Dooyeweerd, Marlet and the new Catholic theology:
From Franz von Baader to Pope Benedict XVI

By

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I. Introduction

In his 1964 lecture to the Association for Calvinistic Philosophy, Herman Dooyeweerd says that recent Roman Catholic theology expresses ideas that come very close to his own philosophy. These developments had caused Dooyeweerd to change his mind about publishing Volume II of his planned trilogy *Reformation and Scholasticism*. He had planned that volume as a polemic against scholasticism. But the book had now lost its point (1964 lecture, 9-10). He says that Roman Catholic theology is now moving in a direction opposed to scholasticism; it has now raised the following ideas: (1) it speaks about man’s radical corruption (2) it opposes any split between a domain of philosophy belonging to natural light of reason and a domain of theology belonging to the divine light of revelation (3) it denies the autonomy of thought (4) it affirms the religious center of man.

Dooyeweerd refers to the doctoral dissertation of the Jesuit Fr. J. Marlet as an example of these developments in Roman Catholicism. Ten years before Dooyeweerd’s lecture, G.C. Berkouwer had expressed strong criticism of Marlet’s dissertation; Berkouwer


found much more divergence than agreement between Dooyeweerd and Marlet. Why then does Dooyeweerd continue to express his appreciation for Marlet? In my view, it is because Berkouwer did not devote enough attention to the ideas that are shared by Dooyeweerd and Marlet. Berkouwer’s concern was too theological; he focused on whether or not this new theology is in continuity with previous Roman Catholic theology. But in his 1964 lecture, Dooyeweerd makes it clear that it is not theological agreement that is important, but agreement regarding the central religious [i.e. supratemporal] truths. Dooyeweerd gives as an example his agreement with a Remonstrant preacher. He says,

If I had been theologically inclined against you and you of course would have theologically defended yourself, then we would again have stood over against each other in accordance with the old labels. Yesterday evening you suddenly heard me speaking in tongues. You have heard what binds us together. And that is not a trifling matter. For I have spoken about the very deepest truths from the Bible, and there we can find each other (1964 Discussion, 21).

For Dooyeweerd, these central and deepest truths concern our religious supratemporal root or selfhood, and the central driving force of God’s Word in our heart. Ecumenism is based on this work of God in our heart, and not on theology.

A year and a half later, in his farewell lecture (afscheidscollege) on Oct 16, 1965, Dooyeweerd states that his agreement with Marlet was not theological, for Marlet himself objected to what he believed to be Dooyeweerd’s theological background. Dooyeweerd says that the agreement with Marlet was based on the shared idea of a transcendental philosophy. And that in turn relies on a view of a transcendent selfhood, which Dooyeweerd refers to in this same farewell lecture as “the key of self-knowledge.” Dooyeweerd says that Abraham Kuyper rediscovered this key, the idea of the religious

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5 See also Dooyeweerd’s use of the phrase, “key of knowledge” in his book *In the Twilight of Western Thought*. See my discussion of this issue in my article “Image of God and Wisdom of God; Theosophical Themes in Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy,” online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Imagination.html] ['Imagination'], especially Appendix D, pages 170-176, where I set out various excerpts from *Twilight*. 

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root of human existence. And it is this idea of religious root that allows us to overcome the dualism of nature and grace, and that allows us to overcome the idea of an autonomous area of natural reason.

Doooyeweerd says that Marlet must have recognized that the central biblical ground motive of the Philosophy of the Law Idea is not of a theoretical-theological nature, and that it has an ecumenical character accepted by the Holy Universal Christian Church at all times. This Church is not built or maintained by humans, but by the power of God’s Word and Spirit within the human heart, the root of man’s existence:

Daarom is dit grondmotief, dat in zijn radicale bijbelse zin de mens in de wortel zijner existentie raakt, dat heel ons leven en denken in Christus een nieuwe richting wijst en ons oproept tot een dagelijkse strijd tegen de afvallige neiging van ons hart, ook het ware reformerend beginsel voor ons wetenschappelijk denken…

[That is why this ground motive, which affects man in the root of his existence, which shows in Christ a new direction for all our life and thought, and which calls us to a daily battle against the apostate inclination of our heart, is also the true reforming principle for our scientific thought…]

As already mentioned, Doooyeweerd refers to four ways that the new Catholic theology has approached his own philosophy. These four ways are all related to this idea of the supratemporal religious root. It is because of man’s religious root that (1) man’s corruption is radical (i.e., in the root, from which our rationality and all other functions proceed) (2) there can be no split between nature and grace (3) there can be no autonomy of thought and (4) man has a religious center.

In previous articles, I have shown how Doooyeweerd’s idea of the supratemporal selfhood as religious root can be traced back to the influence of the Christian theosophist, Franz von Baader. Doooyeweerd obtained this idea from Abraham Kuyper. But as Lieuwe


Mietus has shown, Kuyper’s idea of the supratemporal heart—the center of human existence—was derived from J.H. Gunning, Jr., who obtained it from Baader. And in my own research, I have shown that Kuyper specifically praised Baader for his opposition to the idea of the autonomy of thought (Friesen 2003b, 2007, 2011).

In this article, I will show that Baader also influenced the new Catholic theology, which Marlet relies on. In particular, I will look at Baader’s influence on the theologians Henri de Lubac, Erich Przywara, and Hans Urs von Von Balthasar. It is not that Dooyeweerd and these Catholic theologians somehow came up with the same ideas. Rather, they were inspired by the same source. By looking at these sources, we obtain a better understanding of both Catholic theology and Dooyeweerd’s philosophy.

I will first refer to some key points in Marlet’s dissertation to show his understanding of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, and the correspondence in their ideas. I will then show how the new Catholic theologians relied on Baader in arriving at these conclusions. Finally, I will briefly address some problems in Marlet’s analysis of Dooyeweerd.

II. Marlet’s dissertation

A. Marlet’s understanding of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy

Marlet’s summary of the Philosophy of the Law-idea makes a good introduction to Dooyeweerd. Marlet interprets Dooyeweerd on the basis of what Dooyeweerd himself says is important: the idea of the supratemporal selfhood, the idea of cosmic time, and the idea of the Gegenstand-relation as the basis of theoretical thought.

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Marlet refers to the importance for Dooyeweerd of the idea the heart as the religious center of man’s being (Marlet 28). The heart as religious center is basic to Dooyeweerd’s philosophical anthropology, and that philosophical anthropology is basic to his whole philosophy. Marlet demonstrates this by referring to the concluding pages of Dooyeweerd’s *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*[^9]. Dooyeweerd’s conclusion to this three-volume work bears the heading, “De plaats van de mens in den kosmos als eigenlijk grondthema van de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee” [Man’s place in the cosmos as actually the basic theme of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea]. And Dooyeweerd’s conclusion refers specifically to the supratemporal nature of man’s selfhood or heart [“boven-tijdelijke zelfheid in den religieuzen wortel van zijn bestaan;” see *WdW* III, 627]. And Dooyeweerd says that his thesis is that the central question “Who is man?” is both the beginning and the end of philosophical reflection (*NC* III, 783). The central sphere of human existence “transcends the temporal horizon” (*NC* III, 784).

Marlet refers to this selfhood as “transcendent” (Marlet 36). And it is clear that he understands Dooyeweerd to be referring to a supratemporal religious root-unity. This is clear from Marlet’s discussion of the modal aspects. The unity of the modal aspects is supratemporal. The modal aspects have sphere sovereignty precisely only because of this supratemporal unity:

> Weil die modalen Strukturen nur eine überzeitliche Einheit besitzen und nur auf einen überzeitlichen Generalnenner zurückgeführt werden können, sind die Gesetzeskreise einander gegenüber irreduzibel, haben jeder für sich Souveränität im eigenen Kreis (Marlet, 49)

>[Because the modal structures posses only a supratemporal unity, and can only be reduced to a supratemporal common denominator, the [temporal] modal laws are mutually irreducible to each other. That is why each modal law has sovereignty in its own sphere.]

The modal aspects, which are investigated in theoretical thought, cannot be understood apart from their root supratemporal unity. It is because of that supratemporal unity that

[^9]: Marlet 30, fn36, citing Herman Dooyeweerd: *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, (Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1935-36) [*WdW*]. See *WdW* III, 626. This was translated and revised as *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997; Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1969; first published 1953) [*NC*]. The corresponding reference is at *NC* III, 783.
the modal aspects have sphere sovereignty within cosmic time. In his 1964 Lecture, Dooyeweerd says that the idea of the modal aspects is one of the least understood ideas of his philosophy (1964 Discussion, 2, 8). It is not surprising that many reformational philosophers have misunderstood the modal aspects, for these philosophers deny the whole idea of supratemporality. But apart from supratemporality, we cannot understand the modal aspects nor their sphere sovereignty. In the last article that he wrote (1974), Dooyeweerd repeats the idea that the modal aspects cannot be understood apart from this supratemporal religious root-unity. He says that without the idea of the transcendent selfhood as religious root, we cannot understand the modal aspects, either in their irreducibility or their coherence. In the same article, Dooyeweerd says that it is a “serious mistake” to view the modal aspects as abstractions from temporal reality. Theoretical abstraction is not the abstraction of properties and laws, but the abstraction from the continuity of time.10

Because Marlet emphasizes Dooyeweerd’s idea of the supratemporality of the heart, he also understands Dooyeweerd’s view of theoretical thought as a Gegenstand relation. Dooyeweerd says that theoretical thought is the act of our supratemporal selfhood entering into the temporal functions of our own consciousness.11 It is only this act—of the supratemporal selfhood entering the temporal—that allows us to set these temporal

10 Herman Dooyeweerd: “De Kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de Logische Subject-Objectrelatie,” *Philosophia Reformata* 40 (1975) 83-101 ['Gegenstandsrelatie']. Online at: [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/Kentheoretische.html]. In this same article, Dooyeweerd criticizes those who have rejected the idea of the Gegenstand-relation. Dooyeweerd says that their thought results in a logicism with genuine antinomies, and that their epistemology is indistinguishable from that of modernism.

11 Herman Dooyeweerd: *Encyclopedia of Legal Science* (1946), 12, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Encyclopedia.html]:

The meaning synthesis of scientific thought is first made possible when our *self-consciousness*, which as our *selfhood is elevated above time, enters into its temporal meaning functions. This supratemporal selfhood of our human existence is the *religious root of our personality*, which in its individuality participates in the religious root of the human race. (italics Dooyeweerd’s).
functions over against each other in the \textit{Gegenstand}-relation so that we can theoretically analyze the nature of the modal aspects of our consciousness.

Marlet correctly says that Dooyeweerd’s idea of the modal aspects is related to the temporal structure (the temporal functions) of our transcendent (supratemporal) selfhood. That is why the nature of theoretical thought cannot be understood apart from the supratemporal selfhood, which functions in the same temporal coherence:


[Such abstraction is possible because it takes place in the same temporal coherence that is rooted in the structure of the transcendent unity of the selfhood—a selfhood that experiences all the [temporal] aspects as its own because it functions in all of these aspects. As a creaturely unity, this transcendent unity of the selfhood participates in the religious root of creation, and in this way is concentrically directed to the [divine, not creaturely] Unity of Origin. This concentric relation is the structural law of the selfhood […]. This structural law, the law of “religious concentration,” means that all self-knowledge is completely determined by knowledge of God. And in the case of fallen man, self-knowledge is completely determined by knowledge of idols.]

By the theoretical \textit{Gegenstand}-relation, our supratemporal selfhood (as center) enters into our temporal functions (of our body). But those functions of our temporal body are identical to the functions of the temporal world. There is a correspondence—an “identity”—between the inner, merely intentional\textsuperscript{12} object and the outer world that is

\textsuperscript{12} ‘Intentional’ is not to be understood in Husserl’s sense of a directness to outer objects, but rather to an inner object formed by our imagination when our supratemporal selfhood analyzes its temporal functions. See my discussion of intentional acts proceeding from our supratemporal selfhood in “Imagination,” p. 56ff.

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given by God’s law. As Marlet says, this identity allows us to experience the aspects as *our own*, because our selfhood participates in these same temporal aspects. This experience of the temporal aspects as *our own* is what Dooyeweerd calls ‘cosmic consciousness,’ where the self knows the relatedness of cosmic reality to its own structure. In contrast to this pre-theoretical consciousness, our theoretical attitude results in ‘cosmological consciousness,’ which deepens our experience and relates it back to the religious root of our existence. Marlet sums up this idea:

> Bei theoretischer Vertiefung erschließt sich die logische Subjektsfunktion des Selbst zum logischen Auseinander- und Gegenüberstellen der Wirklichkeit in deren zeitlichen Aspekten. Und diese Vertiefung vollzieht sich in transzendentaler Richtung, das heißt, ausgerichtet auf die Struktur des transzendenten Selbst das sich in der Sinnverschiedenheit und dem nunmehr gegliederten Sinnzusammenhang all seiner Funktionen, nach seiner transzendenten Einheit in der religiösen Wurzel seiner Existenz, jetzt kosmologisch bewußt wird. (Marlet 39-40).

> [In theoretical deepening [of thought], the logical subject function of the selfhood opens up the temporal aspects of reality by setting these aspects apart and over against each other. And this deepening completes itself in the transcendent direction. In other words, it is aligned with the structure of the transcendent Self, which—in the diversity of meaning and the actual articulated coherence of meaning of all of its functions—becomes]

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13 “Theoretical intuition is operative in deepened analysis itself, and only by its intermediary is theoretical thought able to analyse the “Gegenstand” in the intermodal synthesis of meaning. In this intuition I implicitly relate the intermodal meaning-synthesis to the transcendent identity of the modal functions I experience in the religious root of my existence” (NC II, 478-79; WdW II, 413). For an extended discussion of this identity between inner and outer, see my article “Imagination” at pages 122-126.

14 The idea “our own” has not been sufficiently explored by reformational philosophy. See my Glossary Entry for ‘own’ at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Own.html]. It is our intuition that makes us aware of our temporal functions as “our own.” Dooyeweerd says that even the identification of a sensation such as a sweet taste would be impossible without intuition:

> How could I really be aware of a sweet taste, if I could not relate this sensory impression to myself, by means of my intuition entering into the cosmic stream of time? (NC II, 478; WdW II, 413).
cosmologically aware of its transcendent unity in the religious root of its existence].

Thus, the deepening of theoretical thought is itself a religious act, since it relates our experience to a deeper religious root. This is also what Dooyeweerd says: in acts of theoretical thought, we relate our theoretical synthesis to the identity of functions that we experience in the religious root of our existence. God’s law is a law of concentration towards the supratemporal religious root. The cosmic temporal coherence is directed towards our supratemporal selfhood, which in turn is directed to the eternal Origin.

Theoretical thought therefore is related to Dooyeweerd’s three transcendental ideas: (1) the temporal coherence in cosmic time (2) the creaturely and transcendent unity of the selfhood and (3) the eternal and divine Origin. These three ideas correspond to three levels of time: cosmic time, the supratemporal aevum, and eternity. Marlet says that the structural horizon of human experience is given as a cosmic horizon of time in the indissoluble coherence and order of the aspects in cosmic time. And it is given as a transcendent horizon in the self, as the individual center of human existence, from which our theoretical act of thought proceeds. Finally, it is given in the supra-individual religious root in which the selfhood participates as it is concentrically directed to the Origin (Marlet, 39).

15 Cosmological consciousness (theoretical) is contrasted by Dooyeweerd with cosmic consciousness (which is merely pre-theoretical and naïve). See my Glossary entry at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Consciousness.html].
16 “In this [theoretical] intuition I implicitly relate the intermodal meaning-synthesis to the transcendent identity of the modal functions I experience in the religious root of my existence” (NC II, 478-79; WdW II, 413).
17 It is a mistake to view the Philosophy of the Law-Idea as a philosophy of universals that are abstracted from individual things. That is an Aristotelian view of theory. See Friesen 2010. Marlet is correct: what is important for Dooyeweerd is the concentric movement towards the supratemporal center, by which the peripheral temporal reality is fulfilled.
18 Marlet seems to distinguish between individual supratemporal heart and supra-individual religious root. Dooyeweerd does speak of the root as supra-individual. But it can be disputed whether his idea is of an individual supratemporal heart or whether a supratemporal supra-individual heart is individuated solely in time:
Marlet says that for Dooyeweerd, our intuition is related to our heart or innermost self. Our heart is where we have the fullness of knowledge or intuition. It is because of our innermost self that we can form ideas of God, self and the cosmic coherence of the cosmos. These ideas direct any concepts that we may have of coherence (Marlet, 104-105). This is confirmed by what Dooyeweerd says elsewhere. It is only because we both transcend time and are immanently “fitted into” temporal reality that we can perform the theoretical act of synthesis of meaning:

The possibility of meaning-synthesis can only be explained on the basis of what we previously said in a more summary manner concerning the structure of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness transcends cosmic time, insofar as the individual selfhood participates in the religious root of the human race, from whose fullness of meaning all temporal meaning-functions (both natural as well as spiritual functions) are only temporal refractions. Self-consciousness is immanent within cosmic time, insofar as our functions of consciousness are interwoven within the cosmic order of time. The a-logical meaning functions are not foreign to our self-consciousness. They are all together owned by our selfhood. It is only because of this that we can learn to know them in their meaningful conformity to law. [my translation]

And within the temporal horizon man's self-consciousness does not from the outset have a static individuality. Rather it becomes more and more individual. This takes place in a process of development which is also historically determined (NC II, 594; WdW II, 529).

19 Note the difference between ‘idea’ and ‘concept.’
20 Herman Dooyeweerd: De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer, in het licht eener Calvinistische kosmologie en kennistheorie (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1931), 103:

De mogelijkheid der zin-synthesis is slechts op te klaren vanuit de door ons vroeger summier aangegeven opvatting i.z. de structuur van het zelfbewustzijn. Het zelfbewustzijn transcendeert den kosmischen tijd, inzoverre de individueele zelfheid deel heeft aan den religieuzen wortel van het menschegeslacht, van welks zinvolheid alle tijdelijke zin-functies (zoowel natuur- als geestesfuncties) slechts tijdelijke zinbrekingen zijn. Het is immanent aan den kosmischen tijd, in zooverre onze bewustzijnsfuncties in de kosmische tijdsorde zijn ingevlochten. De a-logical zinfuncties zijn niet vreemd aan het zelfbewustzijn. Ze zijn alle gezamenlijk eigen aan onze zelfheid. Alleen daarom kunnen wij ze in hare zin-wetmatigheid leeren kennen.
For Dooyeweerd, our intuition relates our supratemporal selfhood to our functions in time. For our intuition relates the theoretical intermodal meaning-synthesis to the transcendent identity of the modal functions experienced in our religious root. For it is our intuition that shows us that our temporal functions are “our own” Our intuition of time allows us to "enter into the temporal cosmos" and to set apart and combine the modal aspects in theoretical thought. This is because it is an intuition of time (NC II, 478-480). And it is only because of our supratemporal selfhood that we can form Ideas of the transcendental supratemporal conditions that make all thought possible, while nevertheless remaining bound to philosophy.\(^{21}\) Even the aspects are described as “modes of intuition” [schouwingswijzen].\(^{22}\)

Marlet cites Dooyeweerd that theoretical thought, when practiced correctly, is done by subjecting our [transcendent] subjective intuition to the cosmic or temporal law-order. And this requires a belief in divine Revelation in Christ, who in the self-revelation of God also reveals man to himself. Man is revealed as the religious root unity of his creaturely existence, in which the whole meaning of the temporal cosmos is concentrated (Marlet, 40).

Marlet also gives a good account of Dooyeweerd’s idea of individuality structures: they are individual wholes in the diversity of modal aspects. The individual thing is given in a totality structure, which groups the distinguished aspects of its reality into a typical totality (Marlet, 52ff).

Marlet regards Dooyeweerd’s philosophy as falling within the Catholic tradition of Christian transcendence philosophy. Such transcendence philosophy holds that there is a

\(^{21}\) “Therefore by maintaining the Gegenstand-relation, the theoretical Idea relates the theoretical concept to the conditions of all theoretical thought, but itself remains theoretical in nature, thus within the bounds of philosophic thought.” Herman Dooyeweerd: *Encyclopedia of the Science of Law* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002) [‘Encyclopedia’], 80-81, re-translated by myself. See also my glossary entry for ‘intuition,’ online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Intuition.html].

religious basic structure, a structural a priori. Marlet distinguishes such a structural a priori from our subjective views of such a structure. Ground-Motives are subjective views, and not to be identified with the ontical structure itself. Again, this corresponds to Dooyeweerd’s distinction between ontical conditions and subjective presuppositions of thought that seek to approximate those ontical conditions.  

Marlet emphasizes that religious Ground-Motives [Leitmotive] are not final or static propositions. Rather, they are subjective dynamic tendencies. And there are really only two tendencies: (1) the tendency to absolutize what is merely human when one proceeds from the apostate root of existence and (2) the desire for salvation and complete surrender, which proceeds from God’s grace in Christ. Accordingly, a standpoint of religious synthesis compromises the supratemporal in that supposes that the present temporal, fleeting and interim tension is a permanent one. Similarly, Dooyeweerd speaks of two primary Ground-Motives: the biblical and the apostate. There are two central springs operative in the heart (NC I, 61). Dooyeweerd subdivides the apostate Ground Motive into three subtypes: the Greek form/matter motive, the scholastic nature/grace motive, and the enlightenment nature/freedom motive.

Marlet says that the ontical religious basic structure has its basis in creation, fall, and redemption in Christ. But this basic religious structure also shows an articulation (Gliederung); the structure concerns not only Christ, but also we who participate in Him. As Christ says, He is the vine, we are the branches. Or as Paul says, “We in Christ.” And Marlet cites John 15:5: “Whoever abides in me and in whom I abide, he brings forth much fruit, for without me he can do nothing.” Marlet says that this is an insight not of

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23 In his Encyclopedia of the Science of Law, Dooyeweerd distinguishes between subjective presuppositions [vooronderstellingen] and “that which is presupposed” [de vooronderstelde]. The transcendental Ideas of Origin, Totality and temporal coherence, are “subjective presuppositions.” They only point towards “what is presupposed.” Subjective presuppositions are our Ideas as hypotheses, pointing towards the supratemporal a priori conditions that make our Ideas possible. These a priori conditions are “what is presupposed,” but they are not themselves Ideas or even propositions. Unfortunately, the present translation of the Encyclopedia does not make this clear. See my article "Dooyeweerd's Encyclopedia of the Science of Law: Problems with the present translation,” online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Translation.pdf].

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Greek philosophy, but of revelation (Marlet, 108). He cites J. Danielou for the way that the Christian idea of creation has defended against Greek ideas (Marlet, 110).

**B. A comparison of Marlet and Dooyeweerd**

Dooyeweerd refers to Marlet as an example of how Roman Catholic thought has approached his own philosophy. Let us now look at some of the similarities that Dooyeweerd mentions, as enumerated in his 1964 Lecture:

1. **Man’s radical corruption**

   Marlet agrees that man is radically corrupt since the fall, and that we cannot rely on rationality alone. He refers to rationalism as original sin (“erbsündliche Rationalismus des menschlichen Denkens”) (Marlet 128).

   Although Marlet continues to speak in terms of nature and grace, he does not use these terms in a dualistic way, but he says that man’s nature presupposes grace, and that man’s nature is directed from within towards grace. Man as a concrete person has been affected by sin in his very root, the center of the person, which constitutes and forms his wholeness. Grace restores again the right relation to God in the innermost center of the person. And this redemption is the point of departure of the all-encompassing recognition of God in the structural whole of man’s temporal existence. But we must distinguish between this harmony in man’s heart, and the temporal tension in everything that is unfolds temporally and that is structurally based on the heart. This temporal area of tension includes service to others, the realm of values, and the unfolding of what is human. It also includes our act of thinking. Even when our thinking proceeds from a regenerated heart, it still has traces of original and historical sin. Marlet cites with approval the view of Étienne Gilson and Henri de Lubac that even after baptism, traces of the old worldview and the autonomous thought of Aristotle remain (Marlet, 99). He also cites Hans Urs von Balthasar that man has the capacity for religious knowledge, but that there is a moral impossibility of our having such knowledge (Marlet, 97). Again, this is similar to Dooyeweerd’s view that the religious antithesis cuts transversally through the heart of everyone, including Christians (NC I, 524).
2. No split between natural reason and divine revelation

Marlet also agrees with Dooyeweerd in opposing a two-storey, dualistic view of reality (Marlet 67). He specifically opposes any division into a realm of nature and a realm of grace.

3. Rejection of the idea of autonomy of thought

In the very first sentence of Marlet’s dissertation, he rejects the autonomy of thought. Marlet refers to the religious nature of philosophical thought in contrast to autonomous conceptual tendencies. Marlet says that the Vatican Council of 1870 opposed the autonomy of thought. It opposed both the rationalistic and the irrationalistic errors of autonomous reason (Marlet, 82-83, 90).

Marlet characterizes Dooyeweerd’s philosophy as Christian transcendence philosophy, a philosophy that is conscious of its Christian revelation a priori (Marlet, 101). Christian philosophy is rooted not only in Aquinas but in tradition. The Encyclical “Aeterni Patris” (1879) refers to Aquinas, but only “as an example” of Christian philosophy. Marlet relies here on Henri de Lubac, Hans Urs von Balthasar and Erich Przywara (Marlet, 84, 93-95).

True philosophy is concrete reflection, which includes both the Augustinian line emphasizing the existential, and the Aristotelian-Thomist line that emphasizes the scientific function.

Marlet is careful not to accept the Cartesian ideal of philosophy as merely conceptual; that would raise the danger of philosophy as one-sidedly understood from out of the personal center, and it would give only temporary meaning that would be fulfilled through theology (Marlet, 102).

4. Affirmation of the religious center of man.

Marlet is also in agreement with the idea of man’s heart as the religious center. He cites J.B. Lotz regarding the deep structure or ground of the soul,

…in dem alle Kräfte der Seele ihre einzige Wurzel haben” oder auch Herz genannt. “Herz bezeichnet das Innerste des Menschen, die einige Mitte, aus der all sein Denken, Wollen und Tun emporsteigt, und die all dies als bloße Teilenfaltungen eines einzigen Gesamtlebensvollzuges zusammenhält…Vom Herzen wird gesagt, es sei unruhig; Unruhe oder
Ruhelosigkeit bildet geradezu sein Wesen... Tatsächlich aber ist die Unruhe gerade Folge, Ausdruck und Offenbarwerden der tiefen Gerichtetheit des Herzens, seiner Gerichtetheit auf Gott, der uns und damit besonders unseren Seelengrund oder unser Herz zu sich selbst hin erschaffen hat.²⁴

[...in which all powers have the soul have their single root, which is also referred to as ‘heart.’ ‘Heart’ means the innermost part of man, the unified center, from which ascends all his thinking, willing and acting, and which holds together all of these as mere partial unfoldings from a single power of our total life...It is said of the heart that it is restless; unrest or restlessness immediately forms its essence...However the unrest is actually a consequence, expression and a being revealed of the deepest directedness of the heart, its directedness to God, who has created us and thereby especially the ground of our soul, our Heart, towards himself.]

Marlet also cites W. Couturier (1903-1992)²⁵, who followed Karl Rahner and Johannes B. Lotz. Couturier says,

L’esprit human...ne peut être compris que comme intérieurité qui se meut vers soi-même à travers une extériorité, formée par lui, dans laquelle et par laquelle il se realise. Or, cette extériorité de l’esprit human c’est la réalité du corps (Marlet, 124).

[The human spirit...cannot be understood except as an interiority that moves towards itself across an exteriority formed by itself, and in which and by which it realizes itself. Now, this exteriority of the human spirit is the reality of the body.]

Marlet says that part of this idea is evident in H. Robbers, one of the first Catholics to comment on Dooyeweerd’s work.²⁶ Robbers relied on Maurice Blondel, Karl Rahner, Jean Maréchal, and de Petter for the idea that philosophical thought would be impossible


without the religious root of our personality, our self. Karl Rahner was certainly aware of Franz von Baader. This is evident from his review of Spreckelmeyer’s book on Baader.\(^{27}\)

And Jean Maréchal (1878-1944) wrote *Psychology of the Mystics*.\(^{28}\) Dooyeweerd owned a copy of this book, as is evident by the list of that part of his personal library that was incorporated in the library of the Free University.\(^{29}\) I find it fascinating that Maréchal was aware of and cites the reformed theologian Chantepie de la Saussaye (p. 141 fn 106). De la Saussaye, together with J.H. Gunning, Jr., founded the school of ethical theology. They were both highly influenced by Baader, and together introduced Abraham Kuyper to Baader’s ideas, including the all-important idea of the heart as man’s supratemporal center.\(^{30}\) I have elsewhere provided a detailed examination of the influence of J.H. Gunning, Jr. and Chantepie de la Saussaye on both Kuyper and Dooyeweerd (Friesen 2011). I also find it interesting that Maréchal cites (at p. 350), the Hindu Scriptures, the *Isa Upanishad,*

The man who understands that all creatures subsist only in God, and who is acquainted with the unity of being, has no sadness or illusion. The relation between these ideas and those of the selfhood are too complex to detail in this article. It is sufficient to point out that the psychologist C.G. Jung also obtained his idea of the selfhood from the Upanishads. So did the psychologist Frederik van Eeden, who more directly influenced Dooyeweerd (Friesen 2011). And Dooyeweerd’s denial of the idea of substance as well as the idea that we have any existence in ourselves is related to this idea of subsistence only in God. Nevertheless, as I have argued before, the idea of


\(^{29}\) Dooyeweerd Archives, Amsterdam (*Lade* I, 3).

\(^{30}\) See my review of Mietus’s book on Gunning (endnote 8).

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“unity of being” tends towards a monistic view of reality, and one that I do not find in Dooyeweerd. Rather, there is a non-dual unity in duality.  

For Robbers, philosophical thought can only be understood as a religious act of the self [Selbstätigkeit], expressing itself or acting within the temporal, theoretical area (Marlet, 76). But Marlet also says that these ideas of Robbers cannot be reconciled with Robbers’ more traditional ideas of nature and grace. Marlet says that H. Robbers responded to Dooyeweerd’s critique from out of the nature/grace schema (Marlet, 74)

III. Baader as a common source of ideas

Marlet tends to view both Dooyeweerd’s philosophy and the new Catholic theology as proceeding independently towards the same idea of a Christian philosophy of transcendence. His argument would have been stronger if he had shown that both were strongly influenced by the same source: the Christian theosophical ideas of Franz von Baader. Baader was a Roman Catholic who was also attracted to Orthodoxy. He tried to unite Catholics, Protestants and the Orthodox Church. Although Marlet is aware of the ethical theology of de la Saussaye and J.H. Gunning, Jr. (Marlet 20), he does not seem to have made the connection between their theology and that of Franz von Baader (Friesen 2011). He also does not know of the influence of these theologians on Kuyper’s idea of the heart, which was taken over by Dooyeweerd. Marlet does distinguish between the genuine reformational line in Kuyper and the other line in Kuyper that is more traditionally dualistic. But the “reformational line” that Dooyeweerd accepted in Kuyper, including the all-important idea of the supratemporal heart, seems to have been derived from Baader, via the theology of J.H. Gunning, Jr. Vollenhoven and his

followers, who continued to be more explicitly Calvinistic, rejected Kuyper’s ideas of the heart and its regeneration, precisely the ideas that Dooyeweerd accepted.\textsuperscript{34}

Marlet refers to the Roman Catholic theologians Erich Przywara, Henri de Lubac, and Hans Urs von Balthasar. All of these theologians were deeply influenced by Baader, both with respect to the idea of the central inner heart of man, and in their rejection of a two-storey nature/grace dualism. It is worthwhile looking in more detail at Baader’s influence on them.

**Henri de Lubac (1896-1991)**

Henri de Lubac rejected a view of nature as separate from grace. In his book Catholicism, he says that when the supernatural is deprived of its organic links with nature, it tends to be understood as a “super-nature,” or a “double” of nature. After such a complete separation, such a theology has nothing to say to naturalistic thought, which emphasizes only nature in its secularized way.\textsuperscript{35}

The book was controversial. During the 1950’s, de Lubac’s teachings regarding supernaturalism were criticized. It was thought that the encyclical *Humani Generis* was directed against him, especially when he was asked to stop publication of his ideas.\textsuperscript{36} De Lubac was later rehabilitated. Pope John Paul II made him a cardinal in February, 1983.

De Lubac continued his critique of the wrong kind of supernaturalism in his book *The Mystery of the Supernatural*:

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\textsuperscript{33} See my review of Mietus’s book on Gunning (endnote 8).


\textsuperscript{36} Dooyeweerd was of the opinion that the encyclical was in fact directed against la nouvelle théologie (1964 Lecture, 9).
While wishing to protect the supernatural from any contamination, people had in fact exiled it altogether—both from intellectual and from social life—leaving the field free to be taken over by secularism.\(^{37}\)

De Lubac argues that such a separated view of “pure nature” does not appear in eastern theology, and that this is explained by the fact that the early Greek tradition did not contain this idea. He also argues that the idea of a pure nature is not to be found in Aquinas, but that it is due to later interpreters, especially Cajetan (1468-1534).

It is evident that de Lubac had a good knowledge of Franz von Baader, including Baader’s correspondence. He says that Baader, like Boehme, is in the tradition of Joachim of Flores. For Baader, Joachim’s third age has already come. There is both the expectation of Christ’s return as well as a present inner return in the depths of our heart.\(^{38}\)

In the same book, de Lubac comments how Baader deflected the theosophist Oetinger from Malebranche’s Christian rationalism (I, 248). As we shall see, Przywara and von Balthasar were students of de Lubac, and they expressly refer to Baader’s rejection of the rationalist idea of the autonomy of thought.

De Lubac also says that Baader believed that evil was not just a privation of the good, but a positive antithesis in principle, a principle that is spiritual, both within us and outside of us. If we could only penetrate beneath the surface of things, we would see the frightening and terrible substantial basis of life and existence. Abraham Kuyper was later to use a similar idea of Baader's in his aesthetics.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{39}\) See “Kuyper use of Franz von Baader,” fn 7 above.

© (2007, 2011) J. Glenn Friesen
Erich Przywara (1889-1972)

Marlet also refers to Erich Przywara, a philosopher of religion and theologian from Munich. He had been a student of Henri de Lubac. Przywara criticized all “extrinsicism” in the doctrine of grace. This incorrect view of grace can be described as follows:

Briefly, this is the theory that there was something like a self-contained human “nature” (natura pura) equipped with its own natural goal to which grace is then added as an undeserved “supplement” and endows the human person with an additional “supernatural” goal.\textsuperscript{40}

Przywara opposed any idea of grace as a discontinuation of nature or as a continuance of a dualism.\textsuperscript{41} There can be no dualism, because there is a relation between God and every field or domain of creation. Przywara expressly refers to Franz von Baader with respect to this problem of nature and grace. He says that Baader is one of the philosophers who rejected the Enlightenment idea of autonomous knowledge. In contrast to Descartes’ view of knowledge as based on “cogito ergo sum” [I think, therefore I am], Baader proposed “cogitor ergo sum” [I am thought, therefore I am].\textsuperscript{42} In place of autonomous thinking, Baader proposed a receiving and moved thought.\textsuperscript{43} It is a knowledge that is already faith.\textsuperscript{44} In Baader there was a “turn from the synthetic unity of the I in its problematic between object and subject to the concrete ‘all.’ Przywara relates this idea to the ideas of

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\textsuperscript{41} Przywara opposed to any idea of grace as “ein Aufhören von Natur oder als Fordauer eines unausgeglichenen Dualismus zwischen ‘Gnade für sich’ and ‘Natur (als verdammliche) in sich.” Erich Przywara: “Die Problematiek der Neuscholastiek,” Kantstudien (1928), 73-98, at 97. It should be noted that Dooyeweerd certainly had access to Kantstudien. Some copies can be found among his personal library, now at the Institute for Christian Studies.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid. 73.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid. 93. “nicht eigenmächtig cogita-re, sondern letztlich empfangendes und bewegtes cogita-ri.”

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid. 94. “ein Wissen, das bereits Glauben ist.”
\end{flushright}
neo-Thomism. He says that in neo-Thomism, the accent is on a “pointing beyond oneself, the readiness for revelation.”

In another article, Przywara says that Baader followed Augustine’s theosophy, a line which continues in some modern Russian philosophers (Solowjew, Berdjajew, Schestow, and Bulgakoff).

Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905-1988)

The Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar was one of the new Catholic theologians who rejected the scholastic dualism between nature and grace. Medard Kehl says that von Balthasar

...belongs with Przywara, de Lubac, Fessard, Daniélo, Douillard, Congar, Hugo Rahner and Karl Rahner, among others, to that generation of theologians who, precisely with the help of the church fathers, gave the final deathblow to the “two-storey-thinking” of the neoscholastic doctrine of grace and thereby overcame the unhealthy—for the encounter of the church with modern consciousness—dualism in Catholic thought between nature and grace, history and revelation, experience and faith (Von Balthasar Reader, 5).

Von Balthasar’s ideas were much admired by Pope John Paul II, as well as by the present Pope Benedict XVI. In 1929, von Balthasar joined the Society of Jesus. Erich Przywara influenced his studies in philosophy. Von Balthasar translated Henri de Lubac’s work Catholicism (1938) into German, referring to it as the “basic book” of theology. He also studied under Henri de Lubac, who inspired him to research the Church Fathers. Von Balthasar wrote important studies on Origen (Parole et mystère chez Origène, 1957), Gregory of Nyssa (Présence et Pensée, 1942), and Maximus the Confessor (Kosmische


46 Erich Przywara “Das Augustinische Geistesmotive und die Krise der Gegenwart” Kantstudien, 1930.

47 At the time of his death in 1988, von Balthasar was about to be made a Cardinal by John Paul II.

48 Together with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict), Von Balthasar founded the journal Communio.
Liturgie, 1941). Von Balthasar said that the Church Fathers should not be read just in terms of speculative knowledge, for they then become boring. Rather, they must be read in terms of the restlessness of the heart. In his introduction to von Balthasar, Stratford Caldecott says,

The true God is to be found wherever the “parallel lines” of this world meet, at the converging-point of the common or “transcendental” properties of being that we call Truth, Goodness and Beauty. It is only in Beauty that Truth is good, and that Goodness is true. By losing the sense of Beauty, by closing the “spiritual senses” that grasp the colours and the contours, the taste and the fragrance of Truth in its radiant body, the theologians had betrayed even the very Master they claimed to serve.

Like Przywara, Von Balthasar was aware of and appreciated the ideas of Franz von Baader. Von Balthasar refers appreciatively to Baader’s rejection of a human reason that is under the illusion of being absolute. And like Przywara, Von Balthasar refers to Baader’s idea that our knowledge is not autonomous, but is based on our being known by God:

If God becomes an object of my reason, he is no longer primarily the eye which sees me and in whose light I behold his light […]. No: God is the one who knows me. There is truth in Franz von Baader’s formula: “cogitor (cognoscor), ergo sum” I am, because God knows me. Paul continually found new and luminous formulations for this fundamental relationship: “Knowledge’ (gnosis) puffs up, but love builds up. If anyone imagines that he knows something, he does not yet know as he ought to know. But if one loves God, one is known by him” (1 Cor. 8:1ff).

[…] “Now I know in part; then I shall understand fully, even as I have been fully understood” (1 Cor. 13:12). Here below it is not a matter of integrity of gnosis but integrity of love, which is elevated and praised by Paul above everything else; the fragmentary nature of our knowledge is a


50 Cf. Dooyeweerd’s idea of the restless nature of temporal creation and of our supratemporal heart. See my Glossary entry on ‘restless’ at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Rest.html].


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Baader had also emphasized the importance of God’s love as the basis for our knowledge.  

We can find other important references by Von Balthasar to Baader. Von Balthasar wrote an Afterword to Valentin Tomberg’s Meditations on the Tarot. Von Balthasar praises the book, although he says that the power of its spiritual vision is primarily in the author’s certainty of the interrelationship between all things by way of analogy. He traces these ideas to Baader:

There are other historical examples analogous to that of the gathering and accommodation of Hermetic and Cabbalistic wisdom into Biblical and Christian thought: above all, the transposition of Chassidism to a modern horizon of thought by Martin Buber (Chassidism is deeply influenced by the Cabballa). However, just as strong in its creative power of transformation is the incorporation of Jacob Boehme’s Christosophy into the Catholic world-conception by the philosopher Franz von Baader. […] The author’s Meditations on the Tarot are in the tradition of the great

52 Hans Urs von Balthasar: Does Jesus Know Us? Do We Know Him? (San Francisco: Ignatious Press, 1983), 54-55.

53 See Ramon J. Betanzos: Franz von Baader’s Philosophy of Love (Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 1998). Baader says that knowledge and love are indissolubly linked (Werke I, 166).
accomplishments of Pico della Mirandola and Franz von Baader, but are independent of them.54

Like the other Roman Catholic theologians relied on by Marlet, Von Balthasar rejects a dualistic separation between nature and grace. Rather, “nature is totally encompassed by grace.” God’s acts are Trinitarian acts of love, which include beholding, giving and revealing, and receiving or adoring.

But whenever the relationship between nature and grace is severed (as happens... where ‘faith’ and ‘knowledge’ are constructed as opposites), then the whole of worldly being falls under the dominion of ‘knowledge’, and the springs and forces of love immanent in the world are overpowered and finally suffocated by science, technology and cybernetics. The result is a world without women, without children, without reverence for love in poverty and humiliation — a world in which power and the profit-margin are the sole criteria, where the disinterested, the useless, the purposeless is despised, persecuted and in the end exterminated — a world in which art itself is forced to wear the mask and features of technique.55

Social issues and ethics cannot be separated from spirituality. Von Balthasar demonstrated this in his personal life in the Community of St John, which he co-founded with Adrienne von Speyr. Medard Kehl writes about von Balthasar’s views of how social issues relate to spirituality:

God’s love for the world in the gift of his Son and in the sacrament of his church—should be recognized in its original “infolding” (Ein-falt), so that it can then also be continually recognized again in is detailed “unfolding” (Aus-faltungen, i.e. in the most varied expressions of faith, dogmatic formulas, sacramental and liturgical forms, social and legal structures of the community of faith, etc.) For Balthasar the original synthesis has its place in theology ahead of all analyses (of a historical-critical, hermeneutical, historical-doctrinal, psychological, and sociological kind). This synthesis integrates in itself all individual moments of faith and brings them forth from itself, but without ever releasing them from this unity (Von Balthasar Reader, 35)


Note how Von Balthasar speaks of the “unfolding” of a theoretical expression from out of the central root unity or synthesis. Dooyeweerd would not use the word ‘synthesis’ to refer to this root unity, and Dooyeweerd would also object to referring to the central root unity as ‘theological.’ And yet we can see many similarities here in an unfolding from a root unity.\(^\text{56}\) And for both Dooyeweerd and von Balthasar, this root unity is situated in the supratemporal, a time-beyond. As von Balthasar says,

> Full integration of temporal life could only be hoped for in a time-beyond in which, with the eternal significance of every moment, there would also be salvaged the sense of direction of the river of time (von Balthasar Reader, 69).

And von Balthasar stresses the need to overcome our ego in favour of a transcendent selfhood:

> Just as the Buddhist has to dissolve the illusion of his I as a substantial center in order to catch sight of the absolute, so, too does the Christian have to dissolve the geocentricity of his self-awareness, in which everything revolves about his psychological ego in favor of a heliocentric, i.e., theocentric worldview, in which the created and graced is both received purely from the central sun of divine grace and allows itself to be determined by it. So much is this divine center the absolute that the word “objective’ in the worldly sense is not applicable to it. It is, according to Augustine, at once “more inward than I am to myself and more sublimely superior to me,” and for this reason coming to me from within as well as from above-without. But in this coming the finite I is posited, affirmed, loved; and indeed not only my I, but that of all persons who in their essential uniqueness and irreplaceability are a radiation of the one God, and indeed become that more the closer they all come to God. Here the particularity of Christian in contrast to Eastern meditation becomes completely evident. (von Balthasar Reader, 340).

Elsewhere, von Balthasar says that relation between nature and grace is exemplified in the attempts to relate theology to the other sciences. He refers to Baader’s attempt to heal this split:

> But the work of transposing the concept of the physical and mental sciences, and articulating them with theology, was bound to become more and more difficult, and post-scholastic theology rarely applied itself to the

\(^{56}\) See Glossary entry for ‘unfolding’ at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Opening.html].
task (in their own way, Nicholas of Cusa, Leibniz and Baader did, but they were not taken up into official theology). For the most part, it confined itself to using a natural theology, antecedent to biblical theology, as a basis for a rational exposition of the latter.\textsuperscript{57} Other favourable comments regarding Baader can be found in von Balthasar’s \textit{The Glory of the Lord}. He refers to Baader in his comments on Soloviev’s style of theological aesthetics.\textsuperscript{58}

\textbf{Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI)}

We have already discussed how Pope Benedict was influenced by Hans Urs von Balthasar and Henri de Lubac. And like those theologians, Pope Benedict also had a positive appreciation of the work of Franz von Baader. In particular, he agreed with Baader’s rejectin of the autonomy of thought. In his 1968 work, \textit{Introduction to Christianity (Einführung in das Christentum)}, Pope Benedict, or Cardinal Ratzinger as he then was, refers to Baader’s statement that it is just as absurd “to deduce the knowledge of God and the knowledge of all other intelligences and non-intelligences from self-knowledge (self-awareness) as to deduce all love from self-love.” Ratzinger says

Here we are confronted with a sharp rejection of the mode of thinking adopted by Descartes, whose grounding of philosophy in self-awareness (“Cogito, ergo sum”: I think, therefore I am) has decisively influenced the fate of the modern mind right down to the present-day forms of transcendental philosophy. Just as self-love is not the primordial form of love but at the most a derivative of it, just as one has only arrived at the specific nature of love when one has grasped it as a relation, that is, something coming from another, so, too, human knowledge is only reality when it is \textit{being} known, being brought to knowledge and thus again “from another”. […] That is why Baader consciously and quite rightly, changed the Cartesian “Cogito, ergo sum” into “Cogitor, ergo sum”: not “I think, therefore I am,” but “I am thought, therefore I am”. Only from man’s being known can his knowledge and he himself be understood (Ratzinger 2004, 246-7).

\textsuperscript{57} Hans Urs von Balthasar: \textit{Word and Redemption} (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965), 56.

\textsuperscript{58} Hans Urs von Balthasar: \textit{The Glory of the Lord}, vol 3: Soloviev Style I and II.

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As we have seen, both Przywara and Von Balthasar also refers to Baader’s idea that our knowledge is not autonomous, but is based on our being known by God. Pope Benedict follows in this same tradition, at least with respect to this issue.

IV. Other issues related to Marlet’s analysis

A. Substance, supratemporality and personality

Marlet is aware of Dooyeweerd’s repeated opposition to the scholastic idea of substance. But Marlet continues to use the word ‘substance.’ Marlet says that the question of the being of existing things is a question relating to the transcendent, supratemporal reality. And this supratemporal reality is the presupposition for the temporal (Marlet, 70). Thus, he interprets substance in terms of our relationship to the supratemporal.59 He cites Dooyeweerd as saying something somewhat similar:

In de vraag naar een boventijdelijk, onvergankelijk zijn der veranderlijke dingen, kon op zich zelve ook uitsluitend de vraag naar het zijn des zijnden, naar den boventijdelijken zijnsgrond in het geding zijn, een vraag, die inderdaad den transcendenten, religieuzen horizon onzer ervaring raakt (WdW III, 4).

[In itself, the question concerning a supratemporal, unchanging being of changing things, can also refer exclusively to the question of the being of existent things, and therefore concern itself with the supratemporal ground of being. That is a question that does indeed concerns the transcendent, religious horizon of our experience.] [my translation]

Based on this idea—that seeking the unchanging being can refer to the supratemporal ground of being—Marlet continues to use the word ‘substance.’ He says that it refers to our true selfhood or personality. Marlet refers to August Brunner in support of this view.

59 Marlet does not support a static idea of the supratemporal. Neither does Dooyeweerd:

This, however, is not to say that the religious centre of human existence is found in a rigid and static immobility. That is a metaphysical-Greek idea of supra-temporality (NC I, 31 fn1)
The passage from the *WdW* that Marlet cited in support of his idea of substance as personal does not appear in the *New Critique*. Dooyeweerd replaces it with several new pages, which include the following remarks:

The question may be raised as to whether metaphysics, in seeking the supra-temporal point of reference of all changeable things, is perhaps primarily concerned with the transcendental basic problem of the radical identity of the I-ness, as the concentration-point of human existence and human experience. The neo-scholastic philosopher August Brunner, who is strongly under the influence of existentialism and modern phenomenology has to some degree interpreted the idea of substance in this sense. According to him this idea should in the first place be related to the personal centre of experience, since only the human person as subject corresponds in an adequate sense to the definition of substance as “*ens in se stans.*” (*NC* III, 5).

Dooyeweerd says that Brunner’s view is “doubtless interesting, but it cannot be accepted as a serious interpretation of the metaphysical concept of substance.” (*NC* III, 6). This additional information in the *New Critique* was published after the appearance of Marlet’s dissertation, and it appears to be in response to Marlet. And so, despite the agreement that Dooyeweerd feels with Marlet, he is not ready to acknowledge that this is a valid interpretation of what ‘substance’ really means.

For Marlet, truth is ultimately personal (Marlet, 94). He sees the Thomistic idea of Being in terms of personal concreteness, directed to its Origin in Christ (Marlet, 111). Whereas Aristotle overvalued substance as a center of reality (Marlet, 112), Thomistic Aristotelianism sees substance as a structure of being, and distinguishes between essence and being. Thomism proclaims the proper reality of the creature [*Eigenwirklichkeit des Geschöpflichen*] (Marlet, 119). Man’s being is a responsive actuality [*responsorische Aktualität*].


[From its side, creation only has its existence in that, having been addressed in Love by the Father through the Word, it takes on imparted being in an answering way. This answer consists in a living fulfillment of existence; the being real is something that is “lent” to the creature “insofar
as” it answers. So that nothing in creation exists in any way other than in the mode of being an answer].

This responsive being is both in our heart and in our body:

Die Personstruktur gliedert sich in der Tiefenstruktur des Herzens, in der durch Gottes Anrede die ganze Personstruktur zur Antwortstruktur gestaltet wird, und in dem Leibe als der kosmischen Ausdrucksganzheit der Tiefenstruktur oder dem Verflechtungszusammenhang aller Teilentfaltungen. (Marlet, 124)

[The personal structure articulates itself in the deep structure of the heart, where by God’s speech, the whole personal structure is formed into an answering structure, as well as in the body as the cosmically expressed totality of that deep structure or the interwoven coherence of all partial unfoldings].

Being is therefore the concrete fullness, personal structure of being (Marlet, 125). Man’s concentration is in his being personal. Marlet uses the word ‘heart’ in this connection (Marlet 122). Marlet emphasizes that God and creation cannot be reduced to Being as a common denominator (Marlet 128).

Berkouwer agrees that Marlet’s use of ‘substance’ is not the traditional abstraction of certain modal aspects. Marlet wants to avoid the kind of absolutization that Dooyeweerd criticized. Rather, Marlet wants to look at the “center” of the total human nature, which comes into contact with truth (Berkouwer 17). Berkouwer says that in this way Marlet wants to come to a philosophical thought that functions existentially, from out of the center of the person and directed to the divine Origin. Berkouwer correctly says that by ‘personalism,’ Marlet does not mean an irrationalist kind of personalism. By ‘existential,’ Marlet is referring to the Augustinian tradition, which he is trying to reconcile with the tradition of Aquinas. But instead of examining Marlet’s idea of the religious root and heart, Berkouwer then turns to an analysis of Schoonenberg’s theology, since Marlet also cites Schoonenberg. And Berkouwer concludes (p. 23) that Schoonenberg did not overcome the dichotomy of soul and body. While this analysis is an important theological task, it obscures the point of agreement between Marlet and Dooyeweerd regarding the religious root.

Although Dooyeweerd did not agree with Marlet’s use of the term ‘substance’ in terms of personalism, there are other passages in Dooyeweerd that support the kind of central
personalism that Marlet refers to. For example, Dooyeweerd says that the ‘actuality’ spoken of by phenomenology is actually the kernel of each subject-function (WdW I, 78; NC I, 101) Our acts occur in the supratemporal and are expressed in the temporal. The kernel of each subject-function is therefore in the supratemporal. We cannot form a concept of the kernel because the kernel is in the supratemporal.  

B. Substance versus God’s sovereignty

Apart from his revised view of the meaning of ‘substance,’ Marlet's use of this term (in the sense of our subsistence in God), reflects theological differences from Dooyeweerd. He assumes that it is Dooyeweerd’s Calvinistic emphasis on God’s sovereignty—in the sense of God’s action alone [Alleinwirksamkeit]—that prevents Dooyeweerd from acknowledging man’s independent existence. Marlet sees in Dooyeweerd a late-Augustinian overemphasis on God’s sole activity [Alleintätigkeit], which causes man’s own capacity for action [Eigentätigkeit] to disappear. Being is then ascribed only to God (Marlet, 117).

This is also related to Marlet’s idea of substance in terms of response-ability. Marlet believes that there is a co-working with God, and that Dooyeweerd cannot accept this due to Calvinism’s emphasis on God’s sovereignty, which undercuts the own value [Eigenwert] and independence [Eigenständigkeit] of the cosmos. Marlet questions whether Calvinism, which emphasizes the sole activity of God, does justice to the ontical reality of the creaturely participation. Marlet says that Calvinism thereby denies the constitutive meaning of Being (Marlet 133-134). And Marlet says that this is the final difference between Dooyeweerd’s Calvinistic philosophy and philosophy in the Catholic church (Marlet, 130).

60 We cannot define the kernel of each aspect because by this kernel an aspect maintains its individuality even against the logical aspect. (Dooyeweerd's “Introduction to a Transcendental Criticism of Philosophic Thought,” Evangelical Quarterly XIX (1) Jan 1947).
Berkouwer says that Marlet’s emphasis on personalism and synergism against Calvinism is a misrepresentation of Calvinism. Calvinism has never understood God’s sovereignty over all things [alwerkzaamheid] as God working alone [alleenwerkzaamheid] (Berkouwer, 27-28). And so Berkouwer defends the Calvinism that is presumed to form the basis of Dooyeweerd’s thought.

Whether or not Marlet has correctly interpreted Calvinism, it seems to me that there are a few points that could help to clarify the matter. First, Marlet fails to distinguish Dooyeweerd’s philosophy (which Dooyeweerd expressly distances from Calvinism) from the philosophy of Dooyeweerd’s brother-in-law Vollenhoven (whose philosophy continued to expressly connect to Calvinism). Throughout his dissertation, Marlet assumes that Vollenhoven’s ideas are shared by Dooyeweerd. But in fact, Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven disagreed with respect to almost every major issue. Dooyeweerd’s central idea of the heart does not appear to derive from Calvinism at all, but rather from Baader’s Christian theosophy, as mediated by J.H. Gunning, Jr., Chantepie de la Saussaye, Abraham Kuyper, and others (Friesen 2011). Dooyeweerd expressly distinguishes between Kuyper’s neo-Calvinism and traditional Calvinism.

Second, Marlet fails to recognize that Baader, on whom these Catholic theologians rely, has a similar view of man’s total dependence on God. Thus, it is not Calvinism that is at the basis of Dooyeweerd’s assertion that Being is found only in God. The idea derives from Christian theosophy.

We can see this when we look at Baader’s ideas of substance. Baader rejects any view of matter as independent substance. He says that the apparent permanence of matter is like


62 That was the theologian J. Bohatec’s opinion. And see my review of Mietus’s dissertation on Gunning, referred to in endnote 8 above. See also my extended discussion of this issue in “Two Ways of Reformational Philosophy: Early Writings of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd,” (Friesen 2011).

63 See my discussion in “Imagination,” Appendix A (pages 142 to 154).
the apparent existence of a circle of light when we spin a lighted stick. Baader says that the temporal is only a mode [Weise] of production of the Absolute; the temporal is a mode or quality of the inexistence of what has been ‘produced’ by the Absolute. Substance, in the sense of integral existence, exists only in God:

True integral existence, or substance, exists only in God. Only God has substance; the creature has no substantiality except as given to it by God.

Third, I think that Baader provides a solution to Marlet’s problem. Although the creature has no substantiality except that given to it by God, we are not left with a monism. Rather, Baader emphasizes that the temporal creation individualizes and achieves an independent reality of its own.

C. Continuity with Aquinas?

Much of the previous discussion has centered on whether Marlet is correct in seeing a continuity with Aquinas, or whether these developments in Catholic theology are new developments which are counter to the 1870 encyclical as well as the 1950 encyclical Humani Generis. Berkouwer does not believe that this new Catholic theology can be reconciled with those encyclicals, which he regards as reaffirming a natural way of knowledge. He says that the 1870 encyclical affirmed a duplex ordo cognitionis, which added supernatural revelation to human reason (Berkouwer 13, 16, 34). Berkouwer concludes that these “new ideas” are also more in accordance with the Council of Trent than with Vatican Council's Humani Generis.

But Marlet argues for a continuity of the new theology with Aquinas. He says that Aristotle’s idea of substance and essence left no role for the divine creation and sustaining of the world (Marlet, 118). But Aquinas went beyond that view. Dooyeweerd

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64 Franz von Baader: Philosophische Schriften I, 321 fn.
65 Franz von Baader: Elementarbegriffe 540; Werke V, 81.
67 See my article “Imagination,” 36. Christian theosophy understands the refraction of the temporal world from supratemporal unity in terms of a “reengendering,” of becoming real in its individuality. That is not at all the same as monism.
was much too influenced by R.K. Sertillanges’s work on Aquinas. Sertillanges incorrectly emphasized how Aquinas was inspired by Aristotle; he chose Aquinas’s commentaries on Aristotle, and early works. Marlet himself accuses Sertillanges of a tendency towards rationalism [leise Nachgiebigkeit gegenüber den Rationalismus], and says that Sertillanges’ analysis of Aquinas therefore seems to support Dooyeweerd (Marlet 126). But Marlet says that there is a difference between Aquinas and the later scholastic tradition, which did not follow Aquinas (Marlet, 85). Marlet says that Dooyeweerd knew only this late scholasticism (Marlet, 115). Marlet follows Brunner’s idea of a unity of substance and relation (Marlet, 115). He contrasts this view, which he sees as Thomistic, with late scholasticism, which looked only at the concrete individual, and missed the correlation between substance and accident.

Pope Benedict also distinguishes Aquinas from later Catholic scholasticism (which he rejects). As already mentioned, Pope Benedict is very much influenced by Hans Urs von Balthasar and Henri de Lubac, both Baader scholars, who make the same distinction between Aquinas and later scholasticism, and who also reject the distinction between nature and grace that was brought in by late scholasticism.

Marlet is certainly aware of Dooyeweerd’s view that Aquinas relied on a synthesis of the Christian Ground-Motive with the Greek Ground-Motive of form/matter. But Marlet denies that this is an accurate portrayal of Aquinas. Marlet agrees that a form/matter motive has a religious character. But it is an absolutization of the cultural forming that occurs through man’s temporal structure (Marlet, 108-109). This is in agreement with what Dooyeweerd says about the absolutization of cultural forming.

68 Pope Benedict: “Faith, Reason and the University,” Sept. 12, 2006. Online at [http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html#_ftnref8]. Benedict's ideas on the Logos doctrine are very nuanced, and I think it would be wrong to see that doctrine as an absolutization of reason. Dooyeweerd's early writings refer positively to Logos. The idea even appears in the WdW.

Now if, as I have argued, Baader’s ideas are the common link between Dooyeweerd and the new Catholic theologians, what effect does that have on this issue of continuity? Do Baader’s ideas, which expand on the Protestant ideas of Jacob Boehme, really represent Catholic thought? Or are they a departure from the views of Aquinas? Emmanuel Tourpe has argued that Baader is in continuity with Aquinas. Tourpe says that Baader’s theory of knowledge is “a powerful return to Aquinas’s epistemology in the face of the Kantian critique. Baader’s profound originality stems from the theosophical frame into which he sets his reading of Aquinas, confronting it to Jacob Boehme’s Trinitarian vision in particular.”

The historical issue of whether Aquinas really shared these ideas is still important, and should be debated. And if Aquinas can be interpreted in terms of Baader’s ideas, then that is itself a significant development. But in comparing Dooyeweerd, and in seeking ecumenical dialogue perhaps we should not become too bogged down in defending historical divisions that resulted from theological differences when there may be more important theosophical convergences.

D. The role of theology

Marlet says that philosophy looks at the concrete, and in this it depends on a “theological a priori.” H.G. Geertsema, who has also analyzed the similarities and differences between Marlet and Dooyeweerd, correctly points out that Marlet’s reference to a theological basis of philosophy is not intended in a theoretical-theological sense. By ‘theology,’ Marlet does not mean formal presuppositions, but concrete and supra-theoretical assumptions, which Marlet compares to the religious basic structure and the corresponding Ground-Motives in Dooyeweerd (Marlet, 94-96).

70 Emmanuel Tourpe: “Connaître, comme une naissance: La logique générative de la philosophie religieuse selon Franz von Baader (1765-1841),” Laval théologique et philosophique 60 (June 2004), 335-361


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And yet there is an ambiguity here. Marlet sometimes refers to the root-unity as a theological root unity. In that way, ‘theology’ is used to refer to ontical conditions, and not theoretical presuppositions.

But at other times, Marlet refers to theology as a theoretical discipline, as when he contrasts Dooyeweerd’s supposedly Calvinistic ideas on the sovereignty of God with the responsible actions of human.

After Marlet’s dissertation, Dooyeweerd wrote an article showing this ambiguous use of the word ‘theology’ in Roman Catholic thought. Sometimes the word ‘theology’ is used to refer to the central religious drive that precedes all theory, and sometimes it refers to the theoretical results of theological thought. Dooyeweerd instead uses the term ‘religious’ to refer to the central supratemporal influence of God’s Word on our heart. And he uses the term ‘theology’ to refer to the temporal conceptual and theoretical work relating to the mode of consciousness of faith.

As we have already seen, Dooyeweerd emphasizes in his 1964 Lecture that religious ecumenism does not depend on any theoretical thought, including theology, but rather on the work of God’s Spirit upon our supratemporal heart.

Geertsema correctly emphasizes Dooyeweerd’s ideas of the concentric nature of the heart, of the heart as a unity that is expressed in the diversity of time, and Dooyeweerd’s comparison of this unity (as image of God) with God’s own unity as Origin. And Geertsema correctly distinguishes Dooyeweerd’s use of religion from theology. And yet Geertsema himself seems to take an overly theological view of Dooyeweerd. He criticizes Dooyeweerd for speaking of a relation of being between God’s being (as unity of Origin) and created being as the unity and the diversity that is expressed from the Origin (Geertsema, 247). Geertsema thinks that this brings in an idea of sharing in the being of God that goes counter to the idea of the law as boundary between God and creation:

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Wel kan de vraag gesteld worden of in de structuur van de Wetsidee bij Dooyeweerd, voorzover daarin de relatie van de Oorsprong to de creatuurlijke werkelijkheid in termen van eenheid en verscheidenheid en als een relatie van uitdrukking wordt getypeerd, de wet als grens tussen God en het geschapene voldoende blijft gehonoreerd. (Geertsema 248)

[In Dooyeweerd’s structure of the Law-Idea, the question can certainly be asked whether it sufficiently continues to honour the law as boundary between God and creation, insofar as it typifies the relation of the Origin to creaturely reality in terms of unity and diversity, and as a relation of expression].

But although Dooyeweerd does speak of God’s law as boundary, he does not do so in Vollenhoven’s sense, but in the sense of our dependence on God.73 It therefore seems to me that Geertsema misses the real connection between Dooyeweerd and Marlet, between Dooyeweerd and the new Catholic theology. For it is precisely our supratemporal imaging of God, in the root of our existence, which is central to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy.74 Similarly, it is that same philosophical anthropology, obtained via Baader, which allows the new Catholic theologians to overcome the scholastic dualism of soul and body, of nature and grace. So by making his analysis too theological, Geertsema misses the theosophical agreement in both Baader and the new Catholic theology.

E. Dooyeweerd and Ecumenism

Ecumenical dialogue was increasingly important to Dooyeweerd. His 1965 farewell lecture is entitled “The ecumenical Ground-Motive…” In his 1964 Lecture, he makes a very strong plea for an ecumenical approach to reformational philosophy, and for the Association to give up its label ‘Calvinistic.’ He says that the term is an obstacle to those who are otherwise attracted to the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, and gives the impression of a narrow-minded [geborneerde] circle of adherents. (1964 Discussion 17-19). This is all very strongly opposed by Vollenhoven, who wants to restrict ecumenism to those within the Gereformeerd persuasion. He says that Dooyeweerd is being really rather

73 See my article “Dialectic,” referred to in endnote 61.
74 See my review of Mietus’s book on Gunning (endnote 8), and see my article “Imagination.”

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naïve here (he uses the word ‘guileless’), and that modern Roman Catholic theology may have changed a bit, but that it is really the same old stuff (1964 discussion, pp. 22-25).

Dooyeweerd’s response is that Vollenhoven has not understood him. Vollenhoven has brought in theological issues here, the dissection of the 80 or 90 different kinds of theology that Vollenhoven had earlier mentioned. But Dooyeweerd says that he was not talking theology at all, but about the religious center of our being. When we do not talk in theological terms, but focus our Christian philosophy on what is central, we will then find unity with others, and Dooyeweerd gives examples from his own experience.

But I suspect that those reformational philosophers who follow Vollenhoven’s philosophy instead of Dooyeweerd’s will be less interested in this kind of project, preferring to continue to analyze and to label the differences that they might have with other religious denominations. 75 Vollenhoven did not agree with the idea of dialogue with the new Roman Catholic theology. In a 2005 lecture at Redeemer University College, I also suggested how these same ideas in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy could be used in ecumenical dialogue with the Orthodox Church. 76 But Vollenhoven’s philosophy is not compatible with such dialogue. It is clear from a recently discovered document that Vollenhoven did not favour Eastern Orthodox views, which he regarded as too mystical. Instead he favoured the Western Augustinian tradition. 77

V. Conclusion

A review of Marlet’s dissertation helps us to better understand Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy of the Law-Idea and to place it in an historical context that allows for ecumenical dialogue with other Christian philosophy. Marlet provides a good summary of

75 This is a reference to Vollenhoven’s Problem-historical method.
76 J. Glenn Friesen: “Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, and the Quest for an Ecumenical Orthodoxy.” See the handout for my lecture, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/Ecumenism.pdf].
77 See Propositions of D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, submitted to the Curators of the Free University, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/PropV.html].
Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, and shows many parallels to Catholic philosophy of transcendence.

Dooyeweerd stresses that the convergence of ideas between his philosophy and the new Catholic theology is not theological in nature in a theoretical sense. The convergence is rather based on the shared idea of a transcendental philosophy. And that in turn relies on a view of a transcendent selfhood, which Dooyeweerd refers to in this last lecture as “the key of self-knowledge.” What is at issue is not theology, but the central religious driving force of his philosophy. And by ‘central,’ he means the supratemporal root unity of man, which is unfolded and expressed in time, and given new direction by God’s Word for this task. In other words, the core of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, and of the transcendental critique, is this concentrated direction towards the center. It is the “law of concentration” of which Marlet speaks.

Marlet’s comparison of this new theology with Dooyeweerd’s philosophy could have been even stronger had he investigated the reliance of both the new Catholic theologians and Dooyeweerd on the Christian theosophy of Franz von Baader. The convergence of ideas between the new theology and Dooyeweerd is a result of their common inspiration by Baader’s ideas. This is particularly the case for Henri de Lubac, Erich Przywara and Hans Urs von Balthasar. Relying on Baader, these Roman Catholic theologians were able to overcome the scholastic dualism between nature and grace, and to arrive at a unified view of the selfhood, a selfhood that is above time. And since Pope Benedict shares some of this theology, this presents a continuing opportunity for continuing dialogue between Dooyeweerd’s kind of reformational philosophy and today’s Catholic Church.

Marlet claims that there is continuity between these new Catholic theologians and Aquinas. To the extent that the new theology relies on Baader, who in turn relied primarily on the Christian theosophy of Jacob Boehme, this claim of historical continuity with Aquinas might be disputed. But reformational philosophy’s claim of continuity with historic Calvinism can also be disputed, since Dooyeweerd says that he obtained the idea of the supratemporal heart from Kuyper. And recent research has shown that Kuyper obtained this idea from J.H. Gunning, Jr., who in turn obtained it from Baader. In my view, both Dooyeweerd’s reformational philosophy and the new Catholic theology owe
more to Christian theosophy than to either Calvin or Aquinas. This is perhaps a good thing, since it allows for a convergence of ideas not on theological grounds, but on the basis of a common philosophical anthropology of the supratemporal heart, instead of the scholastic dualism of soul and body.

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