Did Dooyeweerd Contradict Himself?

By

J. Glenn Friesen

© 2008

Introduction

In 1975, Dooyeweerd published his last article: “”De Kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de Logische Subject-Objectrelatie.””¹ It was a sharp critique of D.F.M. Strauss’s doctoral dissertation Begrip en Idee.² In his dissertation, Strauss had attacked Dooyeweerd’s account of theoretical thought as a “Gegenstand-Relation.” Strauss argued that the Gegenstand-Relation and its related idea of an intermodal theoretical synthesis involve logical contradictions and antinomies. Dooyeweerd denied any logical contradiction in his thought, and pointed out that Strauss’s own approach involves contradictions and antinomies. He says that Strauss’s approach amounts to “logicism,” and that Strauss’s proposal does not differ from “the most current presuppositions of modern epistemology” that only darken our insight into the correct relation between pre-theoretical and theoretical thought. An English “summary” of Dooyeweerd’s article was published the next year,³ but for some reason, many of Dooyeweerd’s most serious criticisms of Strauss were not included in that summary. I have therefore translated Dooyeweerd’s entire article, and it is this full English text to which reference will be made. The page numbers correspond to the original Dutch article.⁴

⁴ Translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/Kentheoretische.htm] [“Gegenstandsrelatie”].
Nine years after Dooyeweerd’s article “Gegenstandsrelatie,” Strauss repeated the arguments from his dissertation in the article “An Analysis of the Structure of Analysis (The Gegenstand-relation in discussion).” Strauss had not been convinced by Dooyeweerd. Since Dooyeweerd had passed away in 1977, he obviously could not respond to Strauss’s re-assertion of his arguments. But since Strauss’s 1984 article repeats his earlier arguments, we can look at what Dooyeweerd said earlier in “Gegenstandsrelatie” and other writings.

The Gegenstand-relation is the basis for Dooyeweerd’s view of the nature of theory. The supposed contradiction relates to the issue of how the analytical modal aspect can itself be the subject of analysis by our analytically qualified act of thought. This supposed contradiction in the Gegenstand-relation was not discovered by Strauss. It had already been pointed out by others such as H. van Riessen and J.P.A. Mekkes.

In fact, Dooyeweerd had already anticipated this objection in 1935-36 when he first wrote De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee. Dooyeweerd there provides his reasoning why there is no contradiction or paradox in his theory. There is no contradiction when we recognize that every modal aspect—including the logical aspect—that has been set apart from the other aspects in an intentional (not ontic) relation, can be opposed to our theoretical act of thought, which (like all real acts) functions in all modal aspects.

Dooyeweerd denied ever making some of the statements that Strauss attributes to him. This is evident from Dooyeweerd’s marginal notes in his copies of Strauss’s dissertation Begrip en Idee. These notes contain exclamations like “serious misunderstanding” [ernstig misverstand], “sophistry” [sophistische redenering], “this cannot be maintained”

---


6 Herman Dooyeweerd: De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, (Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1935) [‘WdW’]. This work was revised and translated A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1997; Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1969; first published 1953) [‘NC’].
[dit is niet vol te houden], and “I never said this, either!” [Dit is door mij ook nooit beweerd!].

‘Sophistry’ can be defined as a “subtle, tricky, superficially plausible but generally fallacious method of reasoning.” As we will see, some of Strauss’s arguments may initially appear to be plausible, but they are fallacious even as to their logical form.

Although I will examine their logic, it is even more important to look at the premises of Strauss’s arguments. For if the premises are incorrect, one cannot arrive at a correct conclusion. And Strauss’s premises are incorrect. His analysis relies on a large number of misstatements and misunderstandings of what Dooyeweerd says.

Because the premises of Strauss’s arguments are incorrect, the real issues are not really logical issues. The differences between Strauss and Dooyeweerd go well beyond Dooyeweerd’s supposed logical error in one part of his philosophy; rather, the differences extend to every other major idea. We need to understand what Dooyeweerd really did or did not say, and we need to properly interpret what he said. I have already written about this in another article, but I will here analyze the issues in a more detailed way.

Strauss makes several arguments for the supposed contradiction. In some cases, his 1984 article is unclear, and so I will refer to his dissertation Begrip en Idee for clarification. I will refer in particular to pages 101 to 129 of that dissertation, where all 7 arguments can be found with slightly more detail, as well as to the English summary of the dissertation (pages 196-203).

To facilitate further discussion of my analysis of Strauss’s arguments, I will number his arguments from 1 to 7, and I will number the paragraphs of my analysis of those arguments (e.g. 1.00, 1.01 etc).

7 Marcel Verburg: Herman Dooyeweerd: Leven en werk van een Nederlands christen-wisgeer (Baarn: Ten Have, 1989), 401.
From Dooyeweerd’s article “Gegenstandsrelatie,” and from the New Critique, we can see that many statements relied on by Strauss were in fact never made by Dooyeweerd. Insofar as he relies on such misstatements, Strauss has set up a straw man. Since these errors recur in several arguments, I will also number the misunderstandings and misstatements, and deal with each of them only once. These errors make the premises in Strauss’s arguments incorrect. A separate list of these misunderstandings and misstatements is found in the Appendix.

In Section 8, I will examine the issue of logical contradictions and antinomies in a more general sense. Both Strauss and Dooyeweerd accused each other of logical contradictions and antinomies. Neither was convinced by the other’s arguments. Strauss accused Dooyeweerd of rationalism and Dooyeweerd accused Strauss of logicism. From Dooyeweerd’s point of view, the Gegenstand-relation can only be understood in relation to his Ground-motive, and that in turn can be understood only in relation to the idea of the supratemporal selfhood. Strauss’s philosophy, since it denies the supratemporal selfhood, is immanence philosophy. The failure to convince each other gives every sign of being related to differences in Ground-motives.

In Section 9, I will discuss Dooyeweerd’s views on formal logic, and the need for a Christian logic and what that might mean.

In Section 10, I will briefly look at how this conflict between Dooyeweerd and Strauss arose and what its implications may be for the future of reformational philosophy. The differences between Dooyeweerd and Strauss come from a deep divergence of views between Dooyeweerd and his brother-in-law D.H.Th. Vollenhoven. And these differences extend to almost every important issue in their respective philosophies.10

In my article “95 Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd,” have tried to set out in summary form what Dooyeweerd’s philosophy looks like when it is not interpreted in accordance with Vollenhoven’s ideas. For convenience, and in an effort to shorten this very long and detailed analysis of Strauss, I will sometimes refer to those theses for references supporting what I believe to be the correct interpretation of Dooyeweerd.

1. Strauss Argument #1: Different kinds of antithesis

1.01 This argument is found in the first three points i), ii), and iii) on pp. 40-41 of Strauss’s 1984 article, and on pages 102-104 and the first 3 points on p. 11 of Begrip en Idee.

1.02 In point i) Strauss says

   Dooyeweerd talks about an antithetical relation between the actual logical thought-function and its intentionally abstracted non-logical Gegenstand…(Strauss, 1984, 40).

1.03 Strauss here correctly distinguishes between the antithetical relation of our actual thought-function and the modal aspect that is intentionally abstracted as its Gegenstand. The Gegenstand-relation is not between two abstracted or isolated aspects.

1.04 Misstatement #1 But this point i) of Strauss Argument #1 sets up a straw man to attack. For Strauss should also add that Dooyeweerd also talks about an antithetical relation between the actual logical thought-function and its intentionally abstracted logical Gegenstand. The logical aspect can also be the Gegenstand of our act of theoretical thought. Dooyeweerd expressly says that it is possible to analyze the structure of the abstracted logical aspect just like the other abstracted aspects. Dooyeweerd does not restrict the Gegenstand-relation to the non-logical aspects!

1.05 The issue of whether the Gegenstand-relation can investigate the logical aspect itself arises time and again in Strauss’s argument. Strauss repeatedly asserts that Dooyeweerd's view of the Gegenstand-relation is “restricted” to an analysis of the non-

11 J. Glenn Friesen: “95 Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd,” Philosophia Reformata (forthcoming), online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/95Theses.html].
logical aspects, and that the *Gegenstand*-relation cannot analyze the logical aspect itself. For example:

Die formulering van die antietiese denkrelasie *beperk* die Gegenstand uitdruklik tot die nie-logiese aspekte van ons ervaringshorison wat teenoor die logiese funksie van ons reële denkakt gestel word (*Begrip en Idee*, 103).

1.06 Some other examples of this assertion of a “restriction” to the non-logical aspects can be found at *Begrip en Idee* 111, 117 fn36, and 125, and Strauss 1984, 41, 42, 44 and 54.

1.07 This idea that the *Gegenstand*-relation is restricted to the non-logical aspects and cannot investigate the logical aspect itself then forms the basis for Strauss’s assertion that Dooyeweerd’s theory of the *Gegenstand*-relation does not account for an analysis of the logical aspect itself.

1.08 Dooyeweerd already discussed this issue in 1935-36 (*WdW* II, 395-398, repeated later at *NC* II, 462-65). Dooyeweerd specifically says there that we *can* oppose the logical aspect of our real act of thought to the logical aspect. Analysis is *not* restricted to the non-logical aspects.

1.09 In the pages I have cited from the *New Critique*, Dooyeweerd asks how it is possible to subject the analytical aspect itself to theoretical analysis. He says that this is only a “seeming paradox,” and that the argument, which at first *seems* to be irrefutable, is that the analytical aspect cannot be the “*Gegenstand*” of the analytical aspect itself. But the origin of this *seeming* paradox is the *false view* that theoretical synthesis is made up of two isolated modal functions that have been made independent of one another, and the wrong supposition that the analytical aspect would have to analyze itself:

This origin [of the seeming paradox] lies in the resolution of the structure of theoretical synthesis into two isolated modal functions made independent of one another; and in the supposition that the (already abstracted) modal analytical aspect would have to analyse itself if we are to obtain theoretical knowledge of things analytical. This intrinsically antinomic supposition can only occur if one does not see that every theoretical analysis pre-supposes a cosmic systasis of meaning. The theoretically grasped modal analytical aspect which can only be analysed in a synthesis of meaning, is not, and cannot be the *actual*
analysis. In the actual analysis it is I who am operating theoretically. As a ‘Gegenstand’ of theoretical analysis the modal structure of the logical aspect is itself theoretically abstracted from the cosmic continuity of the cosmic temporal order. This structure as such is no more purely analytical than that of the other modal aspects. Even in its abstraction as a ‘Gegenstand’ of theoretical analysis it retains its cosmological character as a modal expression of the cosmic order of time. Not as an abstracted ‘Gegenstand’ of analysis, but in its actual inherence in this cosmic order, it is a transcendental condition of our analytical function of thought. Nevertheless we cannot acquire theoretical insight into this modal structure except by making it into the ‘Gegenstand’ of our analysis. (NC II, 463)

1.10 And in his last article “Gegenstandsrelatie” Dooyeweerd again confirms that he has acknowledged that the logical aspect itself can be analyzed:

It was to be expected that Strauss’s attack on my concept of the Gegenstand-relation would be focused on my acknowledgement that the logical aspect itself could be made into a “Gegenstand” of our actual logical function of thought and knowledge, in order to obtain theoretical knowledge of its modal structure. (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 87).

1.11 Strauss acknowledges that at least in some places, Dooyeweerd does allow the logical aspect to be investigated (Strauss 1984, 40). But Strauss then goes on to argue as if Dooyeweerd’s main view is that theoretical analysis is restricted to the non-logical aspects, and that the places where Dooyeweerd says the opposite are just internal contradictions in his philosophy. We shall see this in point ii) of Strauss Argument #1.

1.12 Point i) of Strauss Argument #1 continues

…and [Dooyeweerd talks] about an antithetical relation between a specific non-logical aspect x and the remaining non-logical aspects y (although in the latter case no inter-modal synthesis is possible)

1.13 No reference in the article is given for this assertion. But Begrip en Idee (p. 103) gives the reference as NC I, 39-40. It reads:

In logical analysis the aspect which is opposed to the logical is distinguished theoretically from the remaining aspects. Consequently, if we designate the opposed aspect by the symbol “x” and the remaining aspects by the symbol “y”, then “x” will also stand in an antithetic relation to “y”. (NC I, 39-40)
1.14 Note that Strauss incorrectly states what Dooyeweerd says. He makes two misstatements. **Misstatement #2**: Strauss refers to the non-logical aspect $x$ and the “remaining non-logical aspects.” But the words ‘non-logical’ are not there in the text.

1.15 Inconsistently, Strauss himself later acknowledges that when a non-logical aspect is analyzed, the “remaining aspects” include the logical aspect. In point iv) of his argument, he correctly says that in the inter-modal synthesis, the non-logical aspects are compared with all other aspects, including the logical one. He says there,

> The juridical aspect, for example, can then only be analyzed by opposing it to all the non-juridical aspects (including the logical one!) which are grasped in an inter-modal synthesis of meaning (Strauss 1984, 41).

1.16 That is the correct view, as asserted by Dooyeweerd. When in theory, we focus on a non-logical aspect $x$, the “remaining aspects” include the logical aspect, too. To understand this, we need to look at what Dooyeweerd says about what happens when we focus on a particular aspect as the *Gegenstand* of our real act of thought.

1.17 In the *Gegenstand*-relation, our real act of thought (which functions in all aspects, but is qualified by the analytical aspect), selects or concentrates on one of the intentionally (not ontically) split-apart modal aspects.

1.18 **Misunderstanding #1.** This concentration on a particular aspect is not just logical distinguishing, as Strauss later suggests (Strauss 1984, 42: “systatical or disstatical logical objectification”). Rather,

> This concentration originates from the actual direction of theoretical attention, which cannot be explained in a purely modal analytical way (*NC* II, 471).

1.19 Our theoretical concentration may focus on a non-logical or on a logical aspect. But when we try to concentrate on a single aspect, there is a *resistance* to such isolation. The isolated aspect $x$ continues to express its coherence of meaning with the remaining aspects $y$. And these remaining aspects include the abstracted logical aspect which has also been set apart by the theoretical act functioning in all aspects. When we focus on the logical aspect, it, too shows a resistance, and continues to express its coherence of meaning with the other aspects.
1.20 Dooyeweerd’s text makes this resistance clear in the following paragraphs of the text at NC I, 40:

Now we have seen, that the non-logical aspects of experience offer resistance to a logical analysis of their structure. This resistance arises from the fact that, even when theoretically abstracted, the modal structure of the non-logical aspect \( x \) which is made into a “Gegenstand” continues to express its coherence (of meaning) with the modal aspects \( y \) which have not been chosen as the field of inquiry. (NC I, 40).

1.21 In a footnote on the same page, Dooyeweerd confirms that the structure of the logical aspect can also be analyzed in the theoretical attitude. We analyze it exactly like we analyze the other aspects: by opposing it to the remaining aspects. In this case, the logical aspect is opposed to the remaining (non-logical) aspects.

1.22 Dooyeweerd confirms elsewhere that this opposition to the remaining non-logical aspects is done in order to find the analogies within the structure of the logical aspect:

In these theoretical acts we oppose the analytical aspect to all that is non-analytical, e.g., in order to grasp the modal difference between logical and arithmetical multiplicity, logical and original extensiveness, etc. (NC II, 461).

1.23 But Dooyeweerd is careful to point out that the logical aspect we are analyzing in this way is the abstracted, isolated aspect, and not the whole logical aspect of the real act of thought that is doing the analysis. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the real act of thought must be separated from the abstracted aspects. The footnote reads:

In this context, I must remark, that the modal structure of the analytical aspect itself is given as a whole and not in analyzed moments. However, in the theoretical attitude of thought we can analyze the structure of the analytical aspect; but only in its theoretical abstraction and opposition to the non-logical aspects. For the analytical aspect, like all others, expresses in its modal structure the temporal order into which the different aspects are fitted. Consequently, this structure is a unity in a multiplicity of analyzable moments. The theoretical act in which we perform this analysis is, of course, not identical with the abstracted modal structure of the logical aspect. The subjective analytical function of this concrete act remains bound to its modal structure in its temporal coherence with the other aspects. In its theoretical abstraction this modal structure has only an intentional existence in our act of thought, and can be made into the “Gegenstand” of our actual logical function. It is, consequently, not the latter which can be made a “Gegenstand”, but only the abstracted, purely intentional, modal structure of the logical function. We never arrive at a
“transcendental logical subject” which can be detached from all modal structures of time and can be sovereign and “absolute” in this sense. \((NC\ I, 40\ fn1)\).

1.24 Strauss cites this footnote at \textit{Begrip en Idee} 103-4, so he was well aware of Dooyeweerd’s position that the logical aspect is analyzed in the same way as the other aspects: by opposing it to the “remaining aspects.” So why did Strauss state in point i) of Strauss Argument #1 that the “remaining aspects” were non-logical? Why did he add the words ‘non-logical’ when they do not appear in the text?

1.25 We get some help in understanding why Strauss mistakenly added these words when we look at what he says in \textit{Begrip en Idee}. On page 103, he cites the passage from \textit{NC} I, 39 correctly:

\begin{quote}
In logical analysis the aspect which is opposed to the logical is distinguished theoretically from the remaining aspects. Consequently, if we designate the opposed aspect by the symbol “\textit{x}” and the remaining aspects by the symbol “\textit{y}”, then “\textit{x}” will also stand in an antithetic relation to “\textit{y}”. \((NC\ I, 39-40)\)
\end{quote}

1.26 \textbf{Misunderstanding #2.} Misunderstanding of the meaning of ‘remaining aspects.’ But Strauss has evidently misinterpreted the first sentence of this passage. He reads it as “the [abstracted] aspect which is opposed to the [abstracted] logical [aspect] is distinguished from the remaining [abstracted] aspects.” If that were the correct reading, then the “remaining aspects” would indeed be non-logical. However, the correct reading is this: “In logical analysis the [abstracted] aspect which is opposed to the logical [aspect of the real act of thought] is distinguished theoretically from the remaining [abstracted] aspects [including the abstracted logical aspect].”

1.27 The paragraph immediately preceding the one in question confirms that “the logical” means the aspect of our real act of thought, and not the abstracted aspect. It begins, “the non-logical aspects stand in an intentional antithesis to the logical function of thought.” Strauss confirms \textit{(Begrip en Idee 103)}, that “logical function of thought” in that paragraph means the logical aspect of our real act of thought. Why should it mean anything different in the following paragraph? We should try to read Dooyeweerd consistently, and not look for contradictions in his philosophy.
1.28 Based on the proper reading of this passage, in our theoretical thought, we focus on a specific aspect in an intentional (not ontic) way. The aspect that we have selected shows resistance to being isolated, since in reality it is fitted into \( \text{inge\textsc{t}steld} \) a continuous coherence with the other aspects. But in the intermodal synthesis, the aspects are set apart \( \text{uiteen-gesteld} \) and we compare the aspect chosen as \textit{Gegenstand} with all the remaining aspects. This is how we obtain the structure of each aspect, with its analogies (retrocipations and anticipations to the other aspects).

1.29 **Misstatement #3**: Addition of words “in the latter case no inter-modal synthesis is possible.”

Strauss’s Point i) in Strauss Argument #1 contains the following:

> …and [Dooyeweerd talks] about an antithetical relation between a specific non-logical aspect \( x \) and the remaining non-logical aspects \( y \) (although in the latter case no inter-modal synthesis is possible)

We have seen that Strauss improperly inserts the words ‘non-logical.’ But the final words ‘(although in the latter case no intermodal synthesis is possible)’ are also not in the text.

1.30 Why would Strauss add those words? It is because he believes synthesis is between the logical and a specific non-logical aspect. Based on Misunderstanding #2– that the “remaining aspects” do not include the logical aspect, he thinks that an antithetical relation here cannot involve a synthesis. But he is wrong about the nature of synthesis, too.

1.31 **Misunderstanding #3**: Strauss misunderstands the intermodal synthesis. In some places, Strauss regards the idea of intermodal synthesis as a synthesis as a “synthesis of opposed elements.” By that he means a synthesis between “the logical function of our act of thought” and “all the non-logical aspects which are supposed to be opposed [to it]” (Strauss, 1984, 38).

1.32 That view cannot be right. For one reason, Strauss is repeating the error that the \textit{Gegenstand}-relation is restricted to the non-logical aspects (Misstatement #1).
1.33 Nor is it correct that the intermodal synthesis is merely a synthesis with the logical
function of our act of thought. Dooyeweerd says that the intermodal synthesis is an act of
our supratemporal selfhood, which functions in all of the aspects.

   The intermodal synthesis of meaning is a subjective cognitive act. Its
super-individual universal validity depends on the cosmic temporal order,
which makes it possible. As an actus it presupposes the transcendent
super-temporal I-ness or selfhood which, according to the Archimedean
point of our cosmonomic Idea, shares in the religious root of the whole of
temporal reality. […] In the selfhood as the religious root of all cognitive
activity, we find its transcendent condition. (NC II, 472)

1.34 Obviously, if one denies the supratemporal selfhood, then one will also object to this
view of synthesis. And Strauss does deny the supratemporal selfhood, and he does object
to this view of synthesis. See further discussion of this point under Argument #5
(intuition).

1.35 Strauss considers the possibility that the intermodal synthesis involves a synthesis of
two abstracted aspects. Strauss rejects that on the basis of his changed meaning for
logical objectification (discussed below under Argument 4). Strauss says that, based on
his view, “it is clear that two distatically [dis-statically?] objectified abstractions cannot
be synthesized by our analytical activity” (Strauss 1984, 43 and again at 48).

1.36 We know from what Dooyeweerd says that the intermodal synthesis is not effected
by the abstracted logical aspect:

   Now that the modal meaning of the theoretical epochè has been examined,
the possibility of the inter-modal synthesis of meaning demands our
attention. The modal analytical aspect cannot explain this possibility,
because it has been theoretically abstracted itself. (NC II, 472)

1.37 As already seen, the intermodal synthesis is effected by an act of our full
supratemporal selfhood. All acts arise from out of our supratemporal selfhood (See
references in my Thesis 81).

1.38 But even if it is not effected by an abstracted modal aspect, the intermodal synthesis
includes a synthesis of all the modes that have been separated or split apart in the
theoretical dis-stasis or setting apart: the logical modes as well as the non-logical. This is
why we can compare each aspect to the “remaining aspects” in the intermodal synthesis.
By the intermodal synthesis, we are able to see how these remaining aspects express
themselves in the aspect being analyzed. That is how we find analogies (retrocipations and anticipations) to the remaining aspects in the aspect being analyzed.

1.39 Misunderstanding #4: Strauss misunderstands the nature of the “opposition” or “antithesis” in the intermodal synthesis. Strauss’s Point i) contains the following:

…and [Dooyeweerd talks] about an antithetical relation between a specific non-logical aspect x and the remaining non-logical aspects y (although in the latter case no inter-modal synthesis is possible).

1.40 Strauss correctly says that this antithesis between the aspects when they are compared in the intermodal synthesis is different from the antithesis in point i) where the full act of our thought is opposed to a Gegenstand on which it focuses. Strauss calls this “a second form of antithesis” (*Begrip en Idee*, 103).

1.41 Strauss makes a further distinction when he refers to the antithesis between the abstracted logical aspect and the remaining aspects. He calls this a “broader” sense of the second form of antithesis (*Begrip en Idee* 104). Strauss believes that this is a modification of the second form of antithesis. He believes this because he (incorrectly) believes that the unmodified second form of antithesis excludes the logical aspect. We have seen in paragraphs 1.18 to 1.21 above that this is not so. Therefore there is no need to modify the second form of antithesis. Whether we choose to concentrate on a logical or a non-logical aspect as our Gegenstand, that aspect will stand in the same intermodal “antithesis” where it is compared with the “remaining aspects.”

1.42 I agree that it is confusing to speak of even two kinds of “antithesis.” Part of the problem is the English translation. In English, the word ‘antithesis’ has too much of a logical connotation.

1.43 The word translated in English as ‘antithesis’ or ‘opposition’ is often ‘tegenovergesteld’ or “set-over-against.” That has a lesser logical connotation than ‘antithesis.’ For example, in the chapter of the *WdW* where Dooyeweerd discusses the Gegenstand, he says,

Hoe is de theoretische zin-synthesis mogelijk, waardoor het probleem van het tegenovergestelde eerst geboren wordt? (*WdW* II, 399).
1.44 If we compare this to the English equivalent at NC II, 466, we find a statement that the inter-modal synthesis of meaning “presupposes a theoretical antithesis” and “implies the primordial question: What gives rise to the problem of that which is opposed to the logical function, i.e. the ‘Gegenstand’?”

1.45 It seems to me that the translation of ‘tegenovergestelde’ as ‘antithesis’ has led to many of the problems in understanding the Gegenstand-relation.

1.46 Even the focus or concentration on a Gegenstand is not purely logical:

   This concentration originates from the actual direction of theoretical attention, which cannot be explained in a purely modal analytical way (NC II, 471).

1.47 Thus, the use of the English word ‘antithesis’ is misleading even for the Gegenstand-relation.

1.48 Even if ‘antithesis’ is suitable for the focus on the abstracted aspect as Gegenstand, it seems to me that it is not suitable for the “opposition” between the isolated aspect and the remaining aspects. The opposition in the intermodal synthesis is a comparing of one abstracted aspect to the others. The resistance to the attempted isolation of the Gegenstand demonstrates its continuity and coherence with the other aspects, and so we learn to see that there are analogies to all the other aspects in the aspect being focused on. To translate this as ‘antithesis’ is only confusing.

1.49 Pages 29 to 69 of Volume I of the New Critique were added in the English translation, and so no direct comparison can be made for the pages 39-40 that are being discussed here. It would be interesting to know what Dooyeweerd’s original manuscript says. We know that Dooyeweerd was unhappy with the translation of Volume I of the New Critique. That is why he changed translators for Volume II, and then he gave up and tried to translate Volume III himself.

1.50 In point ii) on page 41, Strauss continues to refer to Dooyeweerd’s “restriction of the Gegenstand to the non-logical aspects” which he then says is contradicted by Dooyeweerd elsewhere (Strauss 1984, 41 (ii)). So the set-up in point i), which was Misstatement #1, is now used to try to show a contradiction in Dooyeweerd. But Dooyeweerd did not restrict the Gegenstand in this way!
1.51 Why, if Strauss acknowledges that Dooyeweerd sometimes does not restrict the Gegenstand to the non-logical does he continue to say this? It is because he believes that originally Dooyeweerd did restrict it in this way and then only later acknowledged that the logical aspect could also be analyzed as a Gegenstand. Strauss asks whether this was an oversight, or whether it reflects fundamental issues that cannot be resolved (Begrip en Idee, 104).

1.52 What does Strauss mean that “originally” Dooyeweerd restricted the Gegenstand to the non-logical? Dooyeweerd certainly did not restrict this in the original version of the WdW. Already in 1935-36, he indicates that the logical aspect can be analyzed.

1.53 It is true that a footnote about the possibility of analyzing the logical aspect itself seems to have been added to NC I, 40 after the text was written. But this does not mean that the point about analyzing the logical aspect was new. The original WdW contained a section acknowledging the fact that the analytical aspect can be analyzed, and refuting this “seeming paradox” (WdW II, 395-398, discussing this “schiijn-paradox”).

1.54 Furthermore, the pages here discussed, NC I, 29-69 are all new to the English version. They do not appear in the WdW. Thus, even the passages that Strauss (incorrectly) says are restrictive are new.

1.55 Dooyeweerd does not help his defence when, in “Gegenstandsrelatie” he says:

The original formulation of this antithetical relation in the 1st and 2nd editions of A New Critique of Theoretical Thought apparently had a more limited extent insofar as it spoke only of a setting-over-against of the non-logical modal aspects to the logical function of thought. But later a correction was made in a note that even the logical aspect itself must become the “Gegenstand” of theoretical analysis, whenever we try to obtain an epistemological concept of this aspect in its modal structure. This correction, at first only mentioned in passing, was first worked out in the discussion of epistemology in Volume II. (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 87).

1.56 Dooyeweerd should have pointed out that even in the original WdW, he had stated that the logical aspect could itself be analyzed.

1.57 Furthermore, the New Critique was published in 1953. My copy of that edition contains the same footnote at NC I, 40, referring to the analysis of the structure of the analytical aspect. It seems that Dooyeweerd just took Strauss’s word that he had
originally not included a reference to an analysis of the analytical aspect itself. Perhaps
that is why Dooyeweerd uses the word “apparently.” He did not check to see whether
Strauss’s citation was correct.

1.58 So this as Misstatement #4: Strauss incorrectly says that Dooyeweerd originally said
something else, restricting analysis to the non-logical aspects.

1.59 Continuing Strauss Argument #1, Strauss then says,

iii) Relating to i) and as a consequence of ii) we must conclude that an
antithetical relation between the abstracted modal structure of the logical
aspect and the abstracted non-logical aspects is also possible.

1.60 If Strauss is merely trying to say that theoretical analysis can include an analysis of
the logical aspect, then he is correct. But he could have said that without point ii) which
is not true. And there would be no point in making the argument, since Dooyeweerd
clearly says that the logical aspect can be analyzed.

1.61 If Strauss is trying to say that the logical aspect, when analyzed and separated in the
dis-stasis, is compared to the other abstracted aspects, that is also true. But no argument
is needed to establish that. Dooyeweerd clearly says this at NC I, 40 fn1, which I have
cited, and of which Strauss was clearly aware (Begrip en Idee, 103-104).

1.62 So what is Strauss’s reason for this argument? I suggest that it is an attempt to play
on two different meanings of ‘antithetical’ (Strauss tries to make it three) and to try to
show that Dooyeweerd therefore contradicts himself and that he also speaks of a
Gegenstand-relations between abstracted aspects. We already saw this in point i), where
Strauss set the “antithetical” relation of the real act of thought next to the “antithetical”
relation within the intermodal synthesis, where one abstracted aspect is compared to the
others. But that uses terms in multivocal ways in an argument, and is therefore
fallacious.

1.63 That is how Dooyeweerd interpreted what Strauss was trying to do: to indicate that
the Gegenstand-relation was between abstracted aspects. In “Gegenstandsrelatie,”
Dooyeweerd comments on how Strauss should know that the Gegenstand-relation does
not take place between isolated and abstracted aspects. Our full act of thought functions
in all of the aspects:
It was to be expected that Strauss’s attack on my concept of the *Gegenstand*-relation would be focused on my acknowledgement that the logical aspect itself could be made into a “*Gegenstand*” of our actual logical function of thought and knowledge, in order to obtain theoretical knowledge of its modal structure. Our logical or analytical function of thought always itself acts [*fungeert*] within the logical aspect of our horizon of experience and existence. How then can this aspect stand in an *inter-modal Gegenstand*-relation to our logical function of thought? At first sight, it appears irrefutable that the epistemological relation must have an *intra-modal* logical character.

But Strauss himself knows very well, that our *actual* analytical function of thought does not function within the *theoretically abstracted* aspect of thought and experience. Our actual thought can only function in this aspect as it is *previously given* to us within the integral cosmic order of time of the *real* world of human experience, i.e. *not* as analyzed in theoretical abstraction, and in the subjective analytical splitting-apart and setting over against, but in its full *inter-modal* coherence of meaning with the other modal aspects. ("Gegenstandsrelatie," 87)

1.64 Strauss Argument #1 relies on misstatements, misunderstandings and incorrect citations. Dooyeweerd is clear. The logical aspect can also be a *Gegenstand* of theoretical thought. There is no restriction to the non-logical. Any aspect (whether logical or non-logical) will then be compared to the others in the intermodal synthesis.

1.65 Even in his own proposal for an *intra-modal* subject-object relation, Strauss repeats the untrue statement that Dooyeweerd restricted his analysis to the non-logical aspects. He puts forward his own proposal of the subject-object relation as a way of obviating the supposed “restriction of analysis to the non-logical aspects.” (Strauss 1984, 42). And he repeats this at the bottom of the page: “No restriction to the non-logical aspects is any longer necessary.” But as we have seen, Dooyeweerd has no such restriction.

2. Strauss Argument #2: The Circularity of Inter-modal synthesis

2.01 Strauss’s next argument begins on point iv) of page 41 of the 1984 article. He repeats it on page 47. It is also found on pp. 104-105, and part of point iv) on p. 111 of *Begrip en Idee*. Strauss seems to regard it as one of his best arguments, for he repeats it twice in his article, and complains that Dooyeweerd did not address it.
2.02 This argument also contains a number of assertions which are incorrect. Strauss tries to show that what Dooyeweerd says about examining the analytical mode is contradictory. But Strauss’s own logical argument does not make logical sense. I will divide this argument into separate parts to comment.

2.03 This argument begins

Is the theoretical concept of the modal structure of the logical aspect characterized as inter-modal or as intra-modal?

2.04 Strauss concludes that it is not intra-modal. I don’t disagree, but no argument is needed for that. Dooyeweerd himself says that any theoretical concept relies on inter-modal synthesis.

2.05 But I find Strauss’s reason for rejecting an intra-modal idea very interesting: that “if it is intra-modal, then the universal validity of the theory of an inter-modal meaning-synthesis is cancelled.” If we apply this reasoning to Strauss’s own proposal to replace the intermodal Gegenstand-relation with an intra-modal subject-object relation, does he not (on his own reasoning) have a similar problem of establishing the universal validity of the modal aspects as a whole? That was Dooyeweerd’s view. See the discussion of logicism below in paragraph 8.17.


2.07 This is Strauss’s Misunderstanding #5: Strauss does not understand the nature of universal validity, but wants to interpret that in a logical sense of validity.

2.08 Strauss continues with the inter-modal option of analysis:

Usually Dooyeweerd suggests that the logical law-sphere can only be theoretically analyzed by opposing it to all non-logical aspects of reality, i.e. by means of an inter-modal synthesis with all the non-logical aspects (cf. NC II, pp. 461-2)

2.09 This statement is correct. The logical law-sphere can be examined like any other law-sphere. It is by means of the inter-modal synthesis that this opposition with the other remaining aspects is done. But bear in mind that Strauss later denies that any inter-modal synthesis is possible (Strauss 1984, 43; iv) and vii)).
2.10 Strauss continues

But then the same applies to all the non-logical aspects. The juridical aspect, for example, can then only be analyzed by opposing it to all the non-juridical aspects (including the logical one!) which are grasped in an inter-modal synthesis of meaning.

2.11 If Strauss is merely suggesting that all the aspects are compared with the other aspects in order to find their analogies, then that is of course correct. But that has nothing to do with the issue of whether or not the logical aspect can be analyzed.

2.12 Strauss concludes:

Consequently, the logical aspect cannot be analyzed in an inter-modal synthesis, if and only if it can be analyzed in one!

This is a convoluted way of trying to state a contradiction: not \( p \) if and only if \( p \).

2.13 But there seem to be missing steps to the argument (It is at best enthymematic). In formal logic, \( p \) if and only if \( q \) is sometimes stated “\( p \iff q \)” Now “\( p \iff q \)” means that \( p \) is equivalent to \( q \), and it requires bi-conditionality. In other words, it requires that we first prove that both “if \( p \) then \( q \)” and “if \( q \) then \( p \)” are true.

2.14 In this case, Strauss’s conclusion \([\neg p \iff p]\) would require the following two premises:

(A) If the logical aspect cannot be analyzed in an intermodal synthesis, then it can be analyzed in an inter-modal synthesis. \([\neg p \then p]\)

and

(B) If the logical aspect can be analyzed in an inter-modal synthesis, then it cannot be analyzed in an inter-modal synthesis. \([p \then \neg p]\)

Only those two premises could lead to the conclusion that Strauss wants to reach:

(C) The logical aspect cannot be analyzed in an inter-modal synthesis, if and only if it can be analyzed in one! \([\neg p \ifandonlyif p]\).

2.15 Neither of the premises A or B has been proved or even asserted by Strauss. The conclusion is therefore fallacious.

2.16 Even if Strauss had asserted either A or B, both premises would contain a statement that Strauss knows is not true: the statement that it is not possible to analyze the logical aspect in an inter-modal synthesis. We have already seen that Dooyeweerd says that such
an analysis of the logical aspect is possible! Furthermore, such a statement would be in conflict with what Strauss actually states: that the logical aspect can be analyzed in the inter-modal synthesis (see paragraph 2.08 above). Something is very wrong with Strauss’s argument. It just does not make sense.

2.17 Strauss says that although Dooyeweerd quoted this argument in his answer (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 99-100), Dooyeweerd did not try to counter the “explicitly stated logical contradiction” but that instead Dooyeweerd replied by stating that what Strauss had identified as an ‘untenable circle’ simply was a consequence of the transcendentalist ground-Ideas concerning the mutual coherence and irreducibility of the modal aspects.

2.18 Strauss complains:

This remark [by Dooyeweerd] is completely besides [sic] the point. What is at stake is not the mutual coherence and irreducibility of the modal aspects, but the contradictory implications of his antinomic conception of the Gegenstand-relation (Strauss, 1984, 47).

2.19 But Dooyeweerd’s comment was not beside the point. Dooyeweerd was right in seeing this argument not as an attempt to show a logical contradiction, but as an attempt to show that his reasoning is circular. A circular argument is not the same as a contradictory argument. Circularity, or a petitio principii is a formal fallacy otherwise known as “begging the question.” It is an argument, or assertion, which assumes the question it attempts to answer. So Dooyeweerd was attempting to show why this kind of circularity is permissible.

2.20 Indeed, in Begrip en Idee (105), Strauss himself characterizes this argument as circular ['n merkwaardige en onhoudbare sirkel]:

…om die logiese aspek te analiseer word ‘n inter-modale sintese met al die nie-logiese aspekte benodig sónder dat as resultaat gekom word tot ‘n inter-modale sintese met die modale struktuur van die logiese aspect self. Die juridiese aspek, as een van die nie-logiese aspek wat in ‘n inter-modale sintese gevind moet word om die analitiese aspek te analiseer, kan egter as sodanig slegs geanaliseer word via ‘n inter-modale sintese met all nie-juridiese (w.o. die logiese) aspekte (hoewel origens resulterend gekom kan word tot ‘n inter-modale sintese met die modale struktuur van die juridiese aspek). M.a.w.: om die juridiese aspek te analiseer word ‘n inter-modale sintese met die logiese aspek benodig wat origins onmoontlik geag word omdat die logiese aspek slegs via ‘n inter-modale sintese met
2.21 Dooyeweerd’s response is that the alleged vicious circle arises because of ideas that Strauss himself accepts: ideas of sphere sovereignty and universality. Yet the mutual irreducibility of the law-spheres and their mutual irreducible reciprocal meaning-coherence “are not to be separated from the transcendental idea of the root-unity of the modal aspects in the religious center of human existence.” (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 99).

2.22 Misunderstanding #6: Strauss does not understand Dooyeweerd’s proper (not vicious) circularity. There is a kind of circularity in Dooyeweerd, but it is not a vicious circle. It is a circularity of Idea and concept (although those terms must not be understood in the way that Strauss proposes to redefine them; See Misunderstanding #20 discussed below). Dooyeweerd refers to the meaning of ‘encyclopedia’ which is derived from the Greek enkyklios paideia, meaning “learning in a circle.” But it is not a vicious circle like logicism, which remains wholly within the temporal. Rather, the movement is from the supratemporal central to the temporal peripheral. (See my Thesis 92 and references there).

2.23 With respect to the theoretical analysis of the modal aspects in the inter-modal synthesis, the issue is this: in comparing the logical aspect with other aspects, we find that each of these other aspects can in turn also be analyzed and compared to find their analogies. They even have analogies back to the logical aspect. But this does not result in any logical contradiction. What this does show is the marvelous richness and interrelatedness of the modal aspects. There is no static meaning that can be contained in a concept. Instead, the full meaning of each aspect continues to unfold more and more. The more that we investigate, the more anticipations we see within each structure – analogies that anticipate the fullness of meaning that is found only in the supratemporal center where the meanings of each the aspects coincide in a radical unity (NC I, 106).

2.24 This is why Dooyeweerd can say that it is the religious concentration point that guarantees their sovereignty. “What in the totality of meaning has no meaning is the sovereignty in its own sphere in the particularity of meaning.” (WdW I, 71 and see my Thesis 16 and references).
2.25 This richness means that we can never even obtain a concept of the kernel (nuclear meaning of each aspect. We can only approximate that meaning in an Idea. (See my Theses 16 and 17 and references).

2.26 Even our Ideas are insufficient. We finally recognize their insufficiency and we rest in God our Origin. This makes our theoretical work itself a religious experience. (See my Thesis 94 and references).

2.27 Strauss’s complaint about the way that we cannot achieve conceptual certainty about the meaning of the aspects is indicative of an approach that would impoverish the richness of our theoretical experience.

3. Strauss Argument #3: Logical Identity

3.01 This argument is point 4b) on page 41 of Strauss’s 1984 article. This is another argument that he repeats twice in the article (again on p. 47). It is found at page 106 and the second part of point iv) on page 111 of Begrip en Idee.

3.02 This argument begins:

The other possibility implicit in the conception of non-logical Gegenstand-aspects, is that only non-logical states of affairs are (theoretical-) logically analyzable, i.e. identifiable and distinguishable.

3.03 In this argument, Strauss considers what happens if only non-logical states of affairs are theoretically or logically analyzable, i.e. identifiable and distinguishable.

3.04 This argument therefore assumes Misstatement #1: that the Gegenstand-relation is restricted to the non-logical aspects. Since that assumption is not true, we really do not need to analyze this argument further. But for the sake of completeness I will, since the argument is also logically fallacious.

3.05 This argument also relies on Misunderstanding #1: that the Gegenstand-relation concerns only the logical identification and distinguishing of aspects. We have already seen that that is also incorrect. This error relates to Strauss’s logicism, which I will discuss in Section 8.

3.06 This argument, Strauss Argument #3, concerns identity judgments in logic. Identity judgments are in the form “S is S.” In formal logic, such identity statements are viewed
as tautologies, where the predicate “S” adds nothing to our knowledge of “S.” The subject and predicate of the logical judgment are viewed as identical.

3.07 It is important to note that Dooyeweerd denies that any judgments are tautological or analytical in this sense. He says that formal logic believes its statements are purely logical when in fact the terms that it uses require other modal aspects. See the discussion of formal logic in Section 9 below.

3.08 Strauss continues his argument: if analysis is restricted to non-legal states of affairs, then identity judgments are possible only about non-legal states of affairs.

For example, the judgment of identity [sic]: legal is legal, is only possible due to the non-logical nature of this juridical state of affairs.

3.09 “Legal is legal” is a translation of “Recht is recht.” A more colloquial way of saying this in English would be “The law’s the law.”

3.10 Misunderstanding #7. Strauss is here confusing the analysis of states of affairs that operate in all aspects with the analysis of a modal aspect. The judgment “legal is legal” arises in relation to a legal system. That legal system may be legally qualified, but it is an individuality structure that functions in all aspects. Strauss is therefore incorrect in saying that this juridical state of affairs is “non-logical in nature.” No individuality structure is completely non-logical.

3.11 Even if “legal is legal” refers to the juridical aspect, that aspect also contains logical analogies. It is a non-logical aspect, but it is not “illogical.”

3.12 Strauss’s argument therefore relies on a view that tries to have a “pure logic” that is restricted to the analytical mode. Dooyeweerd denies that any logic can be pure in that way and criticizes Strauss’s logicism.

3.13 Even Strauss admits that the non-logical aspects are not purely non-logical, for each non-logical aspect possess in principle a logical analogy (Begrip en Idee, 106). Why is Strauss therefore advancing an argument that the use of logic in states of affairs qualified by non-logical aspects is itself non-logical? He is trying to shift the meaning of “non-logical” aspect to mean “illogical.” And a shift in the meaning of terms results in an invalid argument.
3.14 **Misunderstanding #8:** In this argument, Strauss is confusing identity judgments with self-referential statements. Self-referential statements are notorious for the paradoxes they can cause. An example is “This statement that you are presently reading is false.” If the statement is true, then it cannot be false, and if it is false, then it must mean that it is true.

3.15 Strauss is attempting a similar paradox: “This logical statement “Recht is recht” is illogical.” But the argument is sophistry because by ‘illogical’ he is referring to the fact that it occurs in a state of affairs qualified by the juridical aspect, which is a non-logical aspect, but which is not “non-logical” in the sense that Strauss needs it to mean, i.e. “illogical.”

3.16 **Misunderstanding #9.** “Recht is recht” is not just an identity judgment in the sense of a tautology. When we say, “The law’s the law,” we are not just asserting a logical tautology in the form “S is S.” Here, the predicate contains more information than the subject. We are saying that the law cannot be questioned. In other words, we are saying that we must follow the law even if, as Dickens said in his novel *Oliver Twist*, “The law is an ass.”

3.17 Another non-tautological understanding of “The law’s the law” would be in support of a positivistic understanding of law as judge-made. The expression would then mean that we cannot ask whether a law is just. Law is just whatever a judge says it is.

3.18 A similar issue would arise in respect to an ethical situation if we said, “What’s right is right.” Again, we would not be merely asserting an empty tautology. We would be emphasizing that one must do what is right—that something is the right thing to do—even if we do not want to do it. We would be emphasizing the need for moral willpower.

3.19 Based on these (wrong) assumptions, Strauss then considers what happens if we try to make an “identity judgment” about the logical itself:

> The immanent criticism applicable to this explanation is obvious: Simply consider the identity judgment: *logical is logical*. If all identification and

---

12 In *Oliver Twist*, the character Mr. Bumble says that “the law is an ass” when he is informed that “the law supposes that your wife acts under your direction.”
distinction are always directed only to non-logical realities, it stands to reason that this identity judgment also pertains to non-logical states of affairs.

3.20 Let’s disregard for the moment the important issue of whether these states of affairs are purely logical or non-logical. There is still something tricky in this premise. Note the word “also” in this argument: “also pertains to non-logical states of affairs.” Why would it apply to non-logical states of affairs? The first premise, “all identification and distinction is always directed only to non-logical realities” is ambiguous. Its proper meaning in this argument should be that identity judgments are restricted to non-logical states of affairs. That is not the same as saying that all identity judgments, including those attempted of logical states of affairs, also apply to the non-logical states of affairs. But the argument depends on this ambiguity. If identity judgments are restricted to non-logical states of affairs, then “logical is logical” cannot be asserted.

3.21 We can see the argument better when we clarify the ambiguity and put in the word ‘restricted’:

(A) All identity judgments in the logical form “S is S” are a form of logical analysis
(B) All valid logical analysis is restricted to non-logical states of affairs [false premise]
(C) Therefore all identity judgments in the logical form “S is S” must be restricted to non-logical states of affairs in order to be a valid form of logical analysis.
(D) “Legal is legal” is an identity judgment in the form of “S is S”
(E) “Legal is legal” pertains to non-logical states of affairs.
(D) Therefore “legal is legal” is a valid form of logical analysis.
(E) “Logical is logical” is an identity judgment in the form of “S is S”

From those premises, we cannot derive a conclusion that “Logical is logical” pertains to non-logical states of affairs. Strauss says, “It stands to reason that this identity judgment also pertains to non-logical states of affairs.” But it does not stand to reason. It would have to be asserted as a separate [and false] premise.

(F) “Logical is logical” pertains to non-logical states of affairs. [additional false premise and not a conclusion]

(G) Therefore “logical is logical” is a valid form of logical analysis.
(H) “Logical is logical” does not pertain to non-logical states of affairs.

(I) Therefore “logical is logical” is an invalid form of logical analysis.

Conclusion (G) depends on the additional premise (F) which is false. But if all valid logical analysis is restricted to non-logical states of affairs, the conclusion (I) would follow. We would just not be able to validly assert “Logical is logical.”

3.22 Strauss concludes

Consequently, the identity judgment: logical is logical is valid if and only if logical is non-logical. (Strauss 1984, 41, 4b))

3.23 Again, this conclusion uses “if and only if.” To support that conclusion, Strauss needs two premises:

(A) if “logical is logical” then “logical is non-logical”

(B) If “logical is non-logical” then “logical is logical”

Those premises are not asserted or proved. “Logical is logical” has not been proved to pertain to non-logical states of affairs. All that has been proved is that it may not be validly asserted. That is intuitively wrong, and so we then go back to see what is wrong with the premises.

3.24 In this argument, Strauss is seeking (by a reductio argument) for us to acknowledge that the analytical mode to be able to analyze itself. But isn’t that what he was initially objecting to in his (wrong) understanding of the Gegenstand-relation?

3.25 It would be interesting to see how Strauss would account for identity judgments on his own theory of theories. For he says that logical identity and distinguishing always depends on a given diversity. How then does he himself explain identity judgments?

3.26 Strauss complains that Dooyeweerd doesn’t say a word about this argument in “Gegenstandsrelatie.” That is not surprising, since the argument is based on a false premise (“If identification and distinction are always directed only to non-logical realities”). Dooyeweerd already showed that he disagreed with any view that assumes that states of affairs can be non-logical or that logical judgments can be purely logical. If the premises are false, why would Strauss expect Dooyeweerd (who had retired 10 years previously) to waste his time on this kind of spurious logic game? And even if Strauss’s premises are granted, Strauss’s conclusion “logical is non-logical” does not at all
logically follow. The proper conclusion is that we would not be able to make any logical identical judgments applying to the logical aspect. And that of course is not the situation.

3.27 In fact, Dooyeweerd had already an account of how we can make the identity judgment “S is S” (*NC* II, 460-61).

3.28 Dooyeweerd rejects the distinction between (purely) analytical judgments and synthetic judgments. He says that all theoretical judgments bear a synthetical character, just as without any exception they all have an analytical aspect. Even the judgment S is S can only be conceived in its analytical aspect in an inter-modal synthesis of meaning (*NC* II, 460).

3.29 Dooyeweerd distinguishes between those that have an explicit synthetical structure of meaning and those that have merely an implicit structure of meaning.

> When we direct our attention to the correct linguistic *formulation* of universal modal analytical relations in a judgment, with abstraction from any meaning-individuality, the truly synthetical meaning-structure of the judgment remains merely *implicit* for theoretical knowledge. [...] Our theoretical knowledge remains purely *formal* insofar as it comprises merely the *formulation* of the *logical relations*. (*NC* II, 460)

3.30 Thus, Dooyeweerd rejects any view that the judgment “S is S” is a tautology in the sense of a purely analytical judgment:

> not a single judgment, and not a single concept can be “purely analytical.” There is only an analytical *aspect* of a concept and a judgment, which is present in every judgment and in every concept. (*NC* II, 458).

3.31 Dooyeweerd says that in this formalized judgment, the synthesis of meaning is only explicit. All that has been implied in the judgment can only explicitly enter our consciousness by a further theoretical analysis and synthesis of meaning. (*NC* II, 461)

3.32 Dooyeweerd says that in the theoretical synthesis of meaning between the analytical aspect and the other aspects, our concern is explicit knowledge. But our focus in such theoretical logic is not the knowledge of other modal meaning-structures that are opposed to the analytical modus, but to “explicit knowledge of the analytical states of affairs as such.” (*NC* II, 461)

3.33 This explicit knowledge, obtained by the synthesis of meaning, involve the comparing of the analytical aspect to the non-analytical aspects:
Such a theoretical abstraction is indeed only possible in a theoretical analysis and intermodal synthesis of meaning. In these theoretical acts we oppose the analytical aspect to all that is non-analytical, e.g., in order to grasp the modal difference between logical and arithmetical multiplicity, logical and original extensiveness, etc. (NC II, 461).

3.34 This inter-modal synthesis, whereby the analytical aspect is compared to the others in order to find these analogies, is the only true meaning that can be given to “abstraction from any Gegenstand.” The incorrect view of abstracting from any Gegenstand is Husserl’s view of logic, which was discussed a few pages earlier (NC II, 451). Husserl was incorrect in viewing analytical judgments as completely formalized propositions.

4. Strauss Argument #4: Logical Objectification

4.01 This argument is found at pp. 41 v), 47-8, 51 and 54-5 of the 1984 article, and at pp. 106-9 and 111 v) of Begrip en Idee.

4.02 The argument is summarized on p. 41 v) of Strauss’s 1984 article:

The sharp distinction which Dooyeweerd upholds [between?] the Gegenstand-relation and the logical subject-object relation is contradicted by himself where he states that the pre-and post-logical aspects of reality can be logically objectified. (cf. NC, II, 390, 472) (Strauss 1984, 42).

4.03 Misunderstanding #10: Strauss misunderstands the nature of logical objectification in the subject-object relation. We know what Strauss means by ‘logical objectification.’ He means “an act of identification and distinguishing (i.e. an act of abstraction or analysis). In particular, he thinks logical objectification can identify the logical modality and distinguish it from other modalities. (Strauss 1984, 54).

4.04 But that is not what Dooyeweerd means by ‘logical objectification.’ According to Dooyeweerd, to logically objectify an aspect within the subject-object relation means that an earlier modality is objectified in a later one. (See my Thesis 24 and references). For example, the pre-logical aspects are objectified in the logical aspect in our naïve concepts (NC II, 390).
4.05 This idea of an earlier modality being objectified in a later modality relates to Dooyeweerd’s idea that the modal aspects are given in a temporal order of succession of before and after, or earlier and later. And this temporal order is also expressed in the internal modal structure of every aspect (See my Theses 15 and 24, and references).

4.06 Vollenhoven denied this idea of an order of temporal succession of the aspects. And Vollenhoven therefore also denied that the temporal succession is expressed within the modal structure of every aspect. For Vollenhoven, the pre- and post-logical appears are only a logical notion of the “earlier” aspects being included in the “later” aspects. (See “Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven”).

4.07 And Vollenhoven regards the subject-object relation as a relation between two things, or a person and a thing, and not as a relation within a modality. (See “Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven”).

4.08 In his analysis of the subject-object relation, Strauss makes no reference to temporally earlier and later aspects. He follows Vollenhoven’s views of the subject-object relation. In Section 11 we shall see how this came about.

4.09 Strauss is therefore redefining the subject-object relation in Vollenhoven’s terms. He is free to redefine terms in this way, but then he is not giving a critique of Dooyeweerd’s meaning of the subject-object relation.

4.10 Because Strauss does not share Dooyeweerd’s view of the modalities being given in an order of time, he does not understand Dooyeweerd’s idea of logical objectification.

4.11 Dooyeweerd emphasizes that we must not confuse the modal object with the ‘Gegenstand’ of theoretical thought (WdW I, 50; NC I, 86).

4.12 Misunderstanding #11. But Strauss is attempting to do just that—to confuse the modal object with the ‘Gegenstand’ of theoretical thought.

4.13 Because Strauss confuses object and Gegenstand, he thinks that the analytical subject-object relation can examine the analytical modal aspect itself.

4.14 But Dooyeweerd is clear that the subject-object relation, the logical modality cannot be both subject and object:
An object in a modal functional sense is always an object to a modal subject-function coordinated with it within the same law-sphere. The modal subject-function, insofar as it is the transcendental correlate of the modal object, can no more be objectified in the same modal aspect than it is possible of the modal object-function to be a subject within the same modal sphere. (NC II, 370).

4.15 I suggest that it is this statement that leads Strauss to make the curious Argument #3 that we just analyzed, where he asks whether we can logically analyze states of affairs. But Strauss is confusing the theoretical analysis of states of affairs with what Dooyeweerd means by the “subject-object relation.”

4.16 Strauss refers to NC II, 390 in support of his view of logical objectification. Strauss refers to Dooyeweerd’s idea of naïve concept formation, where Dooyeweerd says that the pre-logical aspects of reality must primarily be objectified by logical thought.13

4.17 Strauss understands Dooyeweerd as saying that only the pre-logical analogies are objectified, but that the pre-logical analogies themselves cannot be objectified (Begrip en Idee 107). What Strauss should have said is that the pre-logical aspects are objectified in the logical aspect of our act of thought (as logical retrocipations), but that the pre-logical aspects are not themselves distinguished or identified as such.

4.18 Referring still to NC II, 390, Strauss asks whether this means that the pre-logical aspects themselves are objectified in this way or whether it is only the retrocipations of these aspects in the logical aspect that are so objectified (Begrip en Idee 107).

4.19 Misunderstanding #12: Misunderstanding that the modal aspects exist separately from each other in reality. By framing his question in this way, Strauss supposes that the pre-logical aspects exist separately in our pre-theoretical experience, and that they are separately identified. This is not the case. No aspect exists separately in reality.

13 On p. 51 of the 1984 article, Strauss misquotes the same citation as saying that the pre-logical aspects must primarily be objectified by “theoretical thought.” The actual passage reads “logical thought.” So for the purposes of this argument, I will assume that it refers to naïve concept formation.
4.20 The splitting apart of the aspects in theoretical dis-stasis is an *intentional* theoretical act. By ‘intentional’¹⁴ Dooyeweerd means that this splitting apart does not correspond to an ontical situation.

4.21 By ‘ontical’ Dooyeweerd means that which is grounded in the order of reality itself, and not in our theory about reality (Thesis 49 and references).

4.22 In reality, the aspects do not exist as separate and apart from the other aspects. It is only in the artificial, intentional theoretical attitude that they are separated. This what Dooyeweerd means when he tells Strauss that we must not confuse the ontical with the epistemological (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 91). Epistemological questions are theoretical, and must not be confused with the ontical situation that we know in pre-theoretical experience.

4.23 This is why Dooyeweerd says,

I must first point out that in the preliminary description of the theoretical *Gegenstand*-relation, we must sharply distinguish it from the subject-object relation *as we meet it in the non-theoretical and what we have called ‘naïve experience,’* in which our logical function of thought is still completely “enstatically” set within the continuity of cosmic time, and in which there is still no setting apart or setting over against of the modal aspects. Here the subject-object relations have only what we may call an “ontical” character—that is, they belong to the *integral temporal reality* itself, as it *gives itself* within the human horizon of experience. Because of this, I have formulated the contrast between these subject-object relations and the theoretical *Gegenständlich* relations as: the former leave empirical reality in-one or intact [in-een of intact], whereas the latter *splits it apart*, and does not correspond to reality as it gives itself to our experience. (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 86, 87).

4.24 **Misunderstanding #13:** Strauss misunderstands the distinction between pre-theoretical and theoretical experience. Because of Misunderstanding #12, Strauss’s belief that aspects exist separately, he fails to understand the true nature of pre-theoretical experience and how it differs from theoretical thought.

¹⁴ For Husserl, intentionality is related to his idea of epoché, which is an attempt to get at the "things themselves." But Dooyeweerd specifically rejects Husserl’s idea of *epoché* (NC II, 73).
4.25 This is why Dooyeweerd says

Because Strauss supposes that he can reject what distinguishes the theoretical attitude of thought and experience—the inter-modal Gegenstand-relations and the necessarily related inter-modal synthesis—he blurs the fundamental difference between the ontical subject-object relations in the naïve pre-theoretical attitude of thought and experience on the one hand and the epistemological subject-object relations on the other hand. In this way it seems that he has given up a fundamental part of the transcendental critique that I developed in my four volume work, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 87).

4.26 Dooyeweerd says that this blurring shows that Strauss’s epistemology does not differ from the “most current presuppositions in modern epistemology”:

Strauss has evidently not seen that it is just this identification of the epistemological Gegenstand-relation with the subject-object relation in human knowledge that belongs to the most current presuppositions in modern epistemology, which as we have earlier seen, have darkened their insight into the correct relation of the naïve or pre-theoretical to the theoretical, scientific attitude of thought and experience. (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 97).

4.27 Strauss is aware of the distinction between ontical and theoretical, since he refers to it in Argument #5, where he argues that intuition as an actual act cannot come into contact with aspects that are merely abstracted. That argument is invalid for other reasons. But by ignoring the distinction ontical/theoretically abstracted in Argument #4, Strauss is inconsistent in his arguments.

4.28 Although Dooyeweerd’s refers to aspects in his account of the subject-object relation, this is because he is theoretically “giving an account” of the pre-theoretical subject-object relation. It is not the same as our actual naïve experience of the subject-object relation, where we do not make these distinctions of the aspects.

4.29 Naïve or pre-theoretical experience is one of a resting enstasis in the systasis of the modal aspects. ‘Systasis’ means “the factual immediacy of our integral experience of reality.” And ‘enstasis’ is the experience of our supratemporal selfhood as it relates to

15 See Thesis 2 and references for the meaning of theoretically “giving an account.”
The temporal ‘systasis’ in our body as a temporal mantle of functions (Theses 35 and 71 and references).

4.30 Theoretical thought splits apart the coherence of our experience, and distinguishes the different modes or aspects of our consciousness. Instead of our naïve experience of enstasis and systasis, we experience a dis-stasis, or a splitting apart of the modal aspects by which we first distinguish them from each other (Thesis 87 and references).

4.31 Our naïve or pre-theoretical experience is an experience of the aspects in the continuity of cosmic time. In the theoretical dis-stasis, we abstract the aspects from this continuity of time in what Dooyeweerd calls the epochè. As already noted, he does not use this term in Husserl’s sense.

4.32 We make distinctions in pre-theoretical experience. But distinction is not the same as dis-stasis of the modal aspects. And our pre-theoretical distinctions are limited to distinguishing things and events; we do not distinguish the modal aspects.

4.33 It is true that “logical objectification” occurs in pre-theoretical experience. This occurs in our naïve concepts (which are distinct from theoretical concepts). But such naive objectification does not mean that we have a concept of the modal aspects.

4.34 In pre-theoretical logical thought, we are limited to distinguishing concrete things and their relations:

In its purely enstatic function the logical law-sphere can never approach the totality of meaning in its own modality. Enstatic logical analysis is restrictively bound to sensory perception and can only analytically distinguish concrete things and their relations according to sensorily founded characteristics. (NC II, 470).

4.35 Note that this quotation confirms that the subject-object relation is a relation in pre-theoretical thought, and is “enstatic.” In this enstatic function of our thought within the analytical aspect, we cannot understand the totality of meaning of the analytical aspect “in its own modality.”

4.36 Dooyeweerd says that the theoretical concept of modal analytical meaning is itself the product of a theoretical abstraction.
The modal analytical aspect cannot explain this possibility [of the inter-modal synthesis] because it has been theoretically abstracted itself. (NC II, 473, cf. WdW II, 407).

4.37 If the modal aspects do not exist separately in our pre-theoretical experience, Strauss’s entire Argument #4 is based on an incorrect premise and is therefore invalid.

4.38 But Strauss needs Misunderstanding #12, that the modal aspects are really (ontically and not merely epistemologically) split apart. He needs it for his argument of an intra-modal analytical subject-object to replace the Gegenstand-relation.

4.39 Based on Misunderstanding #12, the assumption that the modal aspects are really split apart, Strauss will argue in Strauss Argument #6 that the aspects are already separate in our pre-theoretical experience, and that we can therefore separately identify them by naive logical objectification without any inter-modal synthesis, and that therefore no inter-modal synthesis is necessary. Because those premises are false, Strauss Argument #6 is also invalid.

4.40 Because he needs to argue that the aspects exist separately, Strauss argues against the view that modal objectification is only of analogies. He says that if objectification is only of the retrocipations, then this would mean that our naïve experience only has knowledge of the pre-logical aspects in their logical analogies and not in themselves.

4.41 Strauss says that this view of objectification of analogies is contrary to our experience where we have knowledge of actual modal relations and not just their analogies. For example, he says that we have knowledge of original space, etc.

4.42 Dooyeweerd denies that objectification is of the actual modal relations. The objectification is of the analogies. This is clear in Dooyeweerd’s discussion of perception, which is an act that involves objectification within the psychical aspect. (Objectification of aspects occurs not only in the analytical aspect, but in every aspect, including the psychical.)

4.43 Referring to the act of perception, Dooyeweerd says that it is only because of analogies that we can objectify the earlier modalities at all:

The subjective modal functions of number, space, movement, energy, and organic life can be psychologically objectified in the (objective) space of
sensory perception, because in the modal aspect of feeling we find the retrocipations (analogies) of these modal functions of reality (NC II, 373-74; WdW II, 310)

4.44 We are not objectifying the original nuclear meaning of the earlier aspects, but only insofar as they appear as analogies.

This does not mean that original meaning of number, space, movement, energy and organic life are themselves sensory perceptible. But there are objective analogies of them that refer back to these original modal functions (NC II, 373 fn4; not in WdW).

4.45 Perception is an act (NC II, 372), and like all acts, it functions in all modal aspects. And in these acts, the subject-object relation occurs in various modalities, whereby earlier aspects are objectified in the later ones.

4.46 In the act of perception, we form a psychical image in which we objectify analogies of the pre-psychical aspects of what we perceive.16

4.47 Dooyeweerd gives an example of perceiving a tree. My act of perception, as it functions in the psychical aspect, objectifies the tree's subjective physical functions in the physical aspect. The physical function is pre-psychical. The tree has subjective functions up to that level. But it has objective functions in my act of perceiving.

4.48 Within my subjective psychical function, the tree does not function as a subject, but only as an object. Thus, when I observe a tree, its subjective physical ("reality") functions are objectified within my objective psychical perceptual image (WdW I, 50; II, 401; see also NC II 370-382 regarding perception and retrocipation).

4.49 But this does not mean that in the subject-object relation we have any concept of the aspects, or even any explicit awareness of the functioning of the tree in an aspect.

4.50 For Dooyeweerd, the modal subject-object relation is indissolubly connected with the modal retrocipatory spheres of an aspect. For example, the possibility of

objectification in the modal aspect of feeling is primarily bound to the retrocipatory structure of that aspect. (See my Thesis 85 and references).

4.51 For Dooyeweerd the post-logical aspects cannot be logically objectified in the same way (NC II, 391). In “Imagination” I have indicated my understanding of this. It is only when the logical aspect is opened that we can have logical objectification in the post-logical modes. Again, this does not mean that the post-logical aspects can be distinctly known in pre-theoretical experience. Indeed, such opening or deepening is only after we have engaged in the theoretical attitude.

4.52 Strauss in fact correctly cites NC II, 469: the opening of the post-logical aspects occurs only in the inter-modal meaning-synthesis (Begrip en Idee, 108). But since he denies the inter-modal synthesis, this solution is not acceptable to Strauss.

4.53 The other passage referred to by Strauss in support of his view of logical objectification is NC II, 472. It clearly refers to the theoretical attitude. And again there is logical objectification. But in this case, the logical objectification takes the form of the idea of functions in the aspects:

In theoretical scientific thought the modal concept of function discloses the logical object-side of reality. (NC II, 471)

4.54 Thus, we theoretically obtain the logical object-side of reality when we recognize how structures function within the aspects.

4.55 Until we obtain this theoretical view of functions, our naïve experience is content to merely distinguish things whose modal aspects have not been analyzed (see paragraphs 4.34 above; NC II, 470). It is only in theoretical thought that the pre-logical law-spheres are distinctly objectified in the analytical aspect. There is therefore a difference between implicit objectification and distinct objectification when the aspects have been split apart.

4.56 But implicit objectification does not mean that the aspects have been split apart or distinguished. Empirical reality is not given to us in naïve experience in such a dis-stasis (NC II, 472).

4.57 Even things are not experienced as completely separate in our pre-theoretical experience:
In veritable naïve experience, things are not experienced as completely separate entities. This avoids both a naturalistic and atomistic interpretation of the plastic horizon of reality. By limiting my theoretical attention to a concrete natural thing [linden tree] I am actually engaged in a theoretical abstraction (NC III, 54; WdW III, 35).

4.58 The following quotation shows Strauss’s confusion with respect to the subject-object relation:

On the basis of human cosmically-intuitive selfconsciousness, it is possible (by means of systatical or distatical [dis-statical?] logical objectification) to arrive at conceptual knowledge of the cosmic meaning-diversity. Distatic logical objectification merely consists of making explicit the (systatically) implied meaning diversity. Consequently, theoretical disjunctive thought is only possible within the logical subject-object relation. (Strauss 1984, 42)

4.59 Misunderstanding #14: Strauss also speaks of the subject-object relation as isolating the universal law. For Strauss,

…concept-formation is always bound up with the universal order for, and the universal orderliness of things. This implies, as we saw, that one cannot grasp the individual side of entities in a concept. (Strauss, 1984, 37).

4.60 Strauss regards aspects in terms of universals and individuality structures as individuals specifying such universality. (Strauss 1984, 46 fn 21). That is not Dooyeweerd’s view.

4.61 Dooyeweerd rejects this view of the subject-object relation as involving the isolation of universals:

Equally confusing is the prevailing identification of objectivity and universally valid law-conformity. This is done by the customary method of contrasting what is merely individual and subjective with what is universally valid and objective. In this way the insight into the modal structure of the subject-object relation is made impossible. In all the modal law-spheres in which this relation [subject-object relation] is to be found it has a subject-side as well as a law-side. On the subject-side neither the subject nor the object can be reduced to universally valid law-conformity. On the law-side the subject-object relation functions in the sense of a rule of this relation which determines the subject- and the object-function only in general.

In the concrete actualized individuality-structure of reality, however subject and object within the same law-sphere are both individual.
[...] A modal object-function, however, has a different individuality from that of a modal subject-function. That is why in general its individuality is indifferent to that of the modal subject. An individual modal object is an object to any subject whatsoever which in the same modal aspect has the same typical relation to it. (NC II, 370-73)

4.62 Misunderstanding #15: Strauss is wrong that systatical [systatic?] objectification arrives at conceptual knowledge. Systatic logical objectification is what occurs in pre-theoretical experience. As we have seen, for Dooyeweerd this in no way results in conceptual knowledge of cosmic meaning diversity.

4.63 The source of Strauss’s mistaken belief in systatic objectification appears to be his view of logical disjunction as the basis for distinguishing the aspects.

4.64 Strauss says that theoretical thought can only make something explicit (by abstracting) that is already first implicit in our naïve concepts (Begrip en Idee, 118). But this view of abstracting is not Dooyeweerd’s view of the epoché, abstracting from the continuity of time, but rather an abstraction based on something already separately identified in pre-theoretical thought.

4.65 Strauss argues that in order to distinguish on aspect from another, we need some common denominator. This common denominator is the meaning moment that is an analogy in one aspect and the original moment in another. (Begrip en Idee, 119).

4.66 Strauss says that when we theoretically distinguish the aspects, this can only be because we have had pre-theoretical knowledge of the kernel meaning of each aspect. Strauss calls this common denominator for comparison the elementary “moment of making-explicit” [ekspliseringsmoment].

4.67 Strauss gives the example of distinguishing the juridical from the social aspect. For this he gives the example of distinguishing the juridical from the social aspects in a chair.

4.68 Misunderstanding 16: Strauss misunderstands aspects as functions. But functions are not aspects. Individuality structures such as a chair function in the aspects, but the aspects have an ontical priority. (See Theses 21 and 27 and references).

4.69 Based on this Misunderstanding #16, Strauss says we need to first abstract from the concrete individuality of the chair, since the chair cannot be the common denominator:
Om tot ‘n eksplisiete teoretiese begrip van die modale struktuur van die juridiese en sosiale aspekte te kom moet egter geabstraheer word van alle konkrete individualiteit, sodat die stoel as vergelykingsnoemer verval. (*Begrip en Idee*, 119).

4.70 But this is also dependent on Misunderstanding #12 – that the modal aspects are separate and can be separately identified.

4.71 Dooyeweerd certainly has no notion of there being a concept of the nuclear meaning of an aspect, Dooyeweerd denies that we can have any concept of the kernel of an aspect, whether that concept is naïve or theoretical. We only approximate the meaning of the nuclear meaning of an aspect in an Idea. As we shall see, this use of Idea is different from Strauss’s (Misunderstanding #20, discussed below).

4.72 Even Strauss admits that we cannot form a concept of the nuclear meaning-moment:

> Even the meaning-nucleus of an aspect (although undefinable as such) can only be approximated by means of the referential meaning-coherence of all modalities of meaning. (*Begrip en Idee* 203, English summary)

Strauss’s own argument here, relying on this idea of an elementary moment of making-explicit, is therefore inconsistent with his own views elsewhere.

4.73 Misunderstanding #17: Misunderstanding of ‘moment.’ In this idea of an elementary “moment of making-explicit”, Strauss also misunderstands ‘moment.’ For Dooyeweerd, ‘moment’ refers not to an isolated act of abstraction. A ‘moment’ is a moment in the temporal order of succession. The aspects are given in such a temporal order of succession, of before and after. The moments are therefore the retrocipations and anticipations within each modal structure.

4.74 Misunderstanding #18: the meaning of cosmic consciousness. In the quotation from Strauss cited in paragraph 4.58, Strauss refers to “cosmically-intuitive self-consciousness.” Contrary to what Strauss says, cosmically-intuitive self-consciousness does not give conceptual knowledge of the modal aspects.

4.75 Dooyeweerd says that in pre-theoretical experience, we have what he calls “cosmic consciousness” of the modal aspects “as our own.” The “as our own” refers to how the temporal functions are owned by our supratemporal selfhood; our temporal functions of
our body are not foreign to us. We could not even experience the sweetness of something if we did not know the modal aspects as our own (NC II, 478).

4.76 Strauss refers to this “as our own” and questions whether it is conscious or unconscious.

Slegs danksy die feit dat die aktuele teoretiese analise meer is as die logies-analitiese funksie waarin dit o.m. funksioneer, kan die menslike selfheid (sy hart in radikaal Bybelse sin) die ganse verskeidenheid van modale aspekte in (on-)wetende belewing as sy eie ervar.

Die menslike self-bewussyn gaan daarom hoegenaamd nie op in die logiese denkfunksie van die mens nie. (Begrip en Idee, 100)

4.77 For Dooyeweerd, cosmic consciousness is conscious. It is the relation of our supratemporal selfhood to its temporal functions as its own.

4.78 And for Dooyeweerd, cosmic consciousness is not a conceptual awareness of the different aspects. Such conceptual awareness of distinct aspects arises only in what Dooyeweerd calls “cosmological consciousness.” And cosmological consciousness is theoretical.

4.79 **Misunderstanding #19**: misunderstanding of the meaning of ‘dis-stasis.’ In the quotation from Strauss cited in paragraph 4.58, Strauss refers to “distatic [dis-static?] logical objectification.”

4.80 For Dooyeweerd, dis-stasis occurs only in theoretical experience. And it occurs in the Gegenstand-relation and not in the pre-theoretical subject-object relation.

4.81 Dooyeweerd says that the analytical function has no theoretical resistance as long as it remains inert or resting in naïve experience, merely inherent in temporal reality (NC II, 468).

4.82 This resting, inert experience of naïve experience is enstasis. It is contrasted with the dis-stasis in theoretical experience:

Naïve thought has no “opposite” to its logical function and does not perform any inter-modal theoretical synthesis, but is operative in the full temporal reality in enstasis. (NC II, 468)
4.83 Strauss makes no mention of the way that this enstasis is a resting relation. The Gegenstand-relation is an active entering into of the temporal modal functions by the supratemporal selfhood (Thesis 89 and references).

4.84 Dooyeweerd says that even in theoretical experience, the subject-object relation has nothing to do with the antithetical Gegenstand-relation:

The analytical subject-object relation also has a merely enstatic character here. Even in the theoretical attitude of thought this relation has indeed nothing to do with the antithetical Gegenstand-relation. But here [in the Gegenstand-relation] it can be opposed to non-logical subject-object relations. In addition its modal structure can be made into a ‘Gegenstand’ of analysis by abstracting it from the intermodal coherence of cosmic time in its continuity. (NC II, 468)

4.85 So Strauss’s conclusion in the quotation cited above in paragraph 4.59 “Consequently, theoretical disjunctive thought is only possible within the logical subject-object relation” does not at all follow logically from his premises, unless he is changing the meaning of Dooyeweerd’s terms. But in that case he cannot be said to be giving a critique of Dooyeweerd.

4.86 It is true that the theoretical Gegenstand-relation presupposes the logical subject-object relation. And with respect to their logical object function, all aspects function within the analytical aspect. But Strauss is wrong to say that we only come to know the structure of these aspects by logical objectification:

It cannot be doubted that the theoretical Gegenstand-relation presupposes the logical subject-object relation. For the modal aspects are given to us neither in a theoretical abstraction from out of their ontical systasis, nor as analyzed in their structural meaning-moments. They can only be object of our subjective analysis. In the transcendental critique of theoretical thought, this is expressed by saying that they have an object function within the logical aspect, that is to say that they display objective characteristics, which can be brought to light by means of subjective-logical analysis, and brought together into a concept. But are these characteristics of only a logical (analytical) character? It is beyond doubt that with respect to their logical object function they must function within the intra-modal subject-object relation. But from that it by no means follows that they themselves are of a modal-analytical nature and that we can only come to a theoretical knowledge of their characteristic structural moments by means of a logical objectivizing of the modal aspects. (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 94).
4.87 Nor does a deepened subject-object relation help to support Strauss’s views of objectification. The analytical function is deepened in its theoretical meaning (NC II, 468), but this deepening occurs as a result of the comparison that occurs with the other modal aspects in the theoretical Gegenstand-relation and in the inter-modal synthesis. That is how we expressly distinguish the aspects from one another. And that is how we learn of the anticipations, and so deepen our subject-object relation.

4.88 Dooyeweerd asks why the deepening of analysis is only accomplished in the inter-modal meaning-synthesis of thought (NC II, 469). His answer is that “conformable to the transcendental Idea of the consummation of its meaning, the logical function requires the analytical comprehension of the totality of the modal functions with their law-conformities” (NC II, 470). In other words, it is when we obtain a theoretical Idea that the opening of the analytical aspect is required.

4.89 And we cannot have the Idea, with its anticipations, without the comparison with the other aspects in the inter-modal synthesis.

4.90 **Misunderstanding #20:** Misunderstanding of ‘Idea; and ‘concept.’ Again, Strauss tries to make some changes to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. Instead of Dooyeweerd’s distinction between Idea and concept, where Idea is related to the supratemporal central totality, and concept is related to the temporal periphery (Theses 2 and 3 and references), Strauss tries to introduce a different meaning to Idea and concept (Strauss 1984, 35).

4.91 For Dooyeweerd, the Idea of analysis, like all Ideas, involve anticipations, which point to their supratemporal fulfillment where the meaning of all Ideas coincides. (Thesis 3 and references).

4.92 In the Idea of analysis, the analytical function of our real act of thought is opened. This requires the logical function to separate its own substratum and superstratum-functions, and even the analytical modus itself, which is abstracted in the inter-modal meaning-synthesis (NC II, 470). This passage makes it clear that our real act of thought also abstracts the analytical aspect itself, and that it is that abstracted analytical aspect that is compared with the remaining aspects in the inter-modal synthesis.
4.93 When the analytical function [of our actual thought] opens (or is deepened), it abstracts its “Gegenstand” from the full cosmic coherence of time (NC II, 469).

4.94 But here we must recognize that Dooyeweerd uses the term ‘Gegenstand’ in several different meanings. There are several different kinds of Gegenstände. See NC II, 469.

4.95 The deepened analytical function first makes the pre-logical law-spheres into its “Gegenstand” and concentrates on one of them in particular (that of number, space, movement, energy, organic life, or psychical feeling).

4.96 But the deepening of the logical modal aspect is not the cause of the initial Gegenstand-relation. It occurs “at the same time.” See paragraph 4.99 below.

4.97 In the initial Gegenstand-relation, the concentration on a particular aspect is not just logical distinguishing, as Strauss believes (See Misunderstanding #1). Rather,

This concentration originates from the actual direction of theoretical attention, which cannot be explained in a purely modal analytical way (NC II, 471).

4.98 This concentration on a pre-logical sphere opens its own logical anticipatory sphere (NC II, 471). For example, in the aspect of feeling, there is an opening of the anticipation logical feeling. The pre-logical spheres have a predisposition to the systematic tendency of theoretical thought (NC II, 471).

4.99 Strauss also cites the following in support:

At the same time the logical object-side of reality is deepened in the subject-object relation. It changes from an objective logical systasis, merely embedded in temporal reality, into an objective logical ‘standing apart’, the objective dis-stasis of a functional multiplicity in the analytical aspect. (NC II, 471).

What does that mean? Strauss thinks it means that the subject-object relation is the cause of the deepening, and that this deepening causes the “standing apart” of the modal aspects in the analytical aspect. But that is not what is said here. That would be making the modal aspects into objects in the subject-object relation, something that Dooyeweerd denies can be done.

4.100 Part of the problem is the mistranslation in the English. The original Dutch is:
Tegelijk verdiept zich de *logisch objectszijde* der werkelijkheid, welke wij bij de behandeling der modale subject-objectrelatie ontmoetten, van een bloot in de tijdelijke werkelijkheid *ingestelde* objectief-logische *systase* tot een objectief-logisch *uiteen-staan*, tot een *objectieve dis-stase* eener functioneele menigvuldigheid in den modalen zin der analyse. (*WdW* II, 406).

*NC II, 471* has

At the same time the logical object-side of reality is deepened in the subject-object relation.

4.101 So the logical object-side of reality is not deepened “in the subject-object relation” in the sense of “by means of the subject-object relation.” By “in the subject-object relation,” Dooyeweerd is referring to the logical object-side of reality that had been referred to in the discussion of the subject-object relation. The logical object-side of reality, which is on the object-side of the subject-object relation, is deepened, but the subject-object relation does not cause the deepening.

### 5. Strauss Argument #5: Intuition

5.01 this argument is found at pp. 41 vi) and 43 vi) of the 1984 article and at pp. 109-110 and 111 vi) of *Begrip en Idee*.

5.02 The argument is:

The actual and inter-modal nature of the intuition cannot, as Dooyeweerd assumes, establish the inter-modal meaning-synthesis between the actual logical thought-function and the abstracted non-logical aspects of the simple reason that it cannot function actually in abstraction. (Strauss, 1984, 41-42)

5.03 Note again that this argument assumes Misunderstanding #1— that it is only the abstracted non-logical aspects that are involved in the inter-modal meaning-synthesis.

5.04 Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the isolation of the aspects in dis-stasis must be more than the abstracted analytical aspect, but is based on our theoretical intuition, which is the temporal bottom layer of our actual (not abstracted) analysis:

Actual analysis exceeds the modal limits of the analytical law-sphere. If this is so, actual analysis must be something more than the modal analytical function which we can grasp as the product of a synthetic abstraction. The excess lies in that which cannot be theoretically isolated in the analytical modus. It is that temporal bottom layer of the latter by
means of which our analytical function of thought is embedded in cosmic
time itself. Through this bottom layer our thought is in continuous
temporal contact with all the other modal functions which our selfhood
can claim in time as its own. This temporal bottom layer of actual
analysis is our intuition. (NC II, 473)

5.05 And Dooyeweerd says

It is a misconception to think that actual synthetical thought is possible
without intuitive insight. The analytical law-conformity of thought must
be known intuitively, if analysis is to be possible. And it is a fortiori an
indispensable condition of scientific knowledge that we have an intuitive
insight into the “Gegenstand.” (NC II, 475)

5.06 Why does Strauss say that intuition cannot perform this function? He says that
actual intuition cannot come into contact with abstracted modal aspects, but only with the
real aspects.

5.07 As already pointed out in paragraph 4.27, this argument by Strauss is inconsistent
with his ignoring of the ontical/abstract distinction in Strauss Argument #4.

5.08 With respect to the argument that actual intuition cannot come into contact with the
abstracted aspects, Dooyeweerd points out that Strauss has failed to distinguish naïve
intuition from theoretical intuition. Naïve intuition does not operate in abstraction, but
theoretical intuition (which is founded on naïve intuition) does operate in abstraction:

The blurring of the difference in principle between the pre-theoretical and
the theoretical attitudes of thought and experience also appears clearly in
Strauss’s critique of the role that I have ascribed to theoretical intuition in
the process of the inter-modal epistemological concept formation. Strauss
thereby ignores my explicit distinction between theoretical and pre-
theoretical intuition, although it is here of fundamental importance.
Theoretical intuition can never become effective in the process of knowing
apart from the theoretical attitude of knowledge. It is necessary in order
for us to acquire a certain insight into the modal structures, after we have,
by the Gegenstand-relation, obtained an analytical view of these structures
(“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 92-3).

5.09 Naïve intuition recognizes our temporal functions in the actual (ontical) aspects as
“our own.” This is cosmic consciousness. (Thesis 5 and references).

5.10 Theoretical intuition recognizes the abstracted aspects. It relates the aspects split
apart in the theoretical dis-stasis to the unity of our transcendent selfhood, and recognizes
that it is more than these abstracted aspects. This is cosmological consciousness:
In the transcendental temporal direction of theoretical intuition, our selfhood becomes *cosmologically conscious of itself* in the temporal coherence and diversity of all its modal functions. It is human personality that operates in cognition; it is not one or more of its abstracted modal functions. In its religious root this personality transcends its temporal acts and modal functions. (*NC II*, 473)

5.11 Both naïve and theoretical intuition, rely on a relation back to our supratemporal selfhood. And I suggest that this relation to the supratemporal selfhood, which Strauss does not accept, is the reason for his refusal to accept what Dooyeweerd says.

5.12 For if the supratemporal selfhood can enstatically enter time (Thesis 89 and references), why is there any difficulty in the supratemporal selfhood making contact with and making an inter-modal synthesis of the aspects which it has itself intentionally abstracted from the continuity of cosmic time?

5.13 Dooyeweerd says that theoretical intuition is something that is related to our transcendent (i.e. genuinely supratemporal) selfhood in our to give us *insight [in-zicht]*:

The inter-modal synthesis of meaning appears thus to be possible only through the theoretical intuition. The latter is necessarily related to the transcendent selfhood. I cannot grasp the modal meaning of a law-sphere in a theoretical concept, if I lack temporal theoretical insight [in-zicht] into the aspect opposed to the analysis. My intuition moves to and fro between my deepened analysis and its “*Gegenstand*” to bring them into actual contact in the intermodal synthesis of meaning. In this process I become conscious of my theoretical freedom of thought. The actual synthesis of meaning accomplished in it can never be explained by means of the isolated functions of consciousness. Theoretical intuition is operative in deepened analysis itself, and only by its intermediary [mediation] is theoretical thought able to analyse the “*Gegenstand*” in the intermodal synthesis of meaning. In this intuition I implicitly relate the intermodal meaning-synthesis to the transcendent identity of the modal functions I experience in the religious root of my existence.

But it is only in a transcendental reflection, led by our transcendental basic Idea, that this implicit relation can be made explicit to theoretical thought. (*NC II*, 478-79).

5.14 Strauss is aware of Dooyeweerd’s distinction between pre-theoretical and theoretical intuition. He cites *NC II*, 478, that theoretical intuition, necessarily related to transcendental selfhood (*Begrip en Idee*, 101). But clearly Strauss does not accept the Idea.

5.15 Strauss redefines intuition to refer only to the subjective activity of distinguishing:
...only our subjective distinguishing activity, correlated with that which is theoretically distinguished, is embedded in the inter-modal bottom-layer of our actual intuition. (Strauss 1984, 42).

Slegs die subjektiief-onderskeidende aktiwieit, wat korrelleer met dit wat objektiief-logies onderskei word is aktueel ingebed in die inter-modale dieptelaag van die intuïsie. (Begrip en Idee, 126).

5.16 But that is not Dooyeweerd’s idea of intuition. Dooyeweerd gives far more scope to intuition. Pre-theoretical intuition relates the modal aspects to our supratemporal selfhood as its own (NC II, 479). And theoretical intuition moves to and fro between the Gegenstand and one’s deepened analysis to bring them into contact (NC II, 478). It is only by theoretical intuition that our selfhood becomes cosmologically conscious of itself (NC II, 479).

5.17 Only man can have cosmic and cosmological intuition because only man has a supratemporal selfhood:

Only his [man’s] selfhood is able to enter into the temporal cosmos by means of his intuition of time and to set apart and combine the modal aspects in theoretical thought. (NC II, 480).

5.18 Why does Strauss assume that our actual theoretical intuition cannot function in abstraction? I suggest that the reason is that, as the above quotations show (especially NC II, 479), both kinds of intuition are related to our supratemporal selfhood. And that is an Idea that Strauss rejects (See discussion below, paragraph 10.06).

5.19 For Dooyeweerd, the Gegenstand-relation involves the entering of our supratemporal selfhood into our own temporal functions (Thesis 89 and references). If that can be done, why cannot our intuition also relate to those temporal functions?

…it is by means of our intuition that the modal analytical function [of our act of thought] enters continuous cosmic time. So long as our intuition remains at rest in the foundational direction of the cosmic temporal order, the modal analytical function cannot unfold itself by deepening its meaning. Then we are not actually operating in the transcendental freedom of theoretical thought on the road to inter-modal meaning-synthesis. (NC II, 474)

5.20 The real dispute between Strauss and Dooyeweerd is the nature of human selfhood. For Strauss, man is entirely temporal, and so he cannot understand Dooyeweerd’s view of either pre-theoretical or theoretical experience.
5.21 If Strauss has only this entirely temporal view of man, then man is limited to his
temporal functions. There is no place for the idea of an intuition that moves to and fro
between man’s selfhood and the temporal functions, in either their ontical reality or their
theoretically abstracted *dis-stasis*. And Strauss then has no option but to redefine
intuition in terms of logic itself. What an impoverished view of intuition and of
humanity!

6. **Strauss Argument #6: Pre-theoretical implicit knowledge**

6.01 This argument is found at pp. 42 vii) and 46 of the 1984 article and at pp. 110 and
112 vi) of *Begrip en Idee*.

6.02 Strauss says that Dooyeweerd does not answer the question of “how it is possible to
obtain an implicit knowledge of the modal aspects in our naïve pre-theoretical experience
(by means of systatical logical objectification) *without* the need for an inter-modal
synthesis.”

6.03 In fact, Dooyeweerd does provide an answer. First, the modal aspects are *not*
explicitly set apart in naïve experience, and that is why there is no need for any inter-
modal synthesis. This is Strauss’s Misunderstanding #12. Second, dis-stasis is strictly a
theoretical activity (Strauss’s Misunderstanding #19).

6.04 We have an *implicit* knowledge of the modal aspects by systatic logical
objectification, but this does not mean that we have any knowledge of the aspects as
separated.

6.05 Dooyeweerd already discussed this in the *New Critique*. We have implicit
knowledge of the modal aspects in relation to concrete things and their relations (*NC II,
470). There is no knowledge of the aspects as distinct from each other, or even of the
functions of individuality structures in the aspects. We need theoretical knowledge for
that.
6.06 Dooyeweerd says that we do not even have knowledge of the functioning of these individuality structures in our naïve experience: such knowledge of functions belongs to theoretical experience. And we must bear in mind that this objectification is different from what Strauss supposes in Misunderstanding #10.

6.07 So why does Strauss raise this issue at all? It is because of his view that logic as identifying and distinguishing. In his view, in order to distinguish the modal aspects from each other, we need to have some common denominator.

6.08 For Strauss, that common denominator is the concept of the nuclear meaning of each modal aspect, which we obtain in his idea of pre-theoretical experience.

6.09 Misunderstanding #21: misunderstanding of ‘implicit knowledge.’ For Strauss, theory just makes explicit what was known implicitly. For him, to know something ‘implicitly’ means to have an elementary concept of the nuclear meaning of the aspect. See the discussion of ‘ekspliseringsmoment’ in paragraph 4.66 above. That is not Dooyeweerd’s meaning of ‘implicit.’

6.10 And for Strauss, ‘explicitly’ means that in theory, we compare each of these elementary concepts with each other, and then sum them up. The complete explicated perspective that the analysis achieves is the sum total of elementary making-explicit moments (Begrip en Idee, 124).

6.11 This is very different from Dooyeweerd’s dynamic understanding of the way we obtain knowledge of the aspects. There is certainly no summing up of concepts known from naïve experience. We never obtain a concept of the nuclear meaning of a concept, but only an Idea, and even that Idea is never complete. Rather there is an ever-increasing knowledge of the aspects in their inter-relatedness.

6.12 So Dooyeweerd does not share the premise on which Strauss bases this argument: that we can have an elementary concept of the aspect in our naïve experience.

6.13 As mentioned in paragraph 4.72 Strauss elsewhere agrees that we cannot have a concept of the nuclear moment of a modal aspect. So his argument for an elementary concept is itself internally inconsistent.
6.14 Furthermore, Strauss’s whole view of a logical distinguishing of the aspects from each other is based on Strauss’s elevation of the logical. He is reducing cosmic diversity to logical diversity. See discussion of antinomies in Section 8.

6.15 For Dooyeweerd, the distinguishing of the aspects from each other is more than logical. And the act of distinguishing is not done in the way that Strauss suggests, by basing it on some elementary concept that we know elsewhere. The separation of the aspects is done by breaking them from their continuity in time: it is a refraining from the continuity of time, which Dooyeweerd calls the *epochè* (*NC II*, 469).

6.16 Strauss complains that Dooyeweerd did not pay any attention to the question “how is it possible to ‘oppose’ the ‘Gegenstand’ to our logical function without having knowledge of the ‘Gegenstand’ at this stage? But Dooyeweerd answered that we have such knowledge by means of our theoretical intuition, which is related to our supratemporal selfhood. This was discussed above in answer to Strauss Argument #5.

6.17 Based on his inconsistent and wrong assumption of an elementary concept of the nuclear moments, Strauss says,

\[
\text{Distatic logical objectification merely consists of making } explicit \text{ the (systatically) implied meaning-diversity. (Strauss 1984, 42).}
\]

6.18 This statement relies on Misunderstanding #19 (dis-stasis), Misunderstanding #10 (meaning of logical objectification) and Misunderstanding #21 (meaning of implied meaning diversity.).

6.19 Because of these wrong assumptions, Strauss continues:

\[
\text{Since the modal aspects are already implicitly logically objectified in our pre-theoretical thought, their theoretical abstraction and analysis are not in need of any inter-modal meaning-synthesis (Strauss 1984, 43).}
\]

6.20 But Strauss’s conclusion that no inter-modal meaning-synthesis does not follow if we accept Dooyeweerd’s view, where the implied knowledge of the aspects in pre-theoretical experience does not involve knowledge of the modal aspects as distinct. The modal aspects are not ontically distinct from each other; the distinction occurs only in theoretical thought.

7. Strauss Argument #7: Pre-theoretical and theoretical
7.01 This argument is found at pp. 42 viii) of the 1984 article and at pp. 110 and 112 vii) of *Begrip en Idee*. It has many similarities to the previous Argument #6.

7.02 This argument reads,

> When the cosmic meaning-systasis is acknowledged, the first basic problem of a critical theory of knowledge is not given with the question as to the possibility of an inter-modal meaning-synthesis, but in the question: how is it possible to arrive at an analytical awareness of the modal and structural meaning-diversity in our non-theoretical experience? (Strauss, 1984, 42)

7.03 Dooyeweerd’s answer is that we do not arrive at such an analytical awareness of modal and structural meaning-diversity in our non-theoretical experience. Strauss’s question presupposes that we do have this knowledge, but this presupposition is incorrect.

7.04 Strauss’s question is based on Misunderstanding #12—that the aspects exist ontically as separate and can be identified as such.

7.05 Perhaps that is what Strauss’s logicism would demand as a first requirement. But Dooyeweerd denies that we have any analytical awareness of the modal and structural meaning-diversity in our pre-theoretical experience. Dooyeweerd responded:

> Strauss’s remark that the transcendental critique ought to begin by asking how a pre-theoretic implicit concept of the modal aspects is possible consequently makes no sense. What we have called ‘naïve experience’ does not yet know any transcendental theoretical problematic. This problematic arises first in the theoretical attitude of thought and experience, with its characteristic *Gegenstand*-relations. The transcendental critique certainly must give an account of the mutual relation and coherence of the pre-theoretical and the theoretical attitudes of thought and experience. But Strauss’s views certainly do not fulfill this requirement. (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 92).

7.06 On p. 46 of his 1984 article, Strauss concedes the point:

> …it is a bit far-fetched to uphold that we do have implicit concepts of the modal aspects in non-theoretical experience. Of course this does not cancel the presence of an analytical awareness of modal properties which are also experienced in our non-theoretic life… (Strauss, 1984, 46)

7.07 Misunderstanding #22. Strauss misunderstands the aspects as properties of things and events that we experience. By reference to ‘modal properties’ Strauss is again trying to make innovations that will support his logicism. But the aspects are not properties.
7.08 In “Gegenstandsrelatie,” Dooyeweerd says that it is a serious error to assume that the aspects can be abstracted from things:

   There is a serious misunderstanding concerning this cardinal point even by some adherents of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, insofar as they are of the opinion that the modal structures can be discovered by an ever-continuing abstraction from the concrete experience of reality. [...] The modal structures lie at the foundation of the individuality-structures, and not the other way around. (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 90).

7.09 Strauss’s argument also rests on Misunderstanding #16—failing to distinguish aspects from functions. Aspects have an ontical priority to individuality structures. These individuality structures then function in the aspects.

7.10 Dooyeweerd makes it clear that this awareness of functions is not something we experience in pre-theoretical experience. The awareness of functions is a mark of theoretical thought!

   In theoretical scientific thought the modal concept of function discloses the logical object-side of reality. (NC II, 471)

7.11 An example of Strauss’s confusion between aspects and functions is his discussion of the theoretical distinguishing of the juridical and social aspects in a chair (Begrip en Idee, 119). But the modal aspects are not aspects of the chair! The chair functions in the aspects.

7.12 We should in fact be very wary of any view of properties of individuality structures. Elsewhere, Dooyeweerd says that Aristotelian logic is inherently related to the view that things have a substance with properties, and that it cannot be separated from such metaphysics. See discussion below in paragraph 9.23.

7.13 Misunderstanding #23: wrong view of abstraction. Strauss’s view of analysis as abstraction depends on this idea of properties. He sees analysis as the “successive distinguishing of universal features which are identified.” (Strauss 1984, 46 fn21 and 52). That does not fit with Dooyeweerd’s idea of abstraction from the continuity of time.

7.14 Strauss says that the modalities, including the logical modality can be identified as a result of such abstraction or analysis, by identification and distinguishing:

   This explains why the perspective of the disclosed logical subject-object relation does not need any restriction to the non-logical aspects: we can
identify the logical modality and distinguish it from other modalities. (Strauss 1984, 54).

7.15 That statement relies on Misstatement #1. We have seen many times that Dooyeweerd does not restrict analysis to the non-logical aspects.

7.16 In any case, and contrary to Strauss, Dooyeweerd does not agree that the modal aspects can be found by such successive abstraction. He says this in “Gegenstandsrelatie,” but it was already clear in the New Critique:

> But it is no more possible to acquire true structural concepts of individuality by means of the current procedure of gradual abstraction which neglects the cosmic order of time than we can obtain theoretical insight into the modal structures of the law-spheres in this way (NC II, 417).

7.17 Dooyeweerd and Strauss therefore do not share the same idea of abstraction. But even within Strauss’s terms, one might ask whether his solution does not suffer from the supposed logical problem he ascribes to Dooyeweerd. How can the function of logical abstraction abstract itself? Strauss needs to have some idea of reflexive logic (an idea also dismissed by Dooyeweerd17).

7.15 Strauss refers to the experience of child who says he has ‘eleven friends’, that it is ‘five o’clock’ and that he is ‘ten years’ old. Strauss says that the child most certainly has conceptual knowledge of these specified universal modal properties. (Strauss 1984, 52)

7.16 But they are not properties (Misunderstanding #22), and they are not universals (Misunderstanding #14). Nor does the child have conceptual knowledge of the modal aspects. He has knowledge of individuality structures functioning in the aspects, but not even knowledge that they function in the aspects.

7.17 Similarly, Strauss’s appeal to predications does not mean that we are aware of aspects as such:

> In our naïve experience, therefore, the modal aspects of reality are, at least implicitly, implied, for otherwise predications like: this chair is beautiful

17 See J. Glenn Friesen: “Principles and Positivization: A Response to Michael J. DeMoor (2008), online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/DeMoor.html]. I show in that article that Dooyeweerd disagreed with the idea of reflexive thought.
(esthetic characteristic); this chair is expensive (economic); this chair is heavy (physical); etc. would in a logical sense be contradictory—i.e., if the correct concept of a chair does not imply these modal characteristics in an analytical way to begin with, they cannot afterwards be predicated of the chair, except illogically. (From P is non-Q; one cannot infer : P is Q). *(Begrip en Idee* 199, English summary).

7.18 Here we need to remember that even the use of a syllogism has moved us from naïve experience to theoretical experience. And there may be inherent problems with an Aristotelian type of predicate logic. See discussion of syllogistic logic in paragraph 9.22 below.

**8. Contradictions, Antinomies and Ground-Motives**

8.01 A discussion of antinomies is found at pp. 48-49 of Strauss’s 1984 article.

8.02 Both Strauss and Dooyeweerd accuse each other of antinomies. Strauss accuses Dooyeweerd of rationalism (Strauss 1984, 45), and Dooyeweerd accuses Strauss of logicism ("Gegenstandsrelatie," 100: “insoluble genuine antinomies”).

8.03 An antinomy is a sign of a problem in the religious Ground-Motive. A wrong Ground-motive gives rise to an absolutization of one temporal aspect, which then leads to an antinomy with the remaining aspects. This sets up a polar dialectic between an absolutized aspect and the remaining aspects (Thesis 45 and references).

8.04 In Strauss’s case, Dooyeweerd says that Strauss shares the assumptions of modern epistemology. The polar dialectic is between the absolutized analytical aspect and the remaining aspects.

8.05 If there is a clash of religious Ground-motives, it is not surprising that Dooyeweerd and Strauss are unable to convince each other.

8.06 We could try applying Dooyeweerd’s transcendentical critique to Strauss’s argument, but we know that Strauss rejects that critique, too. In particular, he rejects the second transcendental problem of the meaning-totality (the supratemporal selfhood). Strauss has chosen immanence philosophy in his purely temporalized view of man. As a result, he cannot understand Dooyeweerd’s arguments regarding the role of intuition and how the *Gegenstand*-relation is related to the supratemporal selfhood.
8.07 Strauss’s criticism of Dooyeweerd as rationalistic does not bear up to scrutiny. He begins by saying:

Given the problems which I have formulated in connection with the restriction of the ‘Gegenstand’ to the non-logical aspects, I attempted to indicate the origin of this limitation. (Strauss, 1984, 44).

8.08 As we have seen, Dooyeweerd had no such limitation or restriction, and he had dealt with the issue as early as 1935-36. But this does not deter Strauss who continues with his search for the origin of the supposed error. He says,

However in his [Dooyeweerd’s] formulation of the Gegenstand-relation, he indeed identified our analytical subjectivity with the full modal structure of the logical aspect. Consequently, in theoretical thought, there is no room left for the logical object-side! Whatever is opposed to our theoretical logical subjectivity must be non-logical in nature, i.e. found outside the sphere of our subjective logical activity! (Strauss 1984, 44)

8.09 There are several errors here. **Misstatement #6:** Strauss is wrong that Dooyeweerd identifies analytical subjectivity with the full modal structure of the analytical aspect. The full modal structure of the analytical aspect includes both subject and object relations. All subject functions in that aspect are indeed taken by humans, because we act as subject in all aspects. But the object functions are there to be objectified.

8.10 Strauss’s comment continues **Misunderstanding #10,** the wrong view of logical objectification in the subject-object relation.

8.11 **Misstatement #5:** Strauss applies Dooyeweerd’s explanation of the subject-object relation to theoretical thought. Dooyeweerd of course denies that the subject-object relation is the basis for theoretical thought, even in its deepened state. Strauss wants to substitute the subject-object relation for Dooyeweerd’s Gegenstand-relation, but he is using the subject-object relation in a very different sense from Dooyeweerd. To use his own explanations of these terms as a basis for accusing Dooyeweerd of rationalism is not a valid form of argument.

8.12 Because of his misunderstanding of these issues, Strauss accuses Dooyeweerd of following Kant’s rationalism in sharing the “identification of logical subjectivity with the full modal structure of the logical aspect.” (Strauss 1984, 45). In his dissertation, Strauss compared Dooyeweerd and Kant:
This difference explains why Kant viewed the transcendental unity of our self-consciousness as a unity above all multiplicity, whereas Dooyeweerd maintained that the human self-hood transcends every aspect. At most it can be said that human logical subjectivity is identified with the modal structure of the logical aspect in an (implicitly) rationalistic fashion through the formulation of the antithetical relation. (Concept and Idea 129, cited by Strauss 1984 at 45).

8.13 In this comment, Strauss continues Misstatement #6—that Dooyeweerd identifies human logical subjectivity with the modal structure of the logical aspect. We have referred to this as Misstatement #6. What Strauss says is not true. Human logical subjectivity is an act occurring in all aspects. That is the nature of acts, which proceed from our supratemporal selfhood—they function in all aspects. The act of thought is qualified by the analytical aspect, but it still functions in the other aspects, too. And in the Gegenstand-relation, our full act of theoretical thought is directed to various aspects which are opposed to each other in the inter-modal synthesis. But this “opposition” is more than just a logical act. See Misunderstanding #4.

8.14 Dooyeweerd correctly criticizes this comparison with Kant as itself illogical:

This amounts to saying that my sharp critique of Kant’s view of the subjective-logical activity of thought as formal lawgiver for nature is applicable to myself, with this correction—that it does not apply to me! This obvious logical contradiction in his argument (which he himself does not appear to be aware of) should alert Strauss against this way of using the formal-logical method for which he has such a preference to try to show the untenability of a philosophical view that he opposes by pouring it into the form of a logical contradiction. This method of trying to show a logical contradiction is fundamentally different from the method developed in the Philosophy of the Law-Idea of laying bare the antinomies that are necessarily the result of every attempt to absolutize certain modal aspects at the cost of the remaining aspects. Strauss’s method is completely defective for the purpose of trying to show the untenability of a material philosophical conception Formal-logical contradictions in a philosophical argument can generally be corrected, without affecting the underlying material conception. Antinomies on the other hand are not of an intra-modal logical character, but of an inter-modal character. They imply a material conflict between the law-spheres of mutually irreducible modal aspects, as soon as one tries to break through this irreducibility. (Gegenstandsrelatie,” 96-97).

8.15 The “similarity” that Strauss finds between Kant and Dooyeweerd, and Strauss’s accusation that Dooyeweerd is a rationalist, assumes that the antithetical relation in the
Gegenstand-relation is based on the logical aspect in isolation. This continues Misunderstanding #4. Strauss means that Dooyeweerd has absolutized the analytical aspect. And that is certainly not Dooyeweerd’s position! He emphasizes over and over again that the act of theoretical thought is an act of the full person, expressing itself in all modalities, and not just the analytical one. And as we shall see, the fact that the Gegenstand-relation speaks of antithesis or “setting over-against” does not mean that this is a logical opposition between the aspects. Strauss cannot claim that Dooyeweerd is a rationalist (absolutizing the analytical mode) and at the same time acknowledge that Dooyeweerd has modified Kant’s position in not being a rationalist (in viewing man as more than just the analytical aspect). Strauss’s argument is inconsistent.

8.16 But Strauss’s criticism of Dooyeweerd can be turned against Strauss himself. For Strauss does assume that the distinction between the modal aspects is based on the logical aspect. This is the logicism that Dooyeweerd describes, and which results in the insoluble genuine antinomies for Strauss.

8.17 Logicism is the mistaking of logical distinctions for logical diversity:

How could the fundamental modal diversity of meaning, to which the logical function of thought necessarily remains bound, itself be of logical origin (NC I, 19)

8.18 Logicism results in a reduction and flattening (vervlakken) of cosmic diversity of the aspects into a mere logical diversity. It is true that the logical test of the principium contradictionis in the analytical aspect is dependent on the cosmological criterion. But the reverse is not true (NC II, 579).

8.19 Strauss objects that he has admitted cosmological diversity and is in no way trying to reduce other aspects to the logical. But he gives no explanation of what he means by that diversity except a logical diversity. That is the basis for his antinomy.

8.20 Furthermore, because Strauss tries to reduce theory to an entirely intra-modal subject-object relation, he has in fact reduced the other aspects to mere analogies of the logical. This is evident when we consider the following points.

8.21 Dooyeweerd says that logicism is essentially founded in the translation of the retrocipatory or the anticipatory moments in the structure of the analytical aspect into the
original modal meaning-kernels they analogically refer to (NC II, 77). And that is what Strauss does.

8.22 Strauss speaks of the modal aspects as being inter-modally opposed to each other.

Within the deepened logical subject-object relation, the theoretically distinguished modal aspects are (logically objectified) inter-modally opposed to each other. (Strauss 1984, 42)

He repeats this at the bottom of the page:

Within the disclosed [deepened] logical subject-object relation the modal aspects are distinctly (i.e. logically objectified) opposed to each other.

8.23 But the deepened logical subject-object relation is entirely intra-modal! The deepening occurs by the opening up of the analytical aspect by the Idea, which brings out the anticipations in that aspect. These anticipations refer to and approximate the supratemporal totality, where the meaning of all modal aspects coincides. The deepening of the analytical aspect occurs at the same time as the inter-modal synthesis. But it is entirely incorrect to say, as Strauss does, that the theoretically distinguished modal aspects are inter-modally opposed to each other within the subject-object relation, which can only be intra-modal!

8.24 In his logicism, Strauss is trying to use the intra-modal subject-object relation to distinguish the other aspects in an inter-modal way. Strauss believes that the distinction of the modal aspects can only be of a logical nature. But this elevates the logical aspect above the other aspects. And the attempt to place the nuclear kernels within the deepened subject-object relation can only amount to a cancellation of the difference between their nuclear meaning and their analogical meaning.

8.25 This is why Dooyeweerd says:

Because Strauss tries to interpret in an *intra-modal logical sense* the *inter-modal antithesis* that he himself maintains between the logically objectified modal aspects, he falls not only into an obvious logical contradiction, but also into insoluble genuine antinomies. In order for him to simultaneously maintain the mutual irreducibility of the theoretically abstracted modal aspects and his supposed intra-modal logical character of the epistemological antithesis, he is obliged to let their distinguished modal nuclear moments also function in an *intra-modal logical sense*, excluding any *inter-modal theoretical synthesis*. A necessary antinomy
thereby arises between the modal law-sphere of the logical aspect and that of the other aspects, whose meaning-kernels cannot be interpreted in an intra-modal logical sense without canceling their irreducibility. Strauss tries in vain to save himself from this impasse, which threatens to lead him directly in a logicistic pitfall that he himself recognizes, by emphasizing that the modal structure of the logical aspect cannot be understood in a purely logical way, because the analogical structural moments themselves of this aspect point to the inter-modal meaning-coherence. For he has not answered the question of how we can arrive at conceptual insight in these modal structures. For the pointing-to that he refers to must come to expression in the epistemological concept of the modal structures itself. And it is precisely this that has been cut off by trying to reduce the inter-modal Gegenstand-relation to the intra-modal logical subject-object relation. (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 100-101)

8.26 Strauss responded:

On pages 116-117 (cf. pp. 121-122) of my dissertation I have stressed the fact that logical objectification cannot be accounted for in intra-modal logical terms, because it is fully dependent on the more-than-logical cosmic meaning-diversity. The act of logical objectification presupposes the original (not yet logically objectified) nature of what has not yet been logically objectified (Strauss 1984, 49).

8.27 But this is also his dilemma, as pointed out by Dooyeweerd. Strauss wants to have a purely intra-modal subject-object relation and yet he also wants to account for what is more than intra-modal. How do you get knowledge of inter-modal aspecltal structures if you limit yourself to the logical mode? That is the problem that the Gegenstand-relation solves.

8.28 To try to account for inter-modal diversity within the intra-modal subject-object relation cannot be done without elevating the analytical aspect (logicism) and thereby reducing the intermodal diversity to a merely logical diversity. Strauss clearly wants to affirm such inter-modal cosmological diversity, but the problem is he has not theoretically accounted for it, or how we know of it as more than logical.

8.29 For Dooyeweerd, epistemological problems like this are always theoretical problems, and cannot be answered by the merely intra-modal logical subject-object relation. To attempt to do so will result in an overestimation or absolutization of the logical aspect. And that is what Dooyeweerd says has occurred with Strauss’s logicism.
8.30 Strauss says that all logical objectification presupposes a more-than-logical diversity, and that we rely on some theoretical total-view. Strauss refers to this as a Ground-motive and then compares this to a theoretical construct or (using Thomas Kuhn’s term) a ‘paradigm’ (Strauss 1984, 56). But this also shows Strauss’s logicism. Theoretical constructivism is even more rationalistic than Kantianism; it may be called “hyper-Kantianism.” As for paradigms, even Kuhn has stopped using the term because of the way it has been misused.

8.31 For Dooyeweerd, a Ground-motive is not a theoretical construct or paradigm. The Ground-Idea for Dooyeweerd includes ontical conditions that provide the basis for all theory. These conditions are not constructs or even presuppositions, but are the ontical conditions (voor-onderstellingen) for all constructs and presuppositions (vooronderstellingen). (Thesis 2 and references).

8.32 And this was what Dooyeweerd was trying to tell Strauss: our logic and our theory depend on such ontical conditions. And not even sphere sovereignty or sphere universality can be understood apart from “the transcendental idea of the root unity of the modal aspects in the religious center of human existence and the Idea of their divine Origin in the will of the Creator” (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 100). In other words, they rely on the transcendental ideas of supratemporal totality (the selfhood) and of the Origin.

9. Formal Logic and Christian Logic

9.01 As we have seen, Strauss complains that Dooyeweerd did not address his logical arguments. In fact, Dooyeweerd did address some of Strauss’s arguments by showing that these arguments themselves were illogical. Others were ignored because Strauss’s

---


premises were clearly wrong, and Dooyeweerd shows his disagreement with the premises. In some cases, Strauss evidently did not see the force of what Dooyeweerd was saying. For example, Strauss says,

This remark [by Dooyeweerd] is completely besides [sic] the point. What is at stake is not the mutual coherence and irreducibility of the modal aspects, but the contradictory implications of his antinomic conception of the Gegenstand-relation (Strauss, 1984, 47).

9.02 But Dooyeweerd’s response was to the point. In this case, he was responding to the alleged circularity of his arguments.

9.03 Dooyeweerd rejects the idea that criticism can be based on formal logic. And this is what Strauss tried to do in his dissertation: to criticize Dooyeweerd on the basis of supposed formal logic. Dooyeweerd says that this is a misuse of formal logic.

9.04 And by his reference to the larger philosophical ideas that are at stake, Dooyeweerd was showing that we cannot even begin to use logic without the ontical foundation of the mutual coherence and irreducibility of the modal aspects. Even those ideas cannot be apart from the root unity of the modal aspects in the religious center of human existence (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 100)

9.05 Dooyeweerd had already made the same point in the New Critique. Logic cannot be purely analytical, and it remains bound to the cosmological principles of sphere-sovereignty and sphere universality:

Even formal logic remains bound to the cosmological fundamental principles of modal sphere-sovereignty and sphere universality. At this point a truly Christian logic differs essentially from the current logical theories rooted in the immanence standpoint. This difference does not lie in unimportant corrections of traditional logic or of modern “formal” logic. (NC II, 464)

9.06 This is why Dooyeweerd says that Strauss is caught in a genuine insoluble antinomy. Strauss wants to maintain the ontical diversity of the modal aspects. But Dooyeweerd says that their sphere sovereignty and universality cannot be understood apart from their root-unity in the religious center of human existence (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 99).
9.07 And Dooyeweerd objects to Strauss’s improper [foutieve] application of formal logic in his critique of Dooyeweerd’s method (“Gegenstandsrelatie,” 100).

9.08 This does not mean that it is not important to correct logical contradictions in an argument. What it means is that Dooyeweerd thought there were much larger issues at stake here than merely alleged logical contradictions. What is at stake is the issue of logicism, and the over-valuation of the analytical in proving and disproving philosophy.

9.09 Dooyeweerd says that no logical argument can be purely analytical. The use of formal logic is itself a use of the lingual aspect to signify logical relations. Other aspects are involved as well. No judgment is tautological in the sense of purely analytical.

9.10 Within formal logic itself, there is growing awareness that it is not purely logical. I would point out that anyone who has taken a course in formal logic should be aware of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. Not all axioms can be proved within a logical system, but that some axioms must come from elsewhere.

9.11 Dooyeweerd’s criticism of formal logic goes well beyond Gödel’s incompleteness theorem.

9.12 Dooyeweerd says that the following terms used in attempts to set up a purely analytical formal logic are not purely analytical: the whole and its parts, independence and dependence, necessity and law, property, relative nature, state of affairs, relation, identity, equality, set (collection), contents of classes, number, genus and species, categories of signification, arrangement, aggregate the propositional form “there is” (NC II, 453, 459).

9.13 Dooyeweerd asks whether Christian thought can even accept a formal logic. His answer is that there is no purely analytical logic because the analytical modality is bound in a meaning-coherence with the other aspects:

   In the previous investigation it has been established that the conception of “formal logic” in the sense of a “pure analytics” destroys itself in internal antinomy. It is meaningless to speak of “purely analytical” when one has obtained an insight into the complex structure of the analytical modality in the cosmic meaning-coherence. (NC II, 464)

9.14 Dooyeweerd continues,
A truly universal formal logic ought to be oriented to the philosophic basic Idea of the Origin, the meaning-totality, and the universal cosmic meaning-coherence, when it sets out to investigate the logical relations as such. (NC II, 465)

9.15 These are Dooyeweerd’s three transcendental problems, related to the three levels of time: eternity (Origin), meaning totality (supratemporal selfhood) and cosmic meaning-coherence (cosmic time). And Strauss does not accept these ontical foundations to logic. For one thing, Strauss rejects the second problem: that of meaning-totality in the sense of a supratemporal selfhood. And as we have seen, Strauss rejects the idea of the intermodal synthesis of meaning. But that is also something that can be accomplished only by the supratemporal selfhood.

9.16 Strauss agrees with Dooyeweerd that actual analysis cannot be purely analytical (Begrip en Idee 100, 102). But in practice, Strauss tries to use logic in just this purely logical way. This is especially evident in Strauss Argument #3, where Strauss tries to prove that “logical is illogical.” As we have seen, this argument is improper because it is based on false premises. And it also involves a shift in the meaning of the terms. “Illogical” is not the same as “non-logical” in the sense of the non-logical aspects. And even those aspects have a logical analogy and so are not illogical.

9.17 And Strauss’s attempt to explain cosmological diversity in terms of logical diversity lands him in the antinomies that Dooyeweerd describes.

9.18 Dooyeweerd rejects any view that the isolated logical aspect could somehow be used reflexively, as is shown by the continued quotation:

This is the very reason why the distinction between transcendental reflexive thought and objectifying thought (identified with the attitude of natural science) is of no avail here, so long as the paradoxical basic thesis of transcendental immanence-philosophy is adhered to. This philosophy [immanence philosophy] assumes that the theoretical-logical function of thought in its abstract isolation can be actual, whereas the isolation is in reality the product of theoretical abstraction. The epistemological

---

20 See also my article: “Principles and Positivization: A Response to Michael J. DeMoor (2008), online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/DeMoor.html].
problem of the possibility of analyzing the analytical aspect itself cannot be satisfactorily solved before we have obtained an insight into the fundamental problem of epistemology, viz. the inter-modal synthesis of meaning.

9.19 With respect to the analysis of the logical aspect itself, Dooyeweerd says,

For the present only one thing can be accepted as an established truth: a true analysis of the modal analytical meaning can never have a “purely analytical” character, because such a conception leads to the obvious antinomy that has been discussed. (NC II, 463-4)

9.20 Dooyeweerd refers to Vollenhoven’s book The Necessity of a Christian Logic in relation to this search for a truly Christian logic.21 I don’t think that this means that Vollenhoven’s view is definitive, but it is an example of trying to show how logic fits within a wider viewpoint.

9.21 Dooyeweerd says that any time we engage in a logical syllogism, we are already engaged in theoretical thought.22 If we do not engage in logical syllogisms in pre-theoretical thought, then this results in a very different view of naïve concepts than Strauss is putting forward.

9.22 Furthermore, even syllogistic logic may be a problem to the extent that it relies on predicate logic. Predicates can too easily be taken as properties of things that exist as substances. Dooyeweerd’s views of individuality structures are much more dynamic, and do not involve a view that they consist of a substance and its properties. Is not such a wrong view of substance the basis for Misunderstanding #22, regarding the aspects as properties?

9.23 Dooyeweerd says that Aristotelian logic is not unrelated to Aristotle’s view of substance. And he specifically relates this to the idea of properties:

So from this it is already clear that we cannot separate Aristotelian logic from Aristotelian metaphysics. And if it is still believed that the study of


what is called ‘formal logic’ or ‘epistemology’ [denkleer] is a necessary preparation for theological studies, then this can only be explained by a scholastic encroachment in these studies, one which permeates to the deepest foundations of science. […]

It is completely superficial to want to separate “formal logic” from the whole of the philosophical train of thought in which it is included, and to wish to view it as a neutral “universally valid” teaching of thought with respect to philosophy.

In Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, the first and foundational category of being is that of substance. It determines what a thing is according to its essence [wezen], as an individual independent unity of being, to which all other categorical determinations are ascribed.

The remaining categories do not say what a thing is according to its essence, but merely concern what are called ‘accidentia,’ the properties which are carried by the “substance,” and which can never exist apart from a substance.

If one examines this whole table of categories, then it is immediately clear that they exclude in principle any insight into the modal structures of the distinguished aspects of temporal reality. It is oriented to a theoretical teaching of judgments, which views time merely as an external accidental determination of the being of “substances,” and it does not acknowledge time as the inner universal cosmic structural ordering of all temporal creatures. […] For as the Philosophy of the Law-Idea has demonstrated, these structures are not dependent on the things that function in them… 23

9.24 If Dooyeweerd criticizes Aristotle’s view of logic, is he closer to Plotinus’s view of logic? The issue is beyond the scope of this article, but take a look at Dooyeweerd's distinction between different kinds of logic:

Plotinus understood individuality fundamentally differently than Aristotle, not merely as a quantitative individualizing [verenkeling] of the universal form-type, but as the revelation of the infinite wealth of the logos in its perfection of being, as a whole.

This [idea] was undoubtedly in the line of Plato’s conception in the dialogue Sophistes, where Idea was understood not in the least as an abstract universal, but rather as a concrete fullness and totality of the form of being, which [idea] was intended to concentrically include at the same

---

time both the universal and the individual, and which was then was represented as a thinking, living and self-moving being, which in the process of *theoria* would actively work upon subjective, beholding [schouwende] thought. From the Sophists, Plotinus derived the categories by which the spiritual cosmos is more precisely defined: being, rest, movement, identity, diversity.

Platonic dialectic is fundamentally different from Aristotelian logic. Aristotelian logic understands *genus* as an abstract universal framework of the determination of being, which is enriched by the addition of the *differentia specifica* (specific characteristics) and which receives a final (no longer intelligible, because not *specific*) addition by being made individual [verenkeling] from “form” in matter. In Plato it is the other way round: the *progress of the genus* to the *species* is no addition or enrichment of content, but a transition from the whole of the Idea towards its parts: the particular *eidè* or form of being in which the parts still preserve the wealth of the whole. And in this second train of thought, the individual must also be enclosed within the supra-sensory whole of the Idea and its specific *eidè*. It can never be an addition that the *eidos*, as intelligible form of being, first receives when it is empirically realized in a material.

“Matter” adds nothing to the fullness of being of the world of Ideas. The *Ur*-image contains all true existing beings.

[...]

This was really exactly Plotinus’s opinion. He understood the individual Ideas as really separate *Ur*-forms for every individual being and thing in the sensory world, and in this he saw the ideal prototype for every empirical individuality within its universal determination of being (*Enneads. V, 7, 1 §1*).  

9.25 The nature of a truly Christian logic is beyond the scope of this article. But the quotations I have given should show that the issues of logic, formal logic, and how logic is to be used in criticism of philosophical systems are most complex. Even if Strauss’s logical arguments were valid (they are not), there are much larger issues that need to be addressed.

10. *Origins of the conflict and its implications*

---

10.01 Strauss relates an anecdote about a discussion with Dooyeweerd and Hommes in June, 1973 where he says that Dooyeweerd admitted there might be a problem (Strauss 1984, fn 14). Of course it might only indicate that Dooyeweerd needed to formulate a response, which he then did in his 1975 article “Gegenstandsrelatie.” Ultimately, we must rely on Dooyeweerd’s written philosophy. His last article “Gegenstandsrelatie” makes it clear that he did not accept Strauss’s criticisms at all.

10.02 Furthermore, Strauss’s anecdote can be countered with other anecdotes, such as my own discussion with Dooyeweerd on Wednesday, November 20, 1974. Dooyeweerd met with me for several hours in his study at his home. I asked him about the idea that theory was based on abstraction. He told me that he continued to maintain the validity of the Gegenstand-relation, despite the criticism of people like Strauss and Van Riessen.

10.03 In my analysis of Strauss’s argument, I have made frequent reference to the fact that Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven disagreed on almost every important philosophical point. This is evident from their own writings. Now I think it is fair to say that the full extent of their disagreement was not known at the time that Strauss made his criticism of Dooyeweerd. If it had been known, I doubt that Strauss would have made so many wrong assumptions in the premises of his arguments.

10.04 And here it is useful to relate another anecdote. K.A. Bril has told me about an event that occurred when both he and Strauss were philosophy students. They had a discussion about the nature of theory. Strauss asked Bril how, if the idea of the supratemporal selfhood were given up, we would be able to describe theory, since theory relies on the Gegenstand-relation. Bril replied that the solution was easy—all we need to do is to follow Vollenhoven’s view of the subject-object relation.

10.05 This discussion is very helpful in explaining how Vollenhoven’s very different ideas of theory came to be used to (mis)interpret Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. And it also shows that the basis for the differences really comes down to the nature of the selfhood. Dooyeweerd says this issue is the beginning and end of philosophical reflection (NC III, 783). I think that Strauss was initially correct in saying that without the supratemporal selfhood.

---

25 See my article, “Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven.”
selfhood, we cannot account for theory. I do not think that Bril’s suggestion to follow Vollenhoven’s idea solves the problem. Vollenhoven’s theory depends on replacing the idea of a supratemporal selfhood with a purely temporal pre-functional selfhood. Dooyeweerd explicitly rejects that idea (See NC I, 31, fn1).

10.06 And it is evident that Strauss also rejects the supratemporal selfhood. Instead of “pre-theoretical” he uses the term “supra-modal.” (Strauss 1984, 44, fn 16; Begrip en Idee, 100, “bo-modal”). Strauss has even tried to argue that Dooyeweerd gave up the idea of the supratemporal selfhood. But that is clearly incorrect, and is based on Strauss reading a remark of Dooyeweerd out of context.26

10.07 In logical terms, ‘supramodal’ is not equivalent to ‘supratemporal’ as Strauss has suggested.27 Something is supramodal if it is supratemporal. The supratemporal selfhood is supramodal, since the supratemporal realm, the aevum, includes the temporal and modal horizons. But the converse is not true. Whatever is supramodal is not necessarily supratemporal. So it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition that whatever is modal is supratemporal. The terms are not equivalent in the sense of “if and only if.”

10.08 In a separate but related question, Strauss has recently said that if we substitute a temporal supramodal selfhood for the supratemporal selfhood, everything else in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy can remain unchanged.28 But the present discussion of the issue of the Gegenstand-relation is sufficient to show that Strauss’s assertion is wrong. Everything changes.

26 See my article “Why Did Dooyeweerd want to tear out his hair?” (2006), [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/Hair.html].

27 See my references in “Dooyeweerd versus Strauss.”

28 In a Thinknet posting on March 18, 2008, Strauss asked, Is there ANY systematic insight or distinction of Dooyeweerd’s entire philosophy that needs to be changed, dependent upon whether or not the transcendent religious dimension is labeled as supratemoral, time transcending, created eternity (aevum) or just as supra-modal and supra-structural?
10.09 If we give up the supratemporal selfhood, not only does the Gegenstand-relation change, but so does our idea of intuition, naïve/theoretical experience, aspects, inter-modal synthesis, subject-object relation, the distinction between Idea and concept, and the second transcendental problem of the transcendental critique (relating to supratemporal totality).

10.10 The centrality of the Idea of the supratemporal selfhood was recognized by Willem Ouweneel, who did his doctoral dissertation on Dooyeweerd. Excerpts from that thesis were published in *Philosophia Reformata*, where Ouweneel says,

> From around 1930 onward, this view of the Supratemporality of the heart or the religious root-unity of the cosmos becomes the essential, unchangeable, and indissoluble cornerstone of his thought. The pivotal place of this view in Dooyeweerd’s thought must be emphasised over against all those who have expressed objections to this view. They suppose that it is possible to drop this idea but to maintain the “rest” of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. They fail to see that the very core of his thought—the metaphor of the prism with its law of refraction, the law of concentration, the idea of the unity, fullness and totality of the religious root, the theory of time, the transcendental critique of thought—as well as the whole theory of the modalities, according to which the modalities are seen as “temporal aspects,” stand or fall with the idea of the supratemporality of the heart. The transcendence of the heart, as Dooyeweerd sees it, cannot be conceived as if the heart “points” within time to the supratemporal, as if it stands so to speak on the “boundary” of the temporal and the supratemporal, standing as it were on the shore of eternity but limited nevertheless to the beach. It is not the heart but the temporal modality of faith which Dooyeweerd calls a “border sphere” and an “open window to eternity.” The heart to him is always entirely above temporal diversity.²⁹

10.11 As Ouweneel points out, Dooyeweerd’s whole transcendental critique depends on this Idea of the supratemporal heart. I agree with that, since the three transcendental Ideas of Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique depend on distinguishing eternity, supratemporality and cosmic time. The question of the Origin refers to God’s eternity; the question of Totality refers to the supratemporal selfhood and religious root in the *aevum* or created eternity; the question of coherence relates to cosmic time. Those who

deny the supratemporal selfhood, and who start from some other basis for Totality haveallen back into what Dooyeweerd calls “immanence philosophy.” Immanence
philosophers cannot share the same Ground-Motive of creation, fall and redemption,
since they do not understand these ideas in relation to the supratemporal heart. (Theses 43
to 45, 93 and references).

10.12 The idea that much of current philosophy is immanence philosophy operating from
the wrong Ground-Motive is just too shocking a conclusion for many reformational
philosophers to bear. And so an enormous effort is made to discredit Dooyeweerd’s
ideas like the supratemporal selfhood, the idea of the Gegenstand-relation, and the idea of
earthly cosmic time as distinguished from the heavenly supratemporal aevum in which
humanity currently has its true center. And very little effort is devoted to solid historical
research of what Dooyeweerd has actually said.

10.13 What needs to be done is to thoroughly investigate the differences between
Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. We need to go back to looking at what each philosopher
actually said, and the sources that influenced each of them in reaching the conclusions
that they did. I have begun this process by publishing and translating many previously
unknown documents from the archives, such as the responses made by both philosophers
to the Curators of the Free University, 30 and Dooyeweerd’s 1964 Lecture, 31 where many
of the differences between the philosophers were discussed. But much more needs to be
done. One example is the correspondence between Vollenhoven and Antheunis Janse,
which has recently been made available. This needs to be reviewed and translated to
show the influence that Janse had on Vollenhoven’s formulation of his philosophy.

30 See Responses to the Curators, translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandoooyeweerd/Curators.html].
31 See Herman Dooyeweerd, “Center and Periphery: The Philosophy of the Law-Idea in a
Changing World.” The Dutch text of the lecture alone was published in Philosophia
Reformata 72 (2007) 1-19. The English translation of both the lecture and the discussion
is online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandoooyeweerd/1964Lecture.html].
11. Conclusion

I have given a detailed analysis of Strauss’s seven arguments where he tries to prove Dooyeweerd’s view of the Gegenstand-relation is contradictory. The premises of Strauss’s arguments contain many assertions that Dooyeweerd never made, as well as many misunderstandings of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. In any event, Strauss’s conclusions do not logically follow from their premises.

Both Strauss and Dooyeweerd accuse each other not only of contradictions, but also of antinomies. Strauss accuses Dooyeweerd of rationalism, and Dooyeweerd accuses Strauss of logicism. Antinomies are more basic than logical contradictions. Antinomies point to a problem in the underlying religious Ground-motive, and arise because of an absolutization of some aspect of the temporal. If religious Ground-motives are involved, I do not expect that my analysis will convince Strauss or those who follow his ideas that Dooyeweerd is right.

But what should be clear is that the disagreement between Dooyeweerd and Strauss is not just a matter of formal logic. The very idea of a formal logic is in issue if we understand such a formal logic to be “purely logical.” But if we understand Dooyeweerd on his own terms, and on his own view of the place of logic, there is no logical contradiction in his explanation of the Gegenstand-relation.

From Dooyeweerd’s perspective, Strauss is engaged in immanence philosophy. He says that Strauss has become entangled in real antinomies and logicism. Strauss’s epistemology does not differ from that of modernism. This is very sharp criticism, and it is not surprising that Strauss does not want to acknowledge its truth. But what if Dooyeweerd is right? What if so much of the effort devoted by reformational philosophy has in fact been counter-productive, supporting immanence philosophy, the autonomy of thought, and the Aristotelian idea of substance with its related idea of properties? Then reformational philosophy is itself in need of reformation!

It is of course possible to disagree with what Dooyeweerd says. One may accept Strauss’s philosophy. But Strauss’s objection to the Gegenstand-relation is not just a minor change that leaves the rest of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy intact. On the contrary, Strauss’s
philosophy changes all the other major ideas in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. It is therefore difficult to see why someone who accepts Strauss’s criticism of Dooyeweerd would still claim to follow Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. It would make more sense for that person to adopt Vollenhoven’s philosophy, or some other philosophy altogether.

I am sure that some reformational philosophers will continue to criticize Dooyeweerd. But let’s first understand what he is really saying. That is the kind of respect that Dooyeweerd deserves. He himself said that people are too quick to criticize his ideas before understanding them. “They know the name of the beast, but not its nature.” In 1964, the year before his retirement, Dooyeweerd said that the nature of the modal aspects and the nature of individuality structures were still among the Ideas that were the least understood. We need to interpret his philosophy in as consistent a manner as possible, taking seriously what he himself says are his important ideas. In my article “95 Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd” I have tried to set out what Dooyeweerd’s philosophy looks like if we take him at his word as to what issues are really important.

Reformational philosophy has two competing visions. The differences are not just a matter of formal logic, and even the place of formal logic is in issue. These visions cannot be reconciled. Choices will have to be made by reformational philosophers. Which philosophical vision will be followed?

Appendix

Here is a list of the misunderstandings and misstatements referred to in this analysis of Strauss’s arguments:

32 Herman Dooyeweerd: 1964 Discussion, p. 3:
   But if you want to exercise criticism, you first have to know what you are being critical of. It is not sufficient that you know the name and not the nature of the beast—the nature that is covered over [gedekt] by the name, the nature that carries the name.

33 See my article “Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven.”
Misstatements
Misstatement #1: restriction of Gegenstand-relation to the non-logical aspects
Misstatement #2: Addition of word ‘logical’ to ‘remaining aspects’
Misstatement #3: Addition of words “in the latter case no inter-modal synthesis is possible.”
Misstatement #4: that Dooyeweerd originally restricted the Gegenstand-relation to the non-logical aspects.
Misstatement #5: Strauss applies Dooyeweerd’s explanation of the subject-object relation to theoretical thought.
Misstatement #6: That Dooyeweerd identifies human subjectivity with the full modal structure of the logical aspect.

Misunderstandings
Misunderstanding #1: concentration on a particular aspect as merely logical
Misunderstanding #2: the meaning of ‘remaining aspects.’
Misunderstanding #3: the nature of intermodal synthesis
Misunderstanding #4: the nature of ‘opposition’ in the intermodal synthesis.
Misunderstanding #5: universal validity as logical
Misunderstanding #6: circularity
Misunderstanding #7: states of affairs that apply in all aspects.
Misunderstanding #8: identity judgments and self-referential judgments.
Misunderstanding #9: “Recht is recht” as an identity judgment.
Misunderstanding #10: nature of logical objectification in subject-object relation
Misunderstanding #11: confusing modal object with the Gegenstand
Misunderstanding #12: Misunderstanding that the modal aspects exist separately from each other in reality.
Misunderstanding #13: distinction between pre-theoretical experience and theoretical experience
Misunderstanding #14: isolating universals
Misunderstanding #15: systatic objectification and conceptual knowledge.
Misunderstanding #16: functions and aspects.
Misunderstanding #17: meaning of ‘moment’
Misunderstanding #18: meaning of cosmic consciousness
Misunderstanding #19: meaning of dis-stasis
Misunderstanding #20: Idea and concept
Misunderstanding #21: implicit knowledge
Misunderstanding #22: Aspects as properties
Misunderstanding #23: Wrong view of abstraction.
Misunderstanding #24: analytical subjectivity identified with the full modal structure of analytical aspect

Revised Aug 8/09