Dooyeweerd’s Idea of Modalities: The Pivotal 1922 Article
by
J. Glenn Friesen

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During an embargo period of two years from publication in that journal, I am permitted to place on my website my article as submitted prior to peer review. The page numbers below do not correspond with the published article, so all citations should be from the published article and not this version. Apart from page numbers and some formatting changes like paragraph numbering, the main changes in the published version are the addition of a diagram by Janet Danielson showing the dynamic nature of the modalities in Dooyeweerd’s mature philosophy, as well as an expanded footnote 4 and two additional footnotes 21 and 39, where I address the peer reviewers’ comments. Because footnotes were added, the footnote numbering below is also different.

Abstract

Dooyeweerd says that “the first rudimental conception” of his philosophy had ripened even before he started work at the Kuyper Foundation in October 1922. He had not even studied Kuyper's works, although he would later find some similarities in Kuyper. A detailed analysis of an article written earlier in 1922 shows us how Dooyeweerd developed his philosophy. This article is “Normatieve rechtsleer. Een kritisch-methodologische onderzoek naar Kelsen's normatieve rechtsbeschouwing.” It includes these ideas: the rejection of the autonomy of thought, the idea of intuitive beholding [schouwen], and the idea of modalities or modes of consciousness. Previous historians of reformational philosophy have not adequately researched Dooyeweerd's sources for these ideas. None of these sources are Calvinistic. Dooyeweerd used these ideas to critique neo-Kantianism. He dismantles Kant's logical categories and instead puts forward the idea of intuited modalities. And Dooyeweerd uses the scholastic idea of ‘meaning-moments’ to individuate these modalities from totality.

Keywords

autonomy of thought - Herman Dooyeweerd - intuitive beholding (schouwen) - Kant - modalities - meaning-moment - Emil Lask - neo-Kantianism
I. Introduction

On April 8, 1922, Dooyeweerd spoke at a meeting of the Society for Legal Philosophy in The Hague (see 1922a). He was responding to the neo-Kantian ideas of Gerben Scholten. That same spring,\(^1\) Dooyeweerd also wrote three articles on neo-Kantianism, most of which were never published.\(^2\) The third article, *Normatieve Rechtsleer* (1922d), critiques the neo-Kantian assumptions underlying Hans Kelsen’s normative view of law. This article is pivotal in showing how Dooyeweerd begins to develop his reformational philosophy.

In the opening pages to *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*, Dooyeweerd says, “The first rudimental conception of this philosophy had ripened even before I came to the Kuyper-foundation”\(^3\) (*NC I*, v).\(^3\) *Normatieve Rechtsleer* shows the development of those rudimental conceptions. They are not Calvinistic in origin.

Historians of reformational philosophy, including R.D. Henderson, Anthony Tol, Johan Stellingwerff, Marcel Verburg and John Kraay have discussed this article. They note that Dooyeweerd introduces some new terms and ideas, such as the rejection of the autonomy of thought,\(^4\) the idea of intuitive beholding [\textit{schouwen}],\(^5\) and the idea of modalities. But they do not investigate in any detail how Dooyeweerd arrived at these ideas. They note that Dooyeweerd uses ‘modality’ as a synonym for Emil Lask’s term ‘area category’ [\textit{Gebiedskategorie}], a term that Lask used to designate the areas investigated by the special sciences.\(^6\) But they do not explain why Dooyeweerd used ‘modality’; the term was not used as a synonym for area category by Lask or other neo-Kantians.

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\(^1\) The first manuscript, 1922b, is dated Good Friday [April 14], 1922. There has been considerable discussion about the dating of the other two manuscripts, but the consensus is that they were written around the same time (Verburg 33, Tol 291 fn117). A typed copy of Normatieve Rechtsleer was made in 1923, but internal evidence indicates that it was written in 1922, with a couple of 1923 entries added in the Bibliography. I believe that it was substantially completed before May 1922, when Dooyeweerd applied to work at the Kuyper Foundation because of the interest he expressed in epistemology.

\(^2\) Pages 74 to 88 of *Normatieve Rechtsleer* were reproduced in Dooyeweerd’s article “Calvinisme contra Neo-kantianisme,” *Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte*, 1926 (Verburg, 33 fn37). But that section was partially re-worked. For example, Dooyeweerd adds the idea of “field of view” [\textit{gezichtsveld}] to p. 76 of the 1922 article. But the term already appears on p. 87 of the original 1922d.

\(^3\) Dooyeweerd gives the date 1921 after this sentence. He started at the Kuyper Foundation in October 1922, so 1921 may indicate when he first formed the ideas reflected in his 1922 articles.

\(^4\) Henderson suggests he obtained this idea from Kuyper or Groen van Prinsterer (Henderson 103, fn190). However, I am not aware of Groen’s opposition to the autonomy of thought in the sense used by Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd does not refer to Kuyper, and did not seriously read Kuyper until later that year when he started work at the Kuyper Foundation.

\(^5\) Verburg speculates that Dooyeweerd obtained ‘\textit{schouwen}’ from Husserl (Verburg 38). But Dooyeweerd criticized Husserl. There are more likely sources (Friesen 254, 278-9, 281, 286-7).

I refer to this article *Normatieve Rechtsleer* in my book *Christian Theosophy and Neo-Calvinism: Franz von Baader, Abraham Kuyper, Herman Dooyeweerd* (Friesen 2015). There I claim that Dooyeweerd’s rejection of the autonomy of thought (stated several times in *Normatieve Rechtsleer*) has its source in Okke Norel’s 1920 article on J.H. Gunning, Jr. and the ideas of Franz von Baader. Abraham Kuyper also obtained the idea from Baader, and Kuyper specifically praises Baader for this insight. But Dooyeweerd had not yet studied Kuyper. The idea of ‘schouwen’ or intuitive beholding is from the same sources. With respect to the term ‘modalities’, which appears for the first time in *Normatieve Rechtsleer*, I said that further research was required. This has now been done.

This detailed analysis of *Normatieve Rechtsleer* is a result of my discussions with Peter Enneson. I am grateful for Enneson’s close reading of the texts that we reviewed together, and for his discovery that Werner Gent’s *Die Philosophie des Raumes und der Zeit* (1926-28), referred to by Dooyeweerd in 1939, has a chapter on Baader’s ideas of time and the supratemporal. Gent also links Baader’s ideas to scholastic views on time, including the idea of the *aevum*, or created eternity. Our analysis of *Normatieve Rechtsleer* led to new material and perspectives in support of the importance for Dooyeweerd not only of Norel’s 1920 article on Gunning, but also of Baader’s critique of Kant, at least as summarized in the 54 page Introduction by Baader’s editor Franz Hoffmann in Volume I, *Erkenntniswissenschaft* [Epistemology], of Baader’s *Collected Works* [*Werke*].

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7 There can be no doubt that Norel’s article came to the attention of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. They were aware of the journal, *Stemmen des Tijds* (Friesen 153-4). Vollenhoven published a book review in that journal in January 1922 (Henderson, 53 fn125).

8 Kuyper says

“In spite of his Praktisches Vernunft it was this desire which actuated Kant, of whom Baader correctly wrote, “The fundamental error of his philosophy is that man is autonomous and spontaneous, as if he possessed reason of himself; for it transforms man to a god, and so becomes pantheistic” (Kuyper 1892).

II. Kant’s Categories or Pure Concepts of the Understanding

Kant adopts Aristotle’s term ‘categories’, and he derives the categories from Aristotle’s logic. These categories laid the groundwork for the discussion by neo-Kantians like Lask of the use of synthetic a priori judgments in the various sciences. You can see that Kant used the term ‘modality’ in reference to some of these logical categories.

TABLE OF CATEGORIES

I
Of Quantity
Unity
Plurality
Totality

II
Of Quality
Reality
Negation
Limitation

III
Of Relation
Of Inherence and Subsistence
(substantia et accidens)
Of Causality and Dependence
(cause and effect)
Of Community (reciprocity between agent and patient)

IV
Of Modality
Possibility -- Impossibility
Existence -- Non-existence
Necessity -- Contingency

Kant says that these categories, or forms of pure thought, are known a priori, independently of our sense impressions. Our sensory knowledge is a posteriori. The a priori forms themselves have no content, and our a posteriori sensory impressions have content but no form. Kant calls our sensory impressions “the sensory manifold.” What Kant means by all of this has caused much debate, but I find this a helpful interpretation:

Kant, who for the first time draws a consistent distinction between sensation and perception, argues that the subject is affected through sensation, or the sensory manifold, whose contents are suitably transformed into objects we perceive, experience and know. The transformation from mere unprocessed sensory content to perceptual object occurs through the application of the categories, or pure concepts of the understanding, which Kant claims to deduce. […] the sensory manifold (unprocessed sensory content) is transformed to perceptual object by the application of the categories. […] In processing

10 See Joll 2015 for a discussion of how Kant deduced the categories from Aristotelian logic.
11 From the Kemp Smith translation, 113.
the sensory input, the subject “constructs” objects it experiences and knows (Rockmore, 44-5).

Kant says that we can only initially experience this sensory manifold in relation to space and time. We know space and time by our intuition, and so space and time are called “modes of intuition” [Anschnauungsarten]. These modes of intuition are not logical forms. They make possible our receptivity to sensory experience even in its formless state. Dooyeweerd, following Baader’s critique of Kant, will use this idea of modes of intuition. He dismantles Kant’s logical categories, and he expands the list of modes of intuition, which he then calls ‘modalities.’

Baader criticized Kant’s dualism between a priori and a posteriori. He says that these are abstractions from reality. Kant’s logical categories were derived from Aristotelian logic. But that logic was a finished product, a result of an analysis of reality (Werke I, xxvi). In reality, we never experience a form without content, or content without form (Werke I, xlii). And there is never any a priori knowing without a corresponding a posteriori knowing. But the a priori is not to be considered as purely logical; it is rather what we innerly intuit [Schauen], in the center of our being, based on what is given to us to view. What Kant called a priori and a posteriori is ab interiori and ab exteriori. In other words, the distinction is between our beholding in our inner center, and that in our outer (bodily) periphery. It is not the same as objective and subjective (Werke I, 326, 348). The a posteriori is what we express in the periphery of our being, including our act of thinking. This distinction of center and periphery would be crucial in Dooyeweerd’s own philosophy, and so would this way of understanding the a priori. Some of these ideas are already developed in Normatieve Rechtsleer.

III. The Kantian Categories in Neo-Kantianism

1. Reality of the world being investigated

Neo-Kantians tried to apply the logical categories to the areas [Gebiete] that are the subject matter of the special sciences. Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven had previously discussed neo-Kantianism. They had focused on the same problem: what is the relation of the logical categories to the a-logical Gegenstand (that which is set over-against the logical categories)? How does our thinking relate to the fields of investigation of the various special sciences? Dooyeweerd’s ideas in Normatieve Rechtsleer will give a new answer: the Gegenstand is not a-logical; the logical is merely one of our modes of intuition. The logical mode is the area investigated by the special science of logic, but it is only one special science among many.

Neo-Kantians were divided between two schools of thought: the Marburg school and the Baden school. The Marburg school tried to show that the Gegenstand itself was produced

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13 Like Baader, Dooyeweerd uses ‘a priori’ in an ontical and not a logical sense (Friesen 240, 242).
or generated by the logical categories. Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd opposed this overly idealist view of reality.\(^{14}\) In contrast, Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven referred to their position as ‘critical realism.’ This term was not unique to them.\(^{15}\) By ‘realism,’ they emphasized that the world being investigated has a reality or givenness independent of our thinking.\(^{16}\) And by ‘critical’ they distinguished their philosophy from naïve realism, which believes that the object investigated by our thinking is a copy in our mind of the reality that is being investigated. But that kind of copy theory results in a “doubling” of reality instead of a theoretical analysis of it. That is why Dooyeweerd, like Kant (and Baader) continued to distinguish between the Gegenstand of thought—that which is set over-against our thought—from the real objects of our non-theoretical experience.

2. The normative

Unlike his Marburg interpreters, Kant believed in a material side of our knowledge. The Baden school of neo-Kantianism, which included Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert and Emil Lask, sought to reintroduce this material side of our knowledge. Their opposition to Marburg idealism made them close to “critical realism” in that they acknowledged the givenness of the world, upon which the logical forms would work. But the Baden school also believed that Kant had improperly restricted the material side of our knowledge to what is (Sein). They wanted to add the normative, what ought to be (Sollen). They divided the material side of our knowledge into Sein and Sollen, the natural sciences and the normative sciences.\(^{17}\)

3. Emil Lask (1875-1915)

Lask, a student of Windelband and Rickert, died at the age of 40 in the war. He is a most interesting philosopher. He influenced the early Heidegger, who wrote his doctoral dissertation on Lask. Lask’s Collected Works were edited by Eugen Herrigel, who would

\(^{14}\) The idea that the Gegenstand is itself generated by our logical categories is similar to today’s constructivism, which is really a “hyper-Kantianism” (Perovich 1990).

\(^{15}\) The term ‘critical realism’ was first used by J. F. Herbart (1776-1841), successor to Kant at Königsberg. This was also the translation used for Eduard von Hartmann’s term ‘transcendental realism’ (Hartwig, 97). Dooyeweerd describes his use of the term in 1922d, 44. It makes use of cosmic categories, not logical categories. He distinguishes Aristotle, the Marburgers, Lask and Husserl. Dooyeweerd ceased using the term after 1923 (Henderson, 117).

\(^{16}\) This use of ‘realism’, emphasizing the givenness of reality, is distinct from its use in Christian realism, which uses ‘realism’ to refer to ideal realities in “the mind of God.” Christian realism assumes that we can know those ideal realities because our logic or logos corresponds to the Logos of God. In Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article, he moves away from Christian realism. The cosmic categories, created by God, include human logic, but logic is only one of those cosmic categories. Human logic is not the same as Logos, and the cosmic categories are not logical categories.

\(^{17}\) Kant related the normative to practical reason, and he related factual truth to theoretical reason. The Sein/Sollen distinction might be objected to on the ground that there are norms even within Kant’s theoretical reason. These are not norms as to how we should act, but norms as to what we should believe.
later become famous for his book *Zen in the Art of Archery*.\(^\text{18}\) Frederick Beiser says that Lask “stretched his neo-Kantian principles to the limit, indeed to the breaking point, so much so that the question remains whether he was really a Kantian at all” (Beiser, 442).

(a) The individual thing is *given*, not created

Lask and Rickert both opposed the Marburgers, who believed that we create the material side of knowledge. But Lask also opposed Rickert for not giving enough objectivity to the individual thing. Although Rickert believed that the material content was given, he thought that the individual is created by us rather than given.

Rickert had argued at length in *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung* that the *principium individuationis* is something created by our interests and concepts. The manifold on its own is an undifferentiated mass, inexhaustible in its richness and complexity; we individuate it by singling out some factor within it which we wish to discuss or analyze (Beiser 459).\(^\text{19}\)

For Lask, the individual is a *given reality* that is not created by thought. This idea is not only a departure from Marburg neo-Kantianism, but also from Rickert’s Baden school of neo-Kantianism.

(b) Logical categories are determined by their content

Lask was familiar with Baader’s repudiation of Kant’s “dualism” between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* (Lask I, 200). Like Baader, Lask insisted that there is never an *a priori* form of thought that does not correspond to the *a posteriori*. In fact, Lask says that the logical categories are *determined* by the content that they refer to (Lask II, 58). For example, the logical category of identity is incomprehensible without something that is identical; the logical category of difference is incomprehensible without something different (Lask II, 32-3).

Alles Geltende ist ein inhaltliche Erfüllung erwartendes Hingeltendes, ein etwas anderes Betreffendes und bedarf eines Materials als des Betroffenen….Form weist hingeltend auf Inhalt hin, und Inhalte stehen in der Form (Lask II, 33).

[All validity is a directional-validity awaiting fulfillment by its content; it relates to something else and requires some material to relate to….Form as directional-validity refers to content, and contents stand within form]. (my translation)

But logical form and material content are not merely reciprocal. Whereas Kant had said that the logical categories determine the object of our knowledge, Lask gives primacy to the *object*. Form does not determine matter, but matter determines form because our everyday, pre-theoretical experience *already has structure*. Lask’s material side of knowledge is therefore not the same as Kant’s unstructured sensory manifold. The difference from Kant’s views is summarized by S.J. McGrath:

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\(^\text{18}\) A further interesting fact is that the Reformed theologian Klaas Schilder obtained his doctorate under the supervision of Eugen Herrigel (Stellingwerff 2006, 62-63).

\(^\text{19}\) There may be an echo of this in Dooyeweerd, who says that we are engaged in theory when we single out an individual tree.

By limiting my theoretical attention to a concrete natural thing [linden tree] I am actually engaged in a theoretical abstraction (*NC* III, 54; *WD* III, 35).
Lask argues that *a priori* forms are not imposed on the raw “matter” of sense. We live in form, as in a context or an environment (*Umgebung*) which embraces that which it “informs.” Categories accommodate themselves to matter, which they “surround” (*umschließen*) and contextually “validate” (*umgelten*)…

For Lask, the Kantians miss an important phenomenological point when they overemphasize theoretical categories: the preformal intelligibility of the given. The categories light up something that is already showing itself. Matter is not passive and without structure. It determines form by receiving it according to preformal intelligible structures embedded in concrete historical life. Lask speaks of a “preformal something” (das vorformale Etwas) or “fore-predicative something” (das vorprädikative Etwas), which underlies categorial and judgmental knowledge […] (McGrath 94-5, referring to Lask II, 69,72).

The material content is the primary phenomenon [*Urphänomen*] or primary material [*Urmaterial*] for our knowing. This primary material is already structured, already surrounded by meaning. Theoretical thought is secondary and “artificial.” In theoretical thought, the form inherent in matter is artificially separated [*losgerissen*] from this primary material. This separated form then serves as the secondary “material” for judgment, which combines it with the “form” of the logical categories (Lask II, 58, 93, 101, 398). Theoretical judgment therefore deals with “the form of form.” This is a two-storey model of knowledge. The sensory and super-sensory content (such as norms) comprise the first storey, and theoretical meaning is built upon this as a second storey. Form is not independent [*selbständig*]; it depends on and refers to a material lower stratum [*Untergrundes*] (Lask II, 92-3, 193).

In separating the form from the matter, theory “disturbs” [*zerstört*] the primary experience. Human subjectivity analyses its object, which is indivisible, into parts; and it then puts it together again, but in an order that suits itself (Beiser 466, citing Lask II, 418-20).

The primordial state is one of “immediate experience.” As such, it is completely untouched by theory. With respect to the sensory content it is a passive giving oneself over [*Hingabe*] to the object. With respect to the non-sensory, it is also a mere “giving oneself over” to the bare ethical, aesthetic or religious in an unreflective way—without raising it to consciousness or by reflection finding or fixing any clarity about it.

Das unmittelbare Erleben ist ein bloßes “leben” und Sichverlieren im Nichtsinnlichen und darum eben ein Nichterkennen, ein unwissendes, unreflektiertes, insofern naive, durch keinerlei “Gedanken” und Klarheit darüber gestörtes Verhalten, ein Erleben, das nicht “weiß”, was es “tut” oder “lebt” (Lask II, 191).

[Immediate experience is a bare “living” and losing oneself in the non-sensory and therefore even a not-knowing, an unknowing, unreflecting, and in that way naïve, a state of affairs that is in no way disturbed by any “thoughts” and clarity concerning it, an experience that does not “know” what it “does” or “lives”] (my translation).

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20 There is some similarity to Dooyeweerd’s later view of theory as a *dis-stasis* and subsequent synthesis, although Lask does not use the word *dis-stasis.*
In this quotation from his *Kategorienlehre*, Lask denies that we have any knowledge (‘*kennen*’ or ‘*wissen*’) in our primordial naïve state. We live in the preformally intelligible without “knowing” it as such (Lask I, 191).

Lask says that any knowledge requires a “carrying away” [*Entrückung*] of the immediate to the mediate and to the distant (Lask II, 191). Our categorial predication (abstraction) hides the primordial structure, the something [*Etwas*] that makes theory possible (McGrath 110, referring to Lask I, 129).

But later, in *Die Lehre vom Urteil*, Lask says that we do have some kind of knowledge even in our immediate experience. Unlike theory, which uses antithesis (theory is oppositional or *gegensätzlich*), immediate experience is a knowing that is suprapositional and supra-judgmental (ein übergegensätzliches, überurteilsartiges Erkennen) (Lask II, 396).

Lask uses the term ‘meaning’ (*Sinn*) to refer to the use of theoretical categories in combination with this immediate experience. We will discuss this below in reference to “meaning” and grammar. But immediate experience is “metagrammatical” and without any character of predication. Predicate logic belongs to theory.  


[Such a kind of knowing should be seen merely as the receiver of the *Gegenstand*, but not as dealing in any way with its isolated elements, therefore not as the activity of predication, or placing it within the categorial form as a forming function. It includes the undisturbed or restored-again Urbild, in which there is a mere standing of the content within the categories. It is directed not to antithetically split objects as in determinations of judgment, but to the non-antithetical *Gegenstand* itself]. (my translation)

We experience this non-antithetical immediate experience when we regard the *Gegenstand* in its totality and unity [*Ganzheit und Einheit*] (Lask II, 396). This experience is undisturbed by subjectivity. This “intactness” is a kind of transcendence (Lask II, 416).

There are echoes of these ideas in Dooyeweerd’s later distinction between naïve experience and theoretical thought, the idea of taking apart naïve experience in theoretical *dis-stasis*, and the idea of totality and unity. Dooyeweerd later also speaks of our pre-theoretical experience as an intuitive knowing that is deepened by our theoretical knowledge.

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21 Dooyeweerd later said that the *abstract discursive form of the syllogism* is revealed only in theoretical thought (Dooyeweerd 1940, 171).
(c) Intuition

Beiser reads Lask as saying that we know the material content by our “immediate intuitions.” Such intuitions are to be distinguished from subsequent theoretical knowledge. He cites Lask II, 191, which we have already referred to. McGrath refers to the same page. McGrath says Lask obtained the term “categorial intuition” from Husserl.

For Husserl, the object is not merely referred to by the forms, but “is set before our very eyes in just these forms. In other words: it is not thought of, but intuited or perceived” (McGrath 95, citing Husserl’s Logical Investigations, II, VI, §45).

Lask does not use the term ‘intuition’ on that page. And yet I think that Beiser and McGrath are correct that this immediate experience is a kind of intuition. Lask elsewhere refers to immediate experience as intuition “in its widest sense” (Lask II, 217).

But there is an unresolved problem in Lask. When he says that the things stand within forms, is he referring to objective categories independent of our thought, or is he referring to Kantian categories that we deduce? As we shall see, Lask does not come to a satisfactory answer.

(d) Norms versus Values

We have seen that the Baden school of neo-Kantianism added norms to the material side of knowledge. Norms are not given by our senses, so the material side of knowledge thus has both sensory [sinnlich] and super-sensory [übersinnlich, unsinnlich] components. These correspond to the natural and the normative sciences.

But Lask was critical of Rickert’s idea of normativity. He thought that it was too subjective and psychologistic. For Lask, norms need to correspond to objective values or truth. He cites Aristotle: “It is not because we think truly that you are pale that you are pale, but because you are pale we who say this have the truth” (Beiser 463, citing Lask II, 317-18). This objective realm is not created by logic. Our logical assertions, such as “S is P,” need something objective to make them true (Beiser 463, referring to Lask III, 397-8).

This would seem to indicate that Lask is returning to a pre-Kantian way of thinking, and that he is relying on a metaphysical realm of truth to which our logical judgments are subject. That is how Beiser interprets Lask. He points to Lask’s idea that the sensory material is primary, and that it is the primary image or Urbild of which theory is the Nachbild or imitation. Logical truth is made to correspond with an objective realm, which serves as the standard for the judgment that is its copy. He says that these terms, which he paraphrases as ‘archetypical’ and ‘ectypical’ are reminiscent of Plato (Beiser 463). He says that Lask’s return to the correspondence theory is “deliberate,” and that there is a profound Platonic undercurrent. In Die Lehre vom Urteil, “Lask’s objective realm turns out to consist in purely intelligible and indivisible archetypes” (Beiser 463).

Dooyeweerd does not read Lask this way. He says that for Lask, the primary Urbild sphere consists of material that is within the categories and is therefore transcendental in Kant’s sense, and not metaphysical in Aristotle’s sense (1922d, 42 fn4).

Lask’s objective realm is certainly not metaphysical in Plato’s sense. Lask refers to Plato’s two-world theory, but he tries to distinguish it by his own “two-element” theory, where the two elements of form and matter are both within the primary sphere (Lask II, 94). But is that view not metaphysical in Aristotle’s sense?
Dooyeweerd refers on the same page (42) to Lask’s view that in the primary “Urbildliche” sphere, form and matter are merely within one another (“ein schlichte Ineinander von Form und Material”) (see Lask II, 181, 426, 457). Dooyeweerd interprets Lask as saying that it is the Kantian transcendental-logical moments that are included in things.

Dooyeweerd’s interpretation of Lask is not quite accurate. It is not the Kantian categories that are included in things. As we have seen, Lask says that theoretical thought separates the inherent form from this Urbildliche sphere, and then uses those separated forms as the secondary “material” to be combined with the Kantian forms. In the end, Lask tries to fit the form of the original Urbild experience within the logical categories of the theoretical Nachbild.  

But how does Lask know that he has properly abstracted the objective form to be used in this combination with the Kantian forms? Lask is aware of this problem. He refers to Aristotle’s view that the objective measure of the correspondence cannot be merely a subjective, capricious standard (Lask II, 318). And he points to those who speak in terms of “quasi-transcendentals”—they believe they are referring to transcendent objective truth, but they are really only formulating it in terms of subjective theory (Lask II, 421). But does not Lask’s view have the same problem?

Dooyeweerd’s solution is to dismantle the logical categories and substitute an increased number of intuited modes of intuition. These modes of intuition are “cosmic categories”, not logical categories, and they provide the “objectivity” that Lask sought. These cosmic categories are not knowable, but can only be intuited [slechts schouwbaar] (1922d, 44). Later, Dooyeweerd would say that we intuit Ideas of the modalities, which our theoretical concepts can only approximate.

22 Lask II, 201: Philosophy is a summoning of givenness to the judgment seat of Reason (“ein Fordern des Gegebenen vor den Richterstuhl der Vernunft”). It combines reflection and autonomy.

23 Baader says that with the proper use of imagination, our intellect [Vernunft] achieves intuition or inner beholding [Anschauung] (Werke 11, 81). Kant placed “a constitutive contradiction” within Vernunft by opposing it to Verstand. But Baader says that Vernunft and Verstand are not opposed; they explain from differing standpoints in higher and lower regions or spheres of being respectively. Verstand must be subordinated to Vernunft in the higher region. Our Vernunft is a beholding [Anschauen] in and through symbols, not concepts. The forms of Vernunft are revealed in the forms of Verstand. Conversely, the concepts of Verstand carry symbols with them. Verstand reasons in the lower sphere in terms of concepts, which are not to be made in a mechanical way but in an organic way (Werke 15, 199, 203-4). It was this idea of organicism that would lead to Kuyper’s view of sphere sovereignty (Friesen, 82). In my book, I also discuss the relation between imagination, intuited Ideas and theoretical concepts as emphasized by Dooyeweerd in his “New Critique.”

24 For Dooyeweerd, Ideas are not metaphysical, because they are within our experience. Ideas are intuited by our supratemporal selfhood. But Dooyeweerd has a somewhat analogous problem as Lask: when we try to conceptualize these Ideas, we can only approximate them (Friesen 161, 244).
IV. Dooyeweerd’s critique of Lask

Lask continued to divide knowledge into logical categories and contents, whereas Dooyeweerd rejected the idea of logical categories at all, except within the special science of logic. Dooyeweerd says,

Zelfs de ons overigens zoo na staande Emil Lask is door de overpanning van de beteekenis van Kant’s “Copernicusdaad” hier niet tot het juiste inzicht doorgedrongen. Zijn Gegenstandssfeer blijft trascendaal-logische sfeer, en daarmee heeft zijn theorie van het zuiver kennen tegenover de oordeelssfeer der logica geen scherper afpaling kunnen ontvangen dan die van “ongekunsteld” tegenover “gekunsteld” denken. (1922d 46)

[Because of his over-emphasis of the significance of Kant’s “Copernican revolution,” even Emil Lask, who otherwise stands so near to us, did not reach the correct insight here. His Gegenstands-sphere remains a transcendental-logical sphere, and because of this he was not able to give a sharper distinction between his theory of pure knowing over against the sphere of logical judgment other than the distinction between “non-artificial” and “artificial.”] (my translation).

Dooyeweerd says that Lask (1) still sees logic as the higher unity in which the Gegenstand of the special sciences is understood and (2) this is a result of overestimating the significance of Kant’s Copernican revolution.

1. Logic as the higher unity

Although Kant’s logical categories are determined by their content, Lask says that this sensory content is in turn penetrated and controlled by the non-sensory, a priori forms of thought” [“durchsetzt und durchherrscht von unsinnlicher, apriorischer Verstandesform”] (Lask II, 57). Dooyeweerd says that Lask’s idea of logical validity [gelden] qualifies both the areas of being and the normative, and this idea of logical validity becomes Lask’s basic category (1922d, 46, 47 fn2).

In contrast, Dooyeweerd limits the role of logic. Logic is only one of what he will call ‘modalities.’ Logic has its own unique content. Dooyeweerd accepts that within judgments of applied logic [i.e. logic applied to the other modalities and the special sciences that they determine], gelden continues to apply. There is a Seinsgeltung and Sollgeltung. But those other modalities are not themselves determined by logical validity [gelden] (1922d, 48 fn2).

2. Lask overestimates Kant’s Copernican revolution

Dooyeweerd says that because he gives priority to logical validity, Lask’s Gegenstand is still transcendental-logical. Lask overestimates Kant’s so-called Copernican revolution:

Wij ontkennen daarom het transcendentaal-logisch karakter van de Gegenstandssfeer, omdat wij het dogma van de autonomie van het denken verwerpen, omdat wij aan Kant’s Copernicus-daad niet een universele, maar slechts een beperkte beteekenis toekennen, n.l. voor de relatie-logica (1922d, 45; cited Verburg 45).

[We therefore deny the transcendental-logical character of the Gegenstands-sphere, because we reject the dogma of the autonomy of thought, because we acknowledge only a limited and not a universal significance to Kant’s Copernican revolution, namely for relational logic.]
Tol says that Dooyeweerd is here “not explicit in his reasoning” (Tol, 296). It seems that Tol does not understand what Dooyeweerd means by “the rejection of the autonomy of thought.” Dooyeweerd’s rejection of the autonomy of thought is based on the idea, which he found in Norel, that our thinking is only one of many functions of our central selfhood or heart. It is not autonomous over the rest of our functions, such as our feelings and sensations that are investigated by other special sciences. Logic, on which our thinking is based, does not create or determine the nature of the other special sciences. Logic is itself one of those special sciences, with a limited role as just one of the modalities of our intuition.

Although reformational philosophers are now familiar with the critique of autonomy of thought, it was an unfamiliar idea in 1922. Dooyeweerd had introduced the idea of autonomy when he responded to Scholten’s ideas at the Society for Legal Philosophy (1922a). Dooyeweerd recalled in 1975 how surprised his audience was, and how they simply ignored his idea of rejection of autonomy (Boeles, 45).

If thinking is only one of our functions, then Kant’s so-called Copernican Revolution was only a limited revolution, dealing with logic that is only one of our modes of consciousness (Friesen 2015, 163-67). But from whom did Dooyeweerd obtain this idea that Kant’s Copernican revolution was only limited? Not from Lask, who continued to emphasize its importance. I believe that Dooyeweerd obtained the idea of rejection of the autonomy of thought from Norel’s article on Gunning and Baader. This encouraged him to look at Baader directly, and he obtained the comparison with Copernicus from Franz Hoffmann’s introduction to the first volume of Baader’s works (the volume dealing with epistemology).

Hoffmann says that Kant’s idea of logical categories and sensory impressions is not comparable to Copernicus’s idea of the earth moving around the sun as its center. Kant’s idea is rather a reciprocal relationship, where the material depends on thought, and thought depends on material. It is more like a double star, where each star revolves around the other. A true Copernican revolution requires the idea of a center and periphery. This is found in Baader’s philosophy, where the periphery of nature orbits the created spirit [man], who in turn orbits God, the true Center (Werke I, xxxi-xxxii).

That is why Dooyeweerd says in *Normatieve Rechtsleer* that Kant’s Copernican revolution was only limited. In the opening to his *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, Dooyeweerd affirms the same idea. The idea of the central selfhood or heart is the real Copernican revolution. Kant’s Copernican revolution can only be considered a “revolution in the periphery” (*WdW* I, v-vii; mistranslated in the *NC*).25

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25 The concentric orbits of the natural world, man and God are also reflected in what Dooyeweerd would later refer to as “the law of religious concentration” (Friesen 269).
V. Dooyeweerd’s idea of modalities

The following excerpt from *Normatieve Rechtsleer* (1922d, 47-8, reproduced in Verburg 34-8) is of key importance in understanding Dooyeweerd’s new idea of modalities. I have divided it into paragraphs.

§1 Zoowel bij Kant, als de Marburgers, is de zuivere logica ontaard tot de logica der mathematische natuurwetenschap, ja verder tot de logica der natuurwetenschappen. Vandaar dat b.v. Kant’s kategorieëntafel de zuivere kategorieën als identiteit, relatie, modaliteit op één lijn stelt met de met mathematische Gegenständlichkeit belaste kategorieën der quantiteit en met de psychologische en biologische kategorieën der kwaliteit, vandaar voorts, dat hij ruimte en tijd zeer inconsequent tot aanschouwingsvormen stempelde, in onderscheiding van de zuivere denkvormen, ofschoon toch de kategororïën der quantiteit evenmin als de z.g.n. “aanschouwingsvormen” in het denken zelve haar Gegenständlichkeit vinden.

¶1 In Kant as well as the Marburg school, pure logic has been de-natured to the logic of mathematical natural science, or to the logic of the natural sciences. From this it follows for example that in Kant’s table of categories, the pure categories such as identity, relation, and modality are placed on the same level as the category of quantity, which is laden with mathematical *Gegenständlichkeit*, and with the psychological and biological categories of quality. And from this it also follows that he very inconsistently marked out space and time as forms of intuition, as distinguished from the pure forms of thought, although the categories of quantity no more find their *Gegenständlichkeit* in thinking itself than do the so-called “forms of intuition.”

§2 De zuivere logica zal zich moeten bepalen tot het systeem van de zuiver formeele kategorïën en oordeelsvormen.

¶2 Pure logic will have to limit itself to the system of the pure formal categories and forms of judgment.

§3 Identiteit, verscheidenheid, relatie, continuïteit, en systeem, staan qua formeele kategorïën op één lijn; analyse, synthese, bevestiging en ontkening, hypothese en kategorïsche verklaring evenzoo als zuivere oordeelsvormen.

¶3 Identity, diversity, relation, continuity and system remain as formal categories on the same level [as pure formal categories]; similarly analysis, synthesis, confirmation and denial, hypothesis and categorical explanation as pure forms of judgment.

§4 Bovenaan staat als grondkategorie van de eerste orde de modaliteit, de gebiedskategorie om met Lask te spreken, die in de zuivere logica als gelden, in de toegepaste logica’s als met een anderen graad van Gegenständlichkeit belaste grondkategorie het geheele terrein der wetenschap bepaalt. Voor de natuurwetenschappen is deze grondmodaliteit het zijn, *het werkelijke*; voor de normatieve wetenschappen het zoo behooren; voor de geometrie de ruimte; voor de arithmetiek de quantiteit (het getal). Ieder der genoemde grondmodaliteiten kan door de aanneming van een hooger graad van Gegenständlichkeit zich specifieren. Zoo wordt in de phonomnie (bewegingsleer) de grondmodaliteit der ruimte gespecificeerd door de modale kategorie der beweging; in de physica de grondmodaliteit van het zijn door de modale kategorieën beweging, kracht en materied; in de psychologie de grondmodaliteit van het zijn door de modale kategorïën kwaliteit en organiteit. Wat de normal normatieve wetenschappen betreft wordt de grondmodaliteit van het zoo behooren in de ethica tot zedelijk behooren, in de rechtswetenschap tot juridisch behooren, in de aesthetica tot aesthetisch behooren etc. gespecificeerd door de opneming van nieuwe graden van Gegenständlichkeit.
At the head of them all stands modality as the basic category of the first order, the ‘gebiedskategorie’ to use Lask’s term. This basic category determines the whole terrain of science—it determines pure logic as “being valid” [gelden], in the applied logics it is laden with a different gradation of Gegenständlichkeit. For the natural sciences, the basic modality is “existence,” the real. For the normative sciences it is “so-ought” [zo behooren]; for geometry, it is space; for arithmetic it is quantity (number). Each of these basic modalities can become more specific by taking on a higher gradation of Gegenständlichkeit. In phoronomy (the study of motion), the basic modality of space is made more specific by the modal category of motion; in physics, the basic modality of existence is made more specific by the modal categories of motion, force and matter; in psychology, the basic modality of existence is made more specific by the modal categories of quality and organicity. As concerns the normal normative sciences, the basic modality of ought is specified in ethics to moral ought, in legal science to juridical ought, in aesthetics to aesthetic ought, etc.. This further specification is by taking on new gradations of Gegenständlichkeit.\[1922d, 47-48; Verburg 36-7].

Van Kant’s drie modaliteiten: werkelijkheid, mogelijkheid en noodwendigheid blijkt in ‘t licht van ‘t bovenstaande alleen de eerste houdbaar. Mogelijkheid is geen zakelijke gebiedskategorie, maar formeele oordeelsvorm; noodwendigheid als zuivere kategorie is niets anders dan wetmatige relativiteit, een kategorie van de zakelijke samenhang, niet modaliteit; de werkelijkheid of het zijn daarentegen is zakelijke gebiedskategorie (modaliteit) van de zijnswetten (1922d, 48).

From the above it appears that of Kant’s three modalities: reality, possibility, and necessity, only the first can be maintained. Possibility is not an objective area category, but merely a formal form of judgment; necessity as a pure category is nothing other than law-conformative relativity, a category of the objective coherence and not of modality; in contrast, reality or existence is the objective area category (modality) of the natural sciences (1922d, 48).

Dooyeweerd’s reasoning here is very compressed, and so we need to analyze this passage in detail.

1. Pure logic has been de-natured.

In §1, he says that in the philosophy of Kant and the Marburger neo-Kantians, logic has been de-natured [ontaard]. Pure logic has been reduced to a merely mathematical use of logic, or its use in the natural sciences. This reductive usage is contrary to the true nature of pure logic, which has its own modality. It is also contrary to the nature of pure logic to elevate it over the other categories, thereby reducing those modalities to logic. Dooyeweerd uses ‘denatured’ several more times in this article, arguing that modalities have their own nature or “sovereignty” (1922d, 3, 42, 44, 55). He says that Leibniz is wrong in his view of a universal mathematics, since mathematics is sharply distinguished from logic as well as from the normative sciences (1922, 55).

2. Not all categories are logical

In §1 Dooyeweerd says that because Kant used logic in this de-natured way (outside of its true nature or proper boundaries), Kant’s table of categories places the pure [logical] categories such as identity, relation and modality on the same level as quantity (which is mathematical), and with quality (which includes both psychology and biology). Dooyeweerd is signaling here that he will distinguish between the logical, the mathematical, the psychological and the biological.
3. Kant’s inconsistency

As discussed, Kant does not include space and time in the table of categories, but regards them as modes of intuition [Anschauungsorten]. Space and time are not formed by logical thought, but are forms of intuition that enable us to experience the sensory manifold.

Doyeweerd says that Kant was very inconsistent [zeer inconsequent] in marking out space and time as forms of intuition. Space and time are not forms of thought. But, says Doyeweerd, neither is quantity a form of thought. All of these—space, time and quantity—are related to Gegenstände, and their Gegenständlichkeit is not determined by Kant’s pure forms of thought.

Doyeweerd’s solution is in §4: At the head of all the other categories stands modality as the ground-category or basic category of the first order. Space, time, and quantity are all modalities.

Doyeweerd’s claim that Kant is “very inconsistent” echoes Franz Hoffmann’s introduction to Volume 1 of Baader’s Werke. Hoffmann says,

Nicht die Behauptung, dass es eine Erkenntniss a priori und eine Erkenntniss (Kenntniss) a posteriori gebe, sondern die Begriffsbestimmung der ersteren und die Bestimmung des Verhältnisses der ersteren zu der zweiten und dieser zu jener ist das Grundirrige in dem Systeme Kants. Gibt es eine Erkenntniss a priori, so kann sie nicht eine bloss formelle sein, so muss sie nothwendig ihren bestimmten Inhalt haben und somit eine gehaltvolle Erkenntniss sein. […]

Freilich ganz und gar konnte Kant unmöglich das Erfahrungswissen des Geistes von sich selbst ignoriren. So hinkt denn hintennach die Unterscheidung des äusseren und des inneren Sinnes. Aber der innere Sinn wird von Kant nur für die Form erklärt, unter der die Anschauung der Seele von ihrem Zustande allein möglich ist, er gibt durchaus keine Anschauung von der Seele selbst als einem Object, nur von der Art, wie sie sich erscheint, nicht wie sie ist. Der Seele Anschauung ist nicht intellectual. Aber auch so würde Kant die Anwendbarkeit der apriorischen Denkformen auf die Erscheinungen der Seele in ihr selbst haben principiell aussprechen müssen, wenn er consequent sein wollte. Dies geschah aber nicht von Kant, obgleich er hintennach freilich sich jene Anwendung factisch erlaubt, da ja sonst nicht einmal eine empirische Psychologie als Wissenschaft, geschweige eine philosophische Moral, Rechtslehre, Religionslehre &c. möglich gewesen wäre. Jede Form ist Form ihres bestimmten Inhaltes und setzt also diesen voraus. Die vom Inhalt gesonderte Form ist nur eine Abstraction vom concreten Inhalt, ohne dessen Vorhandensein sie selbst unmöglich ist; so wie freilich auch der Inhalt ohne das Vorhandensein der Form unmöglich ist. Der von der Form gesonderte Inhalt ist ebensosehr eine Abstraction, als die inhaltlose Form. Die Erkenntniss ist Einheit der Form und des Inhaltes. Nicht blos die Form der Erkenntniss ist gedacht, sondern auch ihr Inhalt. Der Inhalt bezieht sich nun entweder auf übersinnlich Mögliches und Wirkliches, oder auf Sinnliches, oder auf Wirkliches, welches übersinnlich und sinnlich zugleich ist (Werke I, xlii-iv, my emphasis).

[The basic error in Kant’s system is not the assertion that there is a priori insight [Erkenntnis] and a posteriori knowledge [Erkenntnis/Kenntnis], but rather the conceptual determination of the former, and the determination of the relations of the former to the latter and of it to the other. If there is a priori insight, it cannot be merely formal, but must necessarily have its specified content, and thereby be an insight with content. […]
However, it was impossible for Kant to completely ignore the experiential knowledge of the spirit of itself. And so the distinction between inner and outer sense limped behind. But Kant explained inner sense only as the form that alone makes possible the soul’s intuition of its conditions; there is certainly no intuition of the soul itself as an object, but only of the mode \[Art\] in which it appears to itself \[sich erscheinen\], not how it is. The soul’s intuition is not intellectual. But if Kant had wanted to be consistent \[consequent\], he should in principle have stated the applicability of the \textit{a priori} forms of thought to the appearances \[manifestations\] of the soul in itself in just the same way. This did not occur in Kant, although sure enough in actual fact he later certainly allowed such application, for without it there could be no empirical psychology as a science, not to mention studies of philosophical ethics, jurisprudence, religion, etc. Each form is the form of its specified contents, and therefore presupposes them. Form separated from content is just an abstraction from concrete content, and would itself be impossible without this content being at hand; just as of course the content would be impossible without the form being at hand. Content separated from form is just as much an abstraction as contentless form. Knowledge is a unity of form and of content. Not just the form of knowledge \[Erkenntnis\] is thought, but also its content. Now the content relates either to the supersensory possible and real, or to the sensory, or to what is real, which is both sensory and supersensory at the same time (my translation and emphasis).

Baader’s argument, as summarized by Hoffmann, is that the soul has its own experiential knowledge.\(^{26}\) Kant said that inner sense (time) and outer sense (space) are modes in which the soul appears or manifests.\(^{27}\) Kant applied the \textit{a priori} forms of thought (categories) to these modes. But to be consistent, Kant should have stated the applicability of the categories to other manifestations of the soul in just the same way. Only by applying the logical forms to other manifestations of the soul is science even possible. The \textit{a priori} forms are \textit{forms of their specified contents}. Hoffmann lists several sciences.

What does Hoffmann mean that forms of thought should be “applicable” to the appearances or manifestations of the soul? The soul has innate \textit{a priori} truths within

\(^{26}\) Baader says that Kant (in his Practical Reason) correctly began to analyze the primary mind/heart phenomena of our conscience \[Gemüthsphänomens des Gewissens\], but that Kant in a most contradictory way then strangled this analysis by his system \[“mit seinem System wider den Hals zuschnürt”\]. Our conscience is that by which we became innerly aware with absolute certainty how our Self, in awareness brought forth by our will, acts in the presence of that which is sensory, and how nature and reality, having been made sensible, in turn react to us \(\textit{Werke} 1, 8-9\). Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye would later follow Baader in referidentifying conscience \[geweten\] with our heart \(\textit{Friesen} 64, \text{fn}10\).

\(^{27}\) \textit{‘Erscheinung’} can mean appearance, manifestation or even revelation \(\text{Cassin,} 282\). This is how Baader uses the term: \textit{Erscheinung} is self-revelation \[Sichoffenbaren\] or being revealed \[Geoffenbartwerden\] \(\textit{Werke} 1, 110\). But Kant mistakenly viewed time and space as merely subjective forms, and he failed to distinguish our central \[supratemporal\] intuition of sempiternity and ubiquity from our peripheral intuition of time and space. In our earthly life, we can see both centrally and peripherally. In the center of our being, we are free of, but not separate from time and space \(\textit{Werke} 14, 63-6\). Dooyeweerd would later develop these ideas, and would assert that fallen humanity lives within time but also goes above and transcends time.
itself, and these are not just empty forms (*Werke* 1, xlv, xlv fn).\(^{28}\) Kant did not understand that our reason and our senses, which he regarded as two sources of knowledge, are really only *moments of the unity of our knowing spirit* [Momente der Einheit des erkennenden Geistes] (xlviii). Using these innate or intuitive ideas, we can apply logic in each of the sciences. But logic does not create the modalities that make possible the special sciences to which logic is applied.

In §1, Dooyeweerd also points out Kant’s inconsistency. Quantity and quality are *Anschauungsarten*, modes of intuition, just as much as space and time. Dooyeweerd transforms these logical categories into modes of intuition, or what he calls ‘modalities.’ And like Hoffmann, Dooyeweerd argues that these intuitions make the sciences possible. In this way, ‘quantity’ is the mode of intuition (modality) for mathematics. The logical form ‘quality’ becomes the modality for biology and psychology.

The logical categories of identity, diversity, relation and continuity will become the pure forms of logic for the science of pure logic (§2 and §3). This pure science of logic is itself a modality, and not a category standing outside all modalities. Logic can be used to systematize the other special sciences, which the modalities make possible.

This pivotal move by Dooyeweerd—dismantling Kant’s logical categories and replacing them with modalities in the sense of modes of intuition, which mark out the domains of the special sciences, is based on the inconsistency noted by Hoffmann in his summary of Baader’s critique of Kant.

4. From where did Dooyeweerd obtain the word ‘modality’?

(a) Comparison with Hoffman and Baader

In §1, Dooyeweerd compares what he will call ‘modalities’ with space and time. They are modes of intuition [*Anschauungsarten*] that make the sciences possible. Hoffmann refers to space and time as ‘modalities’ [*Modalitäten*] (*Werke* 11, 223). I believe that Hoffmann’s usage here is one reason for Dooyeweerd’s use of the new term ‘modality.’ If time and space are modalities, then the other intuited modes of consciousness can also be called ‘modalities.’

Dooyeweerd became aware that in using the term ‘modality’ in this way, there could be some confusion with Kant’s use of ‘modality’ in his Table of Categories. Therefore, in 1926, he added a comment to page 75 from the portion included from 1922d, specifically distinguishing his use of the term ‘modality’ from Kant’s table of categories:

> De lezer houde er redening mede, dat ik met *modaliteit* dus iets anders bedoel, dan de gangbare logica (1926, 35 fn2).

The reader should note that by ‘modality’ I mean something different than in current logic.

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\(^{28}\) Although not everything Leibniz said was correct, Hoffmann says he was correct in his emphasis on innate Ideas, and that there can be no empty forms (*Werke* 1, xlv). Hoffmann elsewhere clarifies that Leibniz’s innate Ideas are not full or complete knowledge, but the basis for our reasoning and sensory knowledge (*Werke* 10, xvii).
Dooyeweerd in fact dismantles Kant’s logical category of ‘modality.’ We see this in §5. In Kant’s table of categories, ‘modality’ includes existence, possibility and necessity. Dooyeweerd retains ‘existence’ but uses this idea of existence not in a logical sense, but as a mode of our intuition—it becomes the basic modality for the natural sciences, which deal with existing things.

Dooyeweerd transforms Kant’s modal term ‘possibility’ not into a modality, but rather a form of judgments that we make when using the modalities. Possibility refers to hypothetical judgments made in science.

The modal term ‘necessity’ is also not transformed into a particular modality. He uses the awkward phrase “law-conformative regularity,” using ‘necessity’ to refer to the coherence of the modalities. Later, Dooyeweerd would say that the modalities are an ontical a priori, given by God’s law.

(b) Comparison with Lask

Tol says that Dooyeweerd uses ‘modality’ as a synonym for Lask’s ‘Gebietskategorie’ (Tol 303-5). But Tol does not recognize that ‘modality’ is Dooyeweerd’s term, not Lask’s. Although Lask relates logical categories to the content of Gebietskategorien (Lask II, 453-4), he does not call the categories ‘modalities.’ Furthermore, Lask continues to distinguish between the logical categories and the Gebietskategorien.

Dooyeweerd says that not only are quality and modality related to content, they are not logical categories at all. They are modalities in the sense of modes of the intuitive [aanschouwelijke] experience of our selfhood, just like space and time. Space, quantity, motion, organicity, being valid [gelden], and the areas of all the other special sciences are modalities of our intuition. The modalities are not logical categories, but cosmic categories [‘kosmische kategoriën,’ Verburg 34]. These cosmic categories are modalities, or “modes of consciousness” [beschouwingswijzen], a term that also appears in Normatieve Rechtsleer (1922d, 3, 18-19, 54).

(c) Comparison with Sigwart

We have seen how Dooyeweerd dismantles Kant’s modal logical categories. Although he does not acknowledge the source for this idea, it seems to be Christoph von Sigwart’s 1911 book on logic, which Dooyeweerd had read in preparation for his 1922 response to Scholten.

Sigwart says that every judgment is either an affirmation or a denial of a question. There is only one kind of judgment: that which is necessary for everyone to assert or to believe. Therefore, Kant’s modal categories of existence, possibility and necessity are not required. The possible is not a judgment, but merely leaves the question undecided. It is an hypothesis that is still uncertain. Neither is it a judgment to merely assert something. For what we assert can be mere subjective belief. All true judgments are necessary. The only difference is the basis for that necessity, which depends on different ways that the judgment enters our consciousness—either by individual facts of experience or by communal agreement of the meaning of words (Sigwart 230-44).

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29 Sigwart refers to them as assertoric, problematic and apodictic (Sigwart 231).
Although he shows that Kant’s modal categories are unnecessary, Sigwart then rather confusingly extends the meaning of ‘modal’ to refer to our relation to objects, whether by seeing, hearing, perceiving, thinking or willing about them.

Nennen wir diese Classe von Relationen mit einer Erweiterung des kantischen Sprachgebrauchs die modalen: so fallen darunter alle Beziehungen, in welche wir Objecte zu uns setzen, sofern wir sie vorstellen, und als vorgestellte begehren, wünschen, in ihrem Werthe für uns beurtheilen… (Sigwart 245).

[By extending Kant’s terminology, let us call this class of relations ‘modal.’ It includes all relations in which we set objects before us, insofar as we represent them, and as represented, desire, want, or judge them in their value to us…]³⁰

Tol speculates that Dooyeweerd obtained the term ‘modality’ from this idea of “modal relations” in Sigwart. Scholten had used Sigwart’s idea of extending Kant’s term ‘modal’ to refer to how objects of our knowledge are set in a “modal relation,” “as a ‘value in relation to our self.” Dooyeweerd responded that this is a subjective valuation³¹ and leads to the destruction of jurisprudence. It destroys the objective character of the norm. And in attempting to link ethics with law, it destroys the sovereignty of morality and of law (1922a, 36; Verburg 31; Tol 288). Dooyeweerd repeats this criticism in Normatieve Rechtsleer. Sigwart’s idea of norm, which is regarded as freely given or posited by the one who is also subject to it, is based on the autonomy of thought (1922d, 53).

But Tol acknowledges that for Dooyeweerd, Sigwart’s modal relations are not the same as modalities. Either something is a relation or it concerns a modality. Relations have an intrinsic diversity and logic plays a role. But modalities concern characterizations that can only be intuited or viewed (Tol 303, citing 1922d, 55).³²

The conclusion must be that although Dooyeweerd recognized Sigwart’s extension of Kant’s usage of ‘modal’ to the idea of “modal relations,” this is not a usage that he agreed with. He must have obtained his term ‘modality’ from somewhere else. It is most likely that these sources were Hoffmann and Baader, who pointed out Kant’s inconsistency in referring to only space and time as modes of intuition. Kant’s logical categories could be replaced by similar intuited modalities.

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³⁰ Tol’s translation on p. 303 misses ‘judgment’ in these relations.

³¹ We may question Dooyeweerd’s conclusion here. Even if Scholten referred to subjective values, Sigwart refers to “necessary and universally valid laws” at the basis of every judgment (Sigwart 244).

³² Dooyeweerd would later give a clearer explanation of the difference: seeing, hearing, perceiving, thinking or willing are all acts. Every act functions in all of the modalities, including the logical modality. This functioning within the modalities is not the same as the modalities.
5. Dooyeweerd’s preliminary list of modalities

In §4 of the above quotation, Dooyeweerd lists the modalities, each of which provides the basis for a special science. Lask does not list the special sciences in this way, nor does he call them ‘modalities.’

Dooyeweerd lists some modalities as primary, and others as secondary, based on increasing specialty of meaning.

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**Modalities (basic categories)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normative sciences [what ought to be]</th>
<th>Determination of specialty of science:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetics</td>
<td>aesthetic ought</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jurisprudence</td>
<td>juridical ought</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>moral ought</td>
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<tr>
<th>Natural sciences [what is, ‘quality’ as existence]</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td>quality plus organicity</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Biology?]</td>
<td>the organic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physics</td>
<td>motion, force and matter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phoronomy</td>
<td>motion plus space</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motion</td>
<td>[time?]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geometry</td>
<td>space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arithmetic</td>
<td>quantity (number)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic</td>
<td>validity [gelden]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dooyeweerd adds ‘etc.’ in listing the normative sciences, so this is not a complete list. Elsewhere in the same 1922 article he lists the historical and the sociological (1922d, 87). He also included the political as a modality. In his mature thought he revised the list of modalities. He retained the distinction between the natural and the normative sciences. Instead of static modalities, he introduced the idea of anticipations and retrocipations among modalities. This also allowed him to abandon the distinction between basic modalities and secondary modalities that depended on a further level of specification. All modalities of consciousness became modalities on the same level, with interactions and connections to other modalities.

6. The distinction between epistemology [kentheorie] and logic

Dooyeweerd says that logic is the most basic modality. He would later regard mathematics as the first in a temporal order [not a logical order] of the modalities.

As one of the modalities, logic has its own content. Dooyeweerd uses the term [gelden] for determination of this modality for the special science of logic. But this is a limited use of ‘gelden.’ The logical is only one of the modalities. Therefore logic cannot itself create or determine the other modalities. In the other sciences, logic has only a limited use in

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33 Contrast Lask’s list of ‘Gebiete’ in Lask III, 70.

34 Dooyeweerd also refers to Lask’s idea of a step by step [trapsgewijze] materializing of the categories (1922d, 68 fn2). Although Lask did not speak of modalities in Dooyeweerd’s sense, this may explain why for Dooyeweerd some modalities are more general than others.
making judgments in those sciences, using modalities that are already given to us. We do not logically create the non-logical modalities.

This idea of the limited role of logic echoes what Hoffmann says about Baader’s views.

Denn das wenigstens schien doch unwiderleglich, dass die Logik als besondere, wenn auch alle anderen philosophischen (und nichtphilosophischen) Wissenschaften bedingende, Wissenschaft ihr eigenthümliches Gebiet haben müsse und folglich nicht die Gegenstände der anderen philosophischen Wissenschaften schon durch blosse Logik erkannt und begriffen werden könnten (Werke I, xxiii).

[For it at least appeared irrefutable that logic as a special science—even if presupposed by all other philosophical (and non-philosophical) sciences—must have its exclusive area [eigenthümliches Gebiet] and therefore the Gegenstände of the other philosophical sciences cannot be known and comprehended by mere logic].

Kant’s mistake was that he erroneously believed that logic was a merely formal science, with all content outside of its boundaries. Logic became a science without content or essence. But in fact, logic is metaphysical just like all the other sciences. Solomon Maimon correctly criticized Kant by his assertion that formal logic presupposes necessary transcendental ideas and basic principles [Grundsätze] without which the forms of logic have no meaning [Bedeutung] whatsoever (Werke I, xxvi). 35 Logic does not contain all of metaphysics, but metaphysics also contains logic (Werke I, lx). True logic must be not only theistic, but Christian (Werke I, lxvii).

Failure to recognize the limited role of logic leads to the blurring between epistemology and logic. Epistemology is what Dooyeweerd also calls ‘Gegenstandstheorie’: It is the ranking and ordering of the fields of the special sciences, including that of pure logic.

Kimtheorie blijkt dan te zijn Gegenstandstheorie, de logica het systeem der kategoriale bepalingen van den Gegenstand in het oordeel. De Gegenstand der zuivere (zgn. formeele) logica zijn de zuivere kategoriën en de zuivere oordeelsvormen. Aan de zuivere logica als systematische wetenschap dient dus vooraf te gaan een Gegenstandstheorie van de kategorieën en oordeelsvormen zelve (1922d, 46; cited in Verburg 35).

[Epistemology then appears to be Gegenstands-theory, and logic to be the system of categorical determinations of the Gegenstand in a judgment. The Gegenstand of pure (so-called formal) logic is the pure categories and the pure forms of judgment. A Gegenstands-theory of the categories and forms of judgment themselves thus must therefore precede pure logic as a systematic science.]

Now this is a very different way of thinking from Lask’s. Before we can use the categories and logical forms of judgment, we need to have an epistemology, where those categories and forms are themselves investigated.

The Marburg school wiped out this distinction between epistemology and logic; it said that logic itself created the Gegenstand. In this, they were only being consistent in the idea of the autonomy of thought. Bedingung [determination] became Be-dingung [the creation of a thing] (1922d, 57).

Deze uitwissching van de juiste grenzen der zuivere logica heeft tengevolge gehad een deplorabele verwarring in de leer der kategoriën, waartoe reeds Kant, schoon hij het

35 See Lask’s discussion of Maimon at Lask I, 120 fn1.
anderscheid tusschen formeele en transcendentale logica handhaafde, met zijn kategoriëntafel aanleiding heeft gegeven. De verwerping van de autonomie van het denken doet de vraag naar de grenzen tusschen logica en kentheorie weer in volle scherpte naar voren komen (1922d, 46; cited Verburg, 35).

[This wiping out of the proper boundaries of pure logic has as a consequence caused a deplorable confusion in the doctrine of the categories. Kant, with his table of categories, had already given an inducement for this, although he did maintain the distinction between formal and transcendental logic. The rejection of the autonomy of thought causes the question of the boundaries between logic and epistemology to again come in sharp focus].

If the Marburg school turned the *Gegenstand* into logic, Dooyeweerd does the reverse. Logic does not create the *Gegenstand*, but as a special science it is itself one special science among others in the *Gegenstand*. As a special science, logic can be used to make statements or judgments about other special sciences, but it does not create the modalities of those special sciences.

The modalities are known by our intuitive beholding [schouwen]. Beholding precedes logical thought (1922d, 47). The distinction between the categorial and the logical is also that between the ‘metalogical’ and the ‘logical’ (1922d, 41).

Where did Dooyeweerd get this idea of the primacy of epistemology over logic? Hoffmann distinguishes between a theosophical and an anthroposophical logic. Theosophical logic is epistemology (*Werke* I, lxix fn). Since Baader held that logic had its own content, he could not allow the other sciences to be subsumed in logic (*Werke* I, lxi).

7. Time

Dooyeweerd includes space as one of the modalities, but he is unsure what to do about time. He says,

De *absolute* tijd kan niet zooals het getal en de ruimte van mathematische aard zijn, daar hij in verschillende belasting ook in der historische, psychologische, sociologisch, normatief-juridisch en politiek gezichtsveld kategoraal voorkomt, welke gezichtsvelden uiteraard niet-quantitatief zijn. De tijd is een modale kategorie der absolute beweging (1922, 87; 1926, 58).

[Unlike number and space, *absolute* time cannot be of a mathematical nature, since it also appears variously laden as a category in the historical, psychological, sociological, normative-juridical and political fields of view, and these fields of view are certainly not of a quantitative nature. Time is a modal category of absolute motion].

Dooyeweerd later adopted Baader’s theory of time. He then saw cosmic time not as a modality within the cosmos, but rather as the basis for the continuity among all of the modalities. The modalities were then seen as ordered in an order of before and after in cosmic time.

36 Tol does not seem to understand the distinction between epistemology and logic. He doubts that the content of logic is given by *Gegenstands*-theory (Tol 300). He wants to give logic a role. That was also Vollenhoven’s approach. For Dooyeweerd, this approach is logistic, since logic cannot determine modalities of which it itself is one.
8. Fields of view [gezichtsvelden]

In the above quotation, Dooyeweerd uses the term 'field of view' [gezichtsveld]. Tol is therefore incorrect in stating that Dooyeweerd did not use this term until 1923 (Tol 330). Dooyeweerd also uses another related term, “sphere of view” [gezichtskring] (1922d, 43).

If the categories (forms of thought) are modalities of our intuition, just like the modes of intuition of space and time, then there are many modalities. Each is a particular way of beholding or schouwen. In 1926, he said that the first thing that we do in beholding is to make ourselves aware of the field of view in which the Gegenstand is brought to our consciousness [ons bewust wordt]. Our thinking then acts on that field of view and makes it into a field of thought [denkveld] (1926, 67). The term “field of view” therefore refers to different ways or modes of our intuitive seeing or schouwen.

‘Gezichtsveld’ is a literal translation of the German ‘Blickfeld.’ The neo-Kantian Paul Natorp (a co-founder of the Marburg school) had spoken of how the ‘Blickfeld’ [field of view] of our practical consciousness is gradually extended as we develop ideas (Natorp, 65). He does not relate this to modalities in Dooyeweerd’s new sense. For Natorp, ‘modality’ continues to be used in Kant’s sense of one of the logical categories. Nevertheless, Dooyeweerd, who in my view was trying to reform neo-Kantianism by Baader, may have used Natorp’s term for our intuitive consciousness, in how it recognizes the specific domains of the special sciences.

Another source for ‘gezichtsveld’ may be Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), the successor to Kant at Königsberg. Herbart made a fundamental division between Sein and Sollen. Hans Kelsen later used Herbart’s idea to divide the sciences between the normative and the causal [natural] sciences. He used the term ‘Blickrichtungun’ or “directions of view.” Kelsen says,

Mit großem Scharfsinn gründet Herbart, der den Gegensatz von Sein und Sollen prinzipieller und konsequenter noch als Kant erfaßt hat, den fundamentalen Dualismus auf eine ursprüngliche Besinnung und konstituiert ihn erkennnistheoretisch korrekt in der totalen Verschiedenheit der Blickrichtungen (Kelsen, III, 553)

[Herbart, who in principle and consistency of thought, understood the contrast between Sein and Sollen better than Kant, has with great acuteness established the fundamental dualism on an original consciousness, and constituted them in an epistemologically correct way in the total diversity of directions of views].

Dooyeweerd refers to this citation of Herbart by Kelsen (1922d, 3).

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37 Dooyeweerd’s idea of ‘schouwen’ itself can be related back to Norel’s discussion of Gunning and Baader. We do not logically determine these modalities, but we intuitively behold them [schouwen]. This intuitive beholding precedes any logical thinking.

38 There is no need to distinguish “fields of view” from viewing as ‘schouwen,’ as Tol suggests (Tol 330). The fields of view are based on intuitive beholding [schouwen].

39 On the same page, Kelsen refers to Herbart’s idea that it is our non-artificial reason [unverkünstelten Verstande] that, when seeking Sein and Sollen, looks in two different directions [in zwey ganz verschiedene Richtungen hinaussschaue]. This must be the origin of Lask’s contrast between primordial knowing and artificial reason.
9. Related to a cosmic selfhood [kosmische ikheid]

If the modalities are fields or view, then this presupposes a viewer. The intuitive beholding of the modalities is related to a cosmic selfhood (1922, 47; Verburg 36). By ‘cosmic,’ Dooyeweerd is distinguishing his idea of a central selfhood from other ideas, such as Sigwart’s psychological self, Kant’s epistemological subject or Husserl’s center of intuition including Husserl’s’ idea of a center of intuition [beschouwingscentrum].

Compare this to Hoffmann’s summary of Baader: an abstracted selfhood is no real selfhood (Werke I, L).

Lask does not discuss such a central selfhood. The source of this idea for Dooyeweerd must be Norel, who says that for true knowledge, the whole person is necessary. He refers to our central heart, out of which are the issues of life, including our function of thinking (Norel, 71-72). Our thinking is not independent; it must be saved from its autonomy (Norel, 73, 78).

10. The modalities are the “meaning-moments” of the special sciences

Dooyeweerd’s idea of modalities is not derived from Lask. But Dooyeweerd does adopt Lask’s idea of “meaning,” although he uses it in a different way. We have seen how for Lask there is a relation between logical form and sensory material. For Lask, “meaning” (Sinn) is the unity of the sensory primary material and the validating logical form (Lask II, 93). Lask says he is using ‘meaning’ in its “absolute sense”, and not in the sense of “meaning of” a substrate (Lask II, 34, 394). In the question, “Is A the cause of B?” the copula “is” relates fragments of meaning that have been taken from experience (Lask II, 431).

Lask says that our sensory material gives a “particular content-related completion of that form” [“bestimmte inhaltliche Erfüllung of that Form”]. This determination or particularization of the form allows us to relate the logical [Geltenden] to the material (Lask II, 59). This is the “meaning-moment” [Bedeutungsmoment] that mediates between the unity of thought in the sense of logical validity and the diversity of the sensory material:

Das Bedeutungsmoment ist das principium individuationis, das Prinzip der Vielheit in der Geltungssphäre (Lask II, 61).

[The meaning-moment is the principium individuationis, the principle of diversity in the spheres of validity].

The differentiation of the logical categories is determined by the meaning-moment (Lask III, 161, 397). In this regard, it should be pointed out that the term ‘moment’ is used in the sense of a part derived from a whole or a totality. We have earlier seen how Hoffmann uses the term ‘moment’ to describe reason and sensation as two moments of our central consciousness.

From where does Lask get this idea of “meaning”? McGrath says that Lask obtained it from a scholastic theory of speculative grammar, and in particular from the idea of intuition of singulars (simplex apprehensio) in Duns Scotus, and the idea of grammatical

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40 He critiques Husserl’s idea of wezensschouw at 1922d; it presupposes a closed system of science, and Husserl posits a Gegenstands-sphere that is still transcendent-al-logical.
modes (*modi significandi*) in Thomas of Erfurt. For Thomas of Erfurt, grammatical forms have ontological foundations. The forms of meaning (*modi significandi*) receive their determination by matter (McGrath 91, 98, 107). Heidegger wrote his 1914 dissertation on Lask’s critique of psychologism, and his 1916 post-doctoral “Habilitationschrift” on this work by Thomas of Erfurt. Heidegger finds these ideas of meaning in Lask:

In the context of Lask’s principle of the material determination of form. Heidegger comments: “the investigation of the relation between the *modus essendi* and the “subjective” *modus significandi* and *modus intelligendi* leads to the principle of the material determination of each form (McGrath 140).

Dooyeweerd uses Lask’s idea of ‘*Bedeutungsmoment*’ to specify the nature of each modality. Dooyeweerd retained this idea of meaning even after he rejected Kant’s logical categories. When he later adopts Baader’s law-Idea, he says that God places us in creation both as a supratemporal totality and as a temporal being. Baader had spoken of how we are placed [*gesetzt*] by God’s law [*Gesetz*], whereby God places the selfhood in the supratemporal, and the world in the temporal region. Unity of meaning is thus given not by logical validity [*Geltung*] as in Lask, but by God’s law. There is a supratemporal totality, our selfhood, wherein all the modes of our consciousness coincide in a radical unity. Cosmic time is the prism that splits the central unity or totality of our experience into the diverse modalities or meaning-moments [*zin-momenten*] of our consciousness. In this way, Dooyeweerd continued to use the idea of *meaning* as a way of individuating from a unity or totality to the diversity of our temporal experience, including the diversity of theoretical thought in the special sciences.

This idea of meaning can also be found in Baader. Although he does not use the term ‘*Bedeutungsmoment,*’ he does refer to the scholastic idea of knowing the form (formation) of things in relation to an ‘*informatio.*’ What the word ‘*informatio*’ expresses is that the knower conforms in his knowing to that which is known (*Werke* 1, 260). And Baader refers to Aquinas’s use of ‘*modum significandi*’ (*Werke* 14, 259), in the context of union of object with agent. Baader was influential in preserving and transmitting the works of Meister Eckhart, and we know that Eckhart also relied on the scholastic idea of *modi significandi*. This is not surprising, since Eckhart spent some twenty years as a Dominican in Erfurt, becoming Prior and Provincial, with authority over many convents.

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41 Dooyeweerd says that in the norm, subject and the object are grammatically related. And he seems to approve of Lask’s purely grammatical view of subject and object (1922d, 19; 61 fn1).

42 *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus.*

43 *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus.* Heidegger mistakenly attributed the document to Duns Scotus.

44 Dooyeweerd later said that we know the nuclear moment or meaning-kernel of each modality only in our supratemporal intuition, but that we distinguish them in our theoretical thought by a process of dis-stasis.

45 Cf. McGrath: “Both Lask’s principle of material determination of form and the Scholastic doctrine of transcendental truth point to a precategorial mutual conditioning of intellect and being… The scholastic notion of transcendental truth precludes a dualism between subject and object”(pp. 140-41).
Thomas of Erfurt is of course associated with the same place, and the dates of his work overlap with those of Eckhart.

A full exploration of this topic is beyond the scope of this article. But we know that Baader was keenly interested in how words disclose underlying realities. He explored the etymologies of words, although some of his etymologies sometimes seem fanciful. For example, he places terms such as ‘glauben’ (to believe), along with ‘geloben’ (to promise solemnly) and ‘verloben’ (to betroth). Or he relates the word ‘man’ with Sanskrit root ‘man’ (to know), then relating the Latin ‘mens’ (mind) with ‘Mensch’ (man) to indicate that man is a knowing being. And he relates magic [magie] with ‘imagination’ and with the Sanskrit ‘maya.’ In general, Baader’s Christian theosophy relies on the idea of meaning in that the universe has meaning that we can decode; the language of God is in us and in nature (Faivre, 122, 133).

11. Relation to reality

How do Dooyeweerd’s modes of consciousness relate to our experience of reality? Does he have the same problem as Lask did in relating Kant’s logical categories to the things of our experience? Dooyeweerd would later clarify that the modalities relate to reality because the individuality structures [things] of our experience function within the same modes. We can therefore make analogies from our experience of things to our modes of consciousness.

Baader refers to Leibniz’s idea of a *harmonia praestabilita*:

> Das Leben will Fülle und Hülle; es will erfüllt (beseelt) und umhüllt (gestaltet) sein, will Inhalt und Form, Seele und Leib haben, und zwar beide in Eintracht, d.h. seine Beseelung und seine Beleibung soll eine Identität des Princips (eine Harmonia praestabilita) aussagen. Der Grundtrieb des Lebens ist sohin wedeter Gestaltungs- oder Bildungstrieb allein, noch Beseelungs- oder Erfülltseinstrieb allein, sondern er geht auf beide, auf Inension (Empfinden) und Extension (Schauen), und zwar in Eintracht (Werke 2, 325).

[Life desires fullness and enveloping [Fülle und Hülle]; it wants to be fulfilled (ensouled) and enclosed (formed); it wants content and form, soul and body, and it wants both in harmony, i.e. its ensouling and its embodiment should express an identity in principle (a *harmonia praestabilita*). The basic drive of life is neither a drive for formation or culture alone, neither is it a drive from ensoulment or fulfillment alone, but it relies on both, on intension (experience) and extension (beholding), and indeed on both of them in harmony].

VI. Later developments in Dooyeweerd

In May 1922, Dooyeweerd was invited to apply to work at the Kuyper Foundation. His application included a lengthy work proposal, in which he indicated that his work would be led by Kuyper’s epistemology [kennisetheorie]. Since he had not yet read Kuyper, he could not have known what to expect in that regard. He clearly wanted to continue his previous work in epistemology. Dooyeweerd insisted on having afternoons and evenings free for personal study (Verburg 43-6; Boeles 42).

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46 NC II, 581: “Since the transcendental horizon of our experience is also the transcendental horizon of temporal reality, the same dynamics of meaning is proper to both.”
During the summer of 1922, Dooyeweerd had his famous walk in the dunes, where he further developed the insight that “there must exist a structure of the modal aspects in which their coherence is reflected” (Boeles 37).

Dooyeweerd began work at the Kuyper Foundation in October 1922. He felt that since he was employed by the Foundation, he should start reading Kuyper. But he was not at all looking forward to it (Dooyeweerd 1974). This suggests that, although he was keenly interested in issues of epistemology, he did not really expect to find ideas corresponding to those he had already formed. But he unexpectedly found a connection to the idea of a central consciousness, of which rationality is one of the modes. He found this in Kuyper’s “Pentecost Meditation” [Pinkstermeditatie], with its many references to our “heart” (Dooyeweerd 1974). Without his previous reading of Norel and Baader, I doubt that he would have paid much attention to this article by Kuyper.

At the Kuyper Foundation, Dooyeweerd looked for further connections between Kuyper’s neo-Calvinism and the philosophical convictions he had already formed. He must have been surprised to learn that Kuyper had been influenced by the same sources that had provided his basis for critiquing neo-Kantianism. Kuyper praised Baader’s rejection of the autonomy of thought. Dooyeweerd would find a further connection in Kuyper’s Princeton Stone Lectures, where Kuyper refers to the central undivided point in our consciousness (Friesen, 181-2). Kuyper had obtained his idea of sphere sovereignty in a societal sense from Baader’s analogy from organicism—of head and limbs, or root and branches. Dooyeweerd extended this idea of sphere sovereignty to the idea of modalities that he had developed. Dooyeweerd says that in his four years at the Kuyper Foundation, he worked out the broad lines of his philosophy (Boeles, 43).

I have traced the development of these ideas in my book, and will merely summarize some of them here. One of the most significant developments was the law-Idea (wets-Idee), which is also found in Baader. He expanded on the idea of fields of view [gezichtsvelden]. At some point, he learned of Baader’s idea of time and the supratemporal. We know he read Werner Gent’s book on time and eternity, referred to earlier, which has a section on Baader. I believe he was also aware of the earlier book edited by Johann Sauter in the Herdflamme series, which included Baader’s works on time.48

These ideas on time and the supratemporal would become central in his philosophy. The idea of cosmic time would provide the continuity that he had been looking for among the modalities. He developed the idea of analogies among the modalities, and this allowed him to move away from a nested view of the modalities, with different gradations of Gegenständlichkeit, to a more dynamic view of modalities with retrocipations that refer to previous moments of time, and anticipations of their supratemporal fulfillment (see Friesen 2015, 286-326 for Dooyeweerd’s mature dynamic view of modalities). And

47 It is possible that this walk was in the summer of 1921, but since there is very little discussion of the continuity of the modes in the 1922 articles, I believe the walk was in summer of 1922.

Dooyeweerd developed the idea of individuality structures and *enkapsis*, based on the work of other non-Calvinistic philosophers, who relied on earlier mystical traditions.

**VII. Later developments in Vollenhoven**

In his analysis of *Normatieve Rechtsleer*, Tol tries to make Dooyeweerd’s ideas dependent on his previous discussions with Vollenhoven about neo-Kantianism. Tol’s analysis is flawed; it is a “‘backwards projection’” from what Vollenhoven would write in 1925, and does not accurately analyze Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article. Tol tries to downplay Dooyeweerd’s statement that his discussions with Vollenhoven “had not the least influence on the direction in which his philosophy developed.” Dooyeweerd says that it was “just beating the air somewhat [eigenlijk een beetje gepraat in de ruimte], about neo-Kantianism and so forth” (cited by Tol, 269 fn76). Of course, Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven had a common goal in wanting to reform the philosophy of the sciences, and they had discussed Kantian issues like the relation of the logical to the a-logical and the meta-logical. But the ideas that Dooyeweerd is introducing in this pivotal 1922 article are his own. That includes the idea of modalities.

Vollenhoven seems to acknowledge that Dooyeweerd developed the idea of modalities:

> Van october ’21 tot najaar ’22 hebben we dan ook meer dan één naävond met elkaar gepraat en geboomd. Dooyeweerd’s functieleer, het oudste en nog altijd meest uitgewerkte stuk van de Calvinistische wijsbegeerte, is in die periode wat de grondslagen betreft, onstaan (Stellingwerff 1992, 52).

[On many evenings, from ’21 to fall of ’22, we talked and discussed with each other. Dooyeweerd’s idea of functions, the oldest and still the most developed bit of Calvinistic philosophy, originated during that period, at least as regard to its fundamentals].

Dooyeweerd had developed the idea of modalities, based on his reading of Norel and Baader, and especially their rejection of the autonomy of thought. I believe that this is what Vollenhoven means by “the find” in the summer of 1922. Vollenhoven was clearly interested in Dooyeweerd’s new ideas, but he did not adopt them immediately, in part because he had a nervous breakdown that lasted for most of 1923. In his November 7 1922 letter to Antheunis Janse (before his breakdown), Vollenhoven continues to speak in terms of Lask’s global idea of validity [gelden], although he says he is not using this in

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49 “Back-reading” or “Backwards-projection” is how Peter Enneson (personal email communication) describes how Tol makes Vollenhoven’s idea of “thinking resorts under being” the main ingredient of the 1922 “find” (Tol, 9). Enneson suggests that Tol is “back-reading” ideas that arrive later in Vollenhoven’s thinking, probably as a result of “catching up” with new ideas in Dooyeweerd. Knowing’s resorting under being only appears in Vollenhoven in 1925 (Tol, 204). In my view, Dooyeweerd had already stated this idea in 1922 as the rejection of the autonomy of thought. Our logical thinking or knowing is not autonomous, since logic is only one mode of intuition of our central selfhood (our being).

50 These terms are not at all unique, and occur in neo-Kantian philosophy, including Lask. (See Lask II, 41-2, 327, 356, 390, 419).

51 Dooyeweerd must have read these sources prior to writing *Normatieve Rechtsleer*. It may be that Vollenhoven only became aware of these new ideas in the summer of 1922, in discussions with Dooyeweerd after he wrote this article.
a rational sense. Vollenhoven does not refer to modalities. Instead he refers to different ‘worlds’ [werelden] (Stellingwerff 1992, 62).

Later, Vollenhoven did use the term ‘modality,’ but in a very different way from Dooyeweerd. He tried to adapt it to his view of a temporal selfhood, which he had learned from Janse. He regarded the modalities not as modes of consciousness, but as properties or functions that we abstract from things (adopting Woltjer’s zus/zo and dit/dat distinction). Dooyeweerd regarded such abstraction of modalities as based on a logicistic viewpoint. Dooyeweerd would maintain this objection in his last article, when he made a similar argument against D.F.M. Strauss’s view of abstraction (Dooyeweerd 1975).

Conclusion

_Normatieve Rechtsleer_ places us right at the origins of reformational philosophy. In arriving at his idea of modalities, Dooyeweerd was certainly influenced by Sigwart’s repudiation of the logical modal categories, and by Lask’s idea that the logical categories are specified by their contents. What is fascinating is that Lask may have obtained that idea from Baader. Lask was aware of Baader’s opposition to a dualism between _a priori_ and _a posteriori_. Other ideas that Dooyeweerd shared with Lask include the idea of meaning, and of the “meaning-moments” moments that provide the basis for the special sciences. What has not been seen before by reformational philosophy is how this idea of meaning goes back to scholastic philosophy.

But neither Sigwart nor Lask used the term ‘modality’ in the way that Dooyeweerd would use it—as a mode of our consciousness or intuition. For this, he seems to have relied on Hoffmann’s summary of Baader’s critique of Kant, and on Norel’s and Gunning’s use of Baader. Already in his 1922 articles, Dooyeweerd used these sources to develop his idea of the rejection of autonomy of thought, the idea of intuitive viewing [schouwen] by a central selfhood, the limitation of the place of logic, the distinction between epistemology and logic, the idea of modalities as “modes of consciousness,” and how each mode, including the logical mode, has its own exclusive and sovereign nature.

These ideas allowed Dooyeweerd to give a powerful critique of neo-Kantianism. He later called his philosophy “A New Critique of Theoretical Thought.” Insofar as he adopted Baader’s previous critique of Kant, it was not “new.” In the 19th century, Gunning had already used the term “New Critique” for Baader’s critique of Kant. But Dooyeweerd applied this same critique to the neo-Kantianism of his day, and in that sense it was new.

The genius of Dooyeweerd was to use these sources in a way that allowed him to critique Kant and the neo-Kantians, but also to reform their ideas. Whereas Lask had hinted at a non-theoretical use of intuition, he remained too committed to the autonomy of thought. Dooyeweerd expressly developed the idea of intuition by eliminating Kant’s logical categories and substituting for them the intuited modes of consciousness. And later, when

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52 Already in _Normatieve Rechtsleer_ he objects to the abstraction theory. Its use in logic depends on a psychologistic view of relations between different individual perceptions, and seeks universal ideas abstracted from those associated individual perceptions (1922d, 72).

53 Sauter also used Baader to reform neo-Kantianism (Sauter 1928).
Dooyeweerd developed his law-Idea, he used Lask’s idea of meaning-moments to individuate modalities not from logical categories but from God’s central law.

The 1922 article *Normatieve Rechtsleer* shows us the beginnings of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy in a very clear way. We can see the way that he works, using many sources, often without acknowledgment. In this way, he formed the “rudimentary conceptions” of his philosophy before he began employment at the Kuyper Foundation, and even before he read Kuyper. None of these ideas derive from Calvinism. But because Kuyper relied on some of the same sources for his key ideas, Dooyeweerd was able to use his new philosophical framework to mesh with Kuyper’s neo-Calvinism, and also to reform it.

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