Dooyeweerd versus Strauss:
Objections to immanence philosophy
within reformational thought

by

Dr. J. Glenn Friesen

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I. Background to the Disagreement

In his last article, *Gegenstandsrelatie*,¹ written two years before his death, Dooyeweerd criticized many of the ideas in D.F.M. Strauss’s dissertation, *Begrip en Idee*.² In this article, Dooyeweerd refers to “logicism,” to “serious misunderstanding” and to “insoluble antinomies” in Strauss’s views. And Dooyeweerd says that Strauss’s ideas of the nature of theory reflect “the most current prejudices of modern epistemology” (*Gegenstandsrelatie* 97, 100). Insoluble antinomies are a sign of a religious dialectic, and Dooyeweerd normally uses such strong criticism against those who adhere to a different Ground-Motive.

But in 1984, nine years after Dooyeweerd’s article criticizing him, and seven years after Dooyeweerd’s death, Strauss published an article that Cameron references in the


² D.F.M. Strauss, *Begrip en Idee* (Assen, 1973). Strauss’s doctoral supervisor was Hendrik van Riessen, who had himself done his own doctoral dissertation under Vollenhoven. In my view, van Riessen and Strauss continue along the lines of Vollenhoven’s philosophy, which is very different from Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. Vollenhoven uses many of the same terms as Dooyeweerd, but he uses these terms in very different ways. See my article “Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven: The religious dialectic within reformational philosophy,” *Philosophia Reformata* 70 (2005) 102-132 (*‘Dialectic’) Online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Dialectic.html]. In *Discussion*, Strauss refers to van Riessen’s views with approval.


I shall refer to this 1984 article by Strauss as ‘Discussion.’ In *Discussion*, Strauss refers again to his dissertation, and he reiterates what he had said there. Strauss says:

> In my dissertation I have raised a number of points against the formulation of the *Gegenstand*-relation by Dooyeweerd. In summarizing them, I may mention the following points… (*Discussion*, 40).

In *Discussion*, therefore, Strauss attempts to re-argue the very points that Dooyeweerd had so decisively rejected in *Gegenstandsrelatie*.

Strauss was obviously very unhappy with Dooyeweerd’s strong criticism. Strauss says, “[Dooyeweerd] completely side-stepped my arguments,” that a certain remark by Dooyeweerd was “completely besides the point,” that there are “Inconsistencies in Dooyeweerd’s epistemology,” and that “only some of my points were handled, leaving aside some of the most crucial ones” (*Discussion*, 45-47).

II. Strauss’s Criticism of Dooyeweerd

Let’s now look at some of the ideas that Dooyeweerd rejected in his last article *Gegenstandsrelatie*, and which Strauss brings forward again in *Discussion*.

1. Strauss’s rejection of Gegenstand-relation

Strauss rejects Dooyeweerd’s Idea of the *Gegenstand*-relation. In his last article, *Gegenstandsrelatie*, Dooyeweerd of course defends the *Gegenstand*-relation. The *Encyclopedia of the Science of Law* also affirms its importance.

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2. Strauss’s incorrect view of aspects as properties

Like Vollenhoven before him, Strauss refers to modal aspects as being abstracted from entities. In Gegenstandsrelatie, Dooyeweerd had already criticized this view as a “serious misunderstanding.” Aspects are not deduced from individuality structures.

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5 Discussion, 53:

At this point we must mention that fact that the normal meaning of abstraction coincide [sic] with our notion of analysis. To analyze something always implies an act of lifting out, i.e. the identification of something or some property of it by disregarding or distinguishing it form non-relevant things or features.

Strauss refers to “modal properties observable in the concrete event…” (Discussion, 46). He says “Analysis is first of all the successive distinguishing of universal features which are identified” (Discussion, p. 52). On the same page, he refers to a child’s conceptual knowledge of “specified universal modal properties.” And he says, “The original discreteness of the meaning of number co-determines the possibility to discern differences between entities and properties” (Discussion, 53).

6 Gegenstandsrelatie, 90:

…the modal structures of the aspects can in no way be deduced from the individuality-structures of concrete reality. There is a serious misunderstanding concerning this cardinal point even by some adherents of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, insofar as they are of the opinion that the modal structures can be discovered by an ever-continuing abstraction from the concrete experience of reality.

7 Gegenstandsrelatie, 90:

Therefore it seems to me that Strauss’s remark is incorrect, when he says in the note on page 118 of his thesis, that it is only in a methodological sense that an analysis of the modal structures precedes an explicit analysis of typical structures of totality of naïve experience. He believes that, in view of the fact that naïve experience is the irreplaceable foundation of all theoretical thought, theoretical thought must proceed from out of [“vertrekken”] the typical structures of totality in which naïve experience understands concrete reality.

But this opinion clearly depends on the thought that I have already rejected in principle–that the modal structures are only given to us in their supposed individualization within the individuality-structures of concrete things, event, social relations and so on, and that their universal modal
Rather, individuality structures function in the aspects, which have an ontical priority.\(^8\) This is a view that can be found not only in Dooyeweerd’s last article, but also in one of his first articles.\(^9\) Dooyeweerd finds in Strauss “a continual confusion between the character is only to be discovered by theoretical abstraction from out of these individuality-structures.

\(^8\) Gegenstandsrelatie, 90:

It is not the aspects that are individualized within the various structural types of things, events, societal relations, etc., but only the functions of concrete reality within these aspects that are so individualized. The modal structures lie at the foundation of the individuality-structures, and not the other way around.

\(^9\) In his 1923 article "Roomsch-katholieke en Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde," February, 1923, Dooyeweerd specifically denies that modalities are qualities or properties of things:

De modaliteit werkelijkheid, b.v. valt niet samen met de werkelijkheid van den geschouwden boom, de modaliteit ruimte valt niet samen met de ruimtelijkheid van de geschouwde ruimtefiguur driehoek. De werkelijkheid en de ruimte zijn als het ware gezichtsvelden, waarbinnen de geschouwde zinwezens al naar gelang van hun wezenlijk karakter liggen. Zoo ligt het getal 4 buiten het gezichtsveld der modaliteit werkelijkheid; het smartgevoel (een psychische concreet-primaire zin) buiten het gezichtsveld der modaliteit materie; de rechtsnorm buiten het gezichtsveld der modaliteitruiume, werkelijkheid, materie enz.

Aan de modaliteit als primaire vorm van het schouwend bewustzijn moet dus iets anders beantwoorden in de wereld van den geschouwden zin, dan de concreete geaardheid van de zinvolle wezens zelver; dit analogon noemen wij het wezensverband van het gebied in de wereld van den geschouwden zin, of kortweg, gebiedskategorie. De modaliteit is dus iets totaal anders dan het begrip. De modaliteit is subjectief vorm van de zingeving, objectief een vorm van het wezensverband van het gebied binnen de wereld van den geschouwden zin; het begrip daarentegen is vorm van het denken.

[For example, the modality reality does not coincide with the reality of a perceived tree; the modality space does not coincide with the spatiality of a perceived spatial figure like a triangle. Reality and space are, as it were, fields of view, within which the contemplated meaning-realities are found in accordance with their essential character. In this way the number 4 lies outside the field of view of reality; the feeling of pain (a psychical concrete-primary meaning) lies outside the field of view of matter; the legal norm lies outside the modalities of space, reality, matter, etc.

A modality is a primary form of the intuiting consciousness [schouwend bewustzijn]. What corresponds to the modality must be something other
ontical” and the epistemological states of affairs."¹⁰

3. Strauss’s incorrect view of abstraction

Strauss regards abstraction as occurring intra-modally within the logical subject-object relation. But for Dooyeweerd, theoretical thought is an act, which functions in all of the aspects. The splitting apart of the aspects, the dis-stasis from the systasis or continuity of cosmic time, is such an act.¹¹ It is not based on the logical function alone. So although the Gegenstand-relation sets the logical function of thought over against other aspects, this opposition is not itself of a logical nature. This is something that Dooyeweerd also says in the Encyclopedia.¹² And if we distinguish in this way between the functions of an act of thought, opposing to itself an abstracted aspect, then there is no reason why the act

than the concrete nature of meaningful reality itself. Something else in the world of intuited meaning [geschouwden zin] must correspond to the modality. We call this analogue to the modality 'the essential relation of the domain in the world of intuited meaning,' or in short, 'domain category' [gebiedskeatgorie]. The modality is subjectively a form of giving meaning, and objectively it is a form of the essential relation of the domain within the world of intuitive meaning; in contrast, a concept is a form of thought.

The above excerpts from this article are included in Marcel Verburg: Herman Dooyeweerd. Leven en werk van een Nederlands christen-wijsgeer (Baarn: Ten Have, 1989), 58 ['Verburg'].

¹⁰ Gegenstandsrelatie, 91.

¹¹ Gegenstandsrelatie, 87-88:

Our actual theoretical-analytical function of thought can only reveal its actuality in typical analytically qualified acts of thought, which in their individuality-structures act in principle within all modal aspects.

¹² Dooyeweerd says that that the Archimedean point for our thought may not be sought in logic (Encyclopedia, 2002 Translation, 35). And the Gegenstand-relation cannot proceed from the logical aspect alone:

This synthetic abstraction, this sub-traction, cannot be brought about by our logical function of consciousness itself. For as a subjective meaning-side of temporal reality, the logical function is itself within time.

The meaning synthesis of scientific thought is first made possible when our self-consciousness, which as our selfhood is elevated above time, enters into its temporal meaning functions (1946 Edition, 12).
of thought cannot investigate the logical aspect itself.\textsuperscript{13}

4. **Intra-modal logical subject-object relation**

Strauss substitutes the intra-modal logical subject-object relation for the *Gegenstand*-relation. He says that there need no longer be any difference between them (*Discussion*, 43). Strauss says,

> Within the disclosed logical subject-object relation the modal aspects are distinctly (i.e. logically objectified) opposed to each other (*Discussion*, 42).

But that is not what Dooyeweerd means by “opposed” or “set over-against” [*tegenovergesteld*]. The initial *setting-over-against* [What I call ‘*Gegenstand* Level 1’ in the discussion below] is not purely logical. It sets the act of thought over-against a *Gegenstand* that is isolated from out of the continuity of cosmic time. As already discussed, although the act of thought involves the logical aspect, it also takes place in all aspects. And it is the entry of our supratemporal selfhood into cosmic time that causes this *dis-stasis*, the initial *setting over-against*. What Strauss is referring to by the “disclosed subject-object relation,” where modal aspects are logically objectified within the analytical modality itself, is what occurs in *Gegenstand* Level 3 (see below).

\textsuperscript{13} Dooyeweerd says,

> But Strauss himself knows very well, that our *actual* analytical function of thought does not function within the *theoretically abstracted* aspect of thought and experience. Our actual thought can only function in this aspect as it is *previously given* to us within the integral cosmic order of time of the *real* world of human experience, i.e. *not* as analyzed in theoretical abstraction, and in the subjective analytical splitting-apart and setting over against, but in its full inter-modal coherence of meaning with the other modal aspects. Our actual theoretical-analytical function of thought can only reveal its actuality in typical analytically qualified acts of thought which in their individuality-structures act in principle within all modal aspects. According to the intentional content of these acts, there is effected both a theoretical abstraction of the logical aspect as well as its inter-modal setting over against all non-logical aspects of the human experienced world. For a proper analysis of the logical aspect, it is necessary to recognize that these acts also set the abstracted non-logical aspects over against each other. We would never be able to distinguish the analogical moments in the structure of the logical aspect without setting the modal aspects in a theoretical-logical antithesis to each other (*Gegenstandsrelatie*, 87-88).
In Gegenstandsrelatie, Dooyeweerd had already strongly criticized Strauss’s substitution of the intra-modal logical subject-object relation for the Gegenstand-relation. Dooyeweerd said that Strauss’s view (a) leads to logicism, (b) threatens the irreducibility of the aspects, since what is intra-logical can only be analogies of the non-logical aspects, and not their nuclear meaning (c) leads to a genuine insoluble antinomy, since although Strauss could not maintain irreducibility of the aspects, he still wants to affirm such irreducibility. This gives rise to an antinomy between the logical aspect and the other aspects, (d) that the irreducibility of the aspects can be maintained only on the

14 Dooyeweerd cites from page 125 of Strauss’s dissertation Begrip en Idee:

Binnen (modaal in) die ontsloten subjek-objek relasie staan die modale werklijkheidsaspekte onderskeie (d.i. logies geobjektiveerd) inter-modaal teenover mekaar!

[Within (modally within) the deepened subject-object relation, the modal aspects of reality are distinguished (i.e. logically objectified) inter-modally over-against each other!]

Dooyeweerd says, “Strauss’s argument is not only contradictory in a formal-logical sense. It also contains a genuine antinomy, as I shall demonstrate.” (Gegenstandsrelatie, 98).

15 Gegenstandsrelatie, 100: “Strauss tries in vain to save himself from this impasse, which threatens to lead him directly in a logicistic pitfall…” In Discussion, Strauss recognized that Dooyeweerd had accused him of logicisim (Discussion, 56).

16 Dooyeweerd says that the meaning kernels of the other aspects:

…cannot be interpreted in an intra-modal logical sense without canceling their irreducibility (Gegenstandsrelatie, 100; italics Dooyeweerd’s).

17 Gegenstandsrelatie, 100:

Because Strauss tries to interpret in an intra-modal logical sense the inter-modal antithesis that he himself maintains between the logically objectified modal aspects, he falls not only into an obvious logical contradiction, but also into insoluble genuine antinomies. In order for him to simultaneously maintain the mutual irreducibility of the theoretically abstracted modal aspects and his supposed intra-modal logical character of the epistemological antithesis, he is obliged to let their distinguished modal nuclear moments also function in an intra-modal logical sense, excluding any inter-modal theoretical synthesis. A necessary antinomy thereby arises between the modal law-sphere of the logical aspect and that of the other aspects, whose meaning-kernels cannot be interpreted in an intra-modal logical sense without canceling their irreducibility.
basis of the (supratemporal) religious root, the selfhood\textsuperscript{18} (which Strauss denies) (e) that Strauss’s identification of the Gegenstand-relation with the logical subject-object relation reflects “the most current prejudices of modern epistemology”\textsuperscript{19} (f) that Strauss’s view of theory as an intra-modal logical subject-object relation blurs the distinction between naïve pre-theoretical experience and theoretical experience.\textsuperscript{20}

Dooyeweerd concludes that Strauss has failed in his attempt to eliminate the Gegenstand-relation.\textsuperscript{21} That does not mean that the Gegenstand-relation does not presuppose the subject-object relation, since as an act, the Gegenstand-relation functions in all aspects. But it cannot be reduced to the subject-object relation within the analytical aspect.\textsuperscript{22}

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\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Gegenstandsrelatie}, 100.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Gegenstandsrelatie}, 97:

Strauss has evidently not seen that it is just this identification of the epistemological Gegenstand-relation with the subject-object relation in human knowledge that belongs to the most current presuppositions in modern epistemology, which as we have earlier seen, have darkened their insight into the correct relation of the so-called naïve or pre-theoretical to the theoretical, scientific attitude of thought and experience.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Gegenstandsrelatie}, 87.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Gegenstandsrelatie}, 98.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Gegenstandsrelatie}, 94:

It cannot be doubted that the theoretical Gegenstand-relation presupposes the logical subject-object relation. For the modal aspects are given to us neither in a theoretical abstraction from out of their ontical systasis, nor as analyzed in their structural meaning-moments. They can only be object of our subjective analysis. In the transcendental critique of theoretical thought, this is expressed by saying that they have an object function within the logical aspect, that is to say that they display objective characteristics, which can be brought to light by means of subjective-logical analysis, and brought together into a concept. But are these characteristics of only a logical (analytical) character? It is beyond doubt that with respect to their logical object function they must function within the intra-modal subject-object relation. But from that it by no means follows that they themselves are of a modal-analytical nature and that we can only come to a theoretical knowledge of their characteristic structural moments by means of a logical objectivizing of the modal aspects.
5. Strauss’s claim of abstraction in everyday life

Strauss says that we frequently abstract in everyday life. Strauss also asserts that we have implied knowledge of the aspects in our naïve experience, and that theoretical thought merely makes explicit what was implied:

Distatic logical objectification merely consists of making explicit the (systatically) implied meaning-diversity (Discussion, 42).

and

The implied meaning-diversity is only made explicit by means of distatical logical objectification (Discussion, 43).

In Gegenstandsrelatie, Dooyeweerd specifically denied this. Dooyeweerd said that such an idea blurs the distinction between pre-theoretical and theoretical thought. (Gegenstandsrelatie, 92). Naïve experience knows nothing of abstraction in the sense of dis-stasis, and although it experiences the aspects, it has no articulated or even implied knowledge of the aspects. Dooyeweerd says,

Strauss’s present opinion, that in our pre-theoretical thought we already have an implicit concept of the structures of the modal aspects, is in conflict with the strict givenness in the naïve attitude of thought and experience (Gegenstandsrelatie 89-90)

and

These aspects with their modal structures do not come into view in the so-called naïve, i.e. pre-theoretical attitude of thought and experience. In the transcendental critique, I have explained this as due to the fact that in the naïve attitude, our acts of thought and experience still remain wholly enstatically placed within the concrete, individual reality of things and events, and that our concept formation here still rests inertly upon our

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23 Discussion, 53. Here again, Strauss’s view of the meaning of abstraction is different form Dooyeweerd’s. For Strauss, it involves identifying and distinguishing properties, instead of Dooyeweerd’s view of an epoché from the continuity of time. Strauss says,

To analyze something always implies an act of lifting out, i.e. the identification of something or some property of it by disregarding or distinguishing it from non-relevant things or features.

24 Dooyeweerd says that pre-theoretical concept formation does not yet know epistemological problems

Although we can speak here of an implicit experience of the aspects, this is in any case no implicit conceptual knowledge. (Gegenstandsrelatie, 97-98).

25 Gegenstandsrelatie, 97.
sensory representation. As long as our analytical view is not directed to the modal aspects of our experienced world, we cannot speak of a concept of these aspects, not even an implied concept. (Gegenstandsrelatie, 92).

and

For it is really impossible to maintain that in the pre-theoretic attitude of thought and experience one should already know the difference between the original irreducible modal meaning-kernel of the spatial aspect and the various different spatial analogies within the other aspects which are qualified by the meaning-kernels of these other aspects—such as physical space, biotic space, sensory perceptional space, logical (thought) space, cultural historical space juridical space (the area of validity for a legal order, and the juridical place of a legal fact), economic space etc. (Gegenstandsrelatie, 92).

and

Strauss’s remark that the transcendental critique ought to begin by asking how a pre-theoretic implicit concept of the modal aspects is possible consequently makes no sense (Gegenstandsrelatie, 92).

Dooyeweerd’s rejection of any implied knowledge of the aspects in naïve experience is also consistent with what he says in the New Critique:

Naïve thought has no “opposite” to its logical function and does not perform any inter-modal theoretical synthesis, but is operative in the full temporal reality in enstasis. Naïve experience is a concrete experience of things and their relations in the fulness of individual temporal reality. The analytical subject-object relation also has a merely enstatic character here. (NC II, 468).

6. Strauss’s criticism of the transcendental critique

Strauss criticizes Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique.26 His criticism is related to Strauss’s rejection of the Idea of the supratemporal selfhood. For the transcendental critique is based on understanding Ideas in their relation to the supratemporal selfhood. Dooyeweerd makes this point in the Encyclopedia. The Gegenstand-relation allows us to form Ideas of the transcendental supratemporal conditions, while nevertheless remaining bound to philosophy.27

Strauss says that Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique has a rationalistic tendency

26 Strauss says that Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique upholds a false Kantian opposition between synthesis and analysis (Discussion, 55).

27 Encyclopedia, 2002 Translation, 80-81, but mistranslated in the present edition.
(Discussion, p. 45). It need hardly be stated that Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is directed against rationalism. You need only look at the Encyclopedia for Dooyeweerd’s opposition to rationalism. Dooyeweerd had already responded to this accusation in Gegenstandsrelatie, 96, where Dooyeweerd says that Strauss’s argument of rationalism contains an “obvious logical contradiction” which Strauss does not himself seem to be aware of. Dooyeweerd says that Strauss’s criticism of the transcendental critique was based on Strauss’s “penchant” for formal logic. But Dooyeweerd says that to show logical contradiction cannot possibly relate to transcendental criticism, which refers to antinomies:

This method of trying to show a logical contradiction is fundamentally different from the method developed in the Philosophy of the Law-Idea of laying bare the antinomies that are necessarily the result of every attempt to absolutize certain modal aspects at the cost of the remaining aspects. Strauss’s method is completely defective for the purpose of trying to show the untenability of a material philosophical conception. Formal-logical contradictions in a philosophical argument can generally be corrected, without affecting the underlying material conception. Antinomies on the other hand are not of an intra-modal logical character, but of an inter-modal character. They imply a material conflict between the law-spheres of mutually irreducible modal aspects, as soon as one tries to break through this irreducibility (Gegenstandsrelatie, 96-97).

In Discussion, 45, Strauss compounds his criticism of Dooyeweerd, saying that not only is Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique contradictory, but that it involves antinomies that lead to contradictions.

So Dooyeweerd accuses Strauss of antinomies, and Strauss accuses Dooyeweerd of antinomies. Who is right? The debate between Dooyeweerd and Strauss gives every indication of being a conflict between conflicting Ground-motives. Antinomies arise in the religious, supratemporal dimension of our experience. As discussed below, Strauss denies the supratemporality of the self. It is in this religious, supratemporal dimension that antinomies arise. I therefore think that Dooyeweerd is right, and that Strauss can speak only of logical contradiction, whereas Strauss’s own thought is involved in genuine antinomies because of his logicism. And Dooyeweerd says that Strauss’s method does not fulfill the requirements of a true transcendental critique:

The transcendental critique certainly must give an account of the mutual relation and coherence of the pre-theoretical and the theoretical attitudes of thought and experience. But Strauss’s views certainly do not fulfill this requirement. (Gegenstandsrelatie, 92).
7. Abstraction and synthesis

Strauss says, “Abstraction and synthesis are opposed to each other” (Discussion, 55, fn37). Strauss does not seem to understand either term correctly. Strauss sees analysis as distinguishing and synthesis as identifying (Discussion 55). That ignores the Dooyeweerd’s whole idea of relating what has been analyzed to the supratemporal selfhood.

As discussed, Dooyeweerd’s use of ‘abstraction’ is not the abstraction of properties, but the abstraction from the continuity of cosmic time, by our supratemporal selfhood entering into cosmic time. And for Dooyeweerd, theoretical synthesis involves restoring that cosmic continuity of time, by relating the results of our theory back to the unity of our selfhood, by means of our intuition (see discussion below). Strauss says that synthesis must be either intra-modal or inter-modal (Discussion, 41). Strauss has himself chosen the intra-modal solution, within the logical subject-object relation. He assumes that for Dooyeweerd it must be inter-modal, in the joining together of aspects that were split apart.

But for Dooyeweerd, synthesis already occurs in the (non-logical) opposition between the analytical aspect and the non-logical aspects. For Strauss, such opposition is still a part of abstraction. But for Dooyeweerd, this opposition of the aspects is only a stage in the synthesis, because synthesis does not remain purely temporal or functional; what has been analyzed in the theoretical dis-stasis must be related back to the unity of our selfhood. This relation back to the supratemporal selfhood is what Strauss does not seem to appreciate. In other words, the theoretical synthesis (in its final form) is not merely

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28 Dooyeweerd says that deepened analysis first executes [voltrekt zich] an inter-modal synthesis of meaning, in which the non-analytic meaning is made into a ‘Gegenstand’ of the analytic aspect:

Only in the deepened theoretic thought does the mere en-static attitude of thought give place to the over-against and dis-static attitude. The deepened analysis first executes [voltrekt zich] an inter-modal synthesis of meaning, in which the non-analytic meaning is made into a ‘Gegenstand’ of the analytic aspect. A ‘Gegenstand’ arises only in theoretic knowledge, in the synthesis of meaning and over against the deepened analysis (WdW II, 401).

Dooyeweerd also says every analysis demands a synthesis:

For each theoretical inter-modal antithesis finds its necessary reciprocal [keerzijde] in a theoretical inter-modal synthesis, for it has no other goal than to come to a corresponding concept of the aspects that have been set over against each other (Gegenstandsrelatie, 88).
inter-modal, but an act that relates the aspects that have been split apart to our transcendent selfhood. The synthesis is beyond inter-modal.

Dooyeweerd says that the synthesis can never be explained by means of the isolated functions of consciousness (NC II, 479). The Gegenstand-relation brings about the dis-stasis through our supratemporal selfhood entering time, and the synthesis involves relating it back to the unity of our selfhood. The opposites in theoretical thought\(^\text{29}\) are relative and not absolute, and we must search in theory for their higher synthesis.\(^\text{30}\) The diversity of temporal meaning can come to a radical unity only in the religious center of human existence, in which we transcend time (NC I, 31).\(^\text{31}\) Dooyeweerd says that it is our intuition that relates the analyzed Gegenstand to our supratemporal selfhood:

My intuition moves to and fro between my deepened analysis and its “Gegenstand” to bring them into actual contact in the inter-modal synthesis of meaning. In this process I become conscious of my theoretical freedom of thought. The actual synthesis of meaning accomplished in it can never be explained by means of the isolated functions of consciousness. Theoretical intuition is operative in deepened analysis itself, and only by its intermediary is theoretical thought able to analyse the “Gegenstand” in the intermodal synthesis of meaning. In this intuition I implicitly relate the intermodal meaning-synthesis to the transcendent identity of the modal functions I experience in the religious root of my existence (NC II, 478).

In intuition, we recognize the theoretical datum, the Gegenstand, as “our own” (NC II, 475-480). In other words, our intuition relates our theoretical investigation to the experience of our supratemporal self. The Gegenstand is then no longer foreign [vreemd] to our selfhood.\(^\text{32}\) Dooyeweerd says that theoretical truth is meaningless without its

\(^{29}\) For Dooyeweerd, synthesis involves a dialectical method in theory. He refers to a theoretical dialectic that is relative, and which seeks a higher unity, as opposed to a religious dialectic, which cannot be bridged.

\(^{30}\) Herman Dooyeweerd: *Roots of Western Culture*, (Toronto: Wedge, 1977), 8.

\(^{31}\) Steen correctly observes the importance of the supratemporal heart for this synthesis. Peter J. Steen: *The Structure of Herman Dooyeweerd’s Thought* (Toronto: Wedge, 1983), 126.

\(^{32}\) Dooyeweerd already refers to that which is opposed to our thought as ‘denkvreemdheid’ in "Een kritisch-methodologische onderzoek naar Kelsen's normative rechtsshouding", part of which comes from 1922, but completed in 1926. (excerpts in Verburg 34ff). In the 1946 edition of the Encyclopedia, Dooyeweerd refers to the Gegenstand as “foreign to our consciousness “(p. 9). See my Glossary entry for ‘Own’ at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Own.html].
relation to our cosmological self-consciousness (*WdW* II, 512; *NC* II, 578). For those who begin with a dualistic Ground-Motive, no ultimate synthesis is possible; they are left with a primary religious dualism. Those caught in such a primary dualism may argue for the use of a dialectical logic to attempt to overcome antithesis in starting points (*NC* II, 37). But this results only in a dialectical-logical unity, not a real unity (*NC* I, 89).

8. Strauss’s criticism of intuition

Strauss criticizes Dooyeweerd’s idea of intuition, but that is because Strauss fails to see it relating to the supratemporal selfhood. Dooyeweerd describes Strauss’s view:

The blurring of the difference in principle between the pre-theoretical and the theoretical attitudes of thought and experience also appears clearly in Strauss’s critique of the role that I have ascribed to theoretical intuition in the process of the inter-modal epistemological concept formation. Strauss thereby ignores my explicit distinction between theoretical and pre-theoretical intuition, although it is here of fundamental importance. Theoretical intuition can never become effective in the process of knowing apart from the theoretical attitude of knowledge. It is necessary in order for us to acquire a certain *insight* into the modal structures, after we have, by the *Gegenstand*-relation, obtained an analytical view of these structures […]

Strauss is apparently of the opinion that this *ontical* systasis would make *impossible in principle* the epistemological *synthesis* (and consequently also the epistemological antithesis) between our analyzing act of thought and the abstracted modal aspects. According to him, intuition can therefore play no role in the inter-modal epistemological relation of our actual logical function of thought with the abstracted modal aspects, which we set over against this act of thought as “Gegenstand.” Strauss’s basis for this claim is that intuition can only become effective in the “ontical” systasis and not in the *abstracted* modal aspects.

With this last statement I am naturally completely in agreement. But the conclusion made by him from this statement cannot be maintained due to the obvious confusion of the theoretical with pre-theoretical intuition. It is not the given ontical systasis of the modal aspects of our experiential character that prevents our pre-theoretical intuition from acquiring *insight* into their structure. It is much rather the *enstatic* character of pre-theoretical experience, still wholly set within concrete reality, that prevents pre-theoretical intuition from acquiring this insight. It is only in the theoretical attitude of thought and experience, in which we receive in our analytic view of the modal aspects that have been analytically split apart and set over against each other, that intuition can lead to an epistemological insight into their modal structure. (*Gegenstandsrelatie*, 93-94).
Notice in this quotation how Dooyeweerd speaks of the antithesis and synthesis between our analyzing act and the abstracted aspects. And Dooyeweerd’s point is that both the antithesis and the synthesis come when we actively step out of the enstatic character of pre-theoretical experience. We do this by entering into cosmic time with our supratemporal selfhood, in the intentional act\textsuperscript{33} of theoretical thought.

9. Strauss’s objection to circularity

Strauss says that Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is circular. He even uses the phrase ‘vicious circle.’ But Dooyeweerd had already dealt with this in Gegenstandsrelatie. He says that Strauss’s conclusion is based on an incorrect use of formal logic. He cites Strauss and then says,

This extensive quotation throws a sharp light on the short-circuiting that arises in Strauss’s argument as a result of his losing sight of the fact that, what he calls a “vicious circle” in my train of thought is in reality a necessary consequence of the transcendental ideas—which he himself accepts—of the mutual irreducibility and unbreakable reciprocal meaning-coherence of the modal aspects. For these ideas are unquestionably of an inter-modal character, and they lie at the basis of the epistemological forming of concepts of the modal aspects, as developed in the Philosophy of the Law-Idea. There does not exist any logical contradiction between both of these transcendental ideas. Rather, they cohere unbreakably with each other, and these ideas are in turn not to be separated from the transcendental idea of the root-unity of the modal aspects in the religious center of human existence, and the idea of their divine Origin in the will of the Creator (Gegenstandsrelatie, 100).

Strauss says, “This remark is completely besides [sic] the point. What is at stake is not the mutual coherence and irreducibility of the modal aspects, but the contradictory implications of his antinomic conception of the Gegenstand-relation!”

Strauss doesn’t get the point. We may compare what Dooyeweerd says here with what he says in the 1946 Edition of the Encyclopedia about the meaning of ‘encyclopedia’ teaching in a circle. This is Dooyeweerd’s view of the relation of Ideas and concepts to the Center and periphery! “Research proceeds from the Center to the periphery; it is

\textsuperscript{33} ‘Intentional’ is not to be understood in a phenomenological sense of directedness to an object, but rather in an inner-directedness. See my Glossary entry for ‘Intentional’ at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Intentional.html].
Now it is evident from other writings that Strauss rejects the Central/peripheral distinction. In response to my pointing out Dooyeweerd’s similarity to Baader, who also emphasizes the distinction between a Central Totality and a peripheral Center, Strauss says:

Dooyeweerd does not operate with an anonymous idea of a cosmic “Center” which, “as essence”, is supposed to “stand … over” the so-called “peripheral points.”

and again,

Dooyeweerd does not know anything of “peripheral points” where the “Center” stands over them.”

and again,

…Dooyeweerd would never, in respect of the central religious dimension of reality, operate with a whole-parts (or: center-periphery) scheme in a purely conceptual manner—as it is done by Von Baader

But in view of Dooyeweerd’s statements in the *Encyclopedia*, Strauss is clearly wrong. Dooyeweerd does use the distinction Central/peripheral, and it is basic to his Idea of encyclopedia.

Because of his Central/peripheral distinction, Dooyeweerd’s view of concepts and Ideas is also different from Strauss’s. Strauss says that concepts describe states of affairs displaying themselves within the limits (modal boundaries) of a specific aspect, and that ideas designate states of affairs, which transcend the limits of the aspect in which the descriptive term has its original seat (*Discussion*, 35). Strauss says that an idea concentrates a conceptual diversity upon (or refers it to) that which transcends the limits of all concept-formation (*Discussion*, 37). And at p. 53, Strauss relates the whole-part

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34 *Encyclopedia*, 1946 Edition, 6. Transcendental Ideas, which point to the Center, are possible only because of our supratemporal selfhood and its Gegenstand-relation.


36 See also my ‘Response to Strauss’ for other examples of the Central/peripheral distinction.
relation as an original spatial relation, and says that it functions, under the guidance of our theoretical thought, as the basis of the introduction of the idea of the ‘at once infinite.’

But Dooyeweerd relates Ideas not to the whole/part relation, but to Totality, which is transcendent and supratemporal. Although Ideas certainly transcend concepts, this is because they refer to the supratemporal religious root, where all concepts coincide. Ideas approximate in the transcendental direction that which cannot be comprehended in a concept (WdW I, 71). Ideas open up the anticipatory meaning within each aspect. Ideas do this by pointing to the transcendent (WdW I, 55), by relating them in the transcendental direction towards the supratemporal selfhood. Ideas seek to approximate the fullness of truth, which is religious and supratemporal. Ideas relate our temporal conceptual understanding in an opened up way to what transcends the temporal, and points beyond the temporal.

There is also a central and peripheral relationship between the nuclear meaning moment and its analogies within each law-sphere. Dooyeweerd says that the nucleus or kernel of the modal aspect is the center, and the other aspects surround it. The same article says


38 In 1931, Dooyeweerd wrote about this distinction between concept and Idea. He related the distinction to the anticipations and analogies [retrocipations] in the law-spheres:

Van den generalen zin van iederen wetskring kunnen wij zoo in het later te bespreken zin-synthetisch denken een begrip en een idee winnen. Het begrip vat de zinstructuur in “restrictieve functie,” d.w.z. alleen den nog niet verdiepten, nog niet ontsloten zin, den systatiscen samenhang van zijn kern en zijn analogieën. De idee daarentegen vat de zin-structuur in “expansieve” of “verdiepte functie,” in de ontsluiting zijner “anticipatiesferen.” De Crisis in de Humanistische Staatsleer, (Amsterdam: W. Ten Have, 1931) 95-96.

[Through what we shall later call meaning-synthetic thought, we can obtain a concept and an idea from the general meaning of each law-sphere. The concept grasps the meaning-structure in its “restrictive function,” i.e. only in its not yet deepened, not yet disclosed meaning. This is in the systatic coherence of the kernel and its analogies. In contrast, the Idea grasps the meaning structure in its “expansive” or “deepened function,” in the disclosing of its anticipatory spheres.]

39 Herman Dooyeweerd: “Introduction to a Transcendental Criticism of Philosophic Thought,” Evangelical Quarterly 19 (1947), 42-51. [‘Ev.Qu.’].
that the kernel or nucleus of each aspect is that which gives that aspect its sphere sovereignty. By this kernel or nucleus, the aspect maintains its individuality with respect to all the other aspects of temporal reality. It is the central and directive moment within each aspect. The article also says that we know the kernel of an aspect in its retrocipations and anticipations:

The “nuclear moment,” however, cannot display its individuality except in close liaison with a series of other moments. These latter are by nature partially analogical, i.e. they recall the “nuclear moments” of all the aspects which have an anterior place in the order of aspects. Partially also they are of the nature of anticipations, which recall the “nuclear moments” of all the aspects which have a later place in that order.

This same article says that we cannot define the kernel or each aspect because by this kernel an aspect maintains its individuality even against the logical aspect.

The kernel meaning of the law-sides of reality is therefore in the supratemporal center. Steen points out that for Dooyeweerd there is an eternal moment in each sphere of law (Steen, 170).

The WdW confirms that the sovereignty in its own sphere of the nuclear meaning is an expression of the vertical order, as opposed to the horizontal order of coherence.

The coherence of meaning of the law spheres is an order of cosmic time. In our religious apriori we refer this back to divine predestination in the broadest sense of plan for the world. It is a law-order of a horizontal nature that spans particularized meaning, in contrast to the vertical, which comes to expression in particularized meaning by sovereignty in its own sphere. (WdW I, 70; not in NC)

And Dooyeweerd says,

What in the totality of meaning has no meaning is the sovereignty in its own sphere in the particularity of meaning (WdW I, 71).

The law-order is horizontal in that it spans across all law-spheres. The coherence of the aspects is maintained “horizontally” by cosmic time. There is a systatic coherence between the kernel and its analogies (Crisis, 102-103). But the meaning of each law-sphere is related to its expression from the center. That is why the kernel or nuclear

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40 Another possible interpretation is that each nuclear moment is a peripheral point from out of the supratemporal center, and each such nuclear moment in its turn becomes a temporal center with another periphery (its analogies). Such an interpretation would also affirm a Central/peripheral distinction, repeating itself on several levels. I don’t think that this is Dooyeweerd’s view, since if the kernel were a temporal center, we should be able to obtain a concept of it. I prefer Steen’s interpretation that there are central eternal moments in each law-sphere.
moment of each sphere is supratemporal. Because it is beyond time, we cannot obtain a concept of it, but only an Idea.

The kernel of the aspect, the sovereignty in its own sphere, is related "vertically" to the sovereignty of God, and to humanity as the image of God, who expresses the aspects. It is not just the kernel of the law-side that is found in the supratemporal. All of our acts come out of our supratemporal selfhood, and Dooyeweerd says that this is our actuality. He relates it to the kernel of each subject function. The kernel of each subject function is the actuality that is referred to in phenomenology (*WdW* I, 78; *NC* I, 101).

### III. The supratemporal selfhood

#### 1. The relation of the Gegenstand-relation to the supratemporal selfhood

In *Gegenstandsrelatie*, Dooyeweerd says that Strauss’s views threaten the irreducibility of the law-spheres. And he says that the Ideas of the mutual irreducibility and unbreakable reciprocal meaning-coherence of the modal aspects are “not to be separated from the transcendental idea of the root-unity of the modal aspects in the religious center of human existence” (*Gegenstandsrelatie*, 100). This statement is partially explained by the above discussion of the supratemporality of the central nuclear moment, as an expression from out of the supratemporal root. And the religious root is in the religious dimension of our experience, which is supratemporal (*NC* II, 560).

Let us look at this issue of supratemporality in more detail. For in my view, most of Strauss’s criticism of Dooyeweerd arises because of Strauss’s rejection of the supratemporal selfhood. Strauss asks, …how is it possible to ‘oppose’ the ‘Gegenstand’ to our logical function without having knowledge of the ‘Gegenstand’ at this stage?” (*Discussion*, 44). Dooyeweerd’s answer is that it is our supratemporal selfhood that enables us to do this. For example, the 1946 edition of the *Encyclopedia* says

> This synthetic abstraction, this sub-traction, cannot be brought about by our logical function of consciousness itself. For as a subjective meaning-side of temporal reality, the logical function is itself within time.

> The meaning synthesis of scientific thought is first made possible when our self-consciousness, which as our selfhood is elevated above time, enters into its temporal meaning functions (p. 12).

Dooyeweerd confirms this in his 1940 article on time:

> The theoretical synthesis is determined both by cosmic time as well as by
the supratemporal transcendent selfhood.\textsuperscript{41}

Totality is supratemporal, but we also function within temporal diversity. We live in two worlds, the supratemporal and the temporal, and it is only because we have a supratemporal selfhood that we can have the \textit{Gegenstand}-relation! The \textit{Gegenstand}-relation allows us to form Ideas of the transcendental supratemporal conditions, while nevertheless remaining bound to philosophy:

Therefore by maintaining the \textit{Gegenstand}-relation, the theoretical Idea relates the theoretical concept to the conditions of all theoretical thought, but itself remains theoretical in nature, thus within the bounds of philosophic thought. It is just in this that its transcendental character resides. For in theoretical thought, the transcendental is everything that, by means of the inner (immanent) structure of theoretical way of thought, first makes possible theoretical thought itself; the transcendental is everything that stands at the basis of every theoretical conceptual distinction as its theoretical presupposition \textit{(Encyclopedia, 2002 Edition, 80-81, re-translated by myself)}

Now of course, if, like Strauss, we deny the supratemporal selfhood, such a view of the \textit{Gegenstand}-relation is not possible. Strauss must try to explain theoretical thought from within temporal reality, by the temporal subject-object relation within the logical aspect. Using Dooyeweerd’s terminology, Strauss’s philosophy is immanence philosophy.\textsuperscript{42} That is why Dooyeweerd can say in \textit{Gegenstandsrelatie} that Strauss’s views do not differ from modern epistemology. Strauss’s mistake was the mistake made by Kant, Husserl and the neo-Kantians \textit{(Gegenstandsrelatie, 87)}.

Strauss has evidently not seen that it is just this identification of the epistemological \textit{Gegenstand}-relation with the subject-object relation in human knowledge that belongs to the most current presuppositions in modern epistemology, which as we have earlier seen, have darkened their insight into the correct relation of the so-called naïve or pre-theoretical to the theoretical, scientific attitude of thought and experience \textit{(Gegenstandsrelatie, 97)}.

\textsuperscript{41} Herman Dooyeweerd, “Het Tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee,” \textit{Philosophia Reformata} 5 (1940) 160-192, 193-234 at 181. Translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Tijdsprobleem.html]

\textsuperscript{42} Dooyeweerd says that the second transcendental Idea is that of the deeper, supratemporal unity, which is in the supratemporal selfhood. Anyone who does not accept that Archimedean point is practicing immanence philosophy, since the Archimedean point must then be sought within time.
The *Encyclopedia* says that the *Gegenstand*-relation is what makes Dooyeweerd’s philosophy transcendental.\(^4^3\) Since Strauss denies both the *Gegenstand* relation and the supratemporal selfhood on which it depends,\(^4^4\) he cannot have the same view of Dooyeweerd’s transcendental method.

**2. Supratemporal means more than supramodal**

Strauss rejects Dooyeweerd’s Idea of the supratemporal heart. Strauss wants to substitute the idea of supra-modal, or trans-functional, for Dooyeweerd’s key idea of supratemporality of the heart.

Strauss uses the word ‘supra-modal’ in *Discussion*. He says that Dooyeweerd’s view of inter-modal synthesis was “from the perspective of a supra-modal starting point” (*Discussion*, 55). Now of course, from Dooyeweerd’s perspective, the supratemporal heart is also supramodal. The religious dimension of the supratemporal embraces the temporal, modal and plastic dimensions of our experience (*NC* II, 560). And so, because it is more embracing, the supratemporal is also supra-modal. And so Dooyeweerd does sometimes use the word ‘supramodal.’\(^4^5\) But the supratemporal is more than supramodal, and cannot be reduced to it.

And that is what Strauss seems to be trying to do—to reinterpret Dooyeweerd so that

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\(^{4^3}\) The *Gegenstand*-relation allows us to form Ideas of the transcendental supratemporal conditions, while nevertheless remaining bound to philosophy:

Therefore by maintaining the *Gegenstand*-relation, the theoretical Idea relates the theoretical concept to the conditions of all theoretical thought, but itself remains theoretical in nature, thus within the bounds of philosophic thought. It is just in this that its transcendental character resides. For in theoretical thought, the transcendental is everything that, by means of the inner (immanent) structure of theoretical way of thought, first makes possible theoretical thought itself; the transcendental is everything that stands at the basis of every theoretical conceptual distinction as its theoretical presupposition (*Encyclopedia of the Science of Law*, 2002 Edition, 80-81, re-translated by myself)

\(^{4^4}\) As an *act*, the meaning synthesis presupposes the time-transcending *I-ness* or *selfhood*, which shares in the religious root of all of temporal reality (*WdW* II, 407; *NC* II, 472).

\(^{4^5}\) See Herman Dooyeweerd: “Het Tijdsprobleem en zijn Antinomieën op het Immanentiestandpunt,” *Philosophia Reformata* 1936, 65-83 [*Antinomieën*], where he says at p. 66 that synthesis is grounded in a supramodal intuition of time (See also *WdW* II, 407). But that same article also makes it clear that the heart is supratemporal.
Dooyeweerd’s idea of supratemporality is itself understood in temporal terms. See, for example, Strauss’s article *Intellectual Influences*, where he says,

Dooyeweerd first gained the biblical insight that the human self-hood (*heart*) is *supra-modal* and *supra structural*, and then developed his theory of *cosmic time*—as that cosmic dimension underlying and embracing both the modal aspects and individuality-structures. By conceiving *cosmic time* as a *unique* cosmic dimension embracing the modal and typical dimensions of creation, and by viewing the human self-hood is *sic* supra-modal and supra-structural, it follows that the human heart ought to be seen as “supra-temporal.”

Since it could hardly be denied that humanity has an *eternal* destination and that being human therefore hinges on the boundary-line of *time* and *eternity*, I think it is biblically justified to affirm the *time-transcending* nature of the *core meaning of being human*. (p. 178).

Strauss’s intentions in this passage are clear from an almost identical passage in Strauss’s public email of April 3, 2003, where he claimed that Dooyeweerd “unfortunately” equated supra-modal with supra-temporal:

Dooyeweerd first realized that the human self-hood is supra-modal and supra structural, then developed his theory of cosmic time underlying and embracing the modal aspects and individuality-structures—and on that basis (unfortunately) equated *supra-modal* with *supra-temporal*. I call this unfortunate while maintaining that it could hardly be denied that humanity has an *eternal* destination and that being human therefore hinges on the boundary-line of time and eternity—justifying at least some sense of the *time-transcending* nature of the *core meaning of being human*.46

Strauss is not affirming true supratemporality here, but is changing Dooyeweerd’s idea of the supratemporal to “some sense” of time-transcending. And by “some sense,” Strauss seems to mean merely a state of eternity after death. As will be seen, Dooyeweerd rejects such a view, and says that even now our selfhood transcends time.

And in another email a few days later, Strauss does not even say that Dooyeweerd made a mistake in equating supra-modal with supra-temporal, but that for him, these terms mean the same thing:

In the Foreword referred to (*NC*, I, v-ix) the qualification ‘supratemporal’ does not appear since Dooyeweerd merely said: ‘I came to understand the central significance of the heart, repeatedly proclaimed by the Holy Scripture to be the religious root of human existence. Created

46 Email dated April 3, 2003 on the online discussion group Thinknet, from Strauss to Daniel Mulholland.
(‘creaturely’) reality, for Dooyeweerd, encompasses both the central religious dimension and those of aspects and entities. The distinction between temporal and supratemporal, for Dooyeweerd coincides with modal and supramodal.47

In saying that the distinction between temporal and supratemporal coincides with modal and supra-modal, Strauss is trying to reduce the supratemporal to temporal terms, or what I call ‘temporalizing the supratemporal.’

Now it may be the case that Dooyeweerd’s idea of cosmic time, and of supratemporality, did not develop until around 1930. That is Verburg’s view.48 But Verburg also says that it is only in this same 1930 article that Dooyeweerd first speaks of the heart in its central significance. So Strauss seems to be mistaken in attempting to contrast the timing of Dooyeweerd having first discovered the central significance of the heart and then only

47 Email dated April 9, 2003 from Strauss to Thinknet generally.

48 Verburg says that in 1930, Dooyeweerd writes about a temporal cosmos, a temporal refraction of meaning, cosmic time, and a cosmic order of time. Verburg comments that Dooyeweerd does not really signal that this is a new term, but immediately binds it to the Calvinistic law-Idea:

De Calvinistische wetsidee doet heel onzen tijdelijken kosmos zien als een organischen samenhang van in eigen kring souvereine wets- en subjectsfuncties, die vanaf de getalsfunctie tot de meest gecomplaceerde geestesfunctie, de geloofsfunctie, een zinbreking zijn in den kosmischen tijd van den onvergankelijken, religieuzen, all tijdelijkheid transcendeerenden wortel van het menschengeslacht in zijn onder-worpenheid aan den eeuwigen religieuzen zin der wet: den dienst van God. (“De Structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee,” 232, cited by Verburg, 123).

[The Calvinistic law-Idea sees our whole temporal cosmos as an organic coherence of law-functions and subject-functions, sovereign in their own sphere, from the arithmetical function to the most complicated normative [spiritual] function, the function of faith; they are a refraction of meaning in cosmic time from the unchanging, religious, time-transcending root of the human race in its sub-jectedness to the eternal religious meaning of the law: the service of God.] I have also suggested that Dooyeweerd obtained his idea of supratemporality from his reading of Franz von Baader’s works on time, which had been republished in the 1920s, and from the book on time by Gunn, which Dooyeweerd cites in several of his works (J. Alexander Gunn: The Problem of Time: an Historical & Critical Study (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929).
later the importance of supratemporality. Both emphases occur at the same time. In any event, we do not need to go back further in the development of Dooyeweerd’s thought, for 1930 is before he wrote his magnum opus, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*. And 1930 is before he wrote the *Encyclopedia of the Science of Law*, the translation of which is in issue here. And it is long before the 1967 SRVU edition that is the basis for the 2002 Translation of the *Encyclopedia*.

Whether it was in 1930, or whether it was even earlier that Dooyeweerd obtained the Idea of supratemporality, once Dooyeweerd did obtain the Idea of the supratemporal heart, it became key to his philosophy. When we examine what Dooyeweerd says about supratemporality, there is a clear contrast with Strauss’s own views, including those expressed by Strauss in *Intellectual Influences*.

a) The whole concept of a merely supra-modal selfhood is similar to Vollenhoven’s idea of a merely temporal pre-functional selfhood. But Dooyeweerd explicitly rejected Vollenhoven’s view that the concentration point of our human existence is to be sought in a merely temporal “pre-functional” selfhood, or a selfhood that transcends modal diversity in time. Thus a merely trans-functional selfhood is also rejected:

> But, at least within the horizon of cosmic time we have no single experience of something “pre-functional”, i.e. of anything that would transcend the modal diversity of the aspects. We gain this experience only in the religious concentration of the radix of our existence upon the absolute Origin. In this concentration we transcend cosmic time. How could man direct himself toward eternal things, if eternity were not “set in his heart (NC I, 31, ft. 1).

See also my article *Dialectic*, where I discuss Tony Tol’s conclusion that this footnote was directed against Vollenhoven. But Vollenhoven admitted that he was disagreeing with Dooyeweerd; he did not try to reinterpret the meaning of supratemporality.

b) Dooyeweerd says that the supratemporal is the *aevum*, or “created eternity.” As

> Sin in its supratemporal religious sense is not a transgression of a norm in a meaning-functional sense, but concerns the heart, the root of the human race. It means the rejection of the eternal meaning of the law, the service of God. But sin is revealed in time in a rebellious attitude towards the meaning-functional ordinances, which God the Lord has set [gesteld] for each law-sphere (cited by Verburg 124, my translation).

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49 Verburg says that the first time that the term ‘heart’ receives the central position in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy was also in 1930, in his article ”De Structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee”:

> Sin in its supratemporal religious sense is not a transgression of a norm in a meaning-functional sense, but concerns the heart, the root of the human race. It means the rejection of the eternal meaning of the law, the service of God. But sin is revealed in time in a rebellious attitude towards the meaning-functional ordinances, which God the Lord has set [gesteld] for each law-sphere (cited by Verburg 124, my translation).
such, it differs from God’s eternity, but it also differs from cosmic time. So when Strauss says that supra-modal coincides with supra-temporal because the heart is also something that has been *created*, he is not taking into account that the supratemporal *aevum* is also created. Dooyeweerd is not talking about the heart participating in God’s uncreated eternity. And yet Dooyeweerd is drawing a clear distinction between the supratemporal *aevum* and mere cosmic time.

In his article *Intellectual Influences* (p. 178), Strauss cites a part of Dooyeweerd’s article *Antinomieën* that Strauss has translated. Strauss seems to want to argue that the *aevum* is nothing but a concentration of the temporal upon eternity. But we must take into account the succeeding words, “in religious transcending of the boundary of time.” The concentration is in transcending time. The full context of this passage in *Antinomieën* indicates that we “really meet with the supratemporal” and that all deifying of the temporal is always only possible by transcending the boundary of time. Our self-consciousness is related to the temporal horizon, but it transcends time in the *aevum*. “In this life” we live in both worlds at once, and in this life, we are bound to time. But that does not mean that the *aevum* is merely a temporal longing for, or even concentration upon eternity. A more accurate translation of the full passage is as follows:

> I would nevertheless gladly be willing to adopt the term *'aevum'* in the sense of an intermediate state between time and eternity. I believe that less objection can be taken against the term in this sense, for it was just in this sense that it arose in Christian thought, which felt the need to distinguish between the supratemporal in a creaturely sense and eternity in the sense of the Being of God.

In human self-consciousness as the center of the religious concentration of all temporal functions, we really meet with the supratemporal in the sense of the *aevum*. Hence, in the current condition, this *aevum* is nothing other than the creaturely concentration of the temporal upon the eternal in religious transcending of the boundary of time. Since eternity is set in the heart, the *aevum*-state belongs to the created structure of our selfhood, which must again and again actualize itself, whenever our self-consciousness is active in religious concentration. This is so even when the *aevum*-consciousness reveals itself in an apostate direction when it seeks the eternal within time. For the deifying of the temporal is always

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50 Dooyeweerd speaks of the *aevum* as an intermediate state between eternity and cosmic time. He distinguishes between the supratemporal in a creaturely sense and eternity in the Being of God. See "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën," Philosophia Reformata 1 (1936) 65-83, 4 (1939) 4-5 [‘Antinomieën’]. See also my Glossary entry for ‘*aevum*’ at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Aevum.html].
only possible in the religious transcending of the boundary of time, although this transcending, as the concentration of the temporal functions, retains its connection to this boundary of time. In this life, the *aevum*-state is thus always bound to time. A speculation about the *aevum*-state when the soul is separated from the body, or of the *aevum*-state of the angels, is philosophically unfruitful. In Calvin's terminology, it is ‘*meteorica et vacua speculatio*’ [*Institutes* I,X,2], because we are here concerned about ‘hidden things,’ which are not yet revealed to us. In this life, all our representations, concepts and ideas are bound to time, and our self-consciousness also remains related to the temporal horizon, although it transcends time in the *aevum*.

Dooyeweerd does not speculate about what our state may be like after death, But in this life (our current condition), our supratemporal selfhood, which transcends time in the *aevum*, is also bound to time. It is not speculation to discuss this current state, where we live in both the supratemporal and the temporal. Our being bound in this life to cosmic time limits and determines us. We are “… restricted and relativized by (but not at all to) our temporal cosmic existence (NC II, 561). For, as Dooyeweerd goes on to say on the same page 561, if our experience were limited to our temporal functions of consciousness, it would be impossible to have true knowledge of God, or of ourselves, or of the cosmos.

c) Contrary to what Strauss says in *Intellectual Influences*, to say that our selfhood is supratemporal does not just mean that we have an “eternal destination.” For one thing, our destination is not God’s eternity, but the supratemporal, which is distinct from God’s eternity. More importantly, Dooyeweerd emphasizes that even now, we live both in the supratemporal and in the temporal:

   Concerning the first supposition, suffice it to say that the *heart* (or the soul) of man in its (her) *temporal expression in life* (as spatiality, movement, organic life, feeling, thinking, acting, etc.) is of course subjected to time. These temporal expressions of life can during our life here on earth not be separated from their *root* or *center*. We ourselves are, in all of our *temporal actions*—that is in our whole life in this “body”—subject to time. The question is merely whether in the heart, the religious center of life, we do not at the same time *transcend* (in the sense of *going out above the temporal*) the cosmic order of time—into which all transitory things are fitted.

   In my view it is indeed the case [that in our heart we also transcend and go out above time]. If that were not so, then the undeniable sense of eternity in man’s heart could not be explained, and it would indeed be difficult to maintain the continued identical existence of the “soul” after bodily
death.\textsuperscript{51}

We transcend time in the center of our existence at the same time as we are enclosed within time. Dooyeweerd says this in many other places. We even find it expressed in two footnotes in Strauss’s article *Intellectual Influences*. He did not translate these references, which contradict his view that it is only in the sense of an eternal destination that the selfhood is supratemporal. In footnote 125, Strauss refers to a statement from Dooyeweerd’s article, “Van Peursen’s critische vragen bij “A New Critique of Theoretical Thought,” *Philosophia Reformata* 25 (1960, 103):

En slechts in en uit Hem [Christus] leren wij in de gemeenschap van de H. Geest verstaan, in welke zin wij in het centrum onzer existentie de tijd te boven gaan, ofschoon wij tegelijk binnen de tijd besloten zijn.

[And only in him and from out of Him [Christ], and in the community of the Holy Ghost, do we understand the sense in which we *transcend* time in the center of our existence, although we are at the same time *enclosed within time.*]

The point of being in Christ and from out of Him refers to our participation in Christ, who as the New Root, replaced mankind as the supratemporal root of temporal reality. And in footnote 124, Strauss cites Dooyeweerd’s “Schepping en Evolutie,” which makes the same point that our selfhood transcends time:

Maar hoe kan het ‘hart’ in de bovenbedoelde zin als *religieus concentratiepunt van de geschiedenis* fungeren, wanneer het geheel en al ‘binnen de tijd’ zou zijn besloten?”

[For how could the ‘heart’ function in the sense intended above, as the *religious concentration point of history*, if it were wholly closed up ‘within time?’]

Here are some other references that make the same point about our simultaneous supratemporal and temporal existence:

Ons Archimedisch punt, dat ons zelfbewustzijn (de crux van alle humanistische kennistheorie!) bepaalt, doet ons de tijdelijke werkelijkheid zien als een uiterst gedifferentieerde zin-breking van de religieuze zin-volheid van onzen kosmos door het prisma van den kosmischen tijd, welken tijd wij in den religieuzen wortel van ons zelfbewustzijn, in boventijdelijke zelf-heid transcendeeren, doch waarin wij met al onze tijdelijke bewustzijns- en andere kosmische functies tevens immanent

\textsuperscript{51} Dooyeweerd’s Second Response to Curators, Oct. 12, 1937, 33. Translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Response2b.html].
[Our Archimedean point, which determines our self-consciousness (the crux of all humanistic epistemology!), allows us to see temporal reality as an extremely differentiated meaning-refraction of the religious fullness of meaning of our cosmos by the prism of cosmic time. This time is transcended in the religious root of our self-consciousness, in our supratemporal self-hood. Yet at the same time we move immanently within this time with all our temporal consciousness- and other cosmic functions.]

and

Het zelfbewustzijn draagt noodzakelijk tegelijk een den tijd transcendeerend en den tijd immanent karakter. De diepere identiteit, welke in de zelf-heid beleefd wordt, is een trans-functioneele, het is een zich een- en dezelfde weten in en boven alle kosmisch-tijdelijke zinfuncties en het zich zijn tijdelijke zinfuncties als eigen weten. (Crisis, 97).

[Self-consciousness necessarily carries with it at the same time a character of transcending time and a character immanent within time. The deeper identity, which is experienced in the self-hood, is a trans-functional one, it is a knowing oneself as one and the same in and above all cosmic-temporal meaning functions and it is a knowing of one’s temporal functions as one’s own.]

d) Supratemporality is a real transcendence of time, and not merely a relative transcendence. Dooyeweerd says we really transcend time:

According to my modest opinion, and in the light of the whole Scriptural revelation concerning human nature it is just this possession of a supratemporal root of life, with the simultaneous subjectedness to time of all its earthly expressions, that together belong to the essence [wezen] of man, to the image of God in him by means of which he not only relatively but radically to go out above all temporal things. And that is how I also understand Ecclesiastes 3:11.53

e) Dooyeweerd says that the whole Idea of cosmic time is fundamental to his whole philosophy (NC I, 28). Cosmic time splits up or refracts the supratemporal unity into

52 Herman Dooyeweerd: De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer (Amsterdam: W. Ten Have, 1931) [‘Crisis’], 93. This citation does make reference to the selfhood as trans-functional. But as already discussed, the supratemporal dimension embraces the dimension of the temporal functions, and so it is transfunctional. But is not merely transfunctional, as this same quotation shows.

cosmic diversity (NC I, 101-102).

f) It is only because we transcend time in our heart that we can have a sense of cosmic time (NC I, 32). See also:

Wanneer wij in het diepste concentratiepunt van ons bestaan den tijd niet to boven gingen, dan zou ook ons bewustzijn noodzakelijk in den tijd opgaan, en daarmede de mogelijkheid der religieuze zelf-concentratie ontberen. Het zou geen tijdsprobleem kennen, want tot wezenlijk probleem wordt de tijd eerst, wanneer, wij distants tegenover hem kunnen nemen in het boven-tijdelijke, dat wij in het diepst van ons wezen ervaren. Slechts omdat de eeuw (het aevoem) in ‘s menschen hart gelegd is, terwijl hij met geheel zijn functiemantel in den tijd besloten is, kan hij ook wezenlijk tijdsbesef hebben.54

[If we did not transcend time in the deepest concentration point of our existence, then our consciousness would necessarily be swallowed up in time, and we would thereby miss the possibility of religious self-concentration. We would know no problem of time, for time only becomes a real problem whenever we can take distance from it in the supratemporal, which we experience in the deepest part of our being. Man can have a real sense of time only because eternity (the aevoem) is set in his heart, while he with his whole mantle of functions is enclosed in time.]

Thus, we transcend time in our heart, and our enclosed within time in our body, our mantle of functions.

g) It is because we transcend time that we can enter into the Gegenstand-relation of theoretical thought (see discussion above).

h) It is because we transcend time that we can have transcendental Ideas that point beyond time while yet remaining temporal (see discussion above, and footnote 27).

As we have seen, it is this kind of synthetical thought, directed to the supratemporal selfhood, which is the basis for Dooyeweerd’s understanding of Ideas as opposed to concepts. It is our relation to our supratemporal selfhood that allows us to open up the anticipatory spheres of the aspects of temporal reality.

i) In our selfhood, we not only transcend time, but prior to the fall, humanity was the religious root, the transcendent concentration point of the rest of temporal reality, which

54 Antinomieën, 1-2. See also Tijdsprobleem, 181:

Now it is indeed correct that we could have no true sense of time unless we did not go above time in the deepest part of our being. All merely temporal creatures lack a sense of time.
has no existence in itself. It is because of this that temporal reality, with no religious root of its own, fell with man in his falling away (NC I, 100, Encyclopedia 2002 Translation, 47).

Doodewerdt emphasizes the difference of his philosophy from immanence philosophy. The difference is in the heart as transcendent root, from which the whole of temporal existence issues. Doodewerdt says that if we do not understand this spiritual falling away of the heart as transcendent religious root, then we understand nothing of his philosophy:

As is extensively argued in the Prolegomena, the radical break that the Philosophy of the Law-Idea makes with immanence philosophy consists in the fact that the former by the light of Scripture penetrates to the religious root of thought, and that it understands the whole of temporal human existence in its issuance [uitgang] from this religious root, its heart in the Scriptural sense. Then it is stated how the fall into sin consists in the falling away of man’s heart from his Creator. This is the cause of spiritual death, which may not be confused with either bodily death or with eternal death. The acknowledgement of spiritual death as the consequence of the fall into sin is so central in the Philosophy of the Law-Idea that if it is negated, one can understand no part of this philosophy.55

j) And Doodewerdt says that because we transcend time, at death, when our “body”, or temporal mantle of functions [functiemantel] is dissolved, our supratemporal selfhood will remain.

There is in reality only one fundamental dichotomy [principieele caesuur], that between the whole temporal existence and its supratemporal religious root, a dichotomy that comes into effect in the temporal death of man (Tijdsprobleem, 216).

Doodewerdt says that the body that is put off at death is the whole earthly existence of man in all temporal spheres of life. But this temporal body is merely the instrument of our supratemporal soul or selfhood, which is not in time, and which continues after death:

Bodily death is the freeing from all earthly relations [losmaking van alle aardsche banden]. It is not just the putting off of a problematic material body whose existence is closed up in the physical-chemical aspects of temporal reality. And the "soul" whose continued existence is assured to us beyond doubt by Scripture and the confessions, may not be understood as a part of temporal earthly existence, or as the theoretical abstraction of a

55 Doodewerdt’s First response to the Curators, April 27, 1937. Translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyewerdt/Response1.html].
"substance" that has merely psychical and normative functions. It is rather the full human selfhood, man's heart in the meaning of the center of the whole of his existence, of which the "body" is the temporal instrument [organon].

k) Dooyeweerd says that the idea of the individual selfhood as religious and supratemporal is fundamental to any Christian view of society.

Maar naar onze beschouwing, de Christelijke opvatting der persoonlijkheid, kan evenmin het ‘individuele ik’ in den tijd worden gezocht en daarmede nemen wij principieel tegen de 'geesteswetenschappelijke sociologie' positie, die zulks met de geheele immanente philosophie juist wel doet. De individueele zelfheid is door en door religieus, boventijdelijk. In de kosmische tijdsorde kan nôch aan den individueelen mensch, nôch aan het verband zelfheid, ikheid toekomen. Dit is het cardinale uitgangspunt voor iedere wezenlijk Christelijke beschouwing der tijdelijke samenleving.

[But according to our view, the Christian understanding of a person, the 'individual I' can no more be sought within time. And we thereby stand in principle against the position of sociology in the humanities, which seeks to do just this in its immanence philosophy. The individual selfhood is through and through religious, supratemporal. In the cosmic temporal order, selfhood or I-ness can be reached neither by [these sociological conceptions of] individual man, nor of societal structures. This is the principal point of departure for any truly Christian view of temporal society.]

l) Dooyeweerd seemed to understand that Strauss was denying the supratemporal. That is why in his last article Gegenstandsrelatie, directed against Strauss, Dooyeweerd says that not even the irreducibility of the law-spheres can be understood apart from the supratemporal selfhood as religious root. Because he denies the supratemporal selfhood, Strauss cannot even have the same view of the meaning of the irreducibility and mutual coherence of the modal aspects.

For these ideas are unquestionably of an inter-modal character, and they lie at the basis of the epistemological forming of concepts of the modal aspects, as developed in the Philosophy of the Law-Idea. There does not exist any logical contradiction between both of these transcendental ideas. Rather, they cohere unbreakably with each other, and these ideas are in turn not to be separated from the transcendental idea of the root-unity of

56 Excerpt from Dooyeweerd’s Third response to Curators, March 19, 1938. Translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Response3.html].

57 De Crisis in de Humanistische Staatsleer (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1931), 113.
the modal aspects in the religious center of human existence, and the idea of their divine Origin in the will of the Creator (Gegenstandsrelatie, p. 100)

But Strauss tries to explain theoretical thought from within temporal reality, by the temporal subject-object relation within the logical aspect. Using Dooyeweerd’s terminology, this is immanence philosophy. That is why Dooyeweerd can say in Gegenstandsrelatie that Strauss’s views do not differ from modern epistemology. It was the mistake made by Kant, Husserl and the neo-Kantians (Gegenstandsrelatie, 87). And it is for this reason that Dooyeweerd can compare Strauss’s thought to modern epistemology, which of course Dooyeweerd considered to be immanence philosophy:

Strauss has evidently not seen that it is just this identification of the epistemological Gegenstand-relation with the subject-object relation in human knowledge that belongs to the most current presuppositions in modern epistemology, which as we have earlier seen, have darkened their insight into the correct relation of the so-called naïve or pre-theoretical to the theoretical, scientific attitude of thought and experience (Gegenstandsrelatie, 97)

When we see this, then some of Strauss’s bafflement regarding Dooyeweerd’s strong criticism of him can be understood. Dooyeweerd is not “side-stepping” Strauss’s arguments, but going to the very root of his disagreement with Strauss. Perhaps Strauss did not recognize this because he did not see the differences between van Riessen (his doctoral supervisor) and Dooyeweerd, or between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd.

m) The supratemporal selfhood as religious root is what allows us to understand the Christian Ground-Motive of creation, fall and redemption. It is what makes the fall ‘radical.’ It is therefore the “key of knowledge.”

IV. Other disagreements

Some other parts of Strauss’s article Discussion were not commented on by Dooyeweerd in Gegenstandsrelatie, but I believe that Dooyeweerd would also reject these views.

1. Paradigms

Strauss compares Dooyeweerd’s view of a ground-Idea to ‘paradigms.’ (Discussion, 56).

Presumably, Strauss is referring to Thomas Kuhn’s book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. But paradigm shifts are not something that happens from out of a supratemporal religious motive, directed either towards or away from God. They are a different way of conceptualizing reality, based on new interpretations of empirical evidence. Dooyeweerd’s Ground-Motives, or Ground-Ideas are not based on reinterpretations of empirical evidence. Rather, they make possible any conceptualization at all! They are transcendental Ideas, and not interpretations of empirical facts.

2. Individuality

Strauss begins with an idea of individuality that is contrary to Dooyeweerd. Strauss says that the notion of individuality

…represents therefore an idea-use of the modal meaning of number which transcends the limits of this aspect in its reference to the *uniqueness* of entities. The term universality, on the other hand, is only accessible on the basis of our understanding of the irreducible meaning of the spatial mode, because it refers to the spatial notion of *location*–whatever is considered to be universal is supposed to apply *everywhere*. i.e. universally (*Discussion*, 37).

And Strauss refers to an Idea use of the modal meaning of number:

…represents therefore an idea-use of the modal meaning of number which transcends the limits of this aspect in its reference to the *uniqueness* of entities. (*Discussion*, 37).

Dooyeweerd does not relate individuality to the numerical aspect. For Dooyeweerd, individuality is a result of the refraction from supratemporal totality, and it is in

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59 Herman Dooyeweerd, “Individualiteits-structuur en Thomistisch substantie-begrip,” *Philosophia Reformata* 9 (1944), 33:

…de integrale tijdelijke uitdrukkingsvorm van den geest des mensen die zich uit geen der modale aspecten ven den tijdshorizon laat uitsluiten. Zoals het zonlicht door het prisma gebroken wordt in de zeven kleurengammas van het lichtspectrum, zo breekt zich de geestelijke wortel-eenheid van’s menschen existentie door den tijdshorizon in de rijke verscheidenheid van modale aspecten en individualiteits-structuren van het lichamelijk bestaan.

[…the integral temporal expression of the spirit of Man that does not let itself be excluded from any of the modal aspects of the temporal horizon. Just as the sunlight is broken by the prism into the seven colours of the
supratemporal totality that the fullness of individuality is found:

All individuality is rooted in the religious centre of our temporal world: all temporal individuality can only be an expression of the fullness of individuality inherent in this centre (NC II, 418).

3. Universality

Strauss begins with an idea of universality that is contrary to Dooyeweerd’s. Strauss says,

…the term universality, on the other hand, is only accessible on the basis of our understanding of the irreducible meaning of the spatial mode, because it refers to the spatial notion of location–whatever is considered to be universal is supposed to apply everywhere, i.e. universally.”

and

The irreducibility of individuality and universality is therefore intimately connected with the irreducibility of the aspects of number and space, because these two modes fundamentally co-condition our reflection on the generality and particularity of entities.

Strauss attempts to distinguish between conceptual and idea uses of the spatial modality. But Dooyeweerd rejects any such view of universality. It is not based on the spatial mode. Universality is something within each of the spheres, and as we have seen from the Encyclopedia, the idea of universality cannot be used outside of each sphere.

4. Things

Strauss begins with the wrong view of things. Like Vollenhoven (See Dialectic), Strauss views things as having a structure. Strauss says,

…concept-formation is always bound up with the universal order for, and the universal orderliness of things. (Discussion, 37).

Dooyeweerd’s view is not that things have a structure, but that things are structure. There is nothing that is independent of the individuality structure, something that could

spectrum, so the spiritual root-unity of human existence is broken by the temporal horizon into the rich diversity of modal aspects and individuality structures of bodily existence].

And see my Glossary entry for ‘Individual’ at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Individual.html].
then *have* the structure. The individuality structure has both a law-side and a subject-side. All “things” (Dooyeweerd puts the word in scare quotes in the 1946 edition), are *enkaptic* interlacements of several individuality structures, and their subjectivity is hidden within time, and based on the duration of time.⁶⁰

**V. Different levels of ‘Gegenstand’**

In *Gegenstandsrelatie*, Dooyeweerd says that Strauss confuses the ontical and epistemological levels.

Let’s first look at the ontical experience. Dooyeweerd speaks of four dimensions of ontical experience: the supratemporal religious dimension, the temporal, the modal and the plastic. This fourth dimension is the dimension of individuality structures (*NC* II, 560).

But our theoretical experience is not ontical. Why is that? Dooyeweerd says,

> The epistemological “*Gegenstand*” cannot be cosmic reality itself, because the analytical function, even in its deepened theoretical meaning can never break the bonds of its immanence in temporal reality. The analytical function cannot transcend cosmic time or be opposed to the cosmos. That which is abstracted in anti-thetical theoretical thought appeared to be nothing but the continuity of cosmic time (*NC* II, 468-469).

Dooyeweerd’s statement here that the analytical function cannot transcend cosmic time is in contrast to our supratemporal selfhood, which can transcend time. The *New Critique* omits the following passage from the *WdW*, which explains this:

> As we know from the Prolegomena, only in the religious, transcendent root of his personality does man go beyond the temporal diversity of meaning and only there is he able to choose a position over against the cosmos. But this religious “over-against” may never be confused with the ‘*Gegenstand*’ in the theoretical synthesis of meaning, which is a product of theoretical abstraction. (*WdW* II, 402, omitted from the equivalent passage in *NC* II, 469).

So not every “over-against” relation is theoretical. The religious “over-against” is not theoretical. It is an ontical relation. And the subject-object relation in naïve experience is also an ontical relation. And Dooyeweerd also says that this is not a relation to a *Gegenstand*. For the subject-object relation of naïve experience is concerned with ontical reality. Naïve experience functions within all the dimensions of our experience. Our supratemporal selfhood (the religious dimension) is fitted [*ingeseld*] within the other

⁶⁰See also my article *Enkapsis*. 
dimensions—temporal, modal, plastic—in an *enstatic* relation of supratemporal with temporal. And temporal reality is experienced as a *systatic* continuity of cosmic time.

But the epistemological attitude of theoretical thought is not ontical. It depends on an abstraction from the continuity of cosmic time, so that the modal aspects are split apart into a discontinuity. And when they are epistemologically split apart (not ontically split apart), these aspects are not ontical, but merely intentional. ‘Intentional’ cannot here be understood in the phenomenological sense of directedness towards objects, for that would be a directedness towards ontical reality. ‘Intentional’ must mean something else here.

And the fact that the *Gegenstand* is not ontical is also related to Dooyeweerd’s emphasis that the aspects are not known by abstracting them from out of concrete entities.

Within this non-ontical, purely intentional theoretical *Gegenstand*-relation, Dooyeweerd distinguishes several different levels of the *Gegenstand*. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the first abstraction is from the continuity of cosmic time. But there are then progressive levels of such abstraction, each corresponding with a different level of *Gegenstand*. I have numbered these levels [in square brackets], although the rest of the text is Dooyeweerd’s:

In the primary analytical *epoché* the “*Gegenstand*” may be conceived in a larger or lesser degree of abstraction.

[1] The absolute *limit* of “*gegenständliche*” abstraction is found in the functional basic structure of the modal aspects.

[2] An entire law-sphere with its immanent modality of meaning can function as a “*Gegenstand*.”

[3] Within such an abstracted law-sphere, a whole field of mutually coherent particular “*Gegenstände*” reveal themselves.

[4] Finally it is possible to abstract a structural “*Gegenstand*” from a thing or event of naïve experience. This structural “*Gegenstand*” is no longer merely modal, or functional, but displays typical structural coherences of an inter-modal character in the analytical *epoché*. This latter kind of “*Gegenstände*” constitute the field of our investigations in the third volume [on Individuality Structures]. (*NC* I, 469).

Levels 1 and 4 represent opposite poles of the levels of *Gegenständlichkeit* (there is a limit in each direction. Level 1 refers to “absolute” and level 4 refers to ‘finally.” I will refer in this Appendix to ‘*Gegenstand* Level 1,’ ‘*Gegenstand* Level 2,’ etc.”

As I understand it, Level 1 is where the aspects are split apart from *systasis* to *dis-stasis*. Level 2 is the examination of a separate law-sphere. Level 3 is the examination of the modal structure of a specific law-sphere. And Level 4 is the examination of individuality structures. This last level is not an experience of individuality structures in our concrete experience, but an analysis of individuality structures in a theoretical and abstracted way.
Again, it must be emphasized that Dooyeweerd says we do not abstract the aspects from individuality structures. The individuality structures function in the aspects, which have an ontically prior existence (Gegenstandsrelatie, 90). But this level of Gegenstand shows that we do abstract their individuality structure, which is based on the modal aspects, and which as a concrete entity functions in the actual ontical aspects (not in the abstracted aspects).

The important issue is, how do we get from the enstatic relation of naïve thought, with its continuous, ontic, systatic experience of cosmic time to the epistemological relation that is merely intentional? How do we get from the religious over-against relation, which is ontical but not theoretical, to that initial Gegenstand Level 1, which is not ontical but purely intentional? This is the issue that Strauss is struggling with in his article Discussion, although he comes to a very different conclusion than Dooyeweerd.

Dooyeweerd has not explained everything. But Dooyeweerd has said some things very clearly, and what he does say conflicts with what Strauss says:

(1) This initial dis-stasis is the result of an intentional act, an act that functions in all the aspects. He says that Strauss does not always distinguish between this concrete act of thought and the mere analytical function of thought. Even the analytical function of thought is not the same as the analytical aspects viewed as merely intentional Gegenstände. And because the act of theoretical thought functions in all ontical aspects, it can examine any merely intentional aspect, including the intentionally split out logical aspect. And within the intentional aspects, one such abstracted aspect may be set against another, in order to distinguish them. That is what is done in Gegenstand Levels 2 and

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61 Gegenstandsrelatie, 93:

But the theoretical inter-modal synthesis rather concerns the actual logical function of thought and the non-actual, intentionally abstracted non-logical aspects of experience

62 Gegenstandsrelatie, 88:

Our actual theoretical-analytical function of thought can only reveal its actuality in typical analytically qualified acts of thought, which in their individuality-structures act in principle within all modal aspects. According to the intentional content of these acts, there is effected both a theoretical abstraction of the logical aspect as well as its inter-modal setting over against all non-logical aspects of the human experienced world. For a proper analysis of the logical aspect, it is necessary to recognize that these acts also set the abstracted non-logical aspects over against each other. We would never be able to distinguish the analogical moments in the
3. But that “setting over against” is not the same as the initial dis-stasis. And Dooyeweerd refers to that kind of opposition of the intentional logical aspect over against other aspects as already an act of both analysis and synthesis. The theoretical act has both a positive and a negative side.

(2) This initial dis-stasis is not to be explained by the logical function alone. To set the aspects ‘over-against’ [tegenoverstellen] each other is not the same as a logical antithesis. Nor can the dis-stasis be explained by the subject-object relation. There are statements that describe the initial dis-stasis in terms of logical discontinuity. But such logical discontinuity must be different than logical antithesis. Unfortunately, this distinction has been obscured in the translation of the New Critique, which often speaks of ‘antithesis’ here instead of ‘over-against.’ ‘Antithesis’ can be too easily understood as logical

structure of the logical aspect without setting the modal aspects in a theoretical-logical antithesis to each other.

63 Gegenstandsrelatie, 88:

In order to come to a corresponding epistemological concept of the logical aspect abstracted from out of its continuous coherence within cosmic time, we require a successive series of inter-modal analytical and synthetic acts of knowing.

64 Gegenstandsrelatie, 88:

That is to say that this extremely complicated process of theoretical concept formation of the logical aspect, just like that of each other aspect has both a positive as well as a negative side, both of which must observe the inter-modal meaning coherence of the logical and the non-logical aspects.

65 See also Encyclopedia, where Dooyeweerd says that that the Archimedean point for our thought may not be sought in logic (Encyclopedia, 2002 Translation, 35). And the Gegenstand-relation cannot proceed from the logical aspect alone:

This synthetic abstraction, this sub-traction, cannot be brought about by our logical function of consciousness itself. For as a subjective meaning-side of temporal reality, the logical function is itself within time. (Encyclopedia, 1946 Edition, 12).

66 If the initial setting over-against could be done by the subject-object relation, then the deepening of the analytical function of thought could be done in naïve experience. But that is rejected by Dooyeweerd:

It is impossible to explain this by the subject-object relation; this is evident from the fact that the subject-object relation as such has nothing to do with this activity of splitting apart and setting over-against. [uiteen- en tegenoverstellende] (Gegenstandsrelatie, 98).
antithesis.

(3) This initial dis-stasis is by abstraction in the sense of an epoché or suspension of the continuity of cosmic time. This is a very different view of abstraction than that of Strauss, who sees abstraction as the lifting of properties from individual entities. It is also different from Husserl’s view of the epoché, as Dooyeweerd emphasizes.

(4) Even the subsequent Gegenstand Levels 2 and 3, where we direct our act of thought to specific law-spheres, are not to be explained in a mere modal-analytical sense.67

(5) The initial dis-stasis has something to do with the entry of our supratemporal selfhood into time. Strauss does not deal with this, because he does not accept the supratemporal selfhood, but only a temporal supra-modal selfhood.

It is this last distinction from Strauss that I want to explore, although I must emphasize that my comments here are only preliminary. I am trying to keep Dooyeweerd’s philosophy intact, including the above ways in which he distinguishes it from Strauss. Dooyeweerd says that the dis-stasis occurs when our supratemporal selfhood moves into the temporal:

The meaning synthesis of scientific thought is first made possible when our self-consciousness, which as our selfhood is elevated above time, enters into its temporal meaning functions. This supratemporal selfhood of our human existence is the religious root of our personality, which in its individuality participates in the religious root of the human race. And as Scripture reveals to us, in Adam this root fell away from God, his Creator, but in Christ it is again directed towards God. (Encyclopedia, 1946 Edition, 12)

What does he mean? I see two possibilities:

a) That he is referring to the general nature of acts. For Dooyeweerd, all our acts come forth from out of our supratemporal selfhood, and are expressed in our temporal functions.68 They are expressed in our body, or temporal “mantle of functions.” But I

67 WdW II, 405 [not in NC] says that the directedness of deepened analysis to the prelogical spheres as its Gegenstand is a directedness that cannot be explained in a mere modal-analytic way (“steeds uitgaat van een alleen modaal-analytisch niet te verklaren actuele richting der theoretische opmerkzaamheid”).

68 All acts, including the act of thinking, proceed from out of our supratemporal selfhood (NC III, 88), and are expressed in all temporal aspects (NC II, 112). And see Dooyeweerd’s “32 Propositions on Anthropology”:

All our acts [verrichtingen] come forth out of the soul (or spirit) but they function within the enkaptically structured whole of the human body.
don’t think that Dooyeweerd is merely referring to that. For in our naïve, concrete experience, we also act. We act in three directions: knowing, willing and imagining. Those acts, too, come from out of the supratemporal, and are expressed in time. There is a difference in the act of theoretical thought. In its intentional setting itself over against a Gegenstand, which is not ontical, theoretical thought is doing something different than merely acting from out of the supratemporal Center like other acts.

b) This brings me to the second possibility. Unlike naïve experience, which is “inert” [traag], and merely “fitted into” [ingesteld] temporal reality, theoretical thought actively moves into the temporal world. What seems to be intended is a descent of our supratemporal selfhood into the temporal. The movement out of inert naïve experience is a willed, intentional act:

The ‘Gegenstand,’ which is set over against the analytical function of meaning in the still-problematic synthesis of meaning, is the product of a willed reduction [aftekking] from out of full temporal reality.

We have repeatedly noted that this over-against attitude of theoretical thought must first abstract from nothing other than the continuity of cosmic time. Therefore it appears that the basic problem of the epistemological synthesis of meaning is essentially rooted in the problem of cosmic time—that is, in the possibility of a theoretical epoché [refraining from] the temporal continuity of the cosmic coherence of meaning. (WdW II, 402-203, not in NC).

Why do we do this? Why do we leave naïve experience in order to actively enter the temporal? Dooyeweerd says that it is in order to approximate the fullness of meaning-totality. The logical law-sphere in its naïve, purely enstatic being fitted-into temporal reality cannot do this. In enstasis, logical analysis is restrictively bound to psychical-sensory perception (WdW II, 404). Approximating the fullness of meaning involves opening up the anticipatory analogies within the law-spheres. This anticipation is a bringing experience to an inner unity, an illumination from within:

Yet we can only first do this by illuminating from within [doorlichten] the givenness of naïve experience, that is, the individual thing-experience, by means of meaning-synthetic, philosophic thought, which distinguishes the meaning-sides of naïve reality in an articulated way. (Encyclopedia, 1946 edition, 28).

The quotation cited above from the 1946 Edition refers to the entry of our supratemporal self-consciousness into its temporal meaning functions. And it says that this self-
consciousness is the religious root, fallen in Adam and restored in Christ. And our original task was this same illumination from within of the inner nature of temporal reality:

Man’s task was to lead the unfolding process in the temporal cosmos in such a harmonious way, that in each law-sphere, the supratemporal religious fullness of meaning of human existence would completely shine through [doorlichte], and that in each meaning-side of reality, the fullness of meaning in its own meaning-tone would be completely reflected. (Encyclopedia, 1946 edition, 35).

As I interpret this, humanity’s original task was to descend into the temporal as a kind of Kenosis, in order to illuminate it from within in. This act was to be done out of love for temporal creation and in fulfillment of our cultural mandate. Through Christ, the New Root, we are enabled to perform this task again.

But how does that unification, or inner illumination of temporal reality take place? Many questions are raised here that must be left for further research. Here are some of the issues:

a) If humanity’s original task was to allow the fullness of meaning to illuminate temporal reality from within, and if that is also the goal of theory today, does that mean that humanity’s original task before the fall included theory? My answer at this time would be, yes, but only if theory is seen as the relating of the temporal to the supratemporal unity, bringing it into a deeper unity. In the fall, humanity fell into the very temporal diversity that it was supposed to unify.69

b) Why is it that theoretical thought opens up the analytical aspect first?70 Dooyeweerd

69 Dooyeweerd speaks of a “falling away” from our true selfhood (WdW I, 31), and the human selfhood “fell away into the temporal horizon” (NC II, 564). See my Glossary entry for ‘Fall at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Fall.html].

70 In 1931, Dooyeweerd says,

De "Gegenstand der Erkenntnis," onstaat eerst door een bewuste uiteenstelling van de systatische realiteit, door het verrichten van een analytische epoché aan de continuïteit van de kosmische tijdsorde, waardoor de a-logische, tegenovergestelde zin-structuren in logische discontinuïteit worden gefixeerd. Dat de verdieping van het systatisch, naive denken langs dezen weg van "tegenoverstelling" moet geschieden, verklaart zich uit de analytische structuur van de logische zinfunctie zelven. Slechts in logische discriminatie kan de analytische zinstructuur haar universaliteit in eigen kring openbaren! (Crisis, 102-3).
says that the analytical the aspect itself demands such an opening up? Why is it that only the analytical aspect has this tendency? No other function has this tendency, and no other sphere is set against a Gegenstand in the same way. I think that this is what led Strauss to claim that there is a “rationalistic” tendency in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. But I don’t think that it is rationalistic. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the deepening of the analytical sphere can only occur after the dis-stasis, which is not itself logical in nature, but is a result of the supratemporal selfhood entering cosmic time. See what Dooyeweerd says here:

Only now are those aspects which precede the logical law-sphere distinctly objectified in the latter. And yet this objective analytical dis-stasis is no more a creation of theoretical thought than the objective analytical systasis is a creation of pre-theoretical thought. It belongs to the objective logical aspect of the full temporal reality, and is only made manifest by theoretical analysis. Empirical reality is doubtless not given in analytical dis-stasis; the latter can only function within the continuous coherence of cosmic time. But this dis-stasis is an objective possibility in the logical aspect of

[The "Gegenstand of Knowledge" first arises through a conscious dis-stasis of the systatic reality, by setting up an analytical epoché from the continuity of the cosmic order of time. Through this the a-logical meaning structures that are set over against the logical are fixed in a logical discontinuity. The deepening of systatic, naive thought must occur by means of this "setting over-against." This is seen in the analytical structure of the logical function of meaning itself. Only in logical discrimination can the analytic meaning-structure reveal its universality in its own sphere!]

Dooyeweerd also says that the impetus for the initial setting apart is because the analytical function seeks its universality of meaning. In answer to the question why we cannot be satisfied by remaining at rest in the cosmic meaning-systasis, he says

The answer must be: because in the modal sense of analysis itself, according to its “universality in its own sphere,” the demand is given to find no rest in the mere systasis of meaning of cosmic reality. The universality in its own sphere of the logical aspect can only reveal itself in a deepening of meaning of analysis, in which the modal structures of meaning of the law spheres themselves, which are only given in the continuity of the cosmic coherence of meaning, are split apart [uiteen-gesteld, dis-stasis] in logical dis-continuity.

The logical law sphere in its mere enstatic function can never approximate the totality of meaning in its own aspect of analytical meaning. In enstasis, it only is able to analytically distinguish things and relations between things by their sensorily founded characteristics. (WdW II, 403; slightly different in NC II, 470).
realities itself.

The *epoché* which is characteristic of theoretical thought is made in deepened analysis. It functions within the logical law-sphere; but it is the theoretical meaning-synthesis that refers analysis to its “*Gegenstand*.” *(NC II, 471; WdW II, 406-407)*

Note here that the referring of analysis to its *Gegenstand* is called synthesis! This is what we have already seen before. The opposing of the logical to the non-logical is not the *dis-stasis*, but the first stage of synthesis. Not also that the *dis-stasis* is not itself the creation of theoretical thought. *Dis-stasis* belongs to the aspect itself (but not the function of thought in that aspect). The analytical function of theoretical thought only manifests [ontthuld] what lies hidden in the aspect.

c) Even if it is not rationalistic, does this view of theory have something to do with the *Logos* doctrine? I think that this is a very interesting question. Dooyeweerd did refer to *Logos* in his early writings.\(^{72}\) I don’t think that he had a rationalistic view of *Logos*, since he calls *Logos* the ‘realm of meaning’ as opposed to the logical aspect, which is only one aspect in temporal meaning. For Dooyeweerd, the *Logos* is inclusive of all meaning, and not just logical meaning. *Logos* is expressed in the logical aspect as well as other aspects. In its all-inclusive sense, *Logos* is not an aspect *(WdW I, 65)*. In “Advies over Roomsch-katholieke en Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde,”\(^{73}\) Dooyeweerd devotes 10 pages to “Kosmos en Logos.” He says that the cosmos is the whole ordered world of creation; *logos* is the realm of meaning. We can only speak about the cosmos when we have looked at the area of *Logos*. The *Logos* is cosmic in character and precedes all knowledge.

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\(^{72}\) See my discussion of the Logos doctrine in “Response to Strauss.” Dooyeweerd refers to the to the Logos in his 1928 article "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," (excepts in Verburg 113ff).

\(^{73}\) Herman Dooyeweerd: “Advies over Roomsch-katholieke en Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde,” February, 1923, cited by Verburg 48-61. In this very early article, Dooyeweerd says:

…*logos* is fitted into the cosmic order in an essential relation [wezensverband] that we do not and cannot know because our consciousness is walled up [ingemuurd] in the *logos* and can never look out above the *logos* to its cosmic coherence. We know only the essential relation within *logos*. Within the *logos* are the giving of meaning (*noesis*) to objects having meaning (*noema*) and the meaning itself (*noumenon*) as the law-like fixed meaning that precedes each individual giving of meaning.
d) If theory involves a descent of the supratemporal to the temporal, does that involve an absolutization of the temporal? I find this the hardest question. At one time I thought that it might involve a temporary absolutization of the analytical aspect. But I now believe that a descent of the supratemporal selfhood to the temporal does not necessarily involve an absolutization of the temporal. Christ’s substitution for humanity as the New Root, and Christ’s incarnation did not necessarily involve him in sin. But for humanity, the descent to the temporal within theoretical thought does involve a great temptation to absolutize. (Is it for this reason that we pray, “Lead us not into temptation?”)

Our theory results in an absolutization unless we return to the integral unity of our supratemporal selfhood. We cannot remain working with concepts in the temporal periphery, but must by our Ideas relate these concepts to the supratemporal fullness of meaning. Dooyeweerd seems to say that a false way of doing theory can have effects even when we stop doing theory. A merely “abstract technical mode of inculcation” can impair our naïve experience (NC III, 145). When we attempt to live our practical lives in the theoretical mode, we then live in an over-calculated, technical way. Theoretical concepts and abstraction can lead to a technicizing of our experience. We then live our lives as if we were still doing theory! A wrong view of theory also gives us the illusion that our selfhood is identical with our analytical function, and this gives rise to a dualistic view of human nature:

…the traditional dichotomistic conception of human nature as a composition of a material body and an immortal rational soul is doubtless connected with the misconception, that the antithetic relation in the theoretical attitude of thought answers to reality itself (NC I, 44).

But although there is temptation in the act of theoretical thought, there is also a great task to fulfill. It is a task given to us before the fall, but which we can now complete, to illuminate temporal reality from within. This does not mean to place temporal reality in relation to some fixed Platonic Ideas, but is a much more dynamic view of knowledge. Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is intended to lead us from a conceptual knowledge, which only looks back in time in retrocipation, to Idea knowledge, which ends in apophaticism and worship. Dooyeweerd confirms this in the New Critique:

In the Idea of a meaning-modal philosophical reflection oriented to our cosmonomic Idea passes through a process of successive meaning-coherences in the transcendental direction of time. The internal unrest of meaning drives it on form anticipatory sphere to anticipatory sphere, and so from one anticipatory connection to another. At last we arrive at the transcendental terminal sphere of our cosmos and reflect on the insufficiency of the modal Idea. (NC II, 284)
In other words, the theoretical Ideas of theoretical synthesis are never complete, but are always restless. Even when we reach the boundary aspect of faith, all we can do is to reflect on the insufficiency of the modal Idea.

But then Dooyeweerd goes on to say,

We then direct our glance to the transcendent meaning-totality and the Origin, in which at last our thought finds rest in its religious root.

Our theoretical thought therefore leads us to an apophatic state of wonder, beyond our conceptual knowledge. It finds rest only in God. The process of our theoretical thought is therefore itself a religious act, in which we relate and unify temporal reality, and come to a deeper recognition of God, self and cosmos. And in this we learn to relate to the cosmos from within, and not only in a mere enstatic living through, or what the 1946 Edition calls ‘be-leving’ and ‘doorleven,’ but we learn to relate the temporal world to its center. And for Dooyeweerd, the central, inner law is that of love, as is the fullness of meaning (NC I, 106; II, 152).

VI Conclusion

In his dissertation Begrip en Idee, Strauss made many critical comments about Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. Dooyeweerd responded to those criticisms in his 1975 article Gegenstandsrelatie, directed against Strauss. In 1984, nine years later (seven years after Dooyeweerd published his book on the same topic, which included an article by Strauss and Dooyeweerd’s response), Dooyeweerd published another article titled “Gegenstandsrelatie,” in which he responds to Strauss’s criticisms.

74 I am assisted in this interpretation by Baader’s view that concepts are just a ‘Durchwohnen’ [living-through] and not an ‘Inwohnen’ [living within]. Only in dynamic, organic Idea does the knower live in the known. But in mere mechanical conceptual knowledge there is only a Durchwohnen (Schriften und Aussätze, 109). And Baader says (p. 111) that what is known only from outside, is known by me not in love but only fear. Baader refers to abstraction alone as the death of the Idea (Werke I, 71). In cases of mere ‘Durchwohnen, ’

... the mover only lives through [durchwohnen] the moved; the moved is subordinate to the mover and completely incomprehended by it. There is then only a one-sided dwelling-through of the mover in the moved, and no reciprocal dwelling within [Inwohnung] or dwelling beside [Beiwohnen].” (Elementarbegriffe Über die Zeit, 27). Translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/baader/Elementar.html]

Admiration comes from love; astonishment is not true knowledge; it represents not love but fear. This is mere external knowledge, without inhabitation (Werke I, 54 s.19). See also Ramon Betanzos: Franz von Baader’s Philosophy of Love, ed. Martin M. Herman (Passagen Verlag, 1998).
after Dooyeweerd’s death), Strauss wrote his article *Discussion*, reiterating and re-arguing the points that Dooyeweerd had criticized in *Gegenstandsrelatie*.

The issues of the nature of theoretical abstraction, the *Gegenstand*-relation, the supratemporal selfhood, the place of the logical subject-relation, the irreducibility of the modal spheres were all very much in dispute between Dooyeweerd and Strauss. This conflict should not be carried into Dooyeweerd’s *Collected Works*, by making reference to Strauss’s criticisms of Dooyeweerd. On the contrary, Dooyeweerd can be interpreted in a way that respects his philosophy in an integral way.

More research is required, and there is plenty of room for discussion on these issues. But if reformational philosophy claims to be following Dooyeweerd, then it needs to honour what he himself says about the nature of theory, including the following Ideas:

(1) that theory involves the entry of our supratemporal selfhood into time, in a way that is different from the merely inert nature of naïve experience (2) that theory is merely intentional, and relies on the ontical experience disclosed in naïve experience (3) that the initial *dis-stasis* is not itself logical in nature, (4) that the act of theoretical thought functions in all of the aspects, and proceeds from out of our supratemporal selfhood, (5) that a synthesis with our supratemporal selfhood is always required, and that this is effected by our intuition, (6) that there is a temptation in theory to absolutize, (7) that the whole purpose of theory is to illuminate temporal reality from within, to show its inner and Central relation, and (8) that even our Ideas are insufficient, and must lead us from anticipatory sphere to anticipatory sphere until we end in apophatic wonder in the mysteries of our selfhood and of our Origin, God.