Individuality Structures and Enkapsis:

Individuation from totality in Dooyeweerd and German Idealism

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I. Introduction

As I have shown elsewhere, the philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) was strongly influenced by the philosophy of totality, a philosophical tradition that includes Othmar Spann, Franz von Baader, Jakob Böhme and Meister Eckhart. Dooyeweerd depends on the idea of a supratemporal “totality.” He does not begin with the idea of individual “things.” Dooyeweerd therefore needs to show how the things and events of the temporal world “individuate” from out of this supratemporal totality. He rejects the idea of substance as the basis for such individuation. Instead, he uses the idea of “individuality structures.” The relation between individuality structures is that of “enkapsis.” These ideas are all related to the philosophy of totality.

Max Wundt (1879-1963) was one of these philosophers of totality who influenced Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd’s personal library included a collection of lectures presented in 1930 at the German Philosophical Society. This book, edited by Felix Krüger (1874-

1 J. Glenn Friesen: “Dooyeweerd, Spann and the Philosophy of Totality,” (Philosophia Reformata 70 (2005) [‘Totality’].

2 Dooyeweerd does not use the terms ‘individuality structure’ or ‘enkapsis’ until some time after 1930. He previously refers to a ‘unity of subject’ [subjectseenheid]. Even in 1930, he still refers only to an “individual unity of subject functions.” See Marcel Verburg: Herman Dooyeweerd. Leven en werk van een Nederlands christen-wijsgeer, (Baarn: Ten Have, 1989), 112, 126. [‘Verburg’].

3 Max Wundt was Professor of Philosophy at Tübingen. He should not be confused with his father, Wilhelm Max Wundt (1832-1920), the founder of experimental psychology and the predecessor to Felix Krüger at Leipzig.

4 Felix Krüger, ed.: Ganzheit und Form: Vorträge, gehalten auf der Tagung der Deutschen Philosophischen Gesellschaft October 1930 in Breslau, (Berlin: Junker und
includes a lecture by Max Wundt entitled “Ganzheit und Form in der Geschichte der Philosophie” [Totality and Form in the History of Philosophy]. Wundt’s article deals with the following important points, all of which are of relevance for understanding Dooyeweerd: (1) The difference between the philosophy of totality and mere “additive” thinking; (2) the rejection of the idea of substance in favour of structure; (3) the dynamic nature of individuality structures; (4) the inclusion of “values” within individuality structures; (5) the idea of enkapsis of individuality structures, and (6) the importance of these ideas for the special sciences.

I will compare each of these ideas with Dooyeweerd’s ideas of individuality structures and enkapsis. It will become clear that these ideas can only be understood from the perspective of totality. There are many obvious parallels between Dooyeweerd and Wundt, especially with regard to the idea of enkapsis. Wundt refers to the same sources for the idea of enkapsis, and he gives the same criticisms that Dooyeweerd later makes of these sources.

Why did Dooyeweerd not acknowledge Wundt as a source for his ideas? Questions regarding Dooyeweerd’s sources were certainly raised by Valentin Hepp, who initiated the ten year investigation by the Free University of the ideas of Dooyeweerd and of his brother-in-law D.H.Th. Vollenhoven (1892-1978). Hepp even tried translating Dooyeweerd’s philosophy back into German in order to try to understand it better (Verburg 215). Vollenhoven expressed doubts whether Hepp would be able to reconstruct the “Ur-Dooyeweerd” in this way. But Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd were not very helpful in providing information regarding Dooyeweerd’s sources.

Dünnhaupt, 1932) [‘Breslau lectures’]. This book is in the Dooyeweerd Collection at the Institute for Christian Studies, Toronto.

5 In 1920, Dooyeweerd’s brother-in-law D.H.Th. Vollenhoven spent five months studying under Krüger in Leipzig. Krüger was the successor at Leipzig to Wilhelm Wundt. Upon his return, Vollenhoven must have discussed his studies with Dooyeweerd. In any event, Dooyeweerd owned several books by Krüger.

6 See D.H.Th. Vollenhoven: “Vollenhoven’s response to the curators of the Free University,” October 15, 1937, page 2 (In the Dooyeweerd Archives maintained by The Historical Documentation Centre for Dutch Protestantism) [‘the Dooyeweerd Archives’].
One reason for not acknowledging Wundt’s influence must be that by 1937, Wundt was clearly associated with the ideas of National Socialism. Another reason that Dooyeweerd did not acknowledge Wundt’s influence must be that to do so would have disclosed his profound differences with Vollenhoven. Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven disagreed on almost every key issue, whether ontological, epistemological or theological, but they decided to maintain a common front, and they made a conscious decision not to disclose their differences to the public. One of their disagreements concerned the idea of “subject and individuality.” Vollenhoven specifically rejected the idea of individuality structures. Vollenhoven did not accept the idea of a supratemporal totality that is individuated in time. His idea of individuality begins not with totality but with temporal individual things.

The comparison of Dooyeweerd and Wundt will show some of these major differences between Dooyeweerd’s philosophy and that of Vollenhoven. And I will examine the implications of Dooyeweerd’s ideas of individuality structures and enkapsis for reformational philosophy, which has not understood these ideas within the context of the philosophy of totality.

7 Even before 1933, Max Wundt was associated with the ideas of National Socialism; that may explain why Dooyeweerd does not acknowledge his indebtedness to his work. See Harald Löennecker: “…Boden für die Idee Adolf Hitlers auf kulturellem Felde gewinnen: Der “Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur” und die deutsche Akademierschaft,” (Frankfurt, 2003), p. 6, ft. 18. Online at [www.burschenschaft.de/pdf/loennecker_kampfbund.pdf].


10 At the January 2, 1964 meeting of the Association for Calvinistic Philosophy, Vollenhoven said, 'Individuality structures'–I have always hesitated about that idea; I thought, "I don't need that word (Verburg 381).

II. Totality versus merely additive thought

In Krüger’s Foreword to the Breslau lectures, he says that the purpose of the conference was to allow the idea of totality to again be fruitful in opposition to the technical approach to present life and its rationalization. He refers to a loss of spirituality in society; the energy of technology has degenerated into the demonic. Dooyeweerd makes a similar comment about the dangers of secularized science in the western world:

Car la science, sécularisée et isolée, est devenue une puissance satanique, une idole qui domine toute la culture.12

[For science, secularized and isolated, has become a satanic power, an idol that dominates the whole culture].

Dooyeweerd says that this power of idolatry (or absolutization of temporal reality) is itself based on the law of concentration in the religious center of human existence. As we shall see, Dooyeweerd believed that all of temporal reality is concentrated within the supratemporal selfhood, the religious root. The power of absolutization in secularized science is understandable only from this viewpoint of totality.

Krüger says that if we want to overcome this demonization of our life, we need to find the causes that lie at its basis. Our values need to be directed to the eternal, the focus of our beliefs. He refers to the German philosophical tradition and the importance of the idea of totality since the time of Meister Eckhart. The experiential life of our soul, which is bound to body and earth, is not chaos. Rather, it is ruled by forms of order. Krüger says that we should research the nature of this order and that we should act in accordance with it. He says that our understanding here makes use of ideas that bring about a coherence, aiming at a totality that is a totality of both being and value (“seinsollende Ganzheit”). These ideas are based on our life, which is richer than all theory, and which does not allow itself to be exhausted by human thought or metaphysical systems. Although Krüger sometimes seems to understand totality in terms of a bio-psychological


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organicism, there are other indications that he sees it in transcendental terms. For Dooyeweerd, a philosophy of life (Lebensphilosophie) is itself an absolutization of the biotic. But Dooyeweerd does say that our pre-theoretical experience is more than theory, and that it cannot be exhausted by theory. And as I have shown, the basic law-Idea of Dooyeweerd does include the idea of organicism, i.e. the idea of a supratemporal head whose temporal members are differentiated through cosmic time (See my article ‘Totality’).

Let us now look at Wundt’s article. Wundt distinguishes between two directions of philosophy: (1) those philosophies that begin with the idea of totality, and (2) those that have an “additive” view of reality, beginning with individual parts that are then added together to form a mere “sum of parts.”

Wundt sketches a brief history of the idea of totality throughout the history of philosophy, starting from Aristotle’s metaphysics. He refers to Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Book Delta chapter 26) as the first to distinguish totality from the mere additive sum. He says that Plotinus had the idea of the individual participating in totality (Enneads VI 4 and 5). But in scholasticism the distinction between totality and the additive sum was frequently lost. Different philosophies are distinguished from each other by how they

\[\text{[References and footnotes]}\]

\[\text{[13] In his own lecture, “Das Problem der Ganzheit,” Krüger says that the Rhineland-Thuringer mystics have understood these issues immeasurably deeper, although not as systematically as other thinkers. Each truly creative German spirit stands in this tradition that we are related as members to the All through which God acts (“gliedhaft verbunden mit dem gottdurchwirkten All”). In his references to the German nature of true philosophy, Krüger also makes some racist and nationalist remarks, for example against the mixture of the races (‘Blutmischung’). (Breslau lectures 125).\]


\[\text{[15] Dooyeweerd was already aware of this distinction from the writings of Hans Driesch (1867-1941), the teacher of Krüger. See Hans Driesch: Das Ganze und die Summe [The Whole and the Sum] (inaugural lecture at Leipzig) (Leipzig, 1921). In this book, which Dooyeweerd also owned, Driesch says that these ideas of totality and the sum are Ur-concepts that play a role in every area of knowledge.}\]

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view totality. Wundt gives typologies within philosophy, showing how different conceptions of totality produced different philosophies. The mystical tradition is the virgin source to which philosophies that grow old continually return for renewal. But mysticism tends to over-accentuate the idea of unity. In mysticism, the subjective and the objective sides of totality completely merge, thinking and being become the same, and the striving for totality becomes so powerful that each determination of totality in time is lost. The goal of philosophy should be to understand the finite in its coherence with the infinite. But the exaggeration of this philosophy assumes that the coherence has already been attained, and so this philosophy “flies over” and misses the actual realization of totality. It is absolute totality and fullness.

And so, says Wundt, a reaction sets in where subjective and objective sides diverge, and the objective side is seen as just a collection of elements. A mechanical conception of the objective world begins to develop, with many steps in between. In this development, reality falls from its connection with totality, and it becomes something external to our thought. The understanding of the infinite is then only of an infinite multiplicity. Our thought tries to approximate the totality that has been lost. This kind of totality is always striven for, but never completely achieved.

Wundt says that the next stage is the attempt to obtain a logical totality. Totality is now regarded as a form of thought in which the merely additive beings will be united. Totality is seen in terms of our logical function, as in Descartes’ view of totality as an abstract form of totality of what is given outside of us. Kant’s principles of reason are also logical forms. Totality is here seen as a logical task or goal, bringing dispersed reality into ever-increasing unity.

From this idea of a logical totality, the further form of a psychological totality develops. It is included in the logical totality if we understand the act of thought not in its logical meaning, but as its psychological basis. Through synthesis, the act of thought obtains a totality of knowledge. But it can only do this because the act of thought is based on an original synthetic function of consciousness. Logical totality is still the goal, but psychological totality gives the basis. This relation is clear in Kant; the synthetic unity of
apperception is at the basis of the unity of his principles of reason. In neo-Kantianism the unity of apperception still has a psychological meaning.

Unlike the logical view of totality, which saw only a formal or ideal whole, the idea of totality obtained by the psychological viewpoint was that of a real givenness in the reality of consciousness. But the example of the mechanical natural sciences was so powerful that the psychical was also viewed as a mechanical putting together of elementary parts, as was done in association psychology. Wundt says that the older Aristotelian psychological teaching, which followed Plato’s ideas, was a far better model than this association psychology. And so the psychological viewpoint led to the next form of totality, a biological totality. This is the vitalist life-philosophy [Lebensphilosophie]. But ‘life’ must be understood in a broad sense here. It is not only a whole of nature, but also of culture, a historical totality, which is manifested in state and society, science and art. According to this view, totality is not just logical or psychological, but metaphysical. It is the creative form that penetrates the objective world, an “objective totality.” Life in all its forms is the true place to find such an objective totality, life that cannot be understood from merely additive elements. This conception of totality is found in Aristotle. It was lost in the mechanical views of the Epicureans, and it ruled again in scholasticism until modern science put an end to it. The idea continued only in side paths of philosophy until the great spiritual movement of German philosophy found it again.

But Wundt says there is a further task for philosophy–to return to the original mystical roots from where it started, and to its all-encompassing totality, but now to recognize it as an organic totality:

Wir können die Entwicklung der Philosophie als das Bestreben betrachten, die hier nur noch in ihrer unaufgeschlossenen Fülle erfaßte Ganzheit nach all ihren Seiten zu entfalten. Dann wird sie zuletzt und zuletzst bemüht sein müssen, all diese mannigfaltigen Gestalten der Ganzheit wieder in einer obersten Einheit zusammenzubringen. Ich will dies die absolute Ganzheit nennen. In ihr kehren wir zu der all-umfassenden Ganzheit zurück, von der wir ausgingen; aber sie erscheint nunmehr als ein gegliedertes Ganze.

16 He mentions the work of his father, Wilhelm Wundt.

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[We can view the development of philosophy as the striving to unfold all the sides of the totality that is here still understood in its unopened fullness. Then it will finally at its highest level have to strive to bring together all these various forms of totality into a higher unity. I will call this ‘Absolute Totality.’ In it we return to the all-encompassing totality from which we started; but it now appears to us much more as an articulated whole].

We do not have to look very far for some parallels in Dooyeweerd to the ideas set out here, including the ideas of unfolding all sides of a totality. I have shown how important this idea of the articulated, organic whole is for Dooyeweerd. The central supratemporal totality articulates or differentiates into its temporal members in an organic whole (See ‘Totality’). Wundt does not name the all-encompassing totality as God. He says it is called by many names: the One, Being, Entelechy and Monad, Form or Type, Principle, Idea and Love. He refers to Plato’s Symposium and the idea of a yearning for totality (“die Sehnsucht nach dem Ganzen”).

Dooyeweerd also differentiates philosophies by how they view totality. “Philosophy must direct the theoretical view of totality” (NC I, 4). Totality is one of the three transcendental Ideas—temporal coherence, totality, and Origin—that are found in the Ground-Motive of any philosophy; different philosophies give different content to these Ideas (NC I, 89). Dooyeweerd reviews much of the same history of the idea as in Wundt’s previous typology. What Dooyeweerd calls “immanence philosophy” is any philosophy that imagines that totality can be found within time instead of in the supratemporal religious root.

**III. Structure and not Substance**

Wundt says that additive thinking, which begins with parts, always regards the elements as a rigid substrate. This substrate represents the “contents” of reality that give it its material foundation. But the philosophy of totality does not regard things in terms of substance, but rather in terms of relations, ordering and connecting. Wundt says, “totality extends throughout reality as a system of ordered relations.” Totality is relation, a precise mode of connection and ordering (“eine bestimmte Weise der Verknüpfung und Ordnung”).

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Die Wirklichkeit wird hier nicht aus substantiellen Elementen mechanisch aufgebaut, vielmehr erstreckt sich die Ganzheit als ein System von Ordnungsbeziehungen durch sie hindurch. Nicht der stoffliche Gehalt, sondern die Formbestimmtheit ist es, die ihr Wesen ausmacht. Stoff oder Form, Substanz oder Funktion sind die Begriffe, die sich hier gegenüberstehen. Dabei darf die Beziehung natürlich nicht als eine bloße logische Form angesehen werden, die als eine fertig gegebene auch nur von summenhafter Art wäre, sondern als eine lebendige, die Ordnung hervorbringende Gestalt: nicht ordo ordinatus, sondern ordo ordinans.

[Reality is not built up mechanically from out of substantial elements. Instead, totality extends throughout reality as a system of ordered relations. Its essence is comprised not of material contents, but rather of the determined form. Matter or form, substance or function–these are the concepts that stand over against each other. Of course the relationship may not be seen as a mere logical form, which as a completed given would also have only an additive nature. The relation should rather be seen as a living one, a form bringing forth order. Not ordo ordinatus but rather ordo ordinans.]

Let us look at some of the ideas from this passage in more detail, comparing it to Dooyeweerd’s views.

1. Totality and Structure

Wundt says that the essence of totality is not to be found in material contents but rather in determined form. Now by ‘form’ Wundt does not mean that our rationality gives form to a material substance. He says that form is not to be seen as a mere logical form. Thus, this idea is not the same as Dooyeweerd’s form/matter Ground Motive. Wundt says that a logical form would be a “completed given,” an ordo ordinatus [an achieved order]. He says that this would be viewing the order as itself being of an additive nature. Instead, Wundt proposes form as an ordo ordinans, which has more the meaning of an ordering principle. Ordo ordinans is comparable to Dooyeweerd views of God’s law as ‘ordinances’ for created reality. In an early article from 1925, Dooyeweerd says that God’s particular divine ordinances are set (‘gesteld’) for each separate area of our life. But this differentiation of God’s law in these ordinances is not to be understood in an atomistic-individualistic way (‘verscheiden’ but not ‘gescheiden’). The unity of the laws
is in God’s world plan which cannot be conceptually understood.\textsuperscript{17} Dooyeweerd distinguishes the ordering given by God’s law from a rationalistic order constructed by our own theoretical thought.\textsuperscript{18}

2. Rejection of the idea of substance

Wundt says that those philosophers who begin with totality will reject the idea of substance in favour of the idea of structure. Dooyeweerd also emphasizes that structures of individuality are incompatible with the idea of \textit{ousia} [substance] (\textit{NC} III, 61). But what does it mean to reject the idea of substance? There are several possibilities:

(1) The weakest way to deny the idea of substance is to say that it merely means that God did not create the cosmos from some pre-existent matter. To deny substance is then to believe in creation, but otherwise to continue to regard “things” as if they were substances, separately existing things with properties.

(2) A stronger denial of the idea of substance is Vollenhoven’s view that things cannot exist without coherences [\textit{samenhangen}] with other things, and without an internal coherence (\textit{Isagoogè} par. 69). By ‘internal coherence’ I understand him to be referring to a coherence of the thing’s “functions.”\textsuperscript{19}

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\textsuperscript{17} Herman Dooyeweerd: “Leugen en Waarheid over het Calvinisme” [Lies and Truth about Calvinism], Juli/1925 \textit{Nederland en Oranje}, 87-88.

\textsuperscript{18} Herman Dooyeweerd: "Advies over Roomsch-katholieke en Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde" [Advice about Roman Catholic and Anti-Revolutionary Statecraft], (1923) (cited in Verburg 48-61). Dooyeweerd distinguishes between the autonomous setting ['\textit{stellen}'] of the law, and receiving order as having been set ['\textit{gesteld}'] by God. (“Waar nu het bewustzijn niets meer autonoom stelt, maar alles heeft ontvangen, in alles gesteld is, als objectieven zin.”) This agrees with Vollenhoven’s emphasis that God’s law is “a being in force for” (“\textit{gelden voor}”) and not to be confused with the “\textit{gelden omitrent}” or “\textit{gelden volgens}” of concepts (\textit{Isagoogè}, par. 13, note 6).

\textsuperscript{19} Vollenhoven did not share Dooyeweerd’s distinction between functions of individuality structures and the modal law-spheres or aspects of temporal reality. See my article ‘Dialectic.’ And see the discussion below regarding modal aspects as distinguished from the functions of individuality structures within those aspects.
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(3) A still stronger denial of substance is that there is no distinction between primary qualities (the “objective” substance of a thing) and secondary qualities (the “subjective” sense impressions we receive). Dooyeweerd says,

The identity of a thing, rooted in the continuity of cosmic time, is, however, not the metaphysical identity of a substance, as the absolute point of reference of its different “accidental properties” (NC III, 65).

(4) A further denial of substance, related to (3) but stronger, is to deny the Kantian idea of a thing-in-itself [Ding an sich], which Kant says we know only by its phenomena. Dooyeweerd criticizes the Kantian conception of reality that limits the possibility of our experience to the sensorily perceptible, and says that whatever does not belong to this empirical reality is a “construction of thought” (NC II, 537). Dooyeweerd denies that anything is independent of our consciousness, or independent of possible sensible perception (NC II, 11). If there were a thing existing in itself, it would not at all exist “for us” (NC II, 56). He rejects the view that ascribes our sensations to things in themselves existing independently of the functions of our consciousness, so that our consciousness is one-sidedly dependent upon them (NC III, 45, 46). Instead, things have all the possible object functions that can be realized by interaction with a subject. That is, if a human subject were present, all the object functions which are only there in potential could be realized. There is no distinction between sensory facts and the human “values” that we ascribe to them. As we shall see, Wundt accepts this idea, since he says that the structure of a thing “encloses values.” But this fourth view still assumes that things can exist independently from humans.

(5) A still stronger view is to deny that things can ever exist independently of humans. There is no temporal reality “an sich” (NC I, vi). "Not a single temporal structure of meaning exists in itself (an sich)” (NC II, 30). The metaphysical conception of a natural reality in itself, independent of humans, is un-biblical (NC II, 52). "There cannot exist an 'earthy' 'world in itself' apart from the structural horizon of human experience." (NC II, 549). Nothing exists apart from or unconnected with humanity (NC II, 547). We cannot speak of other possible worlds (NC II, 592). Dooyeweerd does acknowledge that man's appearance "in time" does not occur "until the whole foundation for the normative functions of temporal reality has been laid out." But this temporal priority does not refer
to our original and primary creation as the supratemporal religious root and creaturely fullness of meaning:

According to the temporal relationship between foundation and superstructure in the cosmic world-order, man is not there before the things of inorganic nature. But, viewed from the supertemporal createurally root of the earthly world, this inorganic nature, just as the vegetable kingdom and the animal kingdom, has no existence apart from man, and man has been created as the lord of the creation. (NC II, 52, 53).

This way of denying the idea of substance therefore depends on the idea of the supratemporal selfhood.20

(6) The next stage is to say that the selfhood is not only supratemporal, but it is the religious root of the rest of temporal reality. Not only can temporal reality not exist without humans, but temporal reality has no existence or reality at all except in humanity as the religious root of temporal reality. There is no neutral reality and no static temporal cosmos "an sich" (NC I, vi). "Neutrality" does not just refer to the mistaken belief that there are no religious presuppositions, but to the mistaken view that there is a world that exists separately from humans. There is a complete relativity and lack of self-sufficiency of all that exists in the created mode of meaning (NC I, 123). And just as we are restless in our existence until we find rest in our Origin, so temporal reality is restless in our heart.21 “Apart from its religious root, the temporal world has "no meaning and so no reality" (NC I, 100). It is because temporal reality was concentrated in humanity that temporal reality fell along with humanity. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that without this

20 It also relates to Dooyeweerd’s view of double creation. Creation was completed in the religious root, and there was then a temporal becoming. There is a distinction between Genesis 1 and 2, between our supratemporal calling into existence (Genesis 1) and becoming "living souls" (Genesis 2). The latter is not creation, but the giving form to "an already existing material present in the temporal order." Herman Dooyeweerd: "Na vijf en dertig jaren," Philosophy Reformata 36 (1971), 1-10.

21 Expanding on Augustine, Dooyeweerd says, “Inquietum est cor nostrum et mundus in corde nostrum!” The Latin phrase is not translated. It means that our heart is restless, and that the world is restless in our heart! So the phrase includes the fact that the temporal world has its meaning and existence in our heart, the supratemporal center or totality (NC I, 11).
view of the fall, as causing the spiritual death of the heart out of which our temporal existence proceeds, we cannot understand any other part of his philosophy.  

(7) The fullness of individuality. Not only does Dooyeweerd say that the temporal world has no existence except in the religious root, he says that the “fullness of individuality” or “the ultimate individual” is in that religious root. All temporal individuality is only a “relative unity in a multiplicity of functions” (NC III, 65). And all temporal individuality is also a refraction from out of that fullness of individuality:

If the modalities of meaning are temporal refractions of the religious fulness of meaning, then the fulness of individuality must also be refracted prismatically within the modal aspects, and temporal individuality must be diversified in all the meaning-modalities. (NC II, 418; WdW II, 347-48).

He says “in Christ, the root of the reborn creation, the transcendent fulness of individuality has been saved.” Dooyeweerd specifically links the idea of our selfhood’s supratemporal fullness of individuality to his rejection of the idea of substance. All Substance was used as a principium individuationis, that which individuated reality. But he says that the question, “What is the principium individuationis?” is a false problem, insoluble and internally contradictory. The question lacks insight into the “radical individual concentration of temporal reality in the human I-ness.” (NC II, 417). All temporal individuality is only an expression of the fulness of individuality inherent in the religious centre of our temporal world. Temporal individuality is itself a refraction of “the fullness of individuality” in the religious root. (NC II, 418). The supratemporal religious root maintains the correlation between law-side and subject side of our empirical world (NC II, 418). This is because both law and subject are refracted by

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22 Dooyeweerd’s first response to the curators of the Free University (April 27, 1937), relating to the theologian Valentin Hepp’s complaints about the philosophy of the law-Idea (Verburg 212).

23 The issue of how individuality relates to the supra-individuality of the religious root must be left to another article. For the present it is sufficient to state Dooyeweerd’s view that as long as cosmic time endures, our individuality is in time and the religious root is supra-individual. In the fullness of time, there will be a restoration of supratemporal individuality for those who do not suffer “eternal death.” In other words, the supratemporal fullness of individuality is itself dynamic and will differentiate again due to the power of God in the resurrection.

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cosmic time from this religious root. This “cosmic individuality” is completely religious, and supratemporal.\textsuperscript{24}

Temporal individuality is therefore not based on temporal individual things. True individuality is supratemporal. Temporal individuality is only a relative identity:

The temporal identity of a thing is a relative identity, pointing beyond and above itself to the inter-modal meaning-coherence of time and the radical unity of meaning in the central religious sphere of our experiential horizon (\textit{NC III, 67}).

Even our selfhood, as the religious root and fullness of individuality is not a substance, but also exists only as meaning, in relation to God its Origin (\textit{NC I, 4}). Dooyeweerd condemns an individualistic view of the Self as due to Romanticism, such as Schleiermacher’s principle of \textit{Eigentümlichkeit} (singularity) (\textit{NC II, 493}).

The South African reformational philosopher, Hendrik Stoker, believed that Dooyeweerd’s view of meaning did not give enough independence and dignity to creation. He therefore proposed reintroducing the idea of substance. Dooyeweerd responded to this:

In this context it strikes me that Stoker thinks his conception of substance gives a better expression to “the autonomous being and value of the cosmos with respect to God.” For it is this very autonomous being and value of the created world in itself which must be denied from the radical Biblical viewpoint of creation. Here we are confronted with the core of the question if we can ascribe to created things a mode of existence which is \textit{being} in the traditional metaphysical sense of the word (\textit{NC III, 71}).

Stoker certainly believed in the creation of the world, and his idea was that of a created substance. What Dooyeweerd found objectionable was the idea of independent individuality. It is that “very autonomous being and value of the created world in itself which must be denied.” Dooyeweerd emphasizes that his view of reality as “meaning” does not detract at all from the dignity of created things:

By denying created things a metaphysical substantial being we have not detracted anything from their proper reality and activity, which is

\textsuperscript{24} In \textit{De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer} [The Crisis of the Humanistic Doctrine of the State] (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1931) ['Crisis'], Dooyeweerd says that cosmic individuality is completely religious and founded supratemporally (Verburg 144).
fundamentally distinct from the Divine Being of the Creator. We have only stressed that this reality is of the character of meaning, which cannot be independent and self-contained (NC III, 74).

IV. The Dynamic Nature of Reality

Wundt says:


[The additive way of thinking about reality has supposed that the elements are always at rest, unchanging, and of the most durable existence possible. Only in this form do they appear able to offer a stable material substrate for a reality that is forever in motion. All change is accordingly more or less mere appearance or only a passing modification; Being is continuation, the continuation of the elements; change originates solely from their changing situations with respect to each other. Totality on the other hand, as a functional relation, continually points above itself. Here we find that creative relation, which is not to be separated from the thought of totality. Just as totality shows a creative newness over against the elements, so each totality that is arrived at points beyond itself. Matter, the principle what is dead and at rest, stands over against form as the carrier of life. Form does not serve as a basis for a mere mechanical change, but rather is creative form-giving. With Weinhandl we can also speak of a dynamic view that comes to stand in the place of a static view.]

Wundt refers to a “living relation” of order, a creative bringing forth of order. Dooyeweerd also emphasizes the dynamic character of reality (NC I, 79). He says that

__25__ Ferdinand Weinhandl was another contributor to the Breslau lectures.
Aristotle attempted a dynamic view of reality by conceiving of form as a dynamic principle operating in the matter of substances. This “plastic” motive was lost in modern times, as in Husserl’s rigid-static conception of the “world of pure essences.” But Dooyeweerd wants to reintroduce this plastic character of the structural principles. The principles, although themselves unchanging, realize themselves in variable, individual things, events and relationships:

Owing to this [the plastic character of the structural principles of individuality] the dimension of our experiential horizon that is turned to the inexhaustible wealth of individuality does not show a rigid, atomistic character, but represents itself in a continuous dynamic-structural coherence (NC II, 558).

In the quotation just cited, Wundt says “each totality arrived at points beyond itself.” Dooyeweerd also sees the individuality structures pointing beyond themselves:

Even the temporal identity of a thing cannot be experienced apart from the diversity of its modal functions; it is a relative identity, pointing beyond and above itself to the inter-modal meaning-coherence of time and the radical unity of meaning in the central religious sphere of our experiential horizon (NC III, 67)

It is because of this pointing beyond themselves that Dooyeweerd calls individuality structures “structures of totality.” And in referring to things as “structures of totality,” Dooyeweerd specifically rejects an additive view of temporal reality as an agglomeration or additive sum:

Het ding is gegeven in een totaliteitsstructuur die de onderscheiden aspecten van zijn werkelijkheid tot een typisch geheel groepeert en deze aspecten tegelijk overspant. Een concreet ding is niet zomaar een agglomeraat, een soort optelsom van zijn modale functies; eerder omgekeerd; zijn modale functies zijn functies van een individueel geheel, van een concrete totaliteit. De eenheid van de totaliteit gaat voorop; zij is grondleggend voor de bestaaansmogelijkheid van het ding. [Grenzen 52]

[The thing is given to us in a structure of totality that groups the aspects of its reality into a whole corresponding to a certain type, and which at the same time overarches these aspects. A concrete thing is not just an agglomeration, a kind of additive sum of its modal functions; rather the other way round–its modal functions are functions of an individual whole, of a concrete totality. The unity of the totality comes first; it lays the basis for the possibility for the thing to exist.]
The structure of totality “overarches” the aspects. This overarching is based on the continuity of cosmic time in order to go beyond the points of refraction (‘brekingspunten’) of the modal aspects. This totality is only a temporal totality:

But temporal things are perishable, they do not have a supra-temporal selfhood; their thing-identity is only that of a temporal individual whole, i.e. of a relative unity in a multiplicity of functions. (NC III, 65).

But the temporal individual whole points beyond itself to the supratemporal totality.

**V. Structure includes Values**

We have already seen Krüger’s reference to totality as a “Seinsollen,” combining both being and values. This is also found in Wundt:

Denn jede wirkliche Ganzheit ist gleichsam auf eine ideale hingerichtet, in der sie erst ihre volle Erfüllung findet. So liegt in aller Ganzheit ein Normatives, sie schließt einen Wert ein. Wenn wir jene beiden großen Richtungen in der Philosophie miteinander vergleichen so ist es deutlich, daß die eine, welche die Wirklichkeit in eine Summe von Elementen auflöst, sie damit auch jedes Wertes beraubt, die andere dagegen in der Gerichtetheit auf Ganzheit zugleich eine Wertbeziehung anerkennt und diese als eine bestimmende, ja wohl als die bestimmende Triebfeder in die Auffassung der Wirklichkeit einfügt. Der Wert hat jenen eigentümlichen Doppelcharakter, den Burkamp in seinem Werk über die Struktur der Ganzheiten besonders hervorhebt, daß sie nämlich ihre Glieder zusammen schließt und doch zugleich immer über sie hinausweist.” (Wundt, 14)

[For each genuine totality is as it were directed to an ideal in which it first finds its complete fulfillment. All totality therefore contains a normativity; it includes a value. If we compare with each other the two great directions in philosophy it becomes clear that the first, which dissolves reality into a sum of its elements, also robs it of every value. In contrast, a philosophy that is directed to totality simultaneously acknowledges a relation to value and inserts this as a determining motive—in fact as the determining motive—into its view of reality. Values

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26 “…totaliteitsstructuren, die de brekingspunten der modale aspecten in kosmische continuïteit overspannen en omsluiten.” [“…totality structures, which in cosmic continuity overarch and enclose the refraction points of the modal aspects”]. Herman Dooyeweerd: “Het Tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee,” *Philosophia Reformata* Part II (1940), 213 [‘Tijdsprobleem’].

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have a peculiar double character, which Burkamp\textsuperscript{27} emphasizes in his work about the structure of totalities; they enclose their members together and yet at the same time always refer beyond them.]

We have also seen that one meaning (4) of Dooyeweerd’s rejection of substance is that there is no distinction between the sensory perception and the other aspects in which the thing functions. For Dooyeweerd, an individuality structure functions in all aspects, including those that were called “spiritual aspects” (NC I, v). These are the normative spheres in distinction to the “natural aspects.” Dooyeweerd refers to individuality structures finding their fulfillment in the transcendental direction of reality. The normative spheres always refer beyond themselves, anticipating later spheres. And the last sphere (in the temporal order of succession) is that of faith, which points beyond to the religious root of our existence.

VI. Enkapsis

Wundt seems to be the source for Dooyeweerd’s idea of ‘enkapsis,’ the way that different individuality structures are related to each other. Wundt specifically mentions the term ‘enkapsis,’ and he gives the history of its usage by Rudolf Peter Heinrich Heidenhain (1834-1897) and Theodor Haering (1884-1964).

Haering was the son of a theologian. He wrote on German philosophy\textsuperscript{28} and on Boehme, Cusanus and Paracelsus.\textsuperscript{29} Haering wanted to compare the German and European philosophies, comparing race, Volk and culture.\textsuperscript{30} In 1945, Haering had to leave his post of Systematic philosophy at Tübingen. It was one of the positions considered by Heidegger.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{27} JGF: The reference is to Wilhelm Burkamp (1879-1939): \textit{Die Struktur der Ganzheiten} [The Structure of Totalities], (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1929). It is in the Free University library, and Dooyeweerd would have had access to it.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Das Deutsche in der deutschen Philosophie} [The German nature of German Philosophy], Ed. Theodor Haering. 2nd ed. Berlin/Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1942.


\textsuperscript{30} See Ludwig Jäger: “Siege auf dem Geistigen Schlachtfeld” [Victory on the spiritual battlefield], a review online at [http://iasl.uni-muenchen.de/rezensio/liste/ljaeger.htm.]
\end{flushright}
Heidenhain was a physiologist and histologist. He was opposed to reductionism in the sciences, at least in their mathematical and physical interpretation. He gave a more biological conception.\(^{31}\)


[Finally we must draw attention to a fourth distinction [from substance]. It concerns the relation of members within the whole, the relation of the members among themselves and to the whole. In regard to this, additive thinking knows of only an outer being-next-to one-another, and it is precisely in this [outer] relation of elements to each other that this teaching possesses its particular forcefulness, since it thereby brings this [relation] to its most simple, and indeed most outer expression. In contrast [to additive thinking], the members of totality are ordered, and the members themselves grasp variously in and over each other. The one totality is also at the same time in each member and makes it into a whole. Heidenhain first described this relation in the field of biology as a relation of insertion (enkapsis). And in a 1926 article in Zeitschrift für Psychologie, Groos\(^{32}\)

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\(^{31}\) See biography for “Rudolf Peter Heinrich Heidenhain, online at [http://www.whonamedit.com/doctor.cfm/2267.html].

\(^{32}\) The reference is to Karl Theodor Groos (1861-1946), a German psychologist known mainly for his theory of play. He was a professor at Tübingen from 1911. I have not yet located the referenced article from 1926.
set out the consequences of this idea for all areas including those of the life of our soul and spirit. Perhaps the choice of this word ['enkapsis'] was not completely satisfactory, since it only expresses the formal opposition to an outer next-to-each-other of the parts of what was added together. For a whole holds its members not only as inserted within it, but rather it at the same time rules over them. And the same also holds for the relation of the members among themselves. It therefore concerns a relation of production, since the totality that is ordered above the members does not only enclose [the members] that are ordered in relation to it, but it also forms them.]

Dooyeweerd’s reference to enkapsis is based on the same sources that Wundt refers to. Dooyeweerd says that the term ‘enkapsis’ or ‘incapsulation’ was used by Haering, who borrowed it from the anatomist Heidenhain. Heidenhain used the term to show the relation between the separate organs and the total organism in the structure of a living creature. The total organism is an individual whole, whose organs are not just parts in the sense of dependent components, but rather relatively independent individuals (NC III, 634-35). And Dooyeweerd’s criticism of Heidenhain and Haering is very similar to that by Wundt.

1. Criticism of whole/part

Haering refers to enkapsis as a relation of a whole and its parts.

The whole is not at all merely the sum total of its parts, nor a merely external formation of a plurality of parts moulded into some form, but a real qualitative new unity (NC III 635).

Wundt criticizes Haering’s views of enkapsis as a merely additive viewpoint, based on parts added together. Dooyeweerd also criticizes Haering’s use of the idea of whole and part. He says that Haering uses the term ‘enkapsis’ “promiscuously with ‘Funktionseinheit’ (functional unity) or ‘Ganzes mit Gliederen’ (a whole and its members).”

In my opinion the term ‘enkapsis’ expresses much rather an interwovenness of individuality-structures that cannot at all be qualified as the relation of a whole and its parts. By this term Heidenhain wished to denote that the organs are relatively independent individuals in the body, consequently more than “parts” in the usual sense. But he could not sufficiently distinguish the figure of enkapsis from the relation between the whole and its parts for lack of sufficient insight into the individuality-
structure of a thing. Especially the qualifying rôle of the leading function in this structure was not clear to him. (NC III, 636)

And,

But the enkaptic structural interlacements between things as such never constitute a relation of the whole and its parts. (NC III, 638).

2. Qualified by the whole

Dooyeweerd says that questions as to whether an organ is an independent thing cannot be answered without the foundation of an idea of individuality structures. For example, an animal organ, even if it could be cultivated outside of the body, does not have the “natural destination to live apart from the total organism” (NC III, 636-637). The organ is relatively autonomous, but its normal “destination” is as a part of the whole. He says that we cannot decide what is part of a non-homogeneous whole by a functional mathematical-physical analysis, but only by an inquiry into the internal individuality-structure of the whole.

Every complete individual thing as an individual totality has its parts, and the relation between the individual totality and its parts, as such, is always determined by the internal structural principle of the whole (NC III, 638).

Homogenous aggregates do not display enkapsis, but the part/whole relationship. Non-homogeneous total structures do display enkapsis. There, the parts are qualified by the structure of the whole; the structure of the whole can never be construed by means of its parts (NC III, 638-39).

The relative autonomy of the organs within the total organism does not mean that they have a natural leading function of their own; for their natural internal distinction is dependent on the leading function of the total organism (NC III, 636). Dooyeweerd says this a bit more clearly elsewhere: Enkapsis is not a part/whole relationship. What is part of a whole is determined by the individuality structure of the whole.33

This idea of the qualifying role or leading function is also suggested by Wundt’s statement “For a whole holds its members not only as inserted within it, but rather it at the same time rules over them.” This idea of “ruling over” is also used for the relation of the members among themselves.

33 Herman Dooyeweerd: Grenzen van het theoretisch denken (Baarn: Ambo, 1986), 69.
Dooyeweerd says that Haering tries to apply the idea of *enkapsis* to anthropology, relating the psycho-physical and the functional unity of the I-ness. Dooyeweerd rejects this as based on a trichotomy of *physis*, *psyche* and spirit. Dooyeweerd’s own view of anthropology is that our body (as distinct from our supratemporal selfhood) is constituted by four interwoven enkaptic individuality structures.\(^3\) A full discussion of this is beyond the scope of this article.

### 3. Teleology

Wundt says that *enkapsis* is distinct from ideas of entelechy or teleological ends. He says that Haering has shown that the relation to totality [*Ganzheitsbeziehung*] does not coincide with the relation to goals [*Zweckbeziehung*] but is of a much richer form.\(^5\)

We have earlier seen that Wundt says that totality structures include values. But he says that this resonance of values in totality [*Wertbetontheit der Ganzheit*] is often confused with a teleological relation.

Dooyeweerd also distinguishes the qualifying function of an individuality structure from teleological ends (*NC* III, 60). Dooyeweerd rejects this idea of an *entelechy* (inner *telos* or end) as being based on the idea of substance. The idea of an *entelechy* comes from Aristotle:

> In his [Aristotle’s] view the essence of all existence now became the motive principle of the goal which has been built potential (i.e. germinally) into matter, and to which matter, according to the law of nature, strives to reach its perfection\(^6\)

There is in Aristotle a movement of lower to higher, matter to form, means to the end.

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VII. Philosophy and the Special Sciences

Wundt says that the distinction between philosophies of totality and merely additive views of reality applies to the way we regard all areas of knowledge [Wissensgebieten]:

Sie greifen aber durch alle Gebiete hindurch, und ihre allgemeine Bedeutung für die Struktur der Welanschauungen zeigt sich erst recht an dieser über alle Gebiete sich erstreckenden Wirksamkeit. (p. 16)

[They [the two directions of philosophy] reach through all domains of learning, and their universal significance for the structure of worldviews is first truly demonstrated in the effect they extend to all these domains].

Wundt refers to the following areas of study:

(1) Logic: Our knowledge is either a piecemeal bringing together of individual givens which are added together, or knowledge is seen as original ideas of totality, to which all individual givens must be related.

(2) Ethics: moral values are either derived from individual stimuli of life, or as something that we possess that is original and overarching.

(3) Social customs: are either collected from individual impulses or (in totality) as an overarching form in the depths of humans themselves, where all parts of life are unfolded only under its rule.

(4) Politics: In the doctrine of state and society, there is a difference between the universalism of totality and individualism.

(5) Psychology: totality overcomes the mechanical viewpoint of association psychology.

(6) Aesthetics: the beautiful is seen either as a working together of a manifold of indiviudal impressions, or else is it viewed as an original value of totality.

But Wundt cautions that even the meaning of ‘totality’ varies, and it is the task of philosophy to bring out these various influences. That is the basis for his typology of philosophies of totality.

Again, parallels can be found with Dooyeweerd’s desire to apply the law-Idea, and its view of totality, to the various special sciences. There are also differences. For example, Dooyeweerd’s view of sphere sovereignty goes beyond Wundt’s distinction of
universal/individual for politics, just as it did in the case of Othmar Spann’s political views (See ‘Totality’).

VIII. Another look at Dooyeweerd’s Individuality Structures

The implications of Dooyeweerd's idea of individuality structures have not been fully recognized by reformational philosophy. Dooyeweerd thought that the theologians who were opposed to his philosophy had not given enough attention to the fundamental difference between the idea of substance and that of individuality structures. That is why Dooyeweerd published the 131 page article, “De idee der individualiteitsstructuur en het thomistisch substantiebegrip” (Verburg 272).

But misunderstandings of what Dooyeweerd means by ‘individuality structure’ continue today. This is because reformational philosophy has for the most part rejected Dooyeweerd’s idea of supratemporal totality. But without that idea, we cannot understand individuality structures. Dooyeweerd says that immanence philosophy has only an immanent understanding of totality and therefore absolutizes temporal reality. Therefore, immanence philosophy can never come to a structural concept of a thing, but always either concepts of function or metaphysical substance. This is quite an astounding assertion. Immanence philosophy, which understands totality in a merely temporal sense, can never come to the proper structural concept of a thing! We cannot


38 Herman Dooyeweerd: “De idee der individualiteitsstructuur en het thomistisch substantiebegrip,” [The Idea of the individuality structure and the Thomistic concept of substance], Philosophia Reformata 8 (1943), 65-99; 9 (1944), 1-41; 10 (1945), 25ff; 11 (1946), 22ff. [‘Substantiebegrip’]

understand individuality structures except in the light of the relation of the idea of individuality structures to the philosophy of totality.

1. Individuality structures are not things with a structure

Dooyeweerd’s idea of things as individuality structures is very different from the idea that temporal things have a structure. To say that things have a structure assumes that our experience begins with temporal individual things, that these things have properties, and that by analyzing these properties, we can determine the nature of the thing’s structure. But this viewpoint does not differ very much from the view that things are based on substances with properties, except that it assumes that things are created. This mistaken interpretation of individuality structures seems to be linked to Vollenhoven’s idea of the place of the law. For Vollenhoven, the law stands between God and the cosmos, in a triad God-law-cosmos. The cosmos and things in the cosmos are subjected to a law that stands outside the cosmos. Things therefore have a much more independent status for Vollenhoven than for Dooyeweerd, who sees law as one side of everything in the temporal cosmos. Vollenhoven rejected the idea of the supratemporal selfhood and he therefore also rejected the idea of this selfhood as the religious root of temporal reality, and the idea that creation fall and redemption occur in this religious root. Therefore Vollenhoven could not accept Dooyeweerd’s most extensive denials of substance. This affected Vollenhoven’s ontology, epistemology and theology (See ‘Dialectic’). Vollenhoven also rejected the view that temporal reality is restless and exists as meaning. As we have seen, Vollenhoven denied the whole idea of “individuality structures.” And because Vollenhoven denied that the modal aspects are given to us in a temporal succession of time, he could not understand Dooyeweerd’s view of individuality structures as a knitting together of these moments in a structure that is directed by a leading function.

H. van Riessen, an engineer who became professor of philosophy at the Free University, also disagreed with Dooyeweerd’s idea of individuality structures. After completing his doctorate under Vollenhoven’s supervision, van Riessen’s first appointment was to the University of Delft. At that time, he and P.A. Verburg, professor in linguistics at the University of Groningen visited Dooyeweerd and urged him to come up with a new term.
instead of ‘individuality-structure.’ They said that their students had problems in understanding this new term in his philosophy, which was already difficult enough. They suggested that it be replaced by the word ‘idionomy’ (from the Greek words *idios*: peculiar or special, and *nomos*: law). In other words an individuality structure would be a particular law for an individual thing. Dooyeweerd did not agree with this proposal.\textsuperscript{40} I believe that this is because the idea of idionomy assumes that there is a thing that is separate from its structure.

Dooyeweerd’s view of individuality structures is very different from Vollenhoven’s (or van Riessen’s) view of things. For Dooyeweerd, a thing is not something that has a structure; it is an individuality-structure. An individual structure is not something that exists separately from a law outside of the cosmos. A thing is only a “relative unity in a temporal and modal diversity” (NC III, 65).

\[\text{…een individualiteitsstructuur als zodanig niets anders is dan een in de kosmische tijdsorde gegronde typische eenheid in de verscheidenheid van de modale functies (Grenzen, 80).}\]

\[\text{[…an individuality structure as such is nothing other than a typical unity in the diversity of the modal functions, grounded in the cosmic order of time].}\]

The factual duration of a thing depends on the preservation of its structure of individuality (NC III, 79). When a book is thrown into a fire, the thing itself is consumed. (NC III, 4). We will see how it is only cosmic time that gives this factual duration.

2. Modal aspects are neither properties nor functions of things

Another misunderstanding of individuality structures is that they are things that have aspects, and that we can determine what these aspects are by analyzing the things. That is Vollenhoven’s view, who speaks of aspects as the “not further analyzable determinations” \[\text{[niet te analyseren bepaaldheden]}\] of things (Isagoogè par. 22). It is also Roy Clouser’s view, who says that the modal structures of the aspects can be deduced

\textsuperscript{40} Personal communication to me from Magnus Verbrugge who learned of it from P.A. Verburg.
from the individuality structures, by an ever-increasing abstraction of properties into 
“kinds of properties.”\(^1\) Dooyeweerd emphatically rejects these ideas in his last article:

…the modal structures of the aspects can in no way be deduced from the
individuality-structures of concrete reality. There is a serious
misunderstanding concerning this cardinal point even by some adherents
of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, insofar as they are of the opinion that
the modal structures can be discovered by an ever-continuing abstraction
from out of the concrete experience of reality. This misunderstanding
rests on the supposition that the modal structures are themselves
individualized by the individuality-structures.\(^2\)

The mistaken idea that aspects can be determined by analyzing things is therefore due to
an incorrect view of individuation. Of course, if the totality of the supratemporal
selfhood is denied, then reformational philosophy cannot understand Dooyeweerd’s view
of individuation. We will look at individuation in more detail below.

The idea that aspects can be derived from things goes back to Aristotle’s *Posterior
Analytics* Book 2, Chapter 14, where Aristotle deals with properties, classes and common
genus. Dooyeweerd expressly rejects any such view of aspects as kinds or as properties.
He says that, just as substance cannot be the *genus proximum* of its accidents, so reality
cannot be the *genus proximum* of its modalities (*NC* II, 14). The rejection of properties is
therefore related to Dooyeweerd’s rejection of the idea of substance.

\(^1\) In his book *The Myth of Religious Neutrality* (Notre Dame, 1991), Clouser says (p. 54)
that in theory we intensify the focus of our attention to such a degree that we isolate a
property from something, and focus on the property itself; he calls this “high
abstraction.” In his article, “Dooyeweerd’s Metathetical Critique and its Application to

\(^2\) Dooyeweerd, Herman: “De Kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de Logische
[‘*Gegenstandsrelatie*’] Translation and discussion online: [http://www.members.
shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/Kentheoretische.html].
Nor are aspects the same as functions of things. Hendrik Hart for example speaks of “functors” and their “functions.” This tends to view the “functors” as separately existing things. But Dooyeweerd objects to the idea that the aspects are only functions of things. Dooyeweerd says that function is the new concept of substance (NC I, 202). Dooyeweerd refers to this as ‘functionalism,’ which he says is related to the idea of substance. For example, Kant’s idea does not start from the universe as a totality but from the elementary functional relations of physical interaction (NC III, 629).

Functionalism is also related to nominalism: “The whole functionalistic conception of reality was rooted in the nominalistic tradition” (NC I, 202). Functionalism is the absolutization of the concept of a function. And as long as this functional view dominates exclusively, scientific thought does not view the actual things of nature with their internal structures of individuality. (NC I, 554-55).

Dooyeweerd does say that individuality structures have functions. But these functions are in the aspects. Dooyeweerd therefore distinguishes between the modal aspects and the functions of individuality structures. This distinction cannot be understood unless like Dooyeweerd we begin with the idea of totality and then proceed to individuation.

An apple tree is distinguished from a stone not because it functions in a different modal aspect, but because in whatever aspect it functions it shows a different individuality structure (Grenzen 54).

The functioning of the apple tree is based on its internal functional structure. This functional structure is determined by the individual totality of the tree and not the other way around (NC III, 98). The individuality structure expresses itself in each of its aspects:


44 Vollenhoven seems to understand “functionalism” as the absolutization of any one “aspect” of a thing over another. But for Dooyeweerd, functionalism is the absolutization of function itself.

45 Dooyeweerd himself did not use the word ‘aspect’ until much later. He normally uses ‘law-spheres’ or ‘meaning’spheres.’
...de individualiteitsstructuur drukt zich in elk van haar modale aspecten uit, zoals ook de kosmische tijdsorde zich bleek uit te drukken in de modale structuur van de aspecten en via deze toegankelijk bleek voor theoretisch onderzoek. (Grenzen 59)

[...the individuality structure expresses itself in each of its modal aspects, just as the cosmic temporal order was seen to express itself in the modal structure of the aspects and via these to become accessible for theoretical research].

But although structure is prior to functions, the structure itself of the tree is dependent on the previously existing aspects in which the tree functions (Gegenstandsrelatie 90). The aspects are ontologically prior to the individuality structure, and cannot be deduced from the individuality structure. In order of ontological priority, we therefore have aspects, modal structure, individuality structure and functions. Let us look at this individuation in more detail.

3. Individuation in the modal dimension

The horizon of our experience has four dimensions or levels: the religious, the temporal, the modal, and the dimension of individuality structures. These dimensions give our experience a perspectival nature:

All human experience remains bound to a perspective horizon in which the transcendent light of eternity must force its way through time. In this horizon we become aware of the transcendent fullness of the meaning of this life only in the light of the Divine revelation refracted through the prism of time (NC II, 561).

The religious level is the supratemporal level of our selfhood. But if we lose our sense of the transcendent, we lose our ability to experience the world in this perspectival manner:

Naarmate het transcendentie-besef van den mensch verzwakt, verzwakt ook zijn zelf-bewustzijn en zijn vermogen de perspectivistische structuur van de tijd te ervaren (Tijdsprobleem, 209).

[To the degree that man's understanding of the transcendent is weakened, so also is weakened his self-consciousness and his ability to experience the perspectival structure of time].

This confirms the idea that we have already seen, that immanence philosophy can never come to the proper structural concept of a thing.
From the religious level we “descend” [*afdalen*] to the temporal level of cosmic time (*WdW* II, 482; *NC* II, 552). The central supratemporal totality includes both a “central law” and an “ultimate subject”. Both have their coherence in the religious root. And both are differentiated by cosmic time. Both law and individual subjectivity have religious unity and temporal diversity (*NC* I, 507).

The temporal level includes the modal level. And the temporal and modal levels together encompass the fourth level, that of individuality structures. Thus, the modal law-spheres are prior to the level of individuality structures, and we must look at individuation in this dimension before we look at individuation in the level of individuality structures.

a) **The law-side: Modal Aspects.** The modal aspects individuate from out of totality. This differentiation occurs by means of the “prism” of cosmic time, which differentiates totality into the temporal aspects. The aspects appear in a temporal order of succession of before and after, beginning with the numerical and ending with the aspect of faith.

Each of the modal aspects has a central nuclear “moment” in time as well as anticipatory and retrocipatory moments. Now the use of the terms ‘central,’ ‘nuclear’ or ‘kernel’ when applied to the modal aspects of reality refers to the “moment” that gives a modal aspect its “sphere sovereignty” or irreducibility. This irreducibility is founded in the supratemporal selfhood, where all such nuclear moments coincide in a radical unity. That is why Dooyeweerd says in his last article that the irreducibility of the law-spheres or aspects cannot be understood except in relation to our supratemporal selfhood (*Gegenstandsrelatie* 100). The nuclear moment of the aspect therefore is supratemporal, as compared to its temporal analogies. Around this central or nuclear moment are grouped analogical moments (*Transcendendal Problems*, 44). The nuclear moment guarantees the individuality of the aspect (*EvQuart* 47). And because the nuclear moment is suparatemporal, we cannot form a concept of it. The nuclear meaning kernels “cannot be interpreted in an intra-modal logical sense without cancelling their irreducibility.” And the idea of this mutual irreducibility “is not to be separated from the transcendental idea of the root-unity of the modal aspects in the religious center of human existence” (*Gegenstandsrelatie* 100).
Vollenhoven denies the ideas of cosmic time, the prism, the differentiation of meaning from totality, and the view that the aspects appear in an order of temporal succession. For him, there is only an order of increasing complexity in things. Because he denies the supratemporal selfhood, Vollenhoven cannot understand sphere sovereignty of the nuclear aspect in the same way. Vollenhoven also does not share Dooyeweerd’s views of anticipation and retrocipation, and uses the terms in a different way (See ‘Dialectic’).

b) The factual-side: Modal Structures. Cosmic time differentiates both the central law and the ultimate subject. Within the modal dimension, the law-side is individuated into the aspects. The factual-side is individuated into the modal structures. The subject side is where we obtain individuality. But the modal structures have a completely a-typical individuality.

The pole reached by modal individualization in the full temporal reality on its subject side, is the complete or a-typical individuality of the modal meaning (NC II, 424).

As we shall see, “typical individuality” occurs in the dimension of individuality structures, where types operate to individuate these structures. But this later dimension of individuality structures with types requires the earlier dimension of modal structures that are a-typical, or without a type.

The modal structures lie at the foundation of the individuality-structures, and not the other way around. For without the foundation of modal structures with no individuality, we would not be able to speak of a typical ordering and gradual individuation of the functions in these modal aspects of concrete entities in their individuality structures (Gegenstandsrelatie 90, italics Dooyeweerd’s)

Dooyeweerd gives the example of modal individuality in the juridical modal structure. The juridical modal sphere tends to the pole of complete subjective individuality where no two juridical facts are the same (NC II, 416). If two juridical facts were the same, this would still be subjective, but not individual.
Modal structures have a subject-object relation. The subject-functions of earlier spheres are objectified in the later spheres. Dooyeweerd gives the example of perceiving a tree. Within my subjective psychical function, the tree does not function as a subject, but only as an object. Thus, when we observe a tree, the subjective physical (reality) functions of the tree are objectified within my psychical function. (WdW I, 50; II, 401; NC II, 468).

Vollenhoven denies any such subject-object relation within aspects. For Vollenhoven, subject-object relations are only between things (See ‘Dialectic’).

4. Individuation in the plastic dimension

From the religious, temporal and modal levels, we finally descend to the dimension of individuality structures, the plastic dimension (WdW II, 491-92; NC II, 560). Our experience of individuality structures is in an ontologically lower experiential dimension than that of the modal structures.

But although the dimension of individuality structures depends on the earlier dimension of modal structures, the individuality structures are not individuated from the modal structures.

This misunderstanding rests on the supposition that the modal structures are themselves individualized by the individuality-structures. The true state of affairs is rather that the modal structures belong to another dimension of the horizon of human experience. Their individualization would amount to their elimination. It is not the aspects that are individualized within the various structural types of things, events, societal relations, etc., but only the functions of concrete reality within these aspects that are so individualized. The modal structures lie at the foundation of the individuality-structures, and not the other way around. For without the foundation of modal structures with no individuality, we would not be able to speak of a typical ordering and gradual individuation of the functions in these modal aspects of concrete entities in their individuality structures. (Gegenstandsrelatie 90, italics Dooyeweerd’s).

What does Dooyeweerd mean when he says that if individuality structures were individuated from the modal structures, the modal structures would disappear? I

46 Vollenhoven denied that there was a subject-object relation in the aspects. This is not surprising, since Dooyeweerd’s idea of the subject-object relation depends on his view of the aspects as based in a temporal succession of time. For Vollenhoven, the subject-object relation is only between things. See ‘Dialectic.’
understand this to mean that it would no longer be available for individuation into other individuality structures.

Individuality structures have both a law-side and a factual-side. Let us look at the law-side first.

a) The law-side: Types

Dooyeweerd says that this dimension of our experience is characterized by types:

The plastic horizon of our experience of individuality-structures is characterized by types. There are different types of individuality structures which are different for different groups of things and in which things alternately appear, form themselves or are formed, and disappear (NC II, 489).

Types are the law-side of individuality structures:

… a type, as a structure of individuality, has the character of a law. These and geno-types and sub-types “can never pass over into the a-typical subjective (or objective) individuality of the whole determined by them. (NC III, 97).

So the factual-side of individuality structures is the “whole” that is determined by the type. We will look at this “subjective whole” later.

An individuality structure itself functions in all of the aspects, with either an object or a subject function. The way that the structures function in the modal structures of the aspects is determined by the type that applies to them. The types determine whether the individuality structure will function as an object or as a subject in the modal structures. These functions belong to the factual-side of the individuality structure, but are determined by the type (law-side). The highest subject function of an individuality structure is called its leading or qualifying function. The leading function determines to what realm the individuality structure belongs. If it belongs to the inorganic realm, its highest subject function is in the physical modality. If it belongs to the organic realm, its highest subject function is in the biotic modality. And if it belongs to the animal realm, its highest subject function is in the psychic modality. This is an individualizing of the functions of the individuality structure:

In their framework the different aspects are grouped in a typical manner and bound together in an individual totality and unity. The modal
functions of reality within the different aspects are here individualized by degrees, and they are grouped in such a typical manner, that the whole structure is characterized by one of them, which is called the inner directive or qualifying function.47

As we shall see, in the case of enkaptic interlacements of individuality structures, there is also a foundational function.

There are several different types in the law-side of individuality structures. Radical types determine the realm that the structure belongs to. There are three radical types of individuality structures: matter, plants, animals (NC III, 83). Radical types therefore correspond on the law-side to leading functions on the factual-side:

The radical type appeared to be the elementary and most fundamental structural principle for the typical groupage of the different modal functions within an individual whole which lacks a supra-modal centre. It determines the modality of the leading or guiding function, which qualifies every individual totality belonging to the same kingdom (NC III, 90)

In radical types, the qualifying function is only modally and not typically determined (Grenzen 62). That seems to mean that the radical type does not yet have any individuality, for individuality is given by the factual-side.

Types can be further divided into genotypes [stamtypen] and phenotypes [variabiliteitstypen, fenotypen] (Grenzen 65). Genotypes, also called ‘primary types,’ are the internal structure or inner nature of the individual whole. Variability- or pheno-types: depend on “morphological interlacements of an individual whole with individual totalities of a different radical or geno-type” (NC III 93). Dooyeweerd gives as an example: radical type: animal. Geno-type: mammal, bird, fish. And there are sub-types. A variability type shows its enkaptic interlacement with other structures. For example a cultivated tree is a variability type in interlacement with my garden.

A type is said to be a “nuclear type” when there are no further enkaptic interlacements before it in its unfolding process. The nuclear type is what guarantees the sphere sovereignty of the individuality structure.

47 Herman Dooyeweerd: Transcendental Problems of Philosphic Thought (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), 42 [‘Transcendental Problems’], 42.
Sphere-sovereignty of modal aspects can only reveal itself within the inter-modal temporal meaning-coherence, and a similar restriction applies to the sphere-sovereignty of structural types of individuality. These types of individuality structures have sphere sovereignty. They are arranged in an inter-structural enkaptic coherence frustrating any attempt to absolutize them. (NC III, 627).

b) The factual-side: the subjective “whole” and its functions

In an individuality structure, the modal aspects of reality are grouped into a “typical whole” a “grouping,” or an “architectonic plan” of these aspects:

What is a structure? It is an architectonic plan according to which a diversity of "moments" is united in a totality. And that is only possible so long as the different "moments" do not occupy the same place in the totality but are rather knit together by a directive and central "moment". This is precisely the situation with regard to the structure of the different aspects of reality. They have an enduring structure in time which is the necessary condition for the functioning of variable phenomena in the framework of these aspects.48

The idea of “moments” cannot be understood by those who, like Vollenhoven, reject Dooyeweerd’s view of cosmic time as placing the aspects in a succession of temporal moments (See ‘Dialectic’).

The functional structure of individuality structures is different from the modal structure of the modal aspects. The functional structure is “not understandable from the general temporal order of the aspects, which finds expression in their general modal structure.” (NC III, 59). Dooyeweerd’s theory of individuality structures therefore distinguishes between this temporal order of succession of aspects (from the numerical aspect to the aspect of faith) from the order of the functions of the individuality structure within those aspects. We analyze the types by looking at the functions, just as we analyzed the aspects by looking at the modal structures:

The cosmic temporal order of the modal aspects could only be theoretically approached by an analysis of their modal structures, in which this order finds expression. Similarly we can obtain a theoretical insight into the typical total structures of individuality only by analyzing their

48 Herman Dooyeweerd: “Introduction to a Transcendental Criticism of Philosophic Thought,” Evangelical Quarterly 19 (1947) Vol. 1, 42-51 [‘EvQuart’]

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internal structural functions in the different modal aspects, as they are typically grouped within an individual whole. (*NC* III, 77)

In the functional structure, certain functions lead the structure in its “internal unfolding process.” Such a function is what Dooyeweerd calls “the characteristic leading or guiding function” of that structure. The example given on that page is that of a linden tree.

The internal structure of a thing pre-supposes a functional structure of its modal aspects and an inter-functional coherence of the latter. Through the typical structure of our linden, as an individual living whole, the earlier functions acquire an _internal_ inter-modal structural coherence, which is distinct from the _external_ functional coherence of the _different types of individuality_ within the modal aspects. (*NC* III, 59).

Although the “leading function” is the highest subject function in the modal aspects, it also means more than that. It is the “directive and central moment” that knits the individuality structure together (EvQuart 46).

The leading function “leads” the temporal unfolding process of the individuality structure. That is, it leads the way in which this structure unfolds within time. The leading function is related to the “realm” to which the particular structure belongs (inorganic, organic or animal).

In a structure of individuality, the leading function qualifies every individuality totality belonging to the same kingdom or realm. The foundational function has the nuclear type of individuality (*NC* III, 90-91).

The leading function of the factual-side therefore corresponds to the radical type law on the law-side.

There is a distinction between leading and foundational functions only where there is an enkaptic interweaving of two individuality structures. The leading function is the qualifying, central function of the whole, and the foundational function is the qualifying, central function of another individuality structure that unfolds earlier in the unfolding process of the enkaptic structure. This “earlier” is what is meant by “foundational direction” of time. The foundational function of the structure (factual-side) corresponds to the nuclear type (law-side).
The foundational function can be found only in an anticipatory coherence with the leading function. This means that in the total whole, there is an unfolding in the anticipatory direction of time. The foundational function cannot be in a closed condition in this enkaptic whole (NC III, 91). But the foundational function itself has only a retrocipatory direction, in the foundational direction of time.

These functions belong to the factual-side of the individuality structure. The subjective whole expresses itself in the modal aspects. That is what it means to function in the aspects. But the subjective whole is more than these functions, or even the sum of its functions (NC III, 63). We have seen this before, in that Dooyeweerd says that the individuality is a totality structure that points beyond itself. But how does it do this? What is it that is “more” than the sum of the function? What is it that is “a-typically individual” in the individuality structure? We need to look in more detail at the idea of individuality.

5. Individuality

As we have seen, Dooyeweerd rejects any idea of substance as the basis for individuality. He also rejects Kant’s idea that individuality is to be sought in the sensory matter of experience, or Rickert’s idea that individuality is based on what is unique in space and time (NC III, 420-21). True individuality, or the fullness of individuality, is found in the supratemporal, and temporal individuality is a refraction of that fullness. Therefore, there is only a relative individuality within time (NC III, 65). The idea of cosmic time is the foundation for Dooyeweerd’s philosophy (NC I, 28), and we again see its importance when it comes to individuality. The identity of a thing is “rooted in the continuity of cosmic time” (NC III, 65). Now what is meant by ‘continuity’ of cosmic time?

Cosmic time has both a law-side and a factual-side. Its law side is the temporal order of succession or simultaneity. The factual side is the factual duration, which differs with various individualities. But the duration remains constantly subjected to the order (NC I, 28). The temporal ordering of the modes is what gives temporal beings their duration in time:
Temporal beings have an ‘individuality structure’ based on a temporal ordering of the modes, and this is what gives temporal things their duration in time (*NC* III, 79).

The individuality structure determines the duration. The individual being endures only as long as its individuality structure.

Hetzelfde moeten wij constateren ten aanzien van de individualiteitsstructuren van de werkelijkheid; ook deze zijn gegrond in de kosmische tijdsorde. Zij zijn echter geen puur modale, maar typische tijdsstructuren, tijdsstructuren van individuele totaliteiten, die de subjectieve (resp. objectieve) tijdsduur van deze individualiteitsstructuren naar haar aard bepalen. (*Grenzen* 52)

[We must state the same thing with respect to the individuality structures of reality; they too are grounded in cosmic time. They are really no purely modal but rather typical structures of time, structures of time of individual totalities, which determine the subjective (or objective, respectively) temporal duration of these individuality structures according to their nature.]

All structures of temporal reality are structures of cosmic time (*NC* I, 105; III, 78). They have both order and duration. But this identity of things is relative:

But temporal things are perishable, they do not have a supra-temporal selfhood; their thing-identity is only that of a temporal individual whole, i.e. of a relative unity in a multiplicity of functions (*NC* III, 65).

As already discussed individuality is rooted in the religious centre of our temporal world: all temporal individuality can only be an expression of the fulness of individuality inherent in this centre. Individuality structures are “typical structures of temporal duration” (*NC* III 78). By ‘typical,’ Dooyeweerd is referring to the law-side, and by “temporal duration,” Dooyeweerd is referring to the subject side of reality.

Temporal reality does not end in the modal functions; it is not shut off in the modal horizon of the law-spheres. Rather, it has—if I may use this image–its inter-modal prolongation in the continuity of the cosmic coherence (*NC* III, 64).

Temporal individuality is therefore this inter-modal prolongation or *duration*. The law-side of temporal reality is the temporal *order* of the law-spheres given in cosmic time. The factual-side of temporal reality is given by the *duration* of cosmic time (*NC* I, 28).

The continuity of time, in which temporal identity is rooted, is therefore the duration of cosmic time. Reality has its inter-modal bottom-layer in the continuity of cosmic time.
And this continuity is related to the “temporal bottom layer” in which an indivuality structure is based (NC III, 65). And this bottom layer gives the coherence between the directing and the directed functions:

There exists a typical structural coherence between directing and directed functions in the continuous real bottom-layer of a thing as an individual whole (NC III, 66).  

It is only in this cosmic temporal bottom-layer of every thing-structure that the individual whole of a thing is realized. Its individual identity receives its determination from its internal structural principle. It is this identity that is intuitively experienced in naïve experience (NC III, 65).

Now there has not been much discussion of what Dooyeweerd means by this “temporal bottom layer” of time. But it is only in this cosmic temporal bottom-layer of every thing-structure that the individual whole of a thing is realized. Dooyeweerd says,

We are no more able to isolate the cosmic temporal bottom layer of a thing-structure, than we can theoretically isolate our intuitive faculty (NC II, 65).

Let us look at his comparison with intuition. Our intuition is the “temporal bottom layer of our analysis” (NC II, 473). It is what allows us to relate temporal reality to our supratemporal selfhood. Even the identification of a sensation such as a sweet taste would be impossible without intuition:

How could I really be aware of a sweet taste, if I could not relate this sensory impression to myself, by means of my intuition entering into the cosmic stream of time? (NC II, 478).

The temporal bottom layer thus relates temporal reality to the supratemporal. It relates to the wholeness of our temporal experience.

We experience this continuity of time in our pre-theoretical experience, and this is the experience of identity. We cannot investigate this continuity in theory, because it goes beyond the boundaries of the law spheres (Grenzen 58-59).

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49 This coherence is what gives “individual thing-causality” as opposed to modal causality (NC III, 66).
Some reformational philosophers have said that theory cannot investigate things because they are individuals. But that is not what Dooyeweerd says. Theory cannot investigate individuality structures because theory cannot investigate the continuity of cosmic time. Theory is a “dis-stasis” or splitting up of the continuity of cosmic time, and theory can only investigate this dis-stasis, this discontinuity of time. (*Grenzen* 59, *Gegenstandsrelatie* 86, 93, 98).

The identity of a thing must possess its law- and factual-sides in a mutual, unbreakable correlation. Dooyeweerd says that it must be both a-typically individual as well as determined in conformity with its type, its internal structural principle (*NC* III, 97). So individuality is related to the subject side, which is subjective and objective duration, grounded in the continuous bottom nature of time.

It is in this sense—of two sides of reality, law and factual-sides, order and duration,—that we must understand the following statement that an individuality structure is not the same as individuality itself:

Een individualiteitsstructuur is uiteraard niet de subjectieve (resp. objectieve) individualiteit zelf. Ze is veeleer een grondleggend wetsprincipe, dat de dingen, gebeurtenissen, handelingen, samenlevingsvormen, enz. in haar individuele werkelijkheid eerst mogelijk maakt; een wetmatig kader, waarbuiten zij niet tot bestaan kunnen komen. De appelboom in het algemeen is niet een individueel werkelijk ding; ook niet alleen maar een naam waarmee alle mogelijke individuele appelbomen worden samengevat, en evenmin is het zomaar een begrip waaraan objectieve werkelijkheid zou toekomen. Het is integendeel een structuurprincipe, dat, in de tijdelijke wereldorde gegrond, door Gods scheppingswil bepaald is. (*Grenzen* 54)

[An individuality-structure is certainly not the subjective (or respectively, objective) individuality itself. It is much rather a foundational principle of law which makes things, events, acts, societal organizations, etc. first possible in their individual reality. It is a framework of law-regularity, without which they could not come to existence. The apple tree in general is not an individual real thing; it is also not merely a name by which all

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50 In Dooyeweerd’s view of the theoretical *epoché*, we “refrain” from the continuity of cosmic time (*WdW* II, 402; *NC* II, 468 ft.1). The abstraction of theoretical thought is not just from the continuity of cosmic time, but from the actual, full selfhood that thinks and expresses itself in all its functions (*WdW* I, 6; *NC* I, 5).
possible individual apple trees may be understood together, and even less is it merely a concept which will acquire objective reality. It is in contrast a structural principle, that is grounded in the temporal world order, and determined by God's creative will.]

In this passage, Dooyeweerd rejects realism (the view that the apple tree in general is an individual real thing) and he also rejects nominalism (the view that the apple tree is merely a name grouping all individual apple trees together. Dooyeweerd sees true individuality in the supra-individual selfhood (NC II, 418: “the ultimate individual,” “the fullness of individuality). And that is a very different view than beginning with individual things and abstracting universals.

6. Stoker’s Objections

Stoker argued that Dooyeweerd’s rejection of substance resulted in a thing being only “the sum of its functions plus time.” Stoker called this an “empty coherence of time.” Dooyeweerd responded that Stoker’s objection did not make sense. First of all, cosmic time is not something that we can place alongside of functions:

Time is not an external something that joins itself to the various functions.
But as previously established in the general theory of the modal spheres, the various functions are intrinsically temporal in character. Even in the modal structures of meaning, cosmic time is always present in anticipating and retrocipating functions (NC III, 64)

The functions themselves are understandable only in terms of time. And as we shall see, the modal spheres are not the same as functions. Second, the continuity of time, in which the identity of things is based, is not “empty.” The continuity of cosmic time is “filled with reality” and “reality cannot be resolved into its modal functions” (NC III, 76; also Grenzen 64). By being “filled with reality” Dooyeweerd is referring to the fact that temporal reality is a refraction of totality, or the fullness of reality. And this reality cannot be resolved into its modal functions. For totality is more than the coherence of the modal law-spheres. An individuality structure is more than the sum of its functions (NC III, 63). That would again be an additive view of reality, as opposed to a view that begins with totality.

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7. Our experience begins with individuality structures

Dooyeweerd's philosophy says that naive experience does not begin with individual things but with individuality structures.

Nu is in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee een der grondstellingen, dat de tijdelijke werkelijkheid zich in de naïve ervaring explicite slechts in haar individualiteits-structuren geeft en dat ook de individueele, aan deze ervaring vertrouwde, dingen door haar slechts in deze structuren worden gevatt. (‘Substantiebegrip’ 65-66).

[Now one of the fundamental points of the Philosophy of the law-Idea is that temporal reality explicitly gives itself in naive experience only in its individuality-structures, and that therefore the individual who has been entrusted with this experience, grasps things only in these structures.]

Why is this so fundamental? Because if we do not accept this idea, we will soon find ourselves back in the position of believing that our pre-theoretical experience is of things that have a structure, instead of things that are a structure. And on the other hand, without this idea of an individuality structure, we will not have an answer to metaphysical explanations that deny the reality of thing-hood:

To all of these speculative misunderstandings naïve experience implicitly takes exception by persisting in its pre-theoretical conception of things, events and social relationships in their integral structures of individuality.

[NC III:28]

In other words, our temporal world of things and events is not to be explained away as an illusion, as for example is attempted in philosophical monism. But although he emphasizes the reality of thing-hood, it is not thing-hood in the sense of singular and individual objects! Dooyeweerd objects to the view that our pre-theoretical experience is of separate entities. Such a view was held by Scheler, who said, “There is nothing more certain than the fact that all the objects given in natural observation, are given as singular and individual objects.” Dooyeweerd responds:

It is of great methodological importance to point out that by limiting my theoretical attention to this concrete natural thing, I am actually engaged in a theoretical abstraction. In veritable naïve experience, things are not experienced as completely separate entities. This point is ignored or rather denied by Scheler. It must be emphasized, however, if we are to understand the plastic horizon of reality, and if we are to avoid a naturalistic and atomistic interpretation of the latter. (NC III, 54).
Dooyeweerd says that Scheler has already theorized our experience, for we do not experience separate things in naïve experience. The isolation of the individual is already a theoretical act! And although theoretical thought likes to start with the simple and proceed to the complex, the “simple” only occurs “in the full complexity of a universal interlacement of structures.” There is no simple thing, because no single structure of individuality can be realized but in inter-structural intertwinements with other individuality-structures (*NC III*, 627). There is a universal order of interlacing coherence of all the temporal individuality-structures (*NC III*, 632).

If we do not experience individual, separate things in naïve experience, then it is incorrect to say that our pre-theoretical is directed to the individual and that our theoretical experience is directed to the universal. Such a view depends on the idea that the modal aspects are abstracted from concrete things. Dooyeweerd criticizes just such a viewpoint in his last article ‘*Gegenstandsrelatie*’:

> But this opinion clearly depends on the thought that I have already rejected in principle–that the modal structures are only given to us in their supposed individualization within the individuality structures of concrete things, events, social relations and so on and that their universal modal character can only be discovered through theoretical abstraction from out of these individuality structures. (*Gegenstandsrelatie* 90)

It may be objected that surely Dooyeweerd is wrong, for don’t we experience separate entities when we perceive them by our senses? Dooyeweerd rejects that kind of empiricism:

> One should not be led astray by the fact that physiology and empirical psychology tell us that separated impressions come from the outer world into our sensory organs, or, through them, into our sub-consciousness. For our real experience as *Erlebnis* always has structure and embraces reality within structures of individual totality. These latter cannot have the character of a pure subjective synthesis. Rather they are the transcendental frameworks both of experience and reality. (*Transcendental Problems* 32-33, ft. 2).

Dooyeweerd’s view of individuality structures, and of our experience of them as always occurring in an enkaptic interlacement of those structures, is a radical challenge to the kind of empiricist view of reality that we are accustomed to. Contemporary philosophy also challenges modernism’s empiricism. But Dooyeweerd’s views of individuality
structures and *enkapsis* provide a very different answer than the response of postmodernism. Postmodernism tends to deny all forms of totality. Dooyeweerd’s view depends on the idea of a supratemporal totality that is individuated in time.

**IX. Conclusion**

Max Wundt, one of the philosophers of totality, is one of the likely sources for Dooyeweerd’s ideas of individuality structures and their enkaptic interrelations. Philosophy of totality requires a rejection of any idea of substance. Instead, the temporal things and events that are individuated from out of totality are understood in terms of structure that individuates from out of totality. Dooyeweerd’s idea of *enkapsis*, its sources, and criticism of those sources finds strong parallels in Wundt. Dooyeweerd’s failure to acknowledge Wundt’s influence can be explained by Wundt’s National Socialism. Although ideas of totality can be misused to support totalitarian politics, I have shown in ‘Totality’ that Dooyeweerd’s use of these ideas is distinctly different, in that he applies another principle from the philosophy of totality, especially as found in Kuyper, the principle of sphere sovereignty.

The comparison with Wundt and the philosophy of totality is helpful in showing how Dooyeweerd’s understanding of individuality structures is very different than how it has been interpreted by succeeding reformational philosophers. Some of the differences emphasized by Dooyeweerd are as follows: (1) To reject the idea of substance is not merely to believe that things were created. (2) Temporal things do not exist in themselves. (3) Temporal things have no existence except in relation to the selfhood as religious root. Even the selfhood exists as meaning in relation to the Origin. (4) We must reject any idea of temporal individuality that assumes more than existence as meaning (5) The kind of functionalism that sees the aspects as functions of things is a new version of substance theory. (6) Our pre-theoretical experience is never of isolated individuals, but of individuality structures. (7) It is incorrect to view pre-theoretical experience as that of the individual and theory as that of the universal; the difference is in continuity and discontinuity of cosmic time (8) Individuality structures are not structures of things that exist apart from the structure. Law and subject are two sides of temporal reality. (9) We never experience individuality structures in isolation, but only in enkaptic
interlacements with other structures. Everything temporal is interrelated, in interlocking, interwoven individuality structures. (10) Individuality structures are architectonic structures of the modal aspects, which individuate first from out of totality and therefore have an ontological priority over things and events. (11) Modal aspects are not functions. Individuality structures are based on modal aspects and then those structures function in those aspects. (12) Modal aspects are not properties or qualities of things. (13) Temporal things have only a relative individuality. True individuality is found in the supratemporal fullness of reality. (14) Individuality structures are more than the sum of their functions. (15) Leading functions are central in the temporal unfolding of the individual structure. (16) Temporal individuality is given by the duration of cosmic time, as opposed to the order of cosmic time. (17) Things endure only as long as their structure. An individual thing is only a relative unity in a multiplicity of functions.

The philosophy of totality is essential for understanding Dooyeweerd’s ideas of individuality structures and *enkapsis*. He says that the immanence standpoint, which denies a supratemporal totality, can never arrive at a true understanding of the structures of individuality. Reformational philosophy has tried to interpret Dooyeweerd without this idea of a supratemporal totality and religious root. It has thereby missed the truly radical significance of these ideas.

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