Monism, Dualism, Nondualism:
A Problem with Vollenhoven’s Problem-Historical Method

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I. Introduction

D.H.Th. Vollenhoven (1892-1978) is known for his problem-historical method, by which he categorized philosophers throughout the ages based on their philosophical “types” and on the “time-currents” within those types. In their impressive revised edition of Vollenhoven’s Schematische Kaarten, K.A. Bril and P.J. Boonstra have edited the charts that Vollenhoven used in making his classifications. Bril and Boonstra have provided detailed notes regarding the terminology used in these charts, information concerning many of the philosophers mentioned by Vollenhoven, as well as summary references to many previous articles concerning Vollenhoven’s problem-historical method.¹

According to Vollenhoven, a philosophical type concerns ontology. Each type relates to a vision of the origin (monistic or dualistic) as well as a philosophical anthropology involving the relation of soul, spirit and body (for example, interactionism or parallelism). Each philosophical type also includes a cluster or complex of motives and themes; a particular theme will be compatible with some types but not with others. Thus, motives or themes are not as fundamental as philosophical types (Kaarten, 402-403).

Vollenhoven’s problem-historical method therefore presupposes an ontological dichotomy between monistic and dualistic philosophies.² A difficulty is that Vollenhoven uses the terms ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’ in two different meanings: an ontological sense and an anthropological sense:

² Vollenhoven begins with three main types: the mythologizing (M), the cosmogonic (KG) and the cosmological (KL). Within each of these three types there is a division between monism and dualism.
1. Ontological monism/dualism. In this sense, monism accepts an original ontological unity that diverges into either a duality or a multiplicity (Kaarten 340). An example of monism is pantheism, where the world of multiplicity is ultimately “identical” with God. On the other hand, a person may believe that only multiplicity is real and that God is a part of the cosmos; Vollenhoven calls this view ‘pancosmism.’

But in dualism, multiplicity is original. An example of this kind of dualism is the belief that God created the world from eternally pre-existing matter.

2. Anthropological monism/dualism

This distinction has to do with the origin of our body and soul. In anthropological dualism, our soul and body each derive from a different source. Dualism in this sense involves a fundamental split between soul and body. This kind of dualism is familiar in modern Western philosophy; Descartes’ philosophy is a familiar example, where soul and body are regarded as separate substances. The question then arises as to the relation between these separate substances, and the origin of each.

As will be shown, these two meanings of monism/dualism are incomplete, and as a result Vollenhoven’s problem-historical method is inadequate for describing certain philosophies. I will examine the problems associated with these two basic meanings of monism/dualism in relation to Vollenhoven’s own philosophy as well as the philosophy of his brother-in-law, Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977).

II. Problems with the ontological monism/dualism dichotomy

1. The exclusion of alternative views.

My main criticism of the ontological monism/dualism dichotomy is that it assumes an either/or choice between only monism and dualism. But there are alternatives. Vollenhoven himself believed that Christianity is neither monistic nor dualistic in this sense:

3 Vollenhoven distinguishes between a duality and a dualism. A dualism points to a fundamental dichotomy that cannot be reconciled.
Therefore I must warn against the danger of dualism, for which I do not feel any attraction, and in which I see a great danger – Gereformeerde life has suffered under it. For some pietists it had a monarchian trait; for others a strong dualistic semi-mystical trait. I am very happy that all of this has received a great setback. But above all we must watch out that we do not swing over to monism: that would again amount to being ruled by reaction, and that will not benefit anyone. For we certainly do not need to maintain a theology, or rather a belief, with the help of dualism; on the other hand we must see clearly that it certainly is not to be maintained by monism alone. We must continue to observe a duality between God and humans. And that is something very different than dualism; only by means of that can human life be saved.\(^4\)

Vollenhoven’s attempt to avoid either monism or dualism is also evident in *Isagoogè*, his introduction to philosophy\(^5\), where he says that we must not attempt to determine the relation between God and cosmos merely from the agreement nor from the difference between them. An example of incorrect emphasis on agreement is the idea of “*coincidentia oppositorum*” in Cusanus and Hegel, where God and cosmos are coordinated with each other, and both God and cosmos are subordinated to something that stands above them, such as “being” or “process” [gebeuren]. An example of incorrect emphasis on difference is Barth’s view of God as the “Wholly Other.” The relation between God and cosmos then becomes contradictory.

If the relation between God and cosmos can be explained neither from their agreement, nor from their differences, then Vollenhoven’s ontological categories of monism and dualism are surprisingly incomplete. Did Vollenhoven intend his problem-historical method to include ontological issues? He sometimes referred to his method as “philosophical anthropology” (*Kaarten* 271). If that is so, then the distinction between monism and dualism applies only to Vollenhoven’s second meaning of


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monism–anthropological monism/dualism. The only issue would then be whether humans are composed of a dualistic body and soul or whether they are a unity.

But in fact Vollenhoven does not restrict the application of his method to philosophical anthropology, at least for philosophers other than himself. And although Vollenhoven privileges his own philosophy from an ontological dichotomy between monism and dualism, he does not grant such an exemption to other philosophers. He classifies Dooyeweerd first as a dualist (semi-mysticism) and then as a monist (monistic monarchianism) (*Kaarten* 92 ft. 11). It may be questioned whether Vollenhoven’s entire idea of “consistency” or “consequential method” may imply a logicism of either/or distinctions–an over-emphasis on logical distinctions that have no bearing outside of the temporal.). Dooyeweerd himself said in 1964 that Vollenhoven applied his method too tightly and rigorously (Verburg 89).

2. God-law-cosmos

One way that Vollenhoven attempts to avoid ontological monism or dualism for his own philosophy is to place God’s law between God and cosmos:

> In relation to law and that which is subjected to it: the law is what holds good [*geldt*]; it is not God or man who does so. N.B. God sets the law and creates man. So there is a twofold correlation and no dualism (e.g. God and man) and also no monism (God-man).…

Vollenhoven’s reasoning seems to be that if the law is an intermediary between God and creation, then there is no ultimate dualism. God gives his law, and the created cosmos is subjected to that law. Since the cosmos is subjected to the law, it is also different from God, so there is no monism.

For Vollenhoven, the law is a boundary between God and cosmos. But this boundary separates creation from God, but not God from creation:

> …deze grens paalt wel het geschapene van God, maar niet God van het geschapene af.” (*Isagoogè* 13)

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Vollenhoven wants to maintain that God and creation are distinct, and that there is a boundary between them. But Vollenhoven does not want that boundary to be absolute. Vollenhoven wants to affirm God’s presence in creation.

Vollenhoven says that the law is a “being in force for” [gelden voor]. Therefore, it must stand above and outside that for which it holds (Isagoogê 14). Vollenhoven’s philosophy therefore places much more emphasis on the independence of created reality than does Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd agrees that the cosmos has no existence apart from the law. But unlike Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd does not see the law as existing independently of the cosmos. For Dooyeweerd, there is nothing that exists independently of the law, so it does not make sense to say that the law stands above that which is subject to it. For Dooyeweerd, the law is not “between” God and cosmos, but it is rather one side of the cosmos.

Vollenhoven’s view raises the question: if the law is independent of God and the cosmos, is it divine or is it created? In either case, Vollenhoven’s problem of ontological monism or dualism is just shifted to a different level.

3. Evil and the fall.

The moral consequence of an ontological dualism is that evil co-exists eternally with God, as in Manicheism. In monism, evil is ultimately located in God, for there is ultimately no reality other than God. But here again, the monism/dualism dichotomy is inadequate. It does not take account of the Christian doctrine of the fall, according to which there is no evil principle equally eternal with God (and therefore no dualism), and yet evil is also not found within God (therefore no monism). The origin of evil is ascribed to the creature’s misuse of free will. This doctrine of the fall can take several forms:


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a) For Vollenhoven, temporal creation is not itself fallen. What is fallen is humanity’s “direction” in relation to it (Isagoogè 53). Vollenhoven says in the Problemen 191 that “direction” makes sense only for creatures with a heart (by which he means his idea of a temporal, pre-functional heart). He says that the law holds primarily for human life and that it “makes no sense” to speak of Christian animals, plants and physical things. “Direction” therefore does not apply to any part of creation except humanity. Since he rejects the idea of a supratemporal selfhood, Vollenhoven cannot accept Dooyeweerd’s idea that creation fell ontologically with humanity (see below). All that Vollenhoven can say is that there is a “left” and a “right” direction in man for each normative function (Isagoogè par. 89). Vollenhoven gives a rather moralistic example of direction—an alcoholic, who stands in front of a bar, and who has a change of mind and runs away from that place (Problemen 190).

b) Dooyeweerd believes that the fall has ontological consequences. The entire temporal cosmos is fallen because it had its center in the religious root of mankind and had no religious root of its own. The temporal world fell along with humanity, since it was concentrated in humanity as its religious root; its salvation is in Christ, the new root:

En Christus betekent radicale vernieuwing van levenswortel en daarom betekent Christus' verlossingswerk in principe niet alleen de redding van den individuele mensch, maar van heel het Scheppingswerk Gods, dat in den mensch geconcentreerd was.

[And Christ signifies radical renewal of the root of life and therefore Christ's work of redemption signifies in principle not only the salvation of the individual person, but of all of God's work of creation, which was concentrated in man.]

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8 Vollenhoven’s idea of a pre-functional heart is very different than Dooyeweerd’s idea of a supratemporal heart.


4. Time and eternity.

Vollenhoven warns against dualism “in the sense of: the transcendent is unchanging, the non-transcendent is changing” (*Problemen* 185). But in the same article, he links time with change: "Time implies change in and through creatures." In linking time with change, Vollenhoven assumes (1) that time and eternity are the only options (2) that time corresponds to temporal change and (3) eternity corresponds to God. Vollenhoven himself therefore presupposes a fundamental dualism between the changing and the changeless.

Dooyeweerd specifically denies that the supratemporal religious center is to be found in a rigid and static immobility. Dooyeweerd says that the Bible does not even ascribe to God any supratemporality in this Greek-metaphysical sense. (*NC* I, 106, ft. 1). There is dynamism even within God. And humanity, as the supratemporal root of temporal reality, is also dynamic, since we are the image of God. Instead of a dualism between an eternal static reality and a temporal changing reality, Dooyeweerd holds to a fully dynamic reality. And in between God’s eternity and the temporal reality of the cosmos there is an intermediate realm, the *aevum*. Cosmic time is given with and limited to the cosmos. There is also a more complete time, the *aevum*. The *aevum* is the time that governs our supratemporal selfhood as well as the angelic realm (about which Dooyeweerd does not speculate). The *aevum* is thus different from cosmic time. But it is also different from God’s eternity. It is a “created eternity,” in contrast to “aeternitas increata,” the uncreated eternity of God.11

Because of Vollenhoven’s assumed dualism between time and eternity, his problem-historical method cannot account for these ideas of time, eternity and the *aevum*. Dooyeweerd says that Vollenhoven had raised objections his understanding of time, but that Vollenhoven had not completely thought through his critique.12

11 Herman Dooyeweerd: “Het Tijdsprobleem en zijn Antinomieën op het Immanentiestandpunt,” *Philosophia Reformata* I (1936), 69 [*‘Antinomieën’*].

12 Taped conversation by with M. Verbrugge August 11, 1974, referred to in Verburg, 89.
Vollenhoven regards any supratemporality as a mixing with God’s eternity—as an “identity” with God’s eternity. Vollenhoven therefore assumes that supratemporality implies either semi-mysticism or a monarchical monism. Vollenhoven says that only God is immortal. And he claims that Dooyeweerd places immortal human souls horizontally next to God, that is, within the eternal. (Kaarten 293). But even if we read ‘souls’ here for Dooyeweerd’s idea of the supratemporal heart, this is not correct. Dooyeweerd speaks of a created eternity, the aevum, which is very different from God’s eternity.

5. Creation.

Is the Christian belief in creatio ex nihilo monistic or dualistic in this ontological sense? It is not dualistic in the sense of presupposing an eternally pre-existing matter. The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo does not imply that alongside of God there is an eternally co-existing ‘nothingness’ from which He creates. That would be another kind of dualism. Dooyeweerd makes this point:

But it is well known that the words ex nihilo have turned out to be not entirely harmless in Augustine’s theological exposition of the doctrine of creation, since they foster the idea that nothingness would be a second origin of creaturely being bringing about a metaphysical defect in the latter.\(^{12A}\)

For Dooyeweerd, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo seems more to imply only our dependence on God, without any dualism between God and nothingness. That is Dooyeweerd’s view of the meaning of the boundary between God and creation:

The creature on the other hand stands under the law. That means the deep dependence and limitation of the latter. Calvin keenly carries through this basic idea with respect to human knowing, as in his Inst. I, 10.2 and I, 5.7 he takes the field against the “vacua en meteorica speculatie” about the substantial being of God (“quid sit apud se” in opposition to the “qualis

erga nos”). The idea of a boundary breaks through here clearly and brightly.¹²

But if it is not dualism, then how does the idea of creation differ from a monistic view where the world is emanated from God? If the world comes from God, must it always be seen in a pantheistic way as “identical” to God? Vollenhoven seems to regard all mysticism in terms of such an idea of identity with God. And because of this, he was unable to understand “mystical” philosophers like Dooyeweerd. We will look at the issue of pantheism in more detail below.

III. Problems with the anthropological monism/dualism dichotomy

1. The dichotomy presupposes a false problematic

Vollenhoven’s entire anthropological dichotomy of monism and dualism presupposes that there is a distinction between soul and body. His methodology first looks at whether soul and body have a common (monistic) or separate (dualistic) origin. He then looks to see how the soul and body relate to each other—is there a parallelism between actions of the soul and actions of the body, or is there an interaction between them, etc. But these questions all assume that there is a distinction between body and soul. Both of these issues assume that there are two separate parts that need to be related. Those philosophers who deny that there is any difference between body and soul will not be satisfied with being classified among those who accept a common origin. They deny the very distinction. Nor does the dichotomy of body and soul fit Dooyeweerd’s philosophical anthropology.

For Dooyeweerd, our selfhood is not a combination of a distinct soul and body that need to relate to each other. Rather, our selfhood is a central supratemporal unity (in the aevum and not eternity) that expresses itself by differentiating into a temporal diversity. Such a central heart is not in any way a soul in this dualistic sense.¹³ Nor is our body a

¹² Herman Dooyeweerd: Second Response to Curators of the Free University, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Response2.html].

¹³ “The Biblical meaning of the word ‘soul,’ where it is used in its pregnant sense of religious centre of human existence, has nothing to do with a theoretically abstracted complex of modal functions.” (NC II, 111).
material substance that needs to relate to an immaterial soul, since Dooyeweerd denies all idea of substance. Rather, the body is an interlacing *enkapsis* of four different individuality structures that are also differentiated from out of the selfhood. These individuality structures are referred to as a temporal “mantle of functions” [*functiemantel*] of our supratemporal selfhood. Although Vollenhoven also uses the term ‘*functiemantel,*’ he does not use it in this sense of differentiated from a supratemporal selfhood.

2. An ontology is always presupposed

Even if we grant Vollenhoven’s starting point of a distinction between body and soul, his anthropological question of whether there is a common or separate origin of body and soul presupposes an answer to the ontological issues of monism/dualism. For example, anthropological dualism presupposes an ontological dualism. The body is created from the lower (evil) matter. The soul is then either a higher level of this pre-existing matter, or it may derive from a higher level of divine being. An anthropological monism cannot produce an anthropological dualism, but only a monism that diverges into dualities. Vollenhoven says that one member of such a duality arising from ontological monism may still have a priority with respect to the other member of the duality. He calls this the “priority doctrine” [*prioriteitsleer*] (Kaarten 371). It may be debated to what extent such a priority doctrine differs from anthropological dualism. In some places, Vollenhoven makes use of the term ‘dualistic’ in reference to monistic thought (e.g. Chart 13a, *Kaarten* 202). More importantly, his method does not account for anthropologies deriving from ontologies that do not fit the monism/dualism dichotomy. For example, if we believe that God did not create the body from eternally pre-existing matter, this may not be ontological monism or dualism. But a belief in creation is still compatible with either anthropological dualism or monism or other anthropologies like Dooyeweerd’s. God could have created separate substances\(^{14}\) for an immortal rational soul and a material body (as Descartes assumed).

\(^{14}\) There are many variations of what it means to deny substance, and Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd did not agree on this. The weakest level is merely to deny that matter was created, but otherwise to assume that it has the same functions as a substance. See J.

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In Vollenhoven’s category of anthropological monism, both body and soul derive from the same source. Monism is where both body and soul all come from one origin. This became Vollenhoven’s view, although he initially was an anthropological dualist. He believed that in human reproduction, the soul and body come from one source, the fertilized egg. God does not create the soul separately at or before birth. But anthropological monism itself may presuppose either an ontological dualism or monism. In an ontological dualism, God could create from pre-existing matter one substance that is passed on in procreation, a substance that later diverges into a duality of body and soul. In ontological monism, for example pantheism, then there is also no ultimate dualism between body and soul.

The issues relating to the origin of the body and soul therefore presuppose an ontology. But as we have seen, the ontological monism/dualism distinction is not exhaustive. Other possibilities exist for philosophical anthropology, such as Dooyeweerd’s view of the supratemporal selfhood.

3. Trichotomy explained as dichotomy

Vollenhoven does not take into account trichotomies like intellect, soul and body. Vollenhoven speaks in those cases of higher dualisms and lower dualisms. The lower dualism is the split between soul and body. The higher dualism is a split between intellect (or pneuma) and this lower dualism of soul/body.

But Vollenhoven’s method therefore explains trichotomies in terms of two dualisms. Dooyeweerd continues to distinguish between dualisms and trichotomies. He rejects both.

4. Immortality

According to Vollenhoven, any view that claims that the soul can leave the body is dualistic. It is unclear whether by this he means ontological or anthropological dualism.

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15 See NC III 635, where Dooyeweerd rejects Theodor Haering’s trichotomic schema of physis, psyche and spirit.

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An ontological dualism certainly fits with a view of immortality of the soul, when the soul is regarded as a higher substance than matter. But ontological monism could be either dualistic or monistic in an anthropological sense.

An anthropological monism could suppose that man is completely temporal, with no immortal part to his being (as in Vollenhoven’s view). It was Vollenhoven’s views of immortality that caused the greatest objection by Valentin Hepp in the long investigation into the philosophical views of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd by the Vrije Universiteit. For Vollenhoven, there is nothing in a human that survives death. In that sense, his view anthropology is truly ‘monistic.’ Any interrelation between the pre-functional soul and the temporal functions disappears at death.

Or one could have an anthropology where, beginning with a monism, one part of a duality is viewed as immortal whereas the other part is not. That is neither Dooyeweerd’s nor Vollenhoven’s view.

Dooyeweerd’s view is that the supratemporal selfhood does not have to become supratemporal; it is always supratemporal. Our selfhood is always supratemporal, so it is not a question of a part of our temporal selfhood leaving a remainder called the body. It is only the differentiated “mantle of functions [functiemantel] that is temporal. Unlike this temporal body, the supratemporal heart does not need to be raised [opgeweckt] on the last day. For Dooyeweerd, the selfhood is also supra-individual, and differentiates into


\[17\] Of 79 references given by Hepp of passages that he found offensive, 78 referred to Vollenhoven and only one to Dooyeweerd (Verburg 210). I believe that this is because for Vollenhoven, man in his entirety dies; there is nothing “left over” after death, at least until the resurrection. Dooyeweerd’s view is that our supratemporal selfhood continued after the temporal mantle of functions (‘functiemantel’) is left behind at death. It is fascinating that Vollenhoven classified both Hepp and Dooyeweerd as semi-mystics (Kaarten 92 ft. 11 and 255).

\[18\] Herman Dooyeweerd: His second response to the curators of the Free University (October 12, 1937), in response to Valentin Hepp’s complaints about the philosophy of the law-Idea (in Dooyeweerd Archives, Amsterdam). Online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Response2.html].

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individuals. Since the fall, such individuality is temporal. These issues are beyond the scope of this paper, but it appears that Dooyeweerd believed in a supratemporal restoration of temporal individuality that participates in Christ, the New Root, and eternal death for temporal individuality that does not participate in Christ.\textsuperscript{19} For individuality that is restored, there is a supratemporal differentiation into individuality. Vollenhoven’s dichotomies of monism/dualism do not fit this view in either an ontological or an anthropological sense.

IV. Vollenhoven’s attempts to categorize his own philosophy

Vollenhoven did not include his own philosophy on his problem-historical charts. But at various times he made oral comments as to where he thought he might fit. Vollenhoven’s views changed over time, and do not seem to have reached a point of final certainty. His own philosophical anthropology changed from a dualism to a monism. Up until the time that he was no longer able to work, he continued to revise the categories of his problem-historical method. And if we accept his comments in later life that his philosophy followed Gregory of Nazianzus, then Vollenhoven was also changing his views as to how we relate to God.

1. Vollenhoven’s thesis of 1918

In his 1918 doctoral thesis\textsuperscript{20}, Vollenhoven referred to his views as “theistic, dualistic intuitionism.”\textsuperscript{21} In his thesis, Vollenhoven refers to the selfhood [\textit{Ik}] as a substance. Succession is experienced by this substantial self (p. 441). According to proposition 25


\textsuperscript{20} D.H.Th. Vollenhoven: \textit{De Wijsbegeerte der Wiskunde van Theïstisch Standpunt} (Amsterdam, 1918) [‘Wiskunde’]


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added to his thesis, death is the dissolution of a complete substance when the organ of the soul becomes unusable.\textsuperscript{22}

In 1919, Vollenhoven wrote an article with A. Janse entitled "De Activiteit der Ziel in het Rekenonderwijs" [The activity of the soul in the teaching of arithmetic]\textsuperscript{23} The article is interesting because it argues for the metaphysical existence of the selfhood as substance: there must be a soul to perform the act of counting. This appears to have some similarity to Dooyeweerd's later view that all of our acts proceed from out of our supratemporal selfhood. But Dooyeweerd never speaks of the selfhood in terms of substance. And whatever similarity there may have been in 1919, Vollenhoven later moved towards a view that denied the supratemporal selfhood.

2. Monistic anthropology and ennoëtism

Bril says that the early Vollenhoven was monistic, following Poincaré’s ennoëtism (\textit{Kaarten}, 168, 245). The word ‘ennoëtism’ is derived from the Greek word ‘\textit{nous}’ for intellect. It is the belief that from one origin (e.g. a fertilized egg), a higher soul diverges from a lower living body (\textit{Kaarten} 371). The higher soul is supratemporal intellect or spirit; it contemplates the activities of the psyche and soma. In particular, intellect contemplates the succession of time and the numbers, which belong to the self-moving \textit{psyche}. \textit{Soma} corresponds with geometrical figures and space. \textit{Psyche} causes movement of the \textit{soma}, the material. The arithmetical is succession and the spatial is simultaneity (\textit{Wijsgeer} 167).

In his 1918 thesis, Vollenhoven refers to ennoëtism. He still seems to regard it in a dualistic manner. If it had been monistic at the time of his thesis, he would not have been

\textsuperscript{22} Stelling XXV "Sterven is dissolutie van een substantia completa door het onbruikbaar worden van ‘t orgaan der ziel."


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so shocked when he moved from a dualistic to a monistic anthropology. Yet in the problem-historical charts, he refers to ennoëtism as monistic.

3. Interactionism

But later, according to Bril and Boonstra, Vollenhoven changed his views to an interactionist view of anthropology, either zoological (p. 246) or pneumatological (p. 250). This was after his studies in 1920 in Leipzig under Felix Krueger, and after discussions with A. Janse, who proposed that man is not a dualism of body and soul, but rather a “living soul.” Janse had read a lot in Hans Driesch, Herman Bavinck, S.O. Los and Max Scheler. Stellingwerff says that Janse was inclined to a dualism between the heavenly spiritual, and the earthly world of matter and living soul. Vollenhoven seems to have accepted this idea of a full temporal living soul. In a letter to Janse dated Nov. 7, 1922, Vollenhoven writes that Driesch and Scheler are still too Aristotelian. They see the human faculties as layers above each other: first the anima vegetiva, then the anima

24 Vollenhoven’s struggle with these issues led to a nervous breakdown in 1922. In the beginning of 1923 he was admitted to a clinic for ten months.

25 Stellingwerff 60-61. Vollenhoven was also influenced by Bavinck’s last book, Bijbelsche en Religieuze Psychologie (1920), where it is said that a dualism of body and soul only occurs in Matt. 10:28. And it is said that “living soul” means only that God breathed life. Janse was to develop this idea. In Janse’s letter dated Jan 28, 1928 to J.J. Buskes, Janse says that he came to Aristotle’s philosophy via vitalism and the philosophy of life (Levensphilosophie). Through Aristotle’s emphasis on psyche he came to look at the use of the word ‘nepesh’ in the Old Testament. In the letter, Janse speaks of his fights against pietism. He criticizes pietism for regarding one’s “own soul” as a more pious object than one’s hand or foot or consciousness (Stellingwerff 40). See also the talk on Jan. 8, 2000 by H. Nijenhuis, Vollenhoven’s son-in-law. Online at [http://www.aspecten.org/teksten/teks.html].

26 In a letter of December 30, 1922, Janse objected that this was not what he meant by “living soul.” He says that man as a living being could not be separated into factors such as a soul plus a body. But he wanted to retain the idea of a spirit of man that continued after death. Spirit is what remains of the man when he dies, the principle of life [‘het levensbeginsel’] which God breathed into man, so that man could become a living soul (Gen. 2:7). In the margin of the letter, Vollenhoven writes ‘no’ by the word ‘spirit.’ But in a subsequent letter dated February 20, 1924, Janse seems to come closer to Vollenhoven’s views, where he says he can no longer think of himself as being above or in the living being. In this letter, Janse accepts partial blame for Vollenhoven’s breakdown (Stellingwerff 63-65).
sensitiva and then the anima rationalis. Because they see the faculties as layers, they lose the unity of the soul. And since only the anima rationalis is immortal, there is no immortality of the soul as a whole. Then Vollenhoven gives his preliminary solution:

Er is een ideële wereld van ‘t gelden, noch psychisch, noch redelijk, maar ‘geldend’. Dan een wereld van waarden: ethische en rechts en religieuze waarden enz. Ook een wereld van ‘t physisch zijnde, waarschijnlijk ook een van ‘t biologische waaraan ‘k meer zelfstandigheid toe ga kennen dan vroeger. De vermogens zijn niet lagen, maar relaties van de eene ziel tot die onderscheiden terreinen. Dan is planten, dieren en menschenziel [te] onderscheiden niet door ‘t aantal vermogens, resp 1,2 en 3 [anima vegetiva, anima sensitiva, anima rationalis], maar door den aard der relaties tusschen die onderling onderscheiden zielen eener- en deze werelden [anderzijds]. Dan blijft de ziel een eenheid. (Cited in Stellingwerff, 62)

[There is an ideal world that holds for [other worlds]. It is neither psychical nor rational, but a ‘holding for.’ Then there is a world of values: ethical and juridical and religious values, etc. Also a world of physical being, probably also of the biological, to which I am now inclined to give more independence than previously. The faculties are not layers, but relations of the one soul to the distinguished fields. Then plants, animals and the human soul are not to be distinguished by the number of faculties, respectively 1, 2 and 3 [anima vegetiva, anima sensitiva, anima rationalis] but through the nature of the relations between mutually distinguished souls on the one hand, and on the other hand, relations [of the soul] with these worlds. Then the soul remains a unity.]

Shortly after writing this letter, Vollenhoven suffered a ten month nervous breakdown that required hospitalization in 1922 for ten months. This breakdown was largely a result of his intellectual struggle with anthropological dualism.

But did Vollenhoven in fact accept an interactionism? Notes from his lecture ‘Problemen’ seem to indicate otherwise:

The relation of soul and body is not an interaction, for in our anthropology we must not think in contrasts, and for us the “soul in me” is something different from the inside of consciousness. Consciousness is always in the body! This is ontological. Now there is still an epistemological argument (against the interaction idea): in the interaction theory, subject and object are always seen horizontally (consciousness is at their base.) Therefore, there is no ‘Gegenstand-relation’ possible here. Those who adhere to the interaction theory do not have the possibility to speak about science and the special sciences; because of that they lay great emphasis on reflection! Also parallelism and the priority doctrine cannot be used, because they
identify the ‘Gegenstand-relation’ with the subject-object relation. <(Problemen 191, my translation)

3. Vollenhoven and Gregory of Nazianzus

The problem of understanding what Vollenhoven means by wanting to avoid both ontological monism and dualism is further complicated by his statement that the type of anthropology that most fits his philosophy is KG27 (monism, interactionism, zoological). (See the letter from his assistant A. Tol dated December 18, 1971, referred to in Kaarten 293; also Kaarten 168 note 8 and 399, section 2.2). In his later revisions this category was first changed to Omega 4.1, which changed the zoological characteristic to pneumatic (Chart 46c). In pneumatic interactionism, there is a vertical divergence from out of the Arché into a higher and lower ontical level. And from out of a center there is a horizontal differentiation and integration (this is the idea of the pre-functional soul) (Kaarten 10, ft. 8). Vollenhoven says that this category goes back to Gregory of Nazianzus, J. Woltjer and A. Janse (Kaarten 168, 293).

The reference to Janse is understandable. But the link to Gregory of Nazianzus is very puzzling. For one thing, Gregory is on different charts.27 A more important problem is that Gregory emphasized the doctrine of theosis or deification. Does that not affect the “boundary” that Vollenhoven emphasizes between creation and God? Gregory’s idea of deification enables mankind to transcend human nature. He says, “I too might be made God so far as He [Jesus] is made Man.”(Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 29:19). In Oration 7 he says,

I share one condition with the lower world, the other with God; one with the flesh, the other with the spirit. I must be buried with Christ, arise with Christ, be joint heir with Christ, become the son of God, yea, God Himself.28

27 KG11, chart 30 (Kaarten, 225) (monism, priority, instrumental, primary impetus) or Chart 33c omega 4.2 (cosmogono-cosmological, monistic interactionism, pneumatic, partial universalist) (Kaarten 231).

28 Gregory of Nazianzus: Orations, Medieval sourcebook, online at[http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/gregnaz-athan.htmls].
I see no evidence of Gregory’s ideas in Vollenhoven’s ontology. Can we restrict Vollenhoven’s praise of Gregory to his anthropology? Vollenhoven says that for Gregory, the “whole man” is saved, in contrast to a dualistic view where only a rational soul is saved. And yet that does not seem to be Gregory’s view of anthropology. Gregory refers to the ascent to the height of truth:

What experience of this have I had, you friends of truth, her initiates, her lovers as I am? I was running with a mind to see God and so it was that I ascended the mount. I penetrated the cloud, became enclosed in it, detached from matter and material things and concentrated, so far as might be, in myself.  

In Oration 21, Gregory expresses a similar dualistic view:

Whoever has been permitted to escape by reason and contemplation from matter and this fleshly cloud or veil (whichever it should be called) and to hold communion with God, and be associated, as far as man's nature can attain, with the purest Light, blessed is he, both from his ascent from hence, and for his deification there, which is conferred by true philosophy, and by rising superior to the dualism of matter, through the unity which is perceived in the Trinity. And whosoever has been depraved by being knit to the flesh, and so far oppressed by the clay that he cannot look at the rays of truth, nor rise above things below, though he is born from above, and called to things above, I hold him to be miserable in his blindness, even though he may abound in things of this world; and all the more, because he is the sport of his abundance, and is persuaded by it that something else is beautiful instead of that which is really beautiful, reaping, as the poor fruit of his poor opinion, the sentence of darkness, or the seeing Him to be fire, Whom he did not recognize as light. 

This kind of dualism does not seem to correspond with what Vollenhoven describes as saving the “whole man.” Nor does this view of humanity fit with Dooyeweerd’s anthropology. For Dooyeweerd, our supratemporal selfhood is the fullness of our individuality (NC II, 423). Unlike Gregory, Dooyeweerd does not regard our selfhood as our mind in a dualistic opposition to matter. It is only our temporal fallen “mantle of


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functions” [functiemantel] that is left behind at death. If Vollenhoven is anxious that salvation is of the “whole man,” then Dooyeweerd’s view seems to better express this idea.

Vollenhoven’s ideas therefore do not appear to have been brought to a consistent conclusion. Part of the problem is that his problem-historical categories did not allow him to understand mystical philosophies like that of Gregory. The inadequacy of Vollenhoven’s problem-historical categories is even more evident when we look at his attempt to categorize Dooyeweerd.

**V. Vollenhoven’s attempts to categorize Dooyeweerd’s philosophy**

None of Vollenhoven’s charts include Dooyeweerd. But he made oral comments as to where he thought Dooyeweerd would fit. Over time, Vollenhoven changed his classification of Dooyeweerd. But Vollenhoven’s changing views were not due to changes in the development of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. They were due to the restrictions inherent in Vollenhoven’s problem-historical method. Given his divergences from Dooyeweerd on almost every key point [See ‘Dialectic’], Vollenhoven had a problem in classifying Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. If there is a boundary between God and creation (NC I, 99), does that mean a dualism? But if creation is an *expression of* God, does that imply a monistic view of emanation like Plotinus? If there is a supratemporal selfhood, is that supratemporality identical with God’s eternity? Is unity with God the same as identity? Is this monistic mysticism? Is it dualistic semi-mysticism? Is it monistic pantheism? Dualistic Panentheism? We will look at three of his classifications: dualistic monarchianism, semi-mysticism and monistic monarchianism.

1. Dualistic monarchianism

This was Vollenhoven’s first classification of Dooyeweerd (Kaarten 92, See Chart #50 on p. 256). Dualistic monarchianism draws a sharp boundary between God (the unmoved mover, the monarch) and the universals. There is then a dualism between a higher level of man (which shares in the universals) and an eternal matter, which is the *principium individuationis*. This alone shows that Dooyeweerd cannot be classified here, for he
denies any such dualism. He rejects the idea of substance and says that the question, “What is the principium individuationis?” is a false problem, insoluble and internally contradictory. The question lacks insight into the “radical individual concentration of temporal reality in the human I-ness.” (NC II, 417). Nevertheless, let us look at this category of dualistic monarchianism, which includes several types. Vollenhoven distinguishes between non-Platonizing and Platonizing directions of this type. In Aristotelian dualistic monarchianism (noölogical types), the higher principle is the nous (world intellect). In psychological types it is world soul, and in pneumatological types it is universal spirit (Kaarten 23).

Under type KL12 for dualistic monarchianism (non-Platonizing), Vollenhoven includes K. Krause (who coined the term ‘panentheism’), Othmar Spann and Hans Driesch. The latter two philosophers influenced Dooyeweerd with their philosophy of totality. Dooyeweerd was also aware of Krause, and may have also been influenced by him indirectly through the writing of A.H. de Hartog. But Dooyeweerd is placed in a Platonizing, non-reductionistic pneumatological type, KL14, along with Cusanus. Another type of Platonizing type, KL 16, includes Meister Eckhart and Tauler.

The pneumatological types seem to correspond to Vollenhoven’s later category of monistic monarchianism (types APC 80 to 83) (Kaarten 25). In making this change, Vollenhoven seems to have recognized that the classification of ‘dualism’ was incorrect. Whether monistic monarchianism is a correct classification for Dooyeweerd is discussed below.

2. Semi-mysticism

In 1970, Vollenhoven for the first time interpreted Dooyeweerd as belonging to the type semi-mysticism (Kaarten 92 ft 1). Vollenhoven first listed semi-mysticism as a separate type in 1959. He argued that this type derived from the philosophy of the later Aristotle. Semi-mysticism is still dualistic. But in semi-mysticism, the dualistic boundary is much


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lower than in dualistic monarchianism (Kaarten 27). This is because in semi-mysticism, the highest part of man shares in God (and not just in the universals) (Kaarten p. 255, Chart #49). The higher is universal and individual. The lower is animal psychical-somatic.

Vollenhoven distinguishes three types of semi-mysticism. All of these types come under the basic category KL, or cosmological thought:

KL7 is Hippocratic semi-mysticism. Interestingly enough, he includes under this type Valentin Hepp, the theologian from the Free University who disagreed so strongly with Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd.

KL 8 is Aristotelian semi-mysticism. Vollenhoven included Franz von Baader, and Johann Sauter under this type. In view of the comparisons that I have made between Dooyeweerd and Baader, it is very interesting that Vollenhoven also classifies Baader as a semi-mystic. I believe that the category semi-mysticism is inadequate, but the fact that Vollenhoven saw both philosophers as being involved in a similar problematic is of interest. Vollenhoven's view that this represented a later phase of Aristotle's thought may be questioned on the basis of the studies by Bos showing that there is no distinction between the earlier and later Aristotle.


34 A.P. Bos, De ziel en haar voertuig. Aristoteles’ psychologie geherinterpreteerd en de eenheid van zijn oeuvre gedemonstreerd, (Leende: Damon, 1999). See also A.P. Bos, The soul and its instrumental body. A reinterpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of living nature, (Leiden, 2003). Bos questions any division between an early and a later Aristotle. But there are other implications for Vollenhoven’s idea of semi-mysticism that are
KL9 is Platonizing semi-mysticism. Bril and Boonstra think that this is the time stream in which Vollenhoven placed Dooyeweerd (Kaarten, 92, ft. 11). Now I agree that Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is in a mystical tradition. But the classification of semi-mysticism is clearly incorrect, for the following reasons:

a) All KL (cosmological) thought is static, not dynamic (Kaarten, 398). As we have seen, Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the supratemporal is not static. Not even God’s eternity is static (NC I, 31-33 ft. 1; I, 106, ft. 1).

b) The specific type of semi-mysticism in which Vollenhoven placed Dooyeweerd is KL9. This type is deterministic (Kaarten 399). Vollenhoven’s objections to semi-mysticism included his belief that it led to passivity. This is related to what Vollenhoven says in his introduction to philosophy— that mysticism sees the true process of knowledge as introverted, and that it disqualified the knowledge of that which lies outside us (Isagoogè 120).

Vollenhoven’s opinion regarding static passivity rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of man’s supratemporality and God’s eternity. It is true that Dooyeweerd says that Christ shows us the meaning of imago Dei as being self-surrender (NC II, 149). But such self-surrender is not passivity, but rather love in its fulness of its meaning, as demonstrated by Christ. We are not the image of a static God. God is not like that (NC I, 106, ft. 1). Nor is man’s supratemporal religious center to be found in a rigid and static

beyond the scope of this article. For example, Bos sees a link between Aristotle and the Corpus Hermeticum. But Vollenhoven associated such thought not with semi-mysticism, which is cosmological (KL), but with mythological types (M).

35 See ‘Totality’: Dooyeweerd was influenced by the Philosophy of Totality [Ganzheit], a tradition that extends from Othmar Spann back to Franz von Baader, and to the western mystical tradition including Jakob Boehme and Meister Eckhart.

36 It seems that in classifying this as deterministic, Vollenhoven has misunderstood Eckhart’s idea of ‘Gelatenheid.’ (I am using Eckhart's low German here, and not the high German 'Gellasenheit'). Gelatenheid is not intended to lead to passivity, but to greater action in the world. See Meister Eckeharts Schriften zur Gesellschaftsphilosophie, ed. Ilse Roloff (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1934) ['Roloff']. This is part of the Herdflamme collection edited by Othmar Spann, and which I have argued influenced Dooyeweerd (See ‘Totality’).
immobility (NC I, 31-33, ft. 1). God as Trinity is dynamic, and so is our regenerated selfhood: the *dynamis* of the Holy Ghost “…brings man into the relationship of sonship to the Divine Father (NC I, 61). The idea of image of God gives the real account of why our self-knowledge is dependent on knowledge of God, in that God has expressed His image in man by concentrating its entire temporal existence in this radical religious unity (NC I, 55). Just as God expresses His image in our selfhood, so our selfhood expresses itself in the coherence of temporal functions (NC I, 4).

And Dooyeweerd’s thought is certainly not deterministic. How did Vollenhoven come to misunderstand Dooyeweerd in that way? Did Vollenhoven think that if salvation were in the root, then we would not bother trying to act in the temporal world? Dooyeweerd certainly does not accept that consequence. He says that we help to redeem the world, and only by acting in this way do we act in accordance with the truth, with meaning, with our true selfhood. Initially, the full meaning of the entire temporal cosmos was focused in the religious root-community. But

Because of humankind's fall into sin the entire temporal world has been cursed. The other creatures, which are included with humanity in the same temporal order of the world, do not themselves have a religious root to their existence. Humanity's task was to disclose the entire temporal creation in the service of God. When humankind, in its radical fall into sin, becomes disobedient with respect to this task, it takes with it, in this fall, the entire temporal world. Apart from humanity, the latter could not independently relate itself to God and develop its inherent potentialities in the service of God.37

Perhaps Vollenhoven’s belief that Dooyeweerd’s viewpoint is deterministic is related to Vollenhoven’s rejection of Dooyeweerd’s belief that created reality is insufficient and point towards the transcendent, that it exists only as meaning.38 If that is the basis of Vollenhoven’s belief that this view is deterministic, then it is reminiscent of Hendrik Stoker’s attempt to bring back an idea of substance, to give more dignity and autonomy


38 Vollenhoven rejects Dooyeweerd’s view of created reality in ‘Problemen.’

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to humans. But Dooyeweerd is clear: it is precisely that idea of individual autonomy that must be given up (NC III, 71; see also ‘Enkapsis’).

c) Vollenhoven assumes that semi-mysticism “identifies” the higher part of man with God in a pantheistic way. I discuss this issue of identity in more detail below.

2. Monistic monarchianism

Monistic monarchianism. Vollenhoven distinguished this type in 1973. As discussed, his previous pneumatological types of dualistic monarchianism seem to correspond to types APC 80 to 83 of this new category of monistic monarchianism. Charts for these types APC 80 to 83, are found at Kaarten 240 and 259, Charts 39a and 52a.

In monistic monarchianism, there is a “ruling One.” This view cannot be reconciled with the dualistic idea of eternal matter (Kaarten 25). The One is above and outside of being (Kaarten 28). This is therefore the realm of negative theology. Since God is supposed as beyond being, monistic monarchianism cannot include Augustine’s idea of God as highest being. But within being there is a higher and a lower level.

Vollenhoven gives two basic categories of monistic monarchianism: a descending and an ascending approach. Types APC 80 and 81 are descending; they start with the higher level which then diverges and differentiates. This is the category for Speusippos Plotinus, Meister Eckhart, Tauler, Suso and Ruusbroec. Bril and Boonstra cite the following quotation from H.W. Obbink regarding the emphasis by the Rhineland mystics as an intuition [‘Innenschau’] and a deep absorption within [‘Versenkung’]:

…een terugtrekken in de eigen ziel, om daar in de diepte, de goddelijke werkelijkheid te vinden (Kaarten 338-339, citing H.W. Obbink).

[…a drawing back within one’s own soul, in order to find therein the depth, the divine reality]

39 Vollenhoven’s own philosophy places God outside of being. He says “ontology relates only to the cosmos.” (Problemen, 173).

40 Bril and Boonstra say that monistic monarchianism agrees with semi-mysticism with respect to the higher part of man but not the lower. Kaarten 26 compares monistic monarchianism with semi-mysticism
The second category of monistic monarchianism is an ascending dualistic and combinatorial approach. These are the types APC 82 and 83. There is a directedness to the world, in order to find unity in its multiplicity. Unity is found by Erhebung (ascensus rationalis) and ecstasy, via the docta ignorantia and the coincidentia oppositorum. Vollenhoven says that type 82 includes Nicholas of Cusa, the later Husserl and also Dooyeweerd. For the following reasons, Vollenhoven’s classification of Dooyeweerd here is also clearly incorrect:

a) Dooyeweerd does not begin with the individuated world, but with totality. His view is not that of ascent, but of descent and individuation from out of totality (See ‘Totality’). In placing Dooyeweerd within his new category of monistic monarchianism, APC 80, Vollenhoven was interpreting Dooyeweerd on the basis of his own philosophy, which begins with individual things (See ‘Enkapsis’).

b) This ascending path involves entelechy: there is a finalistic striving towards the unmoved Mover (Kaarten 22). But Dooyeweerd rejects entelechistic approaches on the grounds that they require a notion of substance (NC III, 60).

c) Vollenhoven says that this category includes the idea of a coincidence of opposites, or what he calls “contradictory thinking.” Vollenhoven says that Cusanus’s idea of the coincidentia oppositorum is that God and cosmos come from something that stands above them both (Isagoogè 13). That is certainly not Dooyeweerd’s view. And Dooyeweerd expressly rejects Nicholas of Cusa’s approach of coincidence of opposites!

Giordano Bruno, in his pantheistic philosophy, joined Nicolaus Cusanus’ doctrine of the infinite and his metaphysical mathematical doctrine of the coincidentia oppositorum; he religiously interpreted Copernicus’ theory in a dithyrambic glorification of the infinity of the universe, and of its reflection in human personality as a monadic microcosmos. Here we see how the Humanistic ideal of personality becomes conscious of its power of expansion. The immeasurable space of the cosmos waited to be ruled by man (NC I, 199).

Thus, Dooyeweerd rejects these ideas as (1) pantheistic (2) “metaphysically mathematical” (3) dependent on the humanistic ideal of personality and (4) related to the idea of a microcosmos.
We will look at the objection of pantheism later. But let us first look at the other objections. It is not only Bruno that absolutizes the mathematical. Cusanus also tried to make thought “more geometrico.” Cusanus, like Bruno, was obsessed by the “endless” and thought he could rediscover himself in it “in his boundless impulse of activity” (NC I, 194; 203, ft. 1).

But what is more interesting is Dooyeweerd’s rejection of Cusanus based on the fact that Cusanus based his ideas on the humanistic idea of personality. What is the basis of Dooyeweerd’s objection here? He certainly objects to the idea of human personality as “autonomous”—setting one’s own law instead of being subject to God’s law. But the objection goes beyond that to the idea of human individuality as an individual in itself. This is made clear by Dooyeweerd’s objection to the idea of a microcosmos. His objection is not that the world is contained within humanity. That is Dooyeweerd’s own view: temporal things do not exist in themselves. The whole temporal world has its existence and meaning only within man as the religious root of the temporal (See ‘Enkapsis’ and ‘Totality’). Dooyeweerd’s objection to the idea of man as microcosmos is that it is too individualistic! This is made clear by his rejection of the idea of microcosm in Scheler.

Man, in his full selfhood, transcends the temporal ‘earthly’ cosmos in all its aspects, and partakes in the transcendent root of this cosmos. He cannot be a self-contained and isolated microcosm, a mirror of a so-called macrocosm. Nor can he be what Scheler calls the ‘personal correlate of an absolutely individual cosmos.’ This idea of a microcosm is dominated by the radically irrationalistic personalistic view of the transcendental horizon of human experience. The subjective individuality determines this horizon, making it both individual and cosmic, and “essentially and necessarily” different in each person. Even absolute truth becomes absolutely different for each individual person. Scheler’s “idea of God” is only “realizable” by an individual revelation. This Idea remains a merely intentional, theoretical hypostasis for any one who has not received this individual, most personal revelation. From this hypostasis the possibility of a real experience of the “macrocosm” can never be understood. (NC II, 593).

Dooyeweerd rejects the microcosm/macrocosp distinction because it would imply that there are as many worlds as there are separate individuals (NC II, 594). And it is this idea of separateness that Dooyeweerd finds objectionable in the humanistic conception of
humanity. Dooyeweerd specifically denies the common view of individuality for the selfhood. Our true selfhood is not an “individual” as determined by time and space, but as a radical unity (NC II, 420-21; see also ‘Enkapsis’).

If we are to use Vollenhoven’s category of monistic monarchianism, Dooyeweerd fits much better within APC 80, the descending type of monistic monarchianism that includes Plotinus, Ruusbroec and Eckhart. This is not the path of “ascent” and Erhebung, but rather the path of descent towards one’s inner self. This fits with Dooyeweerd’s view of the importance of “religious self-knowledge,” of “enstasis” and of theory being a synthesis by our intuition that relates the dis-stasis of theory to our supratemporal selfhood (See ‘Dialectic’). There is also a similarity with Plotinus in that Dooyeweerd believed that time is a cause of diversity (Kaarten 399).

But even APC 80 is incorrect, for these reasons:

a) The word ‘monistic’ does not accurately describe the mysticism of the Rhineland mystics, or of Dooyeweerd. Vollenhoven misinterprets Eckhart as saying that the spark of the soul becomes one with the highest Godhead (Kaarten 25). In fact, Eckhart continues to make a distinction between God and creature. See Eckhart’s own Justification of his ideas, where he deals with his use of the term “without all distinction”[ohne alle Unterschied] in relation to our sonship with God.  

He says that however much we are united with God, we do not become God himself or Christ himself. Even in Eckhart’s famous sermon “The poor in spirit,” Eckhart’s idea of “identity” can be interpreted other than as a logical identity, but in terms of panentheism. Prior to our creation we were in God and it is “in this sense” that we were our own cause. Eckhart goes on to say,

But in my breaking through, then, standing passive in the will of God, free
of the will of God and all his works and also of God himself, I transcend

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41 Meister Eckhart: Rechtfertigungsschrift (1926), online at [http://www.pinselpark.org/philosophie/e/echkehart/texte/proz_rechtf01.html]. See also Roloff’s annotations to excerpts of Meister Eckhart’s low German writings.

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all creatures and am neither God nor creature: I am that I was and that I shall remain now and forever.\textsuperscript{42}

I would point out that being neither God nor creature may also correspond with the intermediate state of the \textit{aevvm} if by 'creature' we understand Eckhart to be referring to temporal creatures.

b) Whether APC 80 accurately categorizes Plotinus is more open to debate. For Plotinus, the human psyche is transcendent, and stands on the same level as the divine. (\textit{Kaarten} 399). In Plotinus, there is union with the One, although such union is not of the soul. Dooyeweerd does not accept any union in the sense of identity, but places the human selfhood in the intermediate realm of the \textit{aevvm}.

c) As discussed, Vollenhoven misinterprets Eckhart and other mystics as advocating a passivity and determinism. Those same objections carry over to this new type APC 80.

\textbf{VI. Pantheism, Panentheism, Nondualism}

Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd are opposed to an ontological dualism. This is especially clear in Dooyeweerd’s opposition to any idea of substance, or of things that have existence and meaning apart from God. It is less clear in Vollenhoven, who does not share the idea of “individuality structures” or the “meaning” of temporal reality. Rather, Vollenhoven begins with individual things (See ‘Enkapsis’).

But if they deny a dualism, this does not mean that either Vollenhoven or Dooyeweerd fall into the category of an ontological monism such as pantheism or panchosmism.\textsuperscript{43} Dooyeweerd opposes any mysticism that identifies God and creation. And yet he sometimes speaks of mysticism in a positive sense. For example, he says that the rationalism of Leibniz was “mitigated by a mystical motive” (\textit{NC} I, 308 ft 1). Dooyeweerd certainly uses mystical language and ideas. All human experience “participates” [‘\textit{woord deel te hebben}’] and “partakes” [‘\textit{in haar deel hebben aan}’] in the totality of meaning, the religious root (\textit{NC} I, 8; II, 560; \textit{WdW} I, 11; II, 491). We “have

\textsuperscript{42} Meister Eckhart, “The poor in spirit,” online at [http://www.bota.org/lantern/lantern1_3.html].

\textsuperscript{43} Although Vollenhoven classifies Dooyeweerd along with pantheistic philosophers.
part” [‘waaran wij deel hebben’] in Christ, the new root of mankind (NC I, 99; WdW I, 64). And Dooyeweerd emphasizes the importance of “religious self-reflection” (NC I, 15, 165). Dooyeweerd speaks of our Sonship, related to Christ’s redirection of creation:

The first is the dynamis of the Holy Ghost, which by the moving power of God’s Word, incarnated in Jesus Christ, re-directs to its Creator the creation that had apostatized in the fall from its true Origin. This dynamis brings man into the relationship of sonship to the Divine Father. (NC I, 61).

And Dooyeweerd refers to temporal structures like the family as being expressions of our sonship. These structures are

…the individual structural expression in time of the religious fulness of meaning of the communion of men in Christ, including the relationship between man and God as that of a child to the Heavenly Father (NC III, 303).

But Dooyeweerd’s mysticism is not a mysticism of “identity” between God and creation. We are “from, through and to” God, and yet distinct. Dooyeweerd speaks of the beatific vision when we will behold God “face to face” (NC II, 298). This is not a pantheistic identification with God, but rather a mystical nondualism.44

The term ‘nondualism’ is generally used in discussions of eastern philosophies and religions. But it is increasingly being used in discussions of the western mystical tradition as well as in discussions relating inter-religious dialogue.45 The Hindu term for nondualism is ‘advaita’. ‘Dvaita’ means ‘dualism’, so ‘a-dvaita’ means nondualism, or

44 I use the word ‘nondualism’ or advaita in the sense that “not-two” [a-dvaita] does not mean the same “only one.” A denial of dualism does not entail monism. Many of the Rhineland mystics, such as Meister Eckhart or Jan van Ruusbroec should also be interpreted in this nondual way. See the discussion below regarding Eckhart. See Rik van Nieuwenhove: Jan van Ruusbroec, Mystical Theologian of the Trinity, (Notre Dame, 2003). Nieuwenhove interprets Ruusbroec’s idea of indistinct union with God in terms of a transformation of the human person rather than an immediate experience of God.

‘not-two.’ But ‘not-two’ does not mean the monism of ‘only one.’ The mistake of confusing nondualism with monism is really the mistake of logicism. It is similar to the mistake in assuming that the Trinitarian God means One Substance in three modes, or alternatively, three Gods. In both cases, there is an over-use of temporal logic and mathematics to describe what goes beyond temporal thought.

For those who are bothered by the usage of such terminology, I would point out that Dooyeweerd himself was not afraid of making comparisons to Hinduism. Inagaki has also published a comparison between Dooyeweerd and Kyoto Buddhism. I am encouraged by such cross-cultural comparisons, which can only help us to re-examine the way that Dooyeweerd has been previously interpreted. But Inagaki’s study is flawed in two major respects: (1) He interprets Dooyeweerd’s “religious root” in terms of temporal communities instead of the supratemporal selfhood or heart and (2) His comparison is to the Kyoto school of Buddhism, which was highly influenced by Western philosophy, especially insofar as it speaks of the selfhood in positive terms. A fundamental feature of historic Buddhism is the doctrine of anatman, or ‘no-self’ – a reaction against Hinduism’s emphasis on atman. In view of Dooyeweerd’s emphasis on the selfhood and

46 Hindu philosophy is itself extremely varied. Some of its types include Sankhya dualism, Vaisesika materialism, as well as several kinds of nondualism. One kind of nondualism, sometimes ascribed to Shankara, is a monism that views God (Brahman) as the only reality and the world as utter illusion. But there are those who dispute this interpretation, and there is also a philosophy called vishishtadvaita or ‘modified nondualism’ that derives from the theologian Ramanuja. Here, although there is a unity between Brahman and the creature, there is still a distinction so that the creature can continue to adore and worship Brahman. Thus, nondualism does not necessarily imply monism.

47 See my “Notes regarding Dooyeweerd’s own comparison with Hinduism,” online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Notes/Hinducompare.html].


religious self-reflection, it is therefore more difficult to compare his thought with Buddhism than with (some types of) Hinduism.50

I believe that a comparison of Dooyeweerd to Gregory’s orthodox idea of theosis is worth pursuing further. Dooyeweerd’s philosophy certainly seems much closer than Vollenhoven’s philosophy to Gregory of Nazianzus, at least with respect to this idea of theosis. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that as the image of God, we are the expression of God (NC I, 4). These ideas of ‘expression’ and of the relation between the ideas of sonship and image of God are also found in Abraham Kuyper:

Moreover, you must understand that all this rests upon sober reality. It is not semblance, but actual fact, because God created you after His Image, so that with all the wide difference between God and man, divine reality is expressed in human form. And that, when the Word became Flesh, this Incarnation of the Son of God was immediately connected with your creation after God's Image.51

Although the ideas are not identical, we can obtain some understanding of nondualism by examining the idea of ‘panentheism.’ In contrast to pantheism, panentheism does not assert that we are identical with God; rather, we are in God.52 God is always transcendent to creation and never identical with it. Vollenhoven classifies pantheism as monistic and panentheism as dualistic (Kaarten, 351-52). Again, Vollenhoven’s classification can be questioned, but it is important to note his distinction from pantheism. As students, both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven became aware of the term ‘panentheism’ in connection with the controversy surrounding A.H. de Hartog, who was criticized by the theologian

50 Buddhism may be more compatible with Vollenhoven’s denial of the supratemporal self, and his view of the selfhood as only a “pre-functional unity.” A Buddhistic view of the selfhood is also similar to that given in James Olthuis, “Of Webs and Whirlwinds; Me, Myself and I,” Contemporary Reflections on the Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd, eds. D.F. M. Strauss and Michelle Botting (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000).

51 Abraham Kuyper: To be Near Unto God (New York, Macmillan, 1925), chapter 5.

52 For a recent discussion of panentheism, see Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke, eds.: In Whom We Live and move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004). Unfortunately, the book blurs the distinction from pantheism by the many articles it contains on process theology, but see for example the excellent article by Kallistos Ware, “God Immanent yet Transcendent: the Divine Energies according to Saint Gregory Palamas.”
J.G. Ubbink for pantheism. De Hartog denied that his views were pantheistic, but spoke of “panentheism.”


[We have elsewhere said, that the pantheist “I-entifies” (notice the “I”), whereas the theist “distinguishes them and yet knows them to be one.” “Unity in diversity” absolutely does not mean the same as “identification” (however much Dr. Ubbink may rely on his philosophical dictionary). The Lord in His sovereign omnipotence and love wants to communicate Himself to his creature, where He so “unites” divine and human nature that they remain “undivided and unseparated, unmixed and unchanged” but He has thereby not “identified” the divine and human nature [my translation].

De Hartog also translated excerpts of the work of Jacob Boehme. He refers to Boehme in terms of panentheism.

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53 A.H. de Hartog: Letter to the Editor, Opbouw: Maandschrift in dienst der Christ. Levens-en wereldbeschouwing, van en voor jongeren, (1916), Vol. II, 169. [‘Opbouw]. Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven contributed several articles to Opbouw, sometimes using pseudonyms. Vollenhoven was one of the editors, under one of his pseudonyms, Th. Voorhuizen.

54 A.H. de Hartog: Uren met Jacob Boehme (Baarn: Hollandia-Drukkerij, 1915), 35, 51. This book was favourably reviewed in Opbouw, and so would have come to the attention of both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. The review included excerpts of Boehme’s views of the relation of time and eternity. Boehme’s writings, as translated and annotated by de Hartog, may well have influenced Dooyeweerd’s later philosophy. There are references to our heart as our inner being, to living beyond time and space, and to immediate knowledge as opposed to a dead Biblicism. He describes Boehme as a seer (‘schouwer’), to which Dooyeweerd’s later use of intuition [‘schouwen’] may be related. De Hartog explicitly refers to Franz von Baader’s work on Boehme. De Hartog also gives his own view of science as seeking to understand the coherence of the universe as it is revealed in its cosmic, organic order, which his both its subjective and its objective sides.
Dooyeweerd is a mystic, but he is neither monistic nor dualistic. And that is why Vollenhoven cannot categorize him. Vollenhoven seems to think that the only way that we could have mystical union with God is through “identity” with God. Vollenhoven’s categories do not allow of an intermediate realm between the eternal and the temporal. They cannot describe Dooyeweerd’s idea of “created eternity” or aevum, the realm of the supratemporal selfhood.

**VII. Conclusion**

A study of Vollenhoven’s problem-historical method is useful for understanding Vollenhoven and the development of his own philosophy. The vast amount of information he collected is also useful in understanding other philosophers. But I believe that in its present form, Vollenhoven's problem-historical method has been damaging to reformational philosophy, particularly in its attempts to understand Dooyeweerd. But Dooyeweerd is not the only philosopher who is misrepresented in Vollenhoven's method, and there is a danger that students using Vollenhoven's categories will believe that they have understood a philosopher without actually reading him.

The categories that Vollenhoven uses are incomplete, and his own categories presuppose several dualistic assumptions, including a dualism between eternity and time and a dualistic dichotomy between monism and dualism. I have also reviewed Vollenhoven’s different usages of the terms ‘monism’ and ‘dualism.’ In view of these many meanings, it is not surprising that Vollenhoven was never able to classify either his own philosophy or that of Dooyeweerd. Even towards the end of his life, Vollenhoven was still trying to make these classifications. His difficulties point to the inadequacy of his problem-historical categories. His problem-historical method, at least in its present form, is inadequate to describe the philosophy of many philosophers, especially those in the mystical and nondual traditions.

Vollenhoven was not unique in proposing a problem-historical method. Although not discussed in this article, there are other approaches for classifying monism, dualism and nondualism. As an example of a different problem-historical method, I would point to Radhakrishnan’s attempt. I do not subscribe to this Indian philosopher’s perennialist philosophy nor his triumphalist Hinduism. But it is useful to look at his basic ontological

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categories as an alternative to Vollenhoven’s. He divides philosophies into dualistic, pluralistic and monistic (although he tends to reduce them all to monism). He divides monism into (1) Non-dualism or Advaitism (2) Pure Monism (3) Modified Monism and (4) Implicit Monism\(^5\). If 'monism' is understood as meaning that everything derives from one source, God, this is perhaps satisfactory. Nondualism is then a kind of monism, in showing the nondual relation between the one God and His creation. But I think that to use 'monism' in this way is confusing, because it tends to lead to the idea that creation is merged into God and that it is no longer distinct. Secondly, a use of monism in this way does not do justice to the dynamism within a Trinitarian view of God. I believe that four basic ontological categories are therefore necessary for a problem-historical method that will do justice to both western and eastern, and to mystical and non-mystical, ways viewing and experiencing the world. These four basic ontological categories are: (1) Dualism (2) Monism (3) Pluralism and (4) Nondualism.

In basing so much of his problem-historical method on the relation of the soul and body, Vollenhoven presupposes a false problematic, or one that does not apply to Dooyeweerd’s view of the selfhood. Vollenhoven’s central issue of whether the soul comes from the same source or whether it is added by a special act of creation presupposes that philosophy begins with the concept of a temporal individual person. But Dooyeweerd begins with the idea of the selfhood as a supratemporal totality, which only differentiates and individuates within time. With respect to anthropological monism/dualism, Dooyeweerd therefore does not fit within any of the categories. His view of the selfhood is that of the integral and central supratemporal selfhood that expresses itself in time. Because he denies any anthropological dualism, Dooyeweerd does not need to enter into the debate of the origin of the soul in contradistinction to the body. And Vollenhoven’s own ideas of individuality and universality cannot be applied to Dooyeweerd’s ideas of a central religious root that expresses itself temporally in both a law-side and a subject-side, and to Dooyeweerd’s idea of the fullness of individuality as being found in that center.

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Dooyeweerd does not fit into dualism/monism when it is related to a distinction between time and eternity. Dooyeweerd specifically repudiated such a dualism. He proposed a dynamic view of eternity, and an intermediate “created eternity” or aevum, which is the basis of the religious dimension of our selfhood. This supratemporal selfhood is the basis for the existence of the entire temporal world. Dooyeweerd links this with his interpretation of our creation “in the image of God.” Being created in the image of God, we express ourselves in the temporal, but the present temporal world is the result of the fall. We participate in its redemption. Vollenhoven denies both this view of image of God and Dooyeweerd’s radical view of the fallenness of the temporal cosmos. Vollenhoven’s distinction between time and eternity is a distinction that itself reflects a dualism between change and permanence. And because Vollenhoven an intermediate created eternity, he cannot understand Dooyeweerd’s view of the continuance of the supratemporal selfhood after death.

In classifying Dooyeweerd under either semi-mysticism or monistic monarchianism, Vollenhoven has wrongly assumed that Dooyeweerd is referring to an “identity” with God. Dooyeweerd is certainly mystical, but his mysticism is one that preserves a distinction between God and creature. To attempt to force Dooyeweerd’s philosophy into within the either/or dichotomies of monism and dualism, whether ontological or anthropological, can only result in a misunderstanding of his philosophy. The unfairness of such an interpretation is also evident when we see that Vollenhoven tried to exempt his own philosophy from such dichotomies.

Neither Vollenhoven nor Dooyeweerd are dualists in the sense believing in an eternally pre-existing matter or substance. And neither of them are monists in the sense of pantheism. Dooyeweerd rejects any pantheistic identification with God. But Dooyeweerd also says that we are the expression of God. He asserts that we are “from, out and towards” God as Origin (cf. Romans 11:36). This does not fit with Vollenhoven’s category of ‘semi-mysticism’–a category which itself must be revised in view of recent research regarding Aristotle. Semi-mysticism holds that there is a part of us that is ‘identical’ to God. Dooyeweerd is therefore not a semi-mystic.
Nor does Vollenhoven’s category of ‘monistic monarchianism’ fit Dooyeweerd’s mysticism. That, too, presupposes an identity with God. Furthermore, his linking of Dooyeweerd with Cusanus is contrary to Dooyeweerd’s own view of Cusanus. It would be better to relate Dooyeweerd to the German mystical tradition of Eckhart, Tauler and Ruusbroec. Those mystical traditions, which emphasize union but not identification with God, are neither pantheistic nor monistic.

A new category this is distinct from either monism or dualism is required to account for Dooyeweerd’s belief that we are “from, out and towards” God, our Origin. I have also suggested that the idea of panentheism may be helpful, if it is understood in a nondualistic way. We are united with God, but not in a dualistic sense of fleeing the world, nor in a monistic sense of ‘identity’ with God. This is a view that affirms that we “live and move and have our being” in God, but that God is always more than His creation. But the idea of panentheism will not be helpful if it is understood in terms of process theology. Nor will it be helpful if we accept Vollenhoven’s characterization of it as dualistic.

It is unclear whether Vollenhoven’s problem-historical method can be reformed in order to take account of the problems that I have pointed out. But to apply his presently inadequate categories to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy can only result in missing its richness and spiritual power.

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