under a law of religious concentration, which makes it restlessly search for its own Origin and that of the whole cosmos.⁴⁴ “It is this tendency towards the origin which discloses the fact, that our ego is subjected to a central *law*.”⁴⁵

The temporal horizon

10. We pre-theoretically experience the relation between our supratemporal selfhood and the cosmic temporal coherence as a relation of *enstasis*.⁴⁶ “In pre-theoretical thought our I-ness enters entstatically by means of its intuition into the cosmic temporal coherence of experience.”⁴⁷ This is an experience of resting⁴⁸ equilibrium and coherence. The experience is immediate and integral, and in concentric relatedness to our selfhood.⁴⁹

11. Theoretical experience is not a resting experience of *enstasis* but an act of *dis-stasis*, the entering of our selfhood into temporal reality⁵⁰ and the setting apart of our experience

of temporal reality.⁵¹ Theoretical thought makes our previously given experience into a “problem.”⁵² But it also deepens⁵³ or opens⁵⁴ our pre-theoretical experience by focusing on its deeper identity with the central totality of our selfhood that transcends time.⁵⁵ Only our selfhood, as the undivided concentration point of our temporal existence, can give this concentric direction to our thought.⁵⁶

The modal horizon of our experience: the aspects or modes of consciousness

12. Aspects are modes of consciousness or experience, not modes of being or properties of things.⁵⁷ “A modality is a primary form of the intuiting consciousness [*schouwend bewustzijn*].”⁵⁸ These aspects of our experience and existence within the order of time are related to the central unity of our consciousness, which we call our I, our ego. We could not have any experience at all without this central ego.⁵⁹ In pre-theoretical experience, we experience our temporal modes of consciousness as a coherent unity, but we do not distinguish the modes of consciousness.⁶⁰ It is in theoretical experience that we distinguish and analyze the modes.

13. Dooyeweerd distinguished fifteen different aspects, or modes of consciousness, each mode irreducible to the other modes and yet also related to the others. These modes are: the numerical, spatial, kinematic, the mode of physical energy, organic life, psychical feeling, analytical-logical, historical, linguistic, social, economic, aesthetic, jural, moral and the mode of faith.⁶¹

14. Theoretical thought gives an account of each mode of our consciousness, not by reducing one mode to another mode, but by explaining the modes as temporal refractions from supratemporal totality. Cosmic time acts like a prism to differentiate supratemporal totality both on its law side and its subject side. Temporally, each modal aspect has sphere sovereignty and cannot be reduced to another modal aspect, just as one colour in the differentiated white light cannot be reduced to another colour.⁶² The modal aspects, in their modal structure of analogies with other aspects, are the ontical foundation of individuality structures, which function within these modal structures. The temporal individuation of individuality structures therefore depends on the prior differentiation in time of the modal structures.⁶³

15. Each of the modal aspects is given to our consciousness in an order of succession of cosmic time, in an order of *before and after*, or earlier and later, and this temporal order is also expressed in the internal modal structure of every aspect.⁶⁴

16. The irreducibility of each modal aspect in time is based on its nuclear or kernel moment. Yet the mutual irreducibility of the law-spheres and their mutual irreducible reciprocal meaning-coherence “are not to be separated from the transcendental idea of the root-unity of the modal aspects in the religious center of human existence.”⁶⁵ And “it is not possible to form a concept of a particular aspect without having this concept led by an idea of their [the aspects] mutual coherence and deeper root-unity.”⁶⁶ “What in the totality of meaning has no meaning is the sovereignty in its own sphere in the particularity of meaning.”⁶⁷ So, although no modal aspect can be reduced to any other aspect, all of these modal aspects or law-spheres coincide in a unity of meaning in the supratemporal center. This is just like one colour not being reducible to another after being refracted, and yet all the colours have a common unity in the white light before refraction. The prism of cosmic time guarantees sphere sovereignty within time.⁶⁸ The

distinction between the concept and the Idea of a specific aspect is based on the distinction between the primary modal meaning (nucleus with its retrocipations) and the deepened meaning, which anticipates the later analogical moments in the modal aspects.⁶⁹

17. We cannot conceptualize such a nuclear moment, but we know it only in its analogies with other moments.⁷⁰ These analogical relations either point forward in time to a later aspect, in which case they are called anticipations, or backwards in time to an earlier aspect, in which case they are called retrocipations. Anticipations are complex, for each modal anticipation points forward to a law-sphere that has a retrocipatory sphere of its own.⁷¹ Thus, each anticipation includes further retrocipations from the anticipated sphere! These are different from the retrocipations of the sphere that one started from. In the retrocipatory direction, we look back towards our Origin. In the anticipatory direction, we look forward to the later aspects, and ultimately, to our supratemporal fulfillment beyond the highest modal aspect, that of faith, the “opened window of time through which the light of God’s eternity should shine into the whole temporal coherence of the world.”⁷² For “in the faith aspect of reality, time takes on a specific meaning of the revelation of the supratemporal, of what lies hidden beyond time.”⁷³ Faith is the only aspect that of itself points beyond time, and not merely via anticipatory moments of meaning. We misconstrue the faith aspect if we do not see it “in its immediate relatedness to the transcendent root and origin of the creation.”⁷⁴

18. The nuclear moment, together with its temporal analogies, constitute a law-sphere. All law-spheres are related to each other because the analogical moments in one law-sphere refer to the other modalities that were refracted from the same totality. And every modal aspect points beyond its own limits to a central totality.⁷⁵ The philosophical idea of totality is completely different from the idea of the cosmos or the universe.⁷⁶

19. Dooyeweerd says that his theory of the modal aspects is one of the “least understood” parts of his philosophy.⁷⁷ Aspects are not entities or “whats” but they are “hows” of our temporal experience, or “modes of consciousness.” Modes are not properties abstracted from laws or things. Dooyeweerd says this is a “serious misunderstanding” by reformational philosophers.⁷⁸ “We cannot obtain true structural concepts of individuality by means of the procedure of gradual abstraction. Nor can we obtain theoretical insight into the modal structures of the law-spheres by gradual abstraction.”⁷⁹

20. In theoretical thought, we find that our modes of consciousness correspond in a relation of *identity* to the modes in which individuality structures function.⁸⁰ The horizon of experience is the same horizon of existence for man and for the world.⁸¹ Our inner acts (i.e., those occurring within our body) can be theoretically studied because they have a modal structure of a universally valid character.⁸² Sometimes Dooyeweerd uses ‘inner’ in an even deeper sense, to refer to the supratemporal selfhood apart from its expression within our body, as when he speaks of the soul as the root-unity, the “inner person” in the Pauline sense, which expresses itself in temporal, bodily life.⁸³ But that is not what is referred to here. This identity of our *inner* and *outer* experience gives rise to the law-Idea: the belief that our experience is subjected to a law outside of ourselves that sets or provides for this identity and harmony.⁸⁴

The plastic horizon of individuality structures

21. The final temporal realities to differentiate from out of supratemporal totality are individuality structures, which we experience in the plastic horizon. The modal aspects have an ontical priority to these individuality structures, and are not derived or abstracted from the individuality structures. “The modal structures *lie at the foundation* of the individuality structures, and *not the other way around*.”⁸⁵

22. Our pre-theoretical or naïve experience is primarily of individuality structures in the plastic horizon of our experience.⁸⁶ But we do not experience them as completely separate entities.⁸⁷ And we do not theoretically analyze the nature of those structures, but we engage in a subject-object relation with them.⁸⁸

23. In the pre-theoretical subject-object relation, we recognize that different temporal structures are members of different realms. Thus, we recognize that a tree is qualified by its functions in the biotic aspect of reality, and that it does not subjectively experience sensation. We recognize that animals do experience sensation, and that they are therefore qualified by the psychical aspect of temporal reality.⁸⁹ Object functions are real functions, and should not be regarded as secondary qualities (sensory qualities such as colours, tones, temperatures, pressures, etc.) that inhere only in the perceiving subject. The subject-object relation does not rely on any distinction between primary and secondary qualities.⁹⁰

24. The temporal order of succession of the modal aspects gives rise to the subject-object relation of pre-theoretical experience. The subject-object relation is not just between individuality structures, but also within the aspects in their relation of before and after in cosmic time.⁹¹ The earlier aspects are objectified in the later aspects.⁹²

25. The nature of the pre-theoretical subject-object relation explains why Dooyeweerd says that our pre-theoretical experience is not based nearly as much on sense perception as current philosophy believes.⁹³ The role of imagination is crucial, since perceiving the object can be the result of the formative activity of an individual subject.⁹⁴

26. An individuality structure is a “relative unity in a multiplicity of functions,”⁹⁵ an architectonic grouping⁹⁶ of the modal aspects, “typical structures of cosmic time” with a subjective duration in time.⁹⁷ Individuality structures have no substance, nor do they have any reality at all apart from man, their religious root.⁹⁸

27. An individuality structure functions within the modal structure of all aspects. It does this in accordance with its architectonic grouping of subject and object functions within those aspects. Thus a ‘function’ is not the same as ‘aspect.’⁹⁹ Concrete things function within all of the modal structures. The modal aspects first make things possible; they form their foundation in an *apriori* ontical sense.¹⁰⁰ The aspects within which individuality structures function have a structure of a relative unity in a diversity of *moments*.¹⁰¹

28. Individuality structures are qualified by their highest subject function within the modal aspects. That function is called the ‘qualifying function’ of the individuality structure.¹⁰²

29. On the law-side, these individuality structures are called typical structures, giving rise to subjective correlates of a certain *type*. Typical structures determine the subjective (or objective) temporal duration of these individuality structures. An apple tree differs from a stone not because it functions in different aspects, but because, in whatever aspect it functions, it displays a different typical structure. A thing endures only as long as its typical structure.¹⁰³

30. On the subject-side, or factual side, individuality structures are correlated to an *enkaptic* whole. *Enkapsis* means a relation where two individuality structures each retain their own characteristics.¹⁰⁴ In other words, each continues to be qualified by its highest subject function. In this regard, *enkapsis* is different from the relationship of a part to the whole. What is part of a whole is determined by the individuality structure of the whole. Whole entities are not something in addition to the duration of such *enkaptically* interwoven structures in time. When the *enkaptic* relation fails, the existence of the *enkaptic* whole (or thing) comes to an end.

31. A thing is an enkaptic interlacement of *two or more* individuality structures.¹⁰⁵ There is no simple thing, because no single structure of individuality can be realized except in inter-structural intertwinements with other individuality-structures.¹⁰⁶ It is not correct that a thing *has* an individuality structure, for that would make a thing independent of its law-side, and would lead to a view of reality based on substance.

32. Within the *enkaptic* whole, the qualifying function of the more encompassing individuality structure is called the ‘leading function.’ It qualifies every individual totality belonging to the same kingdom (mineral, plant, animal). The qualifying function of the encompassed individuality structure is called the ‘foundational function.’¹⁰⁷

33. Our temporal body is an enkaptic interlacement of four different individuality structures: the physical, the biological, the psychical, and the act-structure. These structures are not parts of a whole, but are rather *enkaptically* interwoven with each other.¹⁰⁸

34. In our pre-theoretical experience, we form concepts, but these concepts are directed to structures of individuality. This is because *enstatic* logical analysis is restrictively bound to sensory perception.¹⁰⁹ But every use of a logical syllogism shows that we are already engaged in theoretical thought.¹¹⁰

35. We also pre-theoretically experience the coherence of the temporal world. There is a coherence of the modes of our consciousness as well as the modes in which individuality structures function. Dooyeweerd calls this temporal coherence a *systasis*, by which he means “the factual immediacy of our integral experience of reality.”¹¹¹

Ground Motives

36. All philosophy must answer these three problems¹¹²: (1) What is the origin of reality? (2) What is the totality of meaning from which reality unfolds, the supratemporal unity beyond all modal diversity? and (3) What is the basis for the coherence of temporal reality?

37. In answer to these problems, we give different transcendental Ideas, depending on whether our supratemporal heart is directed towards God in an integral and radical¹¹³

way, or whether our heart is directed away from God. These two directions are called the “religious antithesis.”¹¹⁴

38. This religious motivation towards or away from God is a supratemporal act of our will. ‘Motive’ comes from the Latin ‘*movere*,’ meaning “to move, to propel.” It is a *dunamis* or “spiritual power” that drives all human activity forward and sets its direction, even though the individual may not be at all conscious of it.¹¹⁵ Ground-Motives are not themselves the cause of this act of will, but only an attempt to give a theoretical account of it.

The Christian Ground Motive of creation, fall and redemption

39. Christian philosophy provides these three transcendental Ideas as answers to the three problems: (1) God is the Origin (2) Our supratemporal selfhood is the original totality, but since the fall, the totality is Christ in whom we participate and (3) Temporal coherence is given by cosmic time.¹¹⁶

40. These three transcendental Ideas correspond to three ontic levels: (1) God’s eternity (2) the created supratemporal realm (the “*aevum*”), which includes our selfhood and (3) the realm of cosmic time, which includes our temporal body and the temporal cosmos into which our supratemporal selfhood was “fitted” [*ingesteld*].¹¹⁷

41. Our Ideas of God, man and cosmos are all related.¹¹⁸ They are related because they correspond to the three transcendental Ideas, and to the three ontical levels (eternity, supratemporal and temporal).

42. Dooyeweerd’s Christian philosophy is not based on propositions from the Bible or on theological exegesis of texts. Dooyeweerd criticized Groen van Prinsterer’s method of Scripture reading, using Scriptures as a final guide for temporal life.¹¹⁹ He also criticized Vollenhoven’s use of Scripture as a source for philosophy, on the grounds that this was theology and not philosophy.¹²⁰ He criticized Van Til’s idea of revealed concepts in Scripture; he says that this shows Van Til’s “rationalist tendency.” Van Til wrongly identifies the words of Scripture with concepts, and Van Til is wrong to say that man has to “think God’s thoughts after him.” For nowhere does the Bible speak of obeying the voice of God in terms of subjecting every human thought to divine thought.¹²¹ The Scriptures speak to our supratemporal heart, but they are not to be understood in a propositional way. The Scriptures do not use theoretical scientific concepts.¹²² The Christian Ground-motive of creation, fall and redemption cannot be determined by theoretical exegesis.¹²³ Nor is the meaning of the religious centre of life, the root of man’s whole existence, the fall into sin, rebirth or the incarnation of the Word to be determined by exegesis.¹²⁴ We recognize that Scripture “accords with”¹²⁵ our experience. But there is no theology or philosophy that can give us true knowledge of God and self; this is the fruit of God’s Spirit in our heart, and has a “religious *enstatic* character.”¹²⁶ Dooyeweerd distinguishes between the Scriptures and God’s Word. He disagreed with a young theologian who claimed that the Bible was “inspired by God word for word.”¹²⁷

43. Any truly Christian view of anthropology and of temporal society must begin with the Idea of our supratemporal selfhood.¹²⁸ This was the “great turning point” in Dooyeweerd’s thought,¹²⁹ the beginning and end point of his philosophy.¹³⁰ Sometimes he says it is the key of knowledge,¹³¹ although at other times he says that the key is the

Christian Ground-motive of creation, fall and redemption.¹³² But even there he says that the “radical unity of meaning” of this central theme of creation, fall into sin and redemption “is related to the central unity of our human existence.” So the ideas are related, and it is clear that, without the idea of the supratemporal heart, we cannot understand the radical meaning of creation, fall and redemption.¹³³ Nor can we understand the working of God’s Word in our hearts, or the doctrine of the incarnation.¹³⁴

44. Any philosophy that does not accept the Idea of the supratemporal selfhood is called ‘immanence philosophy,’ because it seeks totality and coherence within time. Even a Christian philosophy that acknowledges God as eternal Origin is still making a synthesis with immanence philosophy if it denies the supratemporal selfhood. It may acknowledge God as Origin, but it adopts an immanent view of totality. Dooyeweerd says that his philosophy makes a radical break with immanence philosophy in its idea that it understands that our whole temporal human existence proceeds from out of the religious root, the heart.¹³⁵ Immanence philosophy seeks the Archimedean point of philosophy within theoretical thought itself instead of relating it to our “I-ness”—the “undivided center of all temporal human existence.”¹³⁶ Because it begins with the assumed autonomy of theoretical thought, immanence philosophy denies any non-theoretical presuppositions, or what Dooyeweerd calls ‘ontical conditions’ of thought.¹³⁷

45. By seeking totality and coherence within the temporal world, immanence philosophy necessarily elevates or absolutizes one part of temporal reality above the other parts. The other parts are then “reduced” to or subordinated to the part that is elevated. An example is seeking the unifying element of the temporal world within the rational aspect. This results in antinomies, and a polar dialectic or dualism between the absolutized aspect of reality and the remaining aspects.¹³⁸ Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is resolutely opposed to all such dualisms within temporal reality.

46. *Apostasis* or apostasy is falling away from our true center and the absolutization of the temporal. We then cannot experience temporal things and events as they really are. Instead, we experience the emptiness of a world that seems to be shut up in itself. But in the Biblical attitude of naïve experience, the light of eternity breaks in, illuminating even the most trivial things, and showing the dynamic relation of self, others, cosmos and God.¹³⁹ True knowledge of God and self involves a turning of the personality, and a restoring of the subjective perspective of our experience.¹⁴⁰ The religious antithesis of apostasy runs through the heart of everyone, including Christians; it is not a line to be drawn between groups of people.¹⁴¹ Even Christians are sometimes apostate. But when we stand again in the truth, we are brought into a relation of *anastasis*.¹⁴² So resurrection is also a present reality.

47. The Christian answer to the three transcendental Ideas is governed by its religious Ground-Motive of “creation, fall and redemption in Christ.” This Ground-Motive of creation, fall and redemption sees created reality in an integral and radical [root] way: there is a coherence of temporal reality that refers to a supratemporal created totality or religious root, which in turn refers to the eternal Origin, God. But Dooyeweerd warns that this Ground-Motive is not correctly understood unless creation, fall and redemption are all understood as occurring in relation to the supratemporal religious root. Many people use the terms “creation, fall and redemption” in what appears to be an orthodox way, but

they fail to understand these doctrines in their radical meaning, in their relation to the supratemporal heart as religious root.¹⁴³

God and creation

48. God alone is Being.¹⁴⁴

49. Nothing in creation is being or substance; created reality exists only as *meaning*, restlessly *referring back* towards God as *Arché or Origin*.¹⁴⁵ But although temporal reality is not Being, Dooyeweerd does speak of the “ontical.”¹⁴⁶ By ‘ontical’ he means that which is grounded in the order of reality itself, and not in our theory about reality.¹⁴⁷

50. God *expresses* Himself in His creation, and created reality *refers* back to God.¹⁴⁸

51. The idea of the *expression* of a higher reality in a lower reality is essential in order to understand the nondual relations of (a) God and creation (b) man’s supratemporal heart and temporal body and (c) man and cosmos.

52. All creation is “out, from and towards” God as *Arché* or *Origin*.¹⁴⁹ Kuyper expressed a similar idea: “God alone is here the goal, the point of departure and the point of arrival, the fountain, from which the waters flow, and at the same time, the ocean into which they finally return.”¹⁵⁰ Dooyeweerd was aware that the words “out, from and towards” were associated with pantheism.¹⁵¹ Pantheism does not mean pantheism, but rather a nondual relation—neither dualism nor monism—between the Creator and His creation.

53. God’s eternity is distinct from created eternity (the *aevum*) and from cosmic time. Supratemporality is dynamic.¹⁵² So is God’s eternity; a static eternity is a Greek idea.¹⁵³

54. Created reality is divided into supratemporal created reality (“the heavens”) and temporal created reality (“the earth”).¹⁵⁴

55. The supratemporal created reality exists in the *aevum*, intermediate between God’s eternity and cosmic time. The *aevum* includes man’s supratemporal heart as religious root and totality,¹⁵⁵ and the angelic realm.

56. The cosmos or “earthly” reality exists in cosmic time; it includes man’s temporal body, or mantle of functions [*functiemantel*].¹⁵⁶ For although man is a supratemporal being, man also functions in time in his body, the free plastic *instrument* of his selfhood.¹⁵⁷ Dooyeweerd refers to the *full human selfhood*, man’s *heart* in the meaning of the center of his whole existence, of which the “body” is the temporal instrument [*organon*].¹⁵⁸

57. All of creation is subject (*sujet*), sub-jected to God’s law or Word (Wisdom). Dooyeweerd uses the French word ‘*sujet*’—the created being is subjected to a law that does not originate from this subject itself.¹⁵⁹ The religious root, as supratemporal undifferentiated subjective totality¹⁶⁰ is subject to God’s law in its central and undifferentiated sense. Law has both a central religious unity and a temporal diversity.¹⁶¹ The law in its central meaning is *love*.¹⁶² Both central subject and central law are differentiated by cosmic time.¹⁶³ The central commandment of love is differentiated by cosmic time into the various temporal law-spheres, or modal aspects.¹⁶⁴ And the central subject or religious root is differentiated into individuality structures. All individuality comes from out of the supratemporal root, which differentiates and unfolds itself.¹⁶⁵ The

factual side of reality also has a relation of totality, diversity and coherence of meaning.¹⁶⁶

58. The differentiated and unfolded temporal reality has both a law-side (as a differentiation of God's central law) and a subject-side (as man's temporal "modes of consciousness" and the aspects within which other individuality structures function).

59. Creation was *completed*¹⁶⁷ by God when man was created as the supratemporal religious root—an undifferentiated¹⁶⁸ totality. This undifferentiated totality is the central subject-unity that Dooyeweerd refers to as the "subject-Idea."¹⁶⁹ But this completed creation is temporally worked out or unfolded in the process of becoming.¹⁷⁰

60. Creation of the supratemporal root was "before" cosmic time. The days of creation, and "in the beginning" are to be understood as occurring beyond the limits of cosmic time.¹⁷¹ God's creative act and the "days of creation" are beyond the limits of cosmic time.¹⁷² The supratemporal creation and the temporal unfolding or becoming are described in Genesis 1 and Genesis 2 respectively; these are not two accounts of the same creation. Dooyeweerd makes a sharp distinction between the creation of man (Gen.1:27) and the temporal process of becoming (Gen. 2:7).¹⁷³ The second stage—becoming a "living soul"—is not a creation, but giving form to "an already existing material present in the temporal order." This distinction between creation and becoming is wiped out by a historicistic interpretation that sees creation as a temporal event.¹⁷⁴

61. God's law is a boundary between God and His creation, but this boundary is not to be understood deistically in a spatial sense of separation from God; it refers to created reality's deep dependence on God. "The boundary is not to be understood as a separation [*scheiding*] between God and creature, which would be in conflict with the community with God in Christ."¹⁷⁵

62. There is an unfolding, differentiation and individualization within cosmic time of both the central law (law-Idea) and the supratemporal central religious root (subject-Idea). The totality of meaning, both as to its cosmonomic side and its subject side, is refracted by cosmic time into *meaning-sides* of temporal created reality.¹⁷⁶ This unfolding is expressed as (1) a differentiation of modal aspects, which are a refraction of God's central law, like colours refracted in a prism and 2) a similar differentiation or individuation of individuality structures. Individuality comes from out of the supratemporal root.¹⁷⁷ All temporal individuality can only be an expression of the "fullness of individuality in this center." The "fullness of individuality" is also refracted prismatically by cosmic time. Both the law-side and subject-side are determined in their structural meaning by the cosmic order of time.¹⁷⁸

63. The expression of aspects and of individuality structures from out of a central unity does not imply monism, for a real individuation has commenced, although it has to be fulfilled and perfected. Dooyeweerd speaks of "the ultimate individual," "the fullness of individuality" which has been saved by Christ.¹⁷⁹

Man as Image of God

64. Man's creation as body and soul was completed at creation, but is being worked out by means of "generation." There is a difference between creation and temporal

generation (becoming, *wording*). We were first created as an undifferentiated supratemporal unity, and thereafter formed, and placed within, or “fitted within” temporal reality.¹⁸⁰ This generation has both (1) a temporal bodily side and (2) a spiritual side. According to the bodily side, humanity was formed from one blood. According to the spiritual side, we are the “spiritual seed” of Adam, and we share in his fall. But by regeneration this natural line of spiritual generation is broken.¹⁸¹

65. To be the image of God involves living simultaneously in both the supratemporal *aevum* and the temporal world.¹⁸² Man, as the image of God, *expresses* or *reveals*¹⁸³ his supratemporal selfhood in the lower ontical realm of the temporal cosmos. Just as God expresses and reveals himself in creation, so man expresses himself in the temporal world.¹⁸⁴ The human ego transcends all modal functions, but expresses itself in the entire temporal human existence. These temporal psychological phenomena manifest themselves in a concentric direction to the ego.¹⁸⁵ Expression is from out of the supratemporal center to the temporal periphery. Dooyeweerd sometimes calls this expression within time the ‘revelation’ [*openbaring*] of our selfhood in time, the same word he uses for God’s revelation. Our heart is “the root and centre of our temporal life-revelations” and he refers to “the temporal revelations of the heart in the distinguished life-spheres.” He mentions “the whole Scriptural view of the heart as the religious root and centre of all temporal revelations of life.”¹⁸⁶

66. Man, as the image of God, also concentrates temporal reality in himself. Just as man’s supratemporal selfhood has no existence in itself and refers to God,¹⁸⁷ so temporal reality has no meaning or reality apart from man’s supratemporal selfhood, which was created as the religious root of creation.¹⁸⁸ Just as the meaning of our selfhood is found only in God, so its entire temporal existence is concentrated in the radical religious unity of our selfhood in which the totality of meaning of the temporal cosmos was to be focused upon its Origin.¹⁸⁹ Inorganic nature, the vegetable kingdom, and animals do not have any existence apart from this religious root.¹⁹⁰ “Since God has created the ‘earthly’ world in a concentric relation to the religious root of human existence, there cannot exist an ‘earthly’ ‘world in itself’ apart from the structural horizon of human experience.”¹⁹¹ The concentration of the temporal world in man is analogous to God as the absolute origin of all that exists outside of Himself:

In an indissoluble connection with this self-revelation as Creator, God has revealed man to Himself. Man was created in the image of God. Just as God is the absolute origin of all that exists outside of Himself, so He created man as a being in whom the entire diversity of aspects and faculties of the temporal world is concentrated within the religious centre of his existence which we call our I, and which Holy Scripture calls our heart, in a pregnant, religious sense.¹⁹²

67. Our supratemporal heart is the center of all of our temporal functions; it is not to be identified with any one of these functions. It is the concentration point of all our cosmic functions, a subjective totality lying at the basis of all the functions in time.¹⁹³ It cannot be identified with a merely temporal center of these functions. Dooyeweerd rejects Vollenhoven’s view of the heart as a temporal pre-functionality; we have no experience

of such an idea.¹⁹⁴ Man's heart may be called his 'soul,' but this is not to be identified with the rational function; the heart is the supratemporal source of all functions.¹⁹⁵

68. Man's temporal body, or "mantle of functions" [*functiemantel*]¹⁹⁶ is the free plastic instrument¹⁹⁷ of his supratemporal selfhood. Our supratemporal selfhood *expresses* and *reveals* itself within temporal reality by means of this mantle of functions. This is what Dooyeweerd means when he cites the Bible's reference, "Out of the heart are the issues of life" [Prov. 4:23].¹⁹⁸ Our temporal modes of consciousness *issue* from out of our supratemporal selfhood.

69. Our body is not a substance in the sense of something that exists under the mantle of functions, for this very idea of 'under' is the *hypo* in *hypostasis*, which Dooyeweerd rejects. This also rules out any monistic reduction of soul to body (as in materialism) or of body to soul (as in a world-denying kind of spirituality). Dooyeweerd avoids any spirituality that tries to separate itself from temporality, or our mantle of functions.¹⁹⁹ His philosophy is not world-denying, but fully incarnational.²⁰⁰

70. The body or mantle of functions is not something foreign to man's selfhood, but is man himself in the structural whole of his *temporal* appearance.²⁰¹ And the a-logical functions are not foreign to our self-consciousness. All functions are owned by our selfhood.²⁰² The supratemporal selfhood and the mantle of functions constitute the only fundamental dichotomy, a dichotomy that is really a nonduality [*twee(een)heid*].²⁰³ In a nondual experience of ourselves, our selfhood is the root unity or totality of all of our temporal functions, and not one temporal function elevated over the others.

71. The relation between our supratemporal selfhood and this temporal mantle of functions is what Dooyeweerd refers to as *enstasis*. In *enstasis*, our supratemporal selfhood *expresses* itself within temporal reality. Through *enstasis*, man in his supratemporal selfhood is able to enter into the temporal cosmos. Animals have no supratemporal religious center, and so do not have this ability.²⁰⁴ Animals are ecstatically absorbed by their temporal existence.²⁰⁵ Human experience is fundamentally different from animal awareness of sensations because it is related to the human selfhood, which transcends time.²⁰⁶ In animals there is only a subjective *undergoing* of sense-impressions, not a conscious experience of the sensory in its subject-object relations.²⁰⁷

72. Man's own existence becomes more and more individual, both temporally²⁰⁸ and supratemporally. Just as the original supratemporal root was the source of all temporal individuality, now Christ is the transcendent root of individuality. In Christ the "fulness of individuality" has been saved.²⁰⁹ But no individuality is ever absolute. It always remains a nondual unity together with its center, just as our temporal body is a nondual unity with its center, the heart.

73. After man's death, the entire mantle of functions, including our rational function, is left behind; only our supratemporal selfhood remains. At death, all individuality structures that make up our body are dissolved. All functions of cosmic time are gone. Our total temporal existence is "laid down at death." But the "soul" of human existence is not affected by *temporal* death; it continues to exist even after the putting off of the body. There is in reality only one fundamental dichotomy [*principele caesuur*], that between the whole temporal existence and its supratemporal religious root, a dichotomy that

comes into effect in the temporal death of man.²¹⁰ Our temporal body disintegrates at death because it loses its connection to our supratemporal center, the integral religious root. Death is the unbinding of all earthly bonds.²¹¹

Fall

74. Man was created as both a supratemporal and temporal being in order to unfold the powers that God had placed in temporal reality.²¹² The powers and potential which God had enclosed within creation were to be disclosed by man in his service of love to God and neighbour.²¹³ Man was “destined to concentrically direct all the powers that God had placed in the temporal world.”²¹⁴

75. A further purpose in man’s creation was to help redeem the temporal world. Through man “the entire temporal world is included both in apostasy and in salvation.”²¹⁵ Dooyeweerd cites Kuyper’s *Lectures on Calvinism*: Just as the whole creation culminates in man, its glorification can only first find its fulfillment in man, who was created as God’s image.²¹⁶ Inorganic materials, plants and animals have no independent spiritual or religious root. Their temporal existence first becomes complete [fulfilled] in and through man.²¹⁷ We do this by illuminating the reality of things from within.²¹⁸ This task of redemption implies that the temporal world had fallen prior to man’s own fall (The fall of Lucifer and his angels preceded that of man.) Kuyper makes reference to the idea of a double fall; he does not dismiss it as unorthodox, but only says it cannot be proved.²¹⁹

76. Man failed in this task of redemption, and fell away into the temporal horizon.²²⁰ This was also a falling away [*af-val*] from man’s true selfhood.²²¹

77. Because temporal reality had no root or existence in itself, but was concentrated in mankind,²²² temporal reality fell [again] with man, the religious root of temporal reality.²²³ Thus, it is not only man’s moral direction that must be redeemed, but also all of temporal reality. The fall must be interpreted as a fall in the religious root of temporal reality; there was a falling away of the heart from its Creator. That is the cause of spiritual death [*geestelijken dood*]. This spiritual death cannot be confused with bodily [*lichamelijken*] death nor with eternal death [*eeuwigen dood*]. The acknowledgement of spiritual death as the consequence of the fall is so central that if it is denied, no single part of the Dooyeweerd’s philosophy can be understood.²²⁴ The fall was in the supratemporal root, which was still an undifferentiated unity. In the religious fullness of meaning there is only one law of God, just as there is only one sin against God, and only one mankind that has sinned in Adam.²²⁵

Redemption

78. Because temporal reality was concentrated in man as its religious root, and because man failed in his task, Christ’s incarnation was required as the new religious root.²²⁶ Christ’s incarnation as the New Root effected redemption of the whole temporal cosmos, although this is still being worked out in time.²²⁷ Sin was thereby “really propitiated.”²²⁸ “Christ Jesus is the “second Adam,” in Whom nothing of God’s creation can be lost.” This “particular” grace bears a *radical-universal* character.²²⁹ God’s common grace is shown to his fallen creation “as a still undivided totality.”²³⁰

79. In order to have insight into the full horizon of our experience, we must participate in Christ as the New Root.²³¹

80. Since supratemporality is dynamic,²³² there will after death be a new nature in which our selfhood can express itself. From Dooyeweerd's view that the need to express ourselves is given at creation, I believe it is reasonable to infer that we receive a new body or nature in the afterlife. This seems to be confirmed by his statement affirming the resurrection of the flesh, and "the identity in principle of the mantle of functions after the resurrection."²³³ And Dooyeweerd indicates that there is supratemporal individuality. "But man has an eternal destination, not as an abstract "rational soul" or spiritual "mind", but in the fullness of his concrete, individual personality."²³⁴

Acts of the selfhood

81. All of our acts proceed from out of our supratemporal selfhood,²³⁵ but each act is expressed in all of our temporal functions within the modal aspects.²³⁶ Acts are inner activities by which humans orient themselves intentionally to situations in reality or in their imagination, and make these their own by relating them to the "I" as the individual religious center of the person's existence. Inner acts, when expressed within the human body or in the external world, become actions.²³⁷ But not all inner acts are expressed as actions. There are three kinds of acts: knowing, willing and imagining.²³⁸ Different aspects are associated more with some acts than with others. For example, the jural aspect is associated with the will-orientation, whereas the lingual and the aesthetic aspects are related to the contemplative orientation of knowing and imagining. But no act of will is possible apart from acts of knowing and imagining.²³⁹

82. We are conscious of our acts originating in our supratemporal selfhood and being expressed within time. The two are always found together, so it is wrong to speak of a pure consciousness that is not expressed in time (at least in this dispensation). It is also wrong to speak of pure sensation, for apart from relating our experience of eating something sweet to our supratemporal selfhood, we would not know that it was sweet.²⁴⁰

83. We are able to relate the temporal to our supratemporal selfhood by means of our intuition, which moves to and fro between our selfhood and temporal reality. We relate sensory impressions to our selfhood by our intuition. Intuition makes temporal reality "our own."²⁴¹ In pre-theoretical intuition I have an immediate *enstatic* experience of temporal reality as *my own*.²⁴² Our theoretical intuition enables cosmological consciousness, which is transcendental.²⁴³ But cosmological consciousness is founded on cosmic consciousness.²⁴⁴

Imagination and the Opening Process

84. Because it is directed only to individuality structures, our pre-theoretical experience is 'naïve.' It is an experience in the foundational direction of time, as opposed to the transcendental direction of time of philosophic theoretical thought. It needs to be deepened by the process of "opening up" of the modal spheres. The earlier modal spheres (i.e. earlier in the order of cosmic time) are the foundation or substratum of all the later modal aspects; the foundational direction begins with the first modality (the numerical). The transcendental direction points toward the selfhood that transcends time, the religious fullness of meaning; this direction begins with the last sphere (faith) and follows the

modal spheres in the reverse order toward the fullness that is the foundation of all modal refractions.²⁴⁵ So for Dooyeweerd, faith does not escape or flee from the earlier temporal modalities by ascending, but it goes back through the earlier modalities, deepening their meaning to obtain an Idea of the ontical foundation of all modalities, including those that are the foundation of the later ones. In the transcendental direction, every concept is dependent on an Idea.²⁴⁶

85. Naïve experience is generally restricted to retrocipatory moments. The modal subject-object relation is indissolubly connected with the modal retrocipatory spheres of an aspect.²⁴⁷ For example, the possibility of objectification in the modal aspect of feeling is primarily bound to the retrocipatory structure of that aspect.²⁴⁸ This opening up depends on our imagination to open up the anticipatory moments, it is a looking forward in time to what may and ought to be. Pre-theoretical experience is naive because it is a "resting." It is not free in the sense of being opened out beyond the natural aspects to the normative aspects.²⁴⁹ Another example is in pre-theoretical thought, where the logical aspect is only actualized in its retrocipatory structure.²⁵⁰ Such enstatistical logical analysis is restrictively bound to sensory perception and can only analytically distinguish concrete things and their relations according to sensorily founded characteristics.²⁵¹

86. The historical aspect is the law-sphere in which the opening-process of the normative anticipatory spheres gets started. It is the nodal point of the entire normative meaning-dynamics within cosmic time.²⁵² But Dooyeweerd distinguishes between history as the course of concrete events (what has happened) and the historical aspect in which these events function.²⁵³

Theoretical Experience of the Cosmos

87. Theoretical thought splits apart the coherence of our experience, and distinguishes the different modes or aspects of our consciousness. Instead of *enstasis*, we experience a *distasis*, or splitting apart of the modal aspects by which we first distinguish them from each other.²⁵⁴

88. This splitting up is done by the *Gegenstand*-relation, in which we intentionally abstract from the continuity of cosmic time.²⁵⁵ This kind of abstraction must not be confused with the idea of abstraction of properties or universals from things; such a view of abstraction is a "serious misunderstanding."²⁵⁶ The abstraction from time is an *epoché* or suspension of time; this use of *epoché* must not be confused with Husserl's idea of bracketing.²⁵⁷ And intentionality must not be understood in the sense of Husserl's directedness towards concrete reality; Dooyeweerd's intentionality is an inner process directed to a non-ontical *Gegenstand*.²⁵⁸ The *Gegenstand* as such is not real, but only a theoretical abstraction.²⁵⁹

89. The *Gegenstand*-relation is only possible by means of our supratemporal selfhood, which stands above the temporal aspects that are split apart. In the act of theoretical thought, our supratemporal selfhood enters into its own temporal functions:

The meaning synthesis of scientific thought is first made possible when our self-consciousness, which as our selfhood is elevated above time, enters into its temporal meaning functions.²⁶⁰

By means of an act of thought, our selfhood (from which that act of thought originates) opposes our deepened logical function²⁶¹ to the other functions. Our full act of thought—like all of our acts—functions in all modes, but it is able to analyze each mode of consciousness, including the logical mode.²⁶²

90. After the *dis-stasis* in theoretical thought, we require a synthesis back to the unity of experience our supratemporal selfhood. “In this intuition I implicitly relate the intermodal meaning-synthesis to the transcendent identity of the modal functions I experience in the religious root of my existence.”²⁶³ “Synthesis also presupposes an idea of the deeper root-unity of the distinguished aspects, an idea which can be obtained only if we choose our standpoint above the theoretical diversity.”²⁶⁴ Meaning-synthesis can only be explained on the basis of the structure of self-consciousness.²⁶⁵ The theoretical synthesis is determined both by cosmic time as well as by the supratemporal transcendent selfhood.²⁶⁶ The synthesis back to the unity of our selfhood is done by Ideas, which go beyond what we can conceptualize in time, and which anticipate what is not yet temporally realized. We can reflect on the limits of philosophic thought only because in our supratemporal selfhood we transcend them.²⁶⁷ This allows us to relate our Ideas to that which transcends theory:

Therefore by maintaining the *Gegenstand*-relation, the theoretical Idea relates the theoretical concept to the conditions of all theoretical thought, but itself remains theoretical in nature, thus within the bounds of philosophic thought.²⁶⁸

If we do not accomplish this synthesis, our naïve experience can be impaired²⁶⁹ by a wrong use of theory. Wrong theory can rob us of the many-sided richness of things that we experience.²⁷⁰ The demonic overdevelopment of the cultural power of science leads to an atomizing and technicizing of legal life and economics.²⁷¹

91. The synthesis is accomplished by our intuition, which moves back and forth between the unity of our selfhood and the diversity of temporal meaning. In the transcendental direction of theoretical intuition, by the transcendental leading of faith, our selfhood, in its transcendent unity as the religious root of our whole temporal existence, becomes cosmologically conscious²⁷² of itself within the temporal coherence and temporal diversity of meaning of all its aspects. Contrast this cosmological consciousness with pre-theoretical cosmic consciousness.

92. This movement to and fro between the unity of our selfhood and the temporal diversity of meaning gives a circularity to thought. Dooyeweerd refers to the meaning of ‘encyclopedia’ which is derived from the Greek *enkyklios paideia*, meaning “learning in a circle.”²⁷³ But it is not a vicious circle like logicism, which remains wholly within the temporal. Rather, the movement is from the supratemporal central to the temporal peripheral. Philosophy relates from out of the center, for philosophy is a “science of totality.”²⁷⁴ If, on the other hand, we begin on the temporal periphery, with merely conceptual knowledge, then that conceptual knowledge is deepened by Ideas that relate to the center.²⁷⁵ The relation of center to periphery is found right at the beginning of the *WdW*, where Dooyeweerd relativizes the whole temporal periphery by the central, supratemporal center, although the *New Critique* fails to properly translate it:

From out of this central Christian viewpoint [the heart, the religious root of human existence], it appeared to me that a revolution was necessary in philosophic thought, a revolution of so radical a character, that, compared with it, Kant's "Copernican revolution" can only be qualified as a revolution in the periphery. For what is at stake here is no less than a relativizing of the whole temporal cosmos in what we refer to as both its "natural" sides as well as its "spiritual" sides, over against the religious root of creation in Christ. In comparison with this basic Scriptural idea, of what significance is a revolution in a view of reality that relativizes the "natural" sides of temporal reality with respect to a theoretical abstraction such as Kant's "homo noumenon" or his "transcendental subject of thought?"²⁷⁶ [my translation]

93. If peripheral temporal reality is relativized by the central religious root, then we can no longer believe in the religious neutrality of theoretical thought, since theoretical thought is part of temporal reality.²⁷⁷ In other words, the rejection of the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought is related to the supra-theoretical *a priori* of the heart as religious root. Conversely, to reject the idea of the supratemporal heart is to necessarily become involved in immanence philosophy.²⁷⁸

Theoretical thought as a religious act

94. Theoretical thought, in its concentric relatedness to our selfhood (the religious root, the religious concentration point of our entire temporal existence) and to God (as the absolute Origin of all things) is "an act of an unmistakably religious character."²⁷⁹ It is a process of driving on from anticipatory sphere to anticipatory sphere until we arrive at the transcendental terminal sphere of our cosmos and reflect on the insufficiency of the modal Idea.²⁸⁰ The foundational concepts, which provide a provisional resting-point for our thinking, must be resolved into the essential unrest of meaning, and we must go on to an inter-modal meaning synthesis.²⁸¹

95. None of these ninety-five theses may be regarded as an isolated axiom, or as part of a syllogism, or as a proposition that can be analyzed on its own. They are ideas that are known to be insufficient, but are part of the process of "driving on from anticipatory sphere to anticipatory sphere." The ultimate destination of a transcendently directed reflective journey is the living God of religious self-reflection, in Whom our thought finally finds rest.²⁸² Only after the raising of questions ceases to be meaningful, does philosophic thought attain to the Origin, and is it set at rest.²⁸³

¹ NC I, 3.

² NC II, 7 fn2.

³ NC II, 561.

⁴ NC II, 111-115, especially II, 113, fn1.

⁵ See Theses 10 and 71.

⁶ *NC* II, 474-79; *WdW* II, 410 (“wetend beleven of in-leven in de volle tijdelijke werkelijkheid”).

⁷ *WdW* I, 47 (“*rekenschap geven*”); *NC* I, 83; II 579.

⁸ “Cornelius van Til and the Transcendental Critique,” 75. Also, *Encyclopedia* (1967), 42-44. There is a distinction between theoretical ‘*vooronderstellingen*’ and the ontical ‘*vooronderstelde*’ that make these presuppositions possible. This distinction was improperly translated in *Encyclopedia* (2002). See also “Transcendentale Critiek,” 5 for the distinction between theoretical and supra-theoretical presuppositions [*vooroordeelen*].

⁹ *NC* I, 3; II, 579.

¹⁰ The inter-modal coherence of meaning is not a construction (*NC* I, 507). The Humanistic science-ideal improperly ascribes a creative logical function to human consciousness. And the synthetic *a priori* is not to be understood as a constructive creation of the human mind (*NC* II, 7 fn2, 555, 593).

¹¹ “Dilemma,” 7. See Theses 88-90 for the *Gegenstand*-relation.

¹² *Encyclopedia* (2002), 95.

¹³ “Transcendentale Critiek,” 14: “*ontische voor-onderstelden*” of which we can “give an account” only by our Ideas, not by our concepts.

¹⁴ “*Gegenstandsrelatie*,” 91.

¹⁵ *NC* I, 88.

¹⁶ *NC* I, 37. Also “Transcendentale Critiek,” 4; *Encyclopedia* (1967), 80-81. And “*Gegenstandsrelatie*,” 83.

¹⁷ *NC* I, 57.

¹⁸ For the meaning of ‘anticipate,’ see Theses 17 and 94.

¹⁹ See Theses 9, 11, 66, 87, 90-91, and 94.

²⁰ *NC* I, 57, 88.

²¹ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 80.

²² *NC* II, 560-61.

²³ ‘Plastic’ in the sense of capable of being formed (*NC* II, 557-58).

²⁴ *NC* II, 479, 594.

²⁵ *NC* II, 562 (related to the human selfhood *qua talis*).

²⁶ *NC* II, 474. See also Thesis 83.

²⁷ *NC* II, 491.

²⁸ *NC* I, 51.

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- ²⁹ *NC II*, 560.
- ³⁰ *NC I*, 55, 57; *NC II*, 4.
- ³¹ *Twilight*, 185.
- ³² *Encyclopedia* (2002), 44.
- ³³ *NC II*, 535.
- ³⁴ Second Response to Curators 34.
- ³⁵ *NC I*, 31 fn1.
- ³⁶ *NC I*, 32. Also “Tijdsprobleem,” 1-2.
- ³⁷ *NC I*, 28.
- ³⁸ *NC I*, 32-33.
- ³⁹ *NC III*, 784. Also Propositions 5 and 9 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”
- ⁴⁰ “Tijdsprobleem,” 4-5.
- ⁴¹ Second Response to Curators, 34.
- ⁴² *NC II*, 561.
- ⁴³ *NC I*, 11.
- ⁴⁴ “Dilemma,” 14. *Encyclopedia* (1967), 22: “Wij kunnen deze wet de religieuze concentratiewet noemen.” *Encyclopedia* (2002), 182.
- ⁴⁵ *NC I*, 11.
- ⁴⁶ *WdW II*, 401; *NC II*, 468. Also “Gegenstandsrelatie,” 86, 92, 94.
- ⁴⁷ *NC II*, 479.
- ⁴⁸ *NC II*, 474; *WdW II*, 414.
- ⁴⁹ *NC I*, 33.
- ⁵⁰ *Encyclopedia* (1946), 12.
- ⁵¹ *NC I*, 3; *II*, 467-474, 484; *WdW II*, 405-406, 409. Also *Twilight*, 126.
- ⁵² *NC I*, 18, 84. Also “Tijdsprobleem,” 1-2.
- ⁵³ *NC II*, 184-185.
- ⁵⁴ *NC I*, 29.
- ⁵⁵ *NC I*, 4 fn1; *II*, 479-80 (“experience in identity, only deepened”).
- ⁵⁶ *NC I*, 51. Also *Encyclopedia* (1967), 21 (mistranslated in the 2002 edition).
- ⁵⁷ See 1974 Interview, where Dooyeweerd refers to “modes of experience” [*ervaringswijze*]. Also *Critische Vragen*, 136.
- ⁵⁸ “Rooms-katholieke,” excerpts in *Verburg*, 53.

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- ⁵⁹ *Twilight*, 180.
- ⁶⁰ *NC I*, 3, 34; *II*, 479. And “Gegenstandsrelatie,” 93.
- ⁶¹ *NC I*, 3.
- ⁶² *NC I*, 102.
- ⁶³ “Gegenstandsrelatie,” 90.
- ⁶⁴ *NC I*, 29. See Thesis 17 regarding anticipations and retrocipations.
- ⁶⁵ “Gegenstandsrelatie,” 99.
- ⁶⁶ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 80.
- ⁶⁷ *WdW I*, 71.
- ⁶⁸ *NC I*, 105-106.
- ⁶⁹ *NC II*, 186, 485-86.
- ⁷⁰ “Introduction to a Transcendental Criticism,” 51.
- ⁷¹ *NC II*, 170.
- ⁷² *NC II*, 302.
- ⁷³ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 32.
- ⁷⁴ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 174-75.
- ⁷⁵ *NC I*, 3.
- ⁷⁶ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 33.
- ⁷⁷ 1964 Lecture. This comment comes from page 2 of the Discussion following the lecture, which is published online. See also p. 8.
- ⁷⁸ “Gegenstandsrelatie,” 90 [*ernstig misverstand*].
- ⁷⁹ *NC II*, 417; “Critische Vragen,” 136.
- ⁸⁰ There is a deepened “experience in identity” (*NC II*, 480).
- ⁸¹ “Het Oecumenisch-Reformatorsch Grondmotief,” 7.
- ⁸² *NC II*, 113 fn2.
- ⁸³ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 59.
- ⁸⁴ “Rooms-katholieke,” cited in Verburg, 60.
- ⁸⁵ “Gegenstandsrelatie,” 90.
- ⁸⁶ *NC II*, 557.
- ⁸⁷ *NC III*, 54.
- ⁸⁸ *NC I*, 42. See also “Gegenstandsrelatie, 88ff”

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- ⁸⁹ NC I, 42; III, 55.
- ⁹⁰ NC III, 37-38.
- ⁹¹ NC II, 369-374.
- ⁹² NC II, 374ff.
- ⁹³ NC III, 38.
- ⁹⁴ NC II, 371. That does not mean that we construct the object. See my discussion of this point in Friesen: "Imagination."
- ⁹⁵ NC III, 65.
- ⁹⁶ "Introduction to a Transcendental Criticism," 42-51.
- ⁹⁷ NC III, 79.
- ⁹⁸ NC I, 100. And see Theses 75, 77.
- ⁹⁹ "Transcendentale Critiek," 7.
- ¹⁰⁰ Gegenstandsrelatie," 90.
- ¹⁰¹ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 94, 102.
- ¹⁰² NC III, 56. And *Transcendental Problems*, 42.
- ¹⁰³ NC III, 79. And *Encyclopedia* (2002) 205-206.
- ¹⁰⁴ *Grenzen*, 69. Also "Substantiebegrip," 33 fn60.
- ¹⁰⁵ NC III, 55.
- ¹⁰⁶ NC III, 627.
- ¹⁰⁷ NC III, 90-91, 696ff.
- ¹⁰⁸ NC III, 781, 784. And Proposition 10 of "32 Propositions on Anthropology."
- ¹⁰⁹ *WdW* II, 403; NC II, 470.
- ¹¹⁰ "Tijdsprobleem," 171.
- ¹¹¹ NC III, 36 fn1. *WdW* II, 395 (*systatisch in-gesteld*). "Gegenstandsrelatie," 87, 91-94, 98. Also *Crisis*, 90
- ¹¹² NC I, 89, 99, 111, 502-508.
- ¹¹³ 'Radical' in the sense of 'radix' or root. NC I, 31, 60.
- ¹¹⁴ NC I, 524.
- ¹¹⁵ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 48.
- ¹¹⁶ NC I, 89, 99, 502-508.
- ¹¹⁷ *WdW* I, 6, 22, 36, 64; II, 395, 401 (*ingevoegd, ingesteld*); NC I, 24; II, 468, (translated as 'inherent' and 'fitted into'); 470-471, 473 (translated as 'embedded'); *Encyclopedia*

(1946), 9. *Encyclopedia* (2002), 28, 32, 102 (inconsistently translated as ‘incorporated’ or ‘enmeshed’). *Crisis*, 87, 102.

¹¹⁸ *NC II*, 560.

¹¹⁹ *Vernieuwing*, = 242. This is not included in the partial translation *Roots*.

¹²⁰ *Verburg*, 90.

¹²¹ “Cornelius van Til and the Transcendental Critique,” 83-84.

¹²² *NC II*, 52.

¹²³ *Twilight*, 134. Second Response to Curators, 27.

¹²⁴ Second Response to Curators, 31.

¹²⁵ Cornelius van Til and the Transcendental Critique,” 86.

¹²⁶ 1964 Lecture, 17. Also *NC II*, 562. And “Critische Vragen,” 100-101, 104, 114.

¹²⁷ Boeles Interview, 56.

¹²⁸ *Crisis*, 113. Also “De Zin der Geschiedenis.” And Proposition 5 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”

¹²⁹ *NC I*, v.

¹³⁰ *WdW III*, 627; *NC III*, 783.

¹³¹ “Het Oecumenisch-Reformatorisch Grondmotief,” 8: “Dr. Abraham Kuyper has rediscovered the biblical revelation of the religious root of human existence, which is the key to true self-knowledge.”

¹³² *Twilight*, 125.

¹³³ *Twilight*, 124-25, 135-36, 145.

¹³⁴ 1964 Lecture, 7, 9, 17. And 1964 Discussion, published online, at 5. Also “Critische Vragen,” 114, 143.

¹³⁵ First response to Curators. Also *Crisis*, 113. *Encyclopedia* (1946), 14-15.

¹³⁶ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 36-37, 41. Also *NC I*, 15.

¹³⁷ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 84.

¹³⁸ *NC I*, 64.

¹³⁹ *NC III*, 29-30.

¹⁴⁰ *NC II*, 563.

¹⁴¹ *WdW I*, 492; *NC I*, 524.

¹⁴² *WdW I*, 80. *Anastasis* as opposed to *apostasis*. Not in *NC*.

¹⁴³ *Twilight*, 125. “What is Man?” 14.

¹⁴⁴ *WdWI*, 64; *NC I*, 73 (“Being is only to be ascribed to God”), 99 (Being of God). *WdW* 69, 74; *NC* 104, 108 (Being of the *Arché*).

¹⁴⁵ *NC I*, 4, 10.

¹⁴⁶ *NC I*, 39, 87.

¹⁴⁷ “Transcendentale Critiek,” 7.

¹⁴⁸ *NC I*, 4.

¹⁴⁹ *NC I*, 9; *WdWI*, 11 [“uit, door en tot”].

¹⁵⁰ Kuyper: *Stone Lectures*, 53.

¹⁵¹ From the debate between J.G. Ubbink and A.H. de Hartog in the journal *Opbouw: Maandschrift in dienst der Christ. Levens-en wereldbeschouwing, van en voor jongeren*, 2 (1916), 169, a journal to which Dooyeweerd contributed, and edited by Vollenhoven.

¹⁵² *NC I*, 32.

¹⁵³ *NC I*, 31 fn1 and I, 106 fn1.

¹⁵⁴ *NC II*, 53 fn1 (The ‘heavens’ means the “temporal world concentrated in man”). *NC II*, 52 (in man the whole temporal ‘earthly’ cosmos finds its religious root), 548-49 (‘earthly’ cosmos); 593 (man transcends the temporal ‘earthly’ cosmos in all its aspects; *NC III*, 88 (man as lord of the ‘earthly’ temporal world), 783 (man as “the personal religious creaturely centre of the whole earthly cosmos”).

¹⁵⁵ I discuss the meaning of ‘religious root’ and ‘Totality’ in Friesen: “Totality.”

¹⁵⁶ For ‘*functiemantel*’ see “Tijdsprobleem,” 4, 5.

¹⁵⁷ *NC III*, 88.

¹⁵⁸ Third response to Curators.

¹⁵⁹ *NC I*, 110; *WdWI*, 76: ‘*onderworpen zijn*.’

¹⁶⁰ “Kuyper’s Wetenschapsleer,” 211 and 218, where Dooyeweerd cites Kuyper’s *Stone Lectures*. See also Proposition 9 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.” And Second Response to Curators, 32.

¹⁶¹ *NC I*, 99.

¹⁶² *NC III*, 525.

¹⁶³ *NC I*, 99, 507, 518.

¹⁶⁴ *WdWI*, 57. *NC I*, 99.

¹⁶⁵ *NC II*, 7, 8, 418, 561.

¹⁶⁶ *NC I*, 96.

¹⁶⁷ Proposition 31 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”

¹⁶⁸ See Thesis 57.

¹⁶⁹ *Encyclopedia* (1946), 13. Also 1964 Discussion, 14: “the law-Idea thus finds its correlate in the subject-Idea.” *NC II*, 418: The “ultimate individual” is correlate to the universal on the law-side, and both are correlated in the religious root. The ultimate subject is “the transcendent fullness of individuality.”

¹⁷⁰ “Schepping en evolutie,” 115-16.

¹⁷¹ *NC I*, 33.

¹⁷² *NC II*, 41.

¹⁷³ Proposition 29 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”

¹⁷⁴ “Na vijf en dertig jaren,” 9.

¹⁷⁵ “Critische Vragen,” 113-14; Second Response to Curators, 10.

¹⁷⁶ *NC I*, 102.

¹⁷⁷ *NC II*, 418.

¹⁷⁸ *NC II*, 8.

¹⁷⁹ *NC II*, 418.

¹⁸⁰ See Proposition 29 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.” Also *NC I*, 100.

¹⁸¹ “Calvijn als Bouwer.” See also Proposition 32 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”

¹⁸² “Critische Vragen,” 103. Also Second Response to Curators, 34.

¹⁸³ *WdWI*, 6; *NC I*, 4.

¹⁸⁴ “What is Man? 4-16, reproduced in *Twilight*, 173-195.

¹⁸⁵ *NC I*, 16, 54; *II*, 115.

¹⁸⁶ Second Response to Curators, 26-27.

¹⁸⁷ *NC I*, 4; *NC III*, 6-7: “...a spiritual centre, which is nothing in itself, but whose nature is a “*stare extra se*”, a self-surrender to its true or its fancied Origin.”

¹⁸⁸ *NC I*, 100; *WdWI*, 65.

¹⁸⁹ *NC I*, 55; “Critische Vragen,” 103

¹⁹⁰ *NC II*, 52, 53.

¹⁹¹ *NC II*, 549. *Roots*, 30. *Vernieuwing*, 29. *Encyclopedia* (2002), 58.

¹⁹² “What is Man?” 13; *Twilight*, 189.

¹⁹³ *WdWI*, 5; *NC I*, 4 fn1.

¹⁹⁴ *NC I*, 31-33, fn1; *III*, 784.

¹⁹⁵ *NC II*, 111.

¹⁹⁶ “Tijdsprobleem,” 4, 5. “Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer,” 204.

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- ¹⁹⁷ NC III, 88.
- ¹⁹⁸ See 1964 Lecture at 7, 9, 16-17. *Encyclopedia* (1946), 14. “Tijdsprobleem,” 181.
- ¹⁹⁹ NC II, 561.
- ²⁰⁰ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 62.
- ²⁰¹ NC III, 89.
- ²⁰² *Crisis*, 103.
- ²⁰³ “Kuyper’s Wetenschapsleer,” 204.
- ²⁰⁴ NC I, 32 (“lost in time”); not in *WdW*. Also NC II, 480.
- ²⁰⁵ NC II, 480; *WdW* II, 415.
- ²⁰⁶ NC II, 114, 477.
- ²⁰⁷ NC II, 539; III, 58. Also “Tijdsprobleem,” 181.
- ²⁰⁸ NC II, 594-595. *Encyclopedia* (2002), 181.
- ²⁰⁹ NC II, 418.
- ²¹⁰ “Tijdsprobleem,” 4-5, 181, 204, 216.
- ²¹¹ Third response to Curators; also cited Verburg 226-227. See also Proposition 5 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”
- ²¹² *Vernieuwing*, 58.
- ²¹³ *Roots*, 30. Also *Encyclopedia* (2002), 47, 152.
- ²¹⁴ 1964 lecture, 16.
- ²¹⁵ NC III, 783.
- ²¹⁶ “Kuyper’s Wetenschapsleer,” 211.
- ²¹⁷ *Vernieuwing*, 30.
- ²¹⁸ *Encyclopedia* (1946), 28, 35.
- ²¹⁹ Kuyper: *Encyclopaedie*, I, 370.
- ²²⁰ NC II, 564; *WdW* II, 496 [“viel de menschelijk zelfheid af in den tijdshorizon”].
- ²²¹ *WdW* I, vi.
- ²²² NC II, 53, 549. Also Thesis 66.
- ²²³ *WdW* I, 65; NC I, 100; II, 33 52; III, 783. *Encyclopedia* (2002), 47.
- ²²⁴ First response to Curators.
- ²²⁵ *WdW* I, 67; NC I, 102.
- ²²⁶ NC I, 175, 506. Also “Calvijn als Bouwer,” 6.

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- ²²⁷ *NC I*, 175; *II*, 33.
- ²²⁸ *NC I*, 175.
- ²²⁹ *NC III*, 524-25.
- ²³⁰ *Roots*, 39.
- ²³¹ *WdW II*, 496 [*‘deelhebben’*]; *NC II*, 564, inadequately translated as ‘sharing.’ Also *WdW II*, 491, 527; *NC II*, 560, 593 (*‘partakes’*).
- ²³² See Thesis 53.
- ²³³ “Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer,” 204 fn. 13.
- ²³⁴ *NC III*, 783.
- ²³⁵ *NC I*, 32. And see Propositions 14 and 20 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”
- ²³⁶ See “Tijdsprobleem” regarding what it means “to proceed” from out of the supratemporal selfhood.
- ²³⁷ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 192, 223. *NC II*, 113. Also Proposition 14 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”
- ²³⁸ *NC III*, 88. Also Proposition 14 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”
- ²³⁹ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 192, 225.
- ²⁴⁰ *NC II*, 478.
- ²⁴¹ *NC II*, 474, 478.
- ²⁴² *NC II*, 479.
- ²⁴³ *NC II*, 473.
- ²⁴⁴ *NC II*, 594.
- ²⁴⁵ *NC II*, 51-54.
- ²⁴⁶ *NC I*, 187.
- ²⁴⁷ *NC II*, 383.
- ²⁴⁸ *NC II*, 373.
- ²⁴⁹ *WdW II*, 409. *Encyclopedia* (2002), 178.
- ²⁵⁰ *NC II*, 120.
- ²⁵¹ *NC II*, 470.
- ²⁵² *NC II*, 190.
- ²⁵³ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 140. Also 1964 Discussion, 3, published online.
- ²⁵⁴ *NC I*, 3, 34; *II*, 467-472.
- ²⁵⁵ *Tijdsprobleem*, 175.

²⁵⁶ “Gegenstandsrelatie,” 90.

²⁵⁷ *NC II*, 468 fn1.

²⁵⁸ *NC I*, 39. Also Proposition 14 of “32 Propositions on Anthropology.”

²⁵⁹ “Transcendentale Critiek,” 9.

²⁶⁰ *Encyclopedia* (1946), 12.

²⁶¹ *NC II*, 474.

²⁶² *NC II*, 462-63.

²⁶³ *NC II*, 479

²⁶⁴ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 35. Also *NC I*, 45.

²⁶⁵ *Crisis*, 103.

²⁶⁶ “Tijdsprobleem,” 179.

²⁶⁷ *NC I*, 88.

²⁶⁸ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 80-81, re-translated by myself from *Encyclopedia* (1967).

²⁶⁹ *NC I*, 171; III, 145.

²⁷⁰ *Encyclopedia* (1967), 10.

²⁷¹ *Encyclopedia* (2002) 27, 164.

²⁷² *NC II*, 473, 478-79, 578.

²⁷³ *Encyclopedia* (1946), 6.

²⁷⁴ *Encyclopedia* (1946), 10.

²⁷⁵ See Thesis 85.

²⁷⁶ *WdW I*, vi; inadequately translated by *NC I*, v.

²⁷⁷ *NC I*, vi.

²⁷⁸ See Thesis 44.

²⁷⁹ *Encyclopedia* (2002), 44. Also 1964 Lecture, 17.

²⁸⁰ *NC II*, 284.

²⁸¹ *NC II*, 190.

²⁸² *NC II*, 284

²⁸³ *NC I*, 11.

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