Study Notes
for

Herman Dooyeweerd: De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee
The Philosophy of the Law-Idea
(Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1935-36)

These study notes are to be read in conjunction with my translation of excerpts of the WdW.

#1 Notes on the Foreword

(1) The Foreword corresponds to NC I, v-xi. But the NC version has been abridged. This has resulted in some important points being omitted.

(2) The contrast with Kant’s “peripheral” Copernican revolution is much stronger in the WdW than in the NC. The WdW says that it is the Christian philosophy that relativizes the temporal world against the religious root of creation! The NC translation omits this, and refers only to Kant as relativizing temporal reality relative to Kant’s transcendental subject.

(3) It is not clear why Kant’s German is not translated in NC. I have given my own translation.

(4) Baader had also been concerned with placing the natural and spiritual sides of creation in a common root.

(5) The NC does not translate the words “true human selfhood.” but the idea that we have fallen from our true selfhood is so important in Dooyeweerd. Perhaps it was not included because of the rejection of Dooyeweerd's idea of the supratemporal selfhood.

(6) The NC translates “transcendental Ground-Idea.” But the WdW speaks of a “philosophic” Ground-Idea. This is because for Dooyeweerd, philosophy is that kind of theory that attempts to relate theoretical thought back to the supratemporal conditions of thought. For him this is the only true (wezenlijk) kind of philosophic thought.

(7) The NC removes reference to “religious” in “supra-theoretical religious a priori.” For Dooyeweerd, religion concerns our relation to the supratemporal center and its Origin, God.

(8) The NC speaks of “the religious root of mankind.” This gives the impression that mankind has a root that is religious. But Dooyeweerd’s view is that mankind is itself the religious root. Our supratemporal selfhood is the temporal root of the cosmos; the cosmos is fallen in this root, and needs to be redeemed in this root, as redeemed in Christ, the new root. But the temporal world has no existence at all apart from the religious root. This is a crucial point in Dooyeweerd's philosophy. It has not been followed by those who reject the idea of a supratemporal heart. But this heart is also the root of temporal reality, which has no separate existence an sich. The idea of a reality “an sich” is a view
that reality somehow exists apart from humanity. Dooyeweerd’s argument is that if temporal reality cannot be neutral to its root, how can theoretical thought be religiously neutral?

(9) The distinction between what is religiously central (the supratenporal) and the temporal periphery is essential to understanding Dooyeweerd. That which is central expresses and reveals itself in the peripheral, and the peripheral in turn refers back to what is central for its meaning. The emphasis on the heart as center and the cosmos as temporal continues in Dooyeweerd’s thought. See his 1964 speech to the Association for Calvinistic Philosophy, “Centrum en omtrek: De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee in een veranderende wereld,” Philosophia Reformata 72 (2007) 1-19.

(10) The paragraph beginning with the words "Temporal reality cannot itself be regarded as neutral..." contains two important ideas. First, that temporal reality is not neutral with respect to its religious root. This goes back to the previous paragraph, where Dooyeweerd says that the religious root relativizes all of temporal reality. It has no existence in itself, or “an sich.” Second, if all of temporal reality is not neutral, then certainly theoretical thought, which is a part of our temporal experience, cannot be neutral. Thus, Dooyeweerd’s rejection of the dogma of the autonomy of thought is directly related to his assertion of the supratenporal religious root that relativizes all temporal reality.

#2 Notes regarding WdW I, 5

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 3-4.

(2) Already in the headings for the Introduction, there are some differences between the WdW and the NC translation. The WdW gives the title for Book I as “De Wetsidee als Grondlegging der Wijsbegeerte” [The Law-Idea as Foundation of Philosophy]. The NC entitles Volume I “The Necessary Presupposition of Philosophy.” Note the singular of ‘presupposition’ as opposed to the WdW, which uses the word in the heading for the Prolegomena and speaks of “necessary presuppositions.” The WdW heading also refers to the Archimedean point.

(3) The use of the term ‘presupposition’ must not be understood as a proposition that is accepted. That propositional view of Christian philosophy is not Dooyeweerdian, but rather in the line of Van Til's thought, as well as of those philosophers who refer to their work as “Reformed epistemology.” For Dooyeweerd, the presupposition is rather the foundation (grondlegging), the ontical apriori conditions that make possible our thinking in the first place. We approach (approximate) these apriori conditions by way of Ideas. Dooyeweerd distinguishes between these two senses of presuppositions (ontical and propositional) in his work Encyclopedia of the Science of Law. Dooyeweerd makes a distinction between subjective presuppositions [vooronderstellingen] and “that which is presupposed” [de vooronderstelde]. The Ideas, as “subjective presuppositions,” point towards “what is presupposed.” Subjective presuppositions are our Ideas as hypotheses, pointing towards the supratenporal a priori conditions that make our Ideas possible. These a priori conditions are “what is presupposed,” but they are not themselves Ideas or even propositions. The present translation of
the *Encyclopedia* does not always adequately distinguish between these two meanings of presuppositions. For example, the word for conditions [*voorwaarden*] is translated as ‘presuppositions.’ See my critique of the present translation of the *Encyclopedia*.

(4) The heading of the NC refers to “The First Way of a Transcendental Critique.” I do not accept the contention of Van Til and others that the NC marks a change to a transcendental from a transcendent approach. The transcendental critique is already very evident in the WdW, although Dooyeweerd speaks of a "sharpening" of his method in the NC (NC I, 34). In fact, the same transcendental arguments against Kant appear in Baader a hundred years earlier. WdW I, 52 clearly distinguishes between transcendent and transcendental critique. The transcendental argument is based on the religious-cosmological apriori of which the thinker must give account.

(5) Although the transcendental way is already in the WdW, there is a difference in emphasis between the WdW and the NC. Dooyeweerd speaks of a “sharpening” of the transcendental method. I believe that this is due to Dooyeweerd’s increasing ecumenism. In the NC, Dooyeweerd distances himself from those who refer to his philosophy as ‘Calvinistic.’ He says that the line of antithesis runs through the heart of each of us [and not between Calvinists and other groups] (NC I, 524). In emphasizing the transcendental method, he is moving away from a narrower dogmatic, transcendent approach. But to classify the WdW as totally transcendent would miss the fact that it also uses a transcendental argument.

(6) The very first line of the Prolegomena refers to our experience. This is often overlooked. Dooyeweerd distinguishes our pre-theoretical experience from our theoretical experience. But he also distinguishes both our pre-theoretical and our theoretical experience from the experience of our central selfhood, which he later refers to as a “cosmic self-consciousness.” Too often Dooyeweerd has been interpreted in terms of theoretical (and specifically theological) presuppositions, following Van Til’s approach. But Dooyeweerd’s presuppositions are experiential, relating to our being, and to our supratemporal self. And they are ontological. This is the ontical, religious-cosmological a priori. In this first passage of the Prolegomena, Dooyeweerd starts with both our pre-theoretical and our theoretical experience. He later speaks of our supratemporal experience. His emphasis on experience is an answer to the charge of “fideism” that is sometimes leveled against Dooyeweerd (although it may be correct to assert this charge against some Reformational philosophy that emphasizes conceptual presuppositions). Dooyeweerd’s emphasis on experience will (and has) troubled some Reformed theologians, who see it as a return to “natural theology.” But Dooyeweerd (like Baader) rejects as dualistic the very distinction between natural and supernatural.

(7) Dooyeweerd refers to our experience as it is “given.” This is important in the dialogue with postmodernism today. We do not construct our reality. It is given. As Baader says that our knowledge is a ‘*finden*’ (finding), and not an ‘*erfinden*’ (invention). The knowledge that we find derives from a source that ‘dominates’ and founds this knowledge. (*Weltalter* 261).
The word translated in the NC as ‘experience’ is ‘instelling.’ To merely refer to it as ‘experience’ misses the contrast between ‘instelling’ and ‘uiteen-stelling.’ Dooyeweerd is here playing with words, to show the contrast between pre-theoretical and theoretical experience. I believe that by ‘instelling’ he means the centripetal, inward-directed, enstatic experience of the self, relating temporal reality towards the center and the supratemporal. In naïve experience, we are set or fitted within [‘ingeesteld’] full temporal reality, in its concrete coherence of all its meaning-sides (WdW I, 48). Elsewhere, Dooyeweerd uses the word ‘enstasis’ to describe our naïve, pre-theoretical experience of being fitted into temporal reality in its coherence. So enstasis is the relation of equilibrium between our supratemporal selfhood as center, and temporal reality.

The temporal coherence of the modal aspects, as it gives itself to our experience of individuality structures of temporal reality, is a systasis. In his last article, Dooyeweerd says,

...we also find in [D.F.M.] Strauss a continual confusion between the “ontical” and the epistemological states of affairs. In the Prolegomena of the transcendental critique of the theoretical attitude of thought and experience, I have remarked that in the subject-object relations of naïve attitude of thought and experience, empirical reality is understood as it gives itself, that is to say in the continuous systatic coherence and relatedness of its modal aspects within cosmic time. But in the Gegenstand-relation, these modal aspects are epistemologically (not “ontically”) split apart and set over against each other, with the intention of bringing them into view in their general modality, and thereby making them available for theoretical concepts. (p. 91)

But the relation of enstasis is more than the temporal enstasis. Our selfhood cannot be found in this systasis, because our selfhood is supratemporal, and the systasis is a temporal coherence (II, 400; NC II, 467). In our experience of enstasis, we relate this temporal systasis to our selfhood. Temporal reality becomes “our own.”

In contrast to the coherence of our naïve, pre-theoretical experience, our theoretical or scientific thought appears to split up reality, by distinguishing the various modal aspects. Note that Dooyeweerd italicizes the word ‘uiteen-stelling’ here. Elsewhere, Dooyeweerd speaks of this theoretical splitting apart of reality as the attitude of dis-stasis. The temporal systasis is split apart into a dis-stasis (although this splitting apart is not ontical, but merely intentional and epistemological. The splitting up is not ontical, but only apparent). The NC translates the word ‘uiteen-stelling’ as ‘analysis.’ But that misses the point of the splitting apart of the coherence of reality. We tend to think of analysis in terms of the idea of abstraction, but that also leads to a misunderstanding of Dooyeweerd's thought, for his view of abstraction is an abstraction from the continuity of time, and not of any abstraction of properties from things, as reformational philosophy has tended to believe. If Dooyeweerd had wanted to use the word ‘analysis,’ he could have used the Dutch words ‘analyse’ or ‘ontleden.’ The fact that he uses ‘uiteen-stelling’ and that he italicizes the word must be given proper
emphasis. He is using it in the sense of splitting apart, or dis-stasis, and not in the sense of abstraction of properties.

(12) In theory, there is a ‘tegenoverstellende’ pattern of thought [this is another play on words]. This is the ’Gegen-stand’ [standing over against] relation. In scientific, theoretic thought, there is an opposition [‘tegenstelling’] to the ‘instellende’ pattern of thought in naïve experience (WdW, 49). This “standing over against” is not to be seen as a logical opposition. The Gegenstand-relation is not a logical opposition, but an opposition of our selfhood against all the aspects, including the logical. I believe that most interpreters of Dooyeweerd have missed this point, because they have denied Dooyeweerd's key idea of the supratemporal selfhood. In the 1946 edition of the Encyclopedia of Legal Science, Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the Gegenstand-relation results from the entry of our supratemporal selfhood into the temporal. It is only because of our supratemporal selfhood that we can enter into the Gegenstand-relation:

The meaning synthesis of scientific thought is first made possible when our self-consciousness, which as our selfhood is elevated above time, enters into its temporal meaning functions. This supratemporal selfhood of our human existence is the religious root of our personality, which in its individuality participates in the religious root of the human race. (1946 edition, 12, italics Dooyeweerd’s).

This entry of our supratemporal selfhood into the temporal results in the attitude of splitting apart of the coherence of our experience, and results in the ‘uiteen-stelling,’ the dis-stasis of theoretical thought.

(13) The very first line of this page speaks of ‘giving an account.’ To give an account is to use theory to explain that which transcends theory. We do this by the transcendental Ideas, which as theoretical presuppositions, point to their ontical presupposita. Dooyeweerd says elsewhere that this use of theory to point beyond its subjective presuppositions to its ontical presupposita is possible only because of the Gegenstand-relation, which in turn is possible only by means of our supratemporal selfhood (See the point discussed directly above). In the Encyclopedia of the Science of Law, Dooyeweerd says that it is only by means of the Gegenstand-relation that our theoretical Ideas can relate to these ontical conditions (“that which is presupposed”) while remaining within the bounds of theoretical thought. But this important insight into the importance of the Gegenstand-relation is obscured by the present translation at pages 80-81 of the Encyclopedia, which even breaks up this discussion into two paragraphs, thus losing the connection. See my critique of the present translation. It should read,

Therefore by maintaining the Gegenstand-relation, the theoretical Idea relates the theoretical concept to the conditions of all theoretical thought, but itself remains theoretical in nature, thus within the bounds of philosophic thought. It is just in this that its transcendental character resides. For in theoretical thought, the transcendental is everything that, by means of the inner (immanent) structure of the theoretical way of
thought, first makes possible theoretical thought itself; the transcendental is everything that stands at the basis of every theoretical conceptual distinction as its theoretical presupposition.

(14) In the uiteen-stelling, there is a splitting up of the coherent reality into what “appears” to diverge into separate aspects. It is important to emphasize the word ‘appears’ [schijnt]. Dooyeweerd stresses that the Gegenstand of our theoretical thought does not have a real (ontical) existence. It is only intentional, and does not correspond to the structure of empirical reality (NC I, 39, 40).

(15) In the enumeration of the modalities, the NC adds a reference to the aspect of physical energy. Dooyeweerd added this after publication of the WdW; there are thus fifteen different modal aspects. There is a long development in this regard. In fact, the WdW does not even use the word ‘aspect.’ It generally uses the term ‘meaning-side.’ Verburg wonders whether the new physical aspect includes earlier understandings of the modality of "reality." See aspects. The NC also adds a reference to “logical anticipation.”

(16) The NC adds a footnote about modalities—they do not refer to concrete “what” of things or events but are only the different modes of the universal "how" which determine the aspects of our theoretical view of reality. I have discussed this in the note of aspects. But this note that modes refer to the "how" should not be taken to mean that there is in fact a “whatness” of things and events, at least not as usually understood in empiricism. See things. This has been misunderstood by those reformational philosophers (van Riessen, Strauss, Clouser), who begin with things and try to “abstract” universals and properties from them. But Dooyeweerd specifically says that philosophy does not begin with things! (I, 47) the idea of modalities as "hows" of experience is much more radical than has been generally understood.

(17) The WdW says that nothing in the world coherence exists in itself. The NC says “no single aspect stands by itself.” This may be a proper clarification in this context. The passage is here talking about coherence in the sense of sphere universality (although that term is only used later). But we should not forget that it is not only aspects that do not exist by themselves. Nothing in temporal reality exists by itself. Temporal reality has existence only in our selfhood as the temporal root, and in Christ, the redeemed root. And our selfhood has no existence in itself, but has meaning only in God the Origin. These discussions about existere come later. (NC I, 58, 59).

(18) The interrelation between the aspects is one of being “bound to” (‘verbondenheid’). This is perhaps even stronger than the word 'interrelation.' ‘Verbondenheid’ is perhaps even stronger in showing the relation between aspects.

(19) The phrase ‘drukt zich uit’ needs to be emphasized. It means ‘expressed.’ The WdW uses it in the active voice. The coherence expresses itself. The English translation unfortunately uses the passive, “finds its expression.” The idea of the supratemporal totality expressing itself in the temporal coherence, and the coherence expressing itself in the aspects, is thereby lost. Furthermore, our supratemporal selfhood expresses itself in our temporal functions. This is emphasized in the following sentence: the human I-ness expresses itself in the coherence of all its
cosmic functions. Elsewhere he says, the ex-sistent character of the religious centre of our existence, which, to be sure, expresses itself in all modal aspects of time, but never can be exhausted by these (NC I, 58). Humans function in all aspects, but their supratemporal center goes beyond all aspects (NC I, 51; NC III, 88). We are not a dualistic composite of body and soul, but an integral unity—a supratemporal Selfhood that expresses itself and acts in the temporal.

(20) The NC makes the mistake of translating this supratemporal I-ness as 'ego.' Dooyeweerd distinguishes between supraindividual selfhood and individual ego.

(21) Dooyeweerd also says that individuality is rooted in the religious centre of our temporal world: all temporal individuality can only be an expression of the fullness of individuality inherent in this centre (NC II, 418).

(22) Our creation in “the image of God” is an expression of God's image. Just as the temporal world is an expression of our supratemporal selfhood, so our selfhood is an expression of God. Later, he says that our existence is an ex-sistere in God. And as we are God's image, the temporal world has its existence only in us. Humans are the religious root of temporal reality and only humans have existence in the sense of ex-sistere:

> It is only man who can have cosmic and cosmological self consciousness because only man's cosmic temporal structure is founded in an individual religious root transcending time, viz. his selfhood." (NC II, 480).

(23) Dooyeweerd says that because we are the temporal root of creation, creation fell along with humanity in the Fall. It had no root of its own. Since the Fall, the image of God is only revealed in its true sense in Jesus Christ (NC III 69).

(24) The Idea of expression is therefore a relating of and a supratemporal center to a temporal periphery. The expression is in the sense of the refraction of the unity of the center into a refracted temporal diversity. It is a matter of differentiation. In Twilight of Western Thought 123 he makes this same type of comparison--this time to the central law:

> Just as in the human ego all the aspects of our temporal experience and existence find their central reference point, so the commandment of love is the central unity of all God's different ordinances for the temporal world.

(25) The idea of image of God is mentioned repeatedly by Baader. Baader identifies Man as the mirror of Totality (Schumacher 57). We are the expression of God. Everything from God is directed eternally towards Him, and nothing perishes of what he has expressed, and He is all in all (1 Cor. 15:28) (Werke 11, 42). The same ideas of selfhood as temporal root, and the substitution of Christ as the new religious root had been previously developed by Baader. Baader also speaks of our Existenz, and the fact that we have no being in ourselves. We are God’s final creation (Schlussgeschöpf) (Werke I, 299, 432; IV, 33). The idea of religious root is related to the fact that we are the image of God (Weltalter 184). St. Paul says that Heaven and earth ‘live and move and have their being’ in God [Acts 17:28]. Because our central, supratemporal selfhood is the image of God, humans are truly the center of the material world (Werke V, 31; XI, 78; Begründung 48).
As you can see, even this first short excerpt from the WdW is very densely written, and there is a lot of “unpacking” to do. Dooyeweerd recognizes this. He says in I, 6 that his introductory propositions contain in themselves the whole problematic of the possibility of truly philosophical thought.

(26) Translation notes: Changes Oct 21/06. ‘grondgedachte’ changed to 'basic idea.' 'zgn.' not translated as 'so-called' but simply as indicating the name given to the side of reality. In English, the phrase 'so-called has a negative connotation. In Dutch, 'zgn.' is usually used just to indicate the word used for the idea. And Dooyeweerd did use the terms 'natural' and 'spiritual' sides.

#3 Notes regarding WdW I, 6

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 4

(2) “De zin is het zijn van alle creatuurlijk zijnde.” As the NC points out, there seems to be a parallel to Heidegger’s “das Sein des Seienden.” But Dooyeweerd's emphasis on meaning instead of being is not derived from Heidegger. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that Dooyeweerd continues to use the word 'Being' in reference to the Arché. For the (medieval) source of Dooyeweerd’s idea of meaning, see my article “Dooyeweerd's Idea of Modalities: The Pivotal 1922 Article.”

(3) All of created reality refers to its origin, and is an expression of its origin. This referring and expression is basic to Dooyeweerd's understanding of meaning. He is opposed to any view of substance, because that would imply a self-sufficient being that did not refer to anything else.

(4) The quotation is from Goethe’s Faust, Part I, line 446. The NC does not show this origin of the quotation. The line is spoken by Faust:

Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt,
eins in dem andern wirkt und lebt!
Wie Himmelskräfte auf und nieder steigen
Und sich die goldnen Eimer reichen.

[How everything weaves itself into the whole,
One in the other works and lives!
How heaven’s powers climb up and down
Passing the golden pails from hands to hand]

[my translation]

The “climbing up and down” also echoes the Biblical account of the angels ascending and descending on Jacob’s ladder:

And he dreamed, and behold a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it reached to heaven: and behold the angels of God ascending and descending on it. (Gen. 28:12).

The meaning of the "golden pails" seems to be the carrying of the waters of life emanating from God, the Source. This is made clear in the final scene of Faust, Part II, lines 12,045 to 12,049:
Dooyeweerd first quotes from this part of Faust in the student article that he wrote when he was 20 years old, "De Neo-Mystiek en Fr. van Eeden" [Neo-Mysticism and Frederik van Eeden] (Almanak van het studenten corps van de Vrije Universiteit, 1915). In that article it is in the context of the philosophy of Plotinus, whom Dooyeweerd says is the philosopher of pantheism. It seems that Dooyeweerd revised this viewpoint, since the references in the WdW and the New Critique are not critical, but use the quotation from Goethe as a positive reference to how everything moves towards a Totality.

Dooyeweerd later gives another untranslated quotation from Goethe (I, 167; NC I, 205). It is from Goethe's Der Zauberlehrling ["The Sorcerer's Apprentice," which we know from Disney's Fantasia]:

Die ich rief, die Geister,
Werde ich nun nicht los!

[The spirits that I called up
I now can not get rid of!]

(5) NC confusingly translates 'I-ness' as 'ego.' But 'I-ness' is supratemporal, whereas 'ego,' in most discussions today, is fully temporal. Dooyeweerd also distinguishes between the ego ['ik'] as a temporal coherence of functions and the supraindividual selfhood. In this section, he sometimes uses 'ik' for selfhood, but he speaks of the "full" 'ik.' It seems to me that the temporal coherence of functions is in many ways similar to Dooyeweerd's view of the body as a mantle of functions. At death, this mantle of functions completely dies, but the supratemporal selfhood, which had expressed itself in these temporal functions, continues in the afterlife.

(6) It is important to note that in abstraction, we abstract from the selfhood in our concepts! Thus, those who see abstraction as obtaining the universals from things are missing a central point. The abstraction from our selfhood is the epoché, the refraining from the continuity of cosmic time. In theory as Gegenstand-relation, we act as if our
selfhood is the reduced logical function. I believe that when we function according to this reduced selfhood, we are thinking according to the "mind of the flesh" (WdW I, 65).

(7) Dooyeweerd says that we have been 'fitted' [gevoegd] into the temporal coherence. Elsewhere he says that we have been fitted into this temporal coherence along with the rest of temporal reality:

Het is een wereldsamenhang, dien de mensch wel in zijn zelfheid transcendeert, naar waarbinnen hij met alle schepselen, die met hem in denzelfden wereldsamenhang gevoegd zijn, in universeele gebondenheid aan den tijd verkeert (WdW I, 36)

Our supratemporal selfhood is therefore also fitted into temporality.

(8) This idea of our central selfhood being fitted or placed in the temporal periphery is a key point made by Baader. Baader links this being placed [Gesetzt] to the law [Gesetz]. There is a play on words. (Begründung 29 ft. 12). Each creature is set under its law, in a region or place in which it is to serve God. Our bliss is found only in fulfilling this law and serving God (Weltalter 172, 178). Thus, Baader links the idea of being placed to the law-Idea. Baader developed the law-Idea and its significance for Christian philosophy (in opposition to autonomous thought), before Dooyeweerd. Kuyper acknowledges Baader's influence here.

(9) The Dutch language does not permit the same play on words between 'law' and 'being placed.' But in one of his very first articles that mentions the significance of the law, Dooyeweerd makes a similar play on words between autonomy ['autonoom stelt'] and being placed or fitted 'gesteld':

Al het bestaande ligt gebonden aan zijn objectieven zin, die zijn wezen uitmaakt. Het schouwen is gebonden aan zijn gezichtsvelden, het denken aan zijn kategorieën.

In deze binding van schouwen en denken ligt hun objectieven zin. Waar nu het bewustzijn niets meer autonoom stelt, maar alles heeft ontvangen, in alles gesteldis, als objectieven zin, nu de wet der heteronomie onbeperkt in al het bestaande gaat heersen, ook in het zingeven bewustzijn, komt de vraag naar den wetgever, den ordenaar, den schepper van zelf naar boven. ("Advies re Roomsch-katholieke en Anti-revolutionarie Staatkunde," 1923, cited by Verburg 60).

(10) He says that the 'I' expresses itself in its functions. He uses the word 'ik' here, but he speaks of the "full" 'ik.' I have translated this as the selfhood, but it is possible that he is referring to the individual selfhood or ego expressing itself in the functions. Then we would have God expressing Himself in the selfhood, which expresses itself in the individual ego, which expresses itself as a temporal coherence of the temporal functions. This interpretation is supported by the concluding words of this section, other I's ['ikken']. It is interesting that this does not appear in the NC.

(11) Dooyeweerd refers to the actual thinking of the selfhood. This actual is an act. Dooyeweerd says that all actions are out of our supratemporal selfhood. These acts are then expressed through our temporal body (mantle of functions).
#4 Notes regarding WdW I, 7

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 5

(2) Like the NC, I capitalize Idea, as distinct from concept. Dooyeweerd does not always follow this same convention of capitalizing 'Idea.'

(3) This section shows that Dooyeweerd's whole philosophy is based on the view that philosophy is directed towards a totality. Today, postmodernism has challenged this whole view of philosophy. This raises new problems for dialogue with postmodernism that did not exist when Dooyeweerd wrote the WdW. I believe that his response would be:

a) If philosophy is not directed towards a totality, it is not true philosophy.

b) Our dialogue with postmodernism must be by way of immanent criticism, to show that in fact postmodernism has a metaphysics and a view of totality of its own. In this regard, I believe that my criticism of constructivism is helpful, in that it shows that the postmodern preoccupation with construction and deconstruction is actually hyper-Kantian. It is therefore more open to Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique than even modernism itself. In contrast to postmodernism and constructivism, Dooyeweerd emphasizes that we do not construct our reality, but find it as a given.

c) What we cannot do is to attempt to revise away those parts of Dooyeweerd's philosophy that we consider to be "totalizing." Unfortunately, some Reformational scholars are attempting to do just that. They can only end up by undermining the foundations of Dooyeweerd's philosophy. If we do not direct ourselves to our supratemporal selfhood, to totality and to our Origin, we will become dispersed in the diversity of the world. We will no longer know our true self, nor how it is distinguished from the other realms. Nor will we have true knowledge of God or of the temporal cosmos.

4. The reason that self-reflection is required is that the self is the supratemporal totality.

3. NC adds that Husserl's "individual self" functions in "time and space." Dooyeweerd rejects the view that this temporal self is the thinking selfhood. For Dooyeweerd, our selfhood is not the subjective logical function of thought.

#5 Notes regarding WdW I, 8

1. Corresponds to NC I, 8.

2. Reference to transcendental subject is translated as Husserl’s “transcendental logical subject of thought.”

3. Most of the second paragraph, dealing with the distinction between 'reflexive' and 'reflection' has not been translated in the NC. Dooyeweerd rejects Husserl’s reflexive view of thought. This has not been made clear in the NC, which sometimes uses 'reflexive' to translate 'reflection.'
4. The NC also does not include the turning inwards of our thought in philosophy. The need to turn inwards is related to theoretical synthesis, and returning to the continuity of cosmic time, from which theoretical dis-stasis has abstracted our self.

5. “Blessed Münchhausen”: He was a character that could not be gotten rid of. So here Husserl’s thought-experiment does not resolve the problem of the selfhood.

#6 Notes regarding WdW I, 9

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 7.

(2) NC substitutes ‘universal’ for ‘supra-individual.’ The Dutch 'supraindivueele' must be a mistake for 'supraindividueele.' The use of the word 'supra-individual' is here in the context of Husserl, but Dooyeweerd himself uses the same term for his own ideas. Dooyeweerd does not begin with this idea of the 'individual'; he begins with the religious Root, its fall and redemption. We need a supra-individual point of departure NC I, 60. Temporal individual subjectivity cannot really exist unless it is bound to a supra-individual order (NC I, 493). Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the supratemporal is supra-individual. He speaks of the fulness of individuality that has been saved in Christ. All temporal individuality is only an expression of this fulness of individuality inherent in the religious centre of our temporal world (NC II, 418. This view of the root of humanity as supra-individual is also found in Kuyper. Dooyeweerd cites Kuyper's view that individuals do not exist in themselves; there only exist membra corporis generis humani. Christ is head or reborn humanity (NC II, 248). It is worth pointing out here that one of Dooyeweerd's disagreements with Vollenhoven concerned the nature of individuality.

(3) The word 'aanzijn' is translated as 'existence' in the NC. But 'aanzijn' is a determined existence. See the discussion in another [non-dooyeweerdian] context by Börger at http://www.nikhef.nl/~a17/wd/WD_11.HTM. 'Aanzijn' is the fitting of our selfhood into the temporal reality by which it is determined. Temporal reality, the cosmos, is subject to cosmic law, which "limits and determines" our selfhood (I, 13). We ourselves in our temporal individuality are also determined by the modal dimension, part of temporal reality (II, 483). In a sense 'aanzijn' is like Heidegger's 'Dasein,' except that Heidegger does not speak of a supratemporal self beyond Dasein; he has temporalized the selfhood. For Heidegger, there is only the temporal, the 'Vorhandenes' (WdW I, 69). Another interesting web site regarding 'aanzijn,' again from a non-Dooyeweerdian perspective, is http://www.theosofie.net/onlineliteratuur/aspecten/5a.htm, which emphasizes that 'aanzijn' is the bringing forth of forces, entities and substances from the universe. These 'unfold' themselves from within ['van binnenuit] in a kind of emanation or evolutionary reversal.
This meaning to 'aanzijn' must not be ignored in interpreting Dooyeweerd. It relates to the expression of the supratemporal in the temporal, and to the limiting and determining of the law.

(4) The 'reflection' of thought returns thought back not towards itself, but towards the selfhood. See the discussion of reflection in Van Eeden. Just as we are the image of God, so temporal reality, which has its existence in humanity as the temporal root, reflects this root.

(5) Again, the NC mistranslates 'selfhood' as 'ego.'

#7 Notes regarding WdW I, 10

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 7

(2) "Not foreign to me." Because our selfhood expresses itself in our temporal functions, these temporal functions must be related back to the selfhood if they are not to be foreign to us. They must be made our own. This is an emphasis that is also found in Baader. I am not aware of any analysis of this idea in Dooyeweerd by reformational philosophers who claim to be his adherents. The Idea is important to Dooyeweerd, but it makes no sense if we do not accept the supratemporality of the selfhood. This supratemporality is the key of knowledge.

(3) Our I-ness transcends temporal particularized and diversified meaning. But through our temporal functions, we act within temporal reality.

(4) We must participate in totality if we are to have an Idea of it.

(5) I myself (in my supratemporal selfhood) am at work in the temporal world in my functions. As Baader says, our temporal functions are the instrument of our selfhood.

(6) Dooyeweerd refers to his thought as cosmological thought. Elsewhere, he differentiates this from metaphysical thought. But Dooyeweerd's Ideas of the cosmos, of cosmic time, and of supratemporal Being expressing itself in meaning, are surely also metaphysical. It seems to me that it would be better for Dooyeweerd to acknowledge that we all must engage in metaphysics, and that it is only a question of what kind of metaphysics. Perhaps Dooyeweerd's real distinction is that we do not begin with Ideas, but with our experience of the supratemporal, which can only be approximated in Ideas.

(7) We choose our standpoint. This choice of position is a religious act. Like other acts, it is an act of our supratemporal selfhood. Baader says that our choice either for or against God is really our only choice. After we make this choice of position, our other ways of thinking and acting are determined by this Ground-Principle or Ground-Attitude. Dooyeweerd says that in order to see God, Self and cosmos correctly, we need to start from the correct Ground-Motive. To do this, we need a change of heart, or as the Scriptures also say, a metanoia, change of nous.
#8 Notes regarding WdW I, 10b

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 8.

(2) Meaning is "from, through and to" the Origin. It is not just that we receive meaning from the Origin. Created meaning refers to the Origin, and we find no rest except in the Origin. Our thought is also from and towards an Origin, whether our true Origin, or our supposed self-sufficient origin.

See van Eeden, who says that God is our goal and direction, but also our Origin [Redekunstige Grondslag, 117 #156]

(3) Ground-tendency (motive to return). There is a built-in propensity or tendency to return to the Origin.

Van Eeden named this tendency towards God as "love." Love is the uniting of that which is divided, the breaking through of limitation. This tendency he sees intuitively as the meaning of all words. [Johannes Viator]

(4) The law "limits and determines" our selfhood. We act out of our supratemporal selfhood. But our selfhood expresses itself in temporal functions. These functions are given by the law, which limits and determines temporal reality. It also limits and determines our selfhood. I interpret this as the relating of our supratemporal selfhood to temporal reality, and to our individualizing within that temporal reality.

(5) Insight into meaning presupposes a relatedness to our selfhood. Insight is an inner-directed thought.

#9 Notes regarding WdW I, 11

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 8

(2) See previous discussion of 'aanzijn.'

(3) The 'critical' questions of how knowledge is possible are transcendental questions of philosophy. They cannot be distinguished from the 'genetic.' I believe that this is another way of saying that our knowledge is not just towards an Origin, but from an Origin.

4. Our Origin is the source of the a priori conditions of knowledge.

5. Meaning refers to an Origin which is no longer meaning. The Origin does not refer to anything, but is self-sufficient.

6. Our thought comes to rest in the Origin, where the meaning of our questions ceases; philosophic thought come to its origin and is it set at rest.

See van Eeden, who says our 'ikheid,' our selfhood has the desire for Rest and Unity [Redekunstige Grondslag, 61 #61] and he says that our reason is only an aid
[hulpmiddel] to get us to where it can no longer exist, and where the raising of questions is no longer meaningful. [63 #67]

#10 Notes regarding WdW I, 13

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 11.

(2) From Augustine.

"Tu excitas (hominem), ut laudare te delectet, quia fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te" (Confessiones 1,1).

Our heart is restless until it finds peace in God.

Dooyeweerd cites only part of this quotation, "inquietum est cor nostrum." "Our heart is restless. And he adds the following words to this quotation:"et mundus in corde nostro!" And the world is restless in our heart!

I am not aware of any other Dooyeweerd scholars who have pointed out this addition. It is most remarkable. It is why he ends it with an exclamation point. The world is restless in our heart because we are the supratemporal root of the temporal world, and it has no existence except in us, just as we have no existence except in God.

(3) The cosmos has its existence in us. And we understand the meaning of the cosmos in understanding the meaning of our selfhood.

I believe that this refers to the ontical status of the analogies within temporal reality. Different aspects and things that have their individuality structures in those aspects can be compared because of analogies. These analogies are real (and not "merely" metaphorical) because temporal reality is an expression of the supratemporal unity, and has its existence only in this supratemporal root.

This view of analogy, and of the idea that we understand the cosmos in understanding our own selfhood, is related to the Hermetic idea "as above, so below."

(4) The law determines the center and root of our existence. Our supratemporal root is determined and limited in cosmic time.

(5) The Idea of subject as subjected-ness, as sujet, is also found in Baader.
#11 Notes regarding WdW I, 14

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 12

(2) The law "limits and determines" the subject. The human subject is supratemporal, but insofar as we have temporal bodily functions, and act within temporal reality, we are limited and determined by the law.

(3) Without this law, the subject sinks into nothingness. This is what being "subject" to God's law means. in itself, our selfhood is nothing. It has an ex-sistent character (NC I, 58-59). Elsewhere, Dooyeweerd says that this restraining function of the law is that of "common grace."

"Door deze “algemene genade” wordt de doorwerking van de zonde in de wereld gestuit en de algehele verdemonsiering van de afgevallen mensheid tegengehouden, zodat nog overall lichtvonken van Gods macht, goedheid, waarheid, gerechtigheid en schoonheid kun schitteren ook in afgodisch gerichte culturen.” (Vernieuwing en Bezinning, 36).

[By this "common grace" the continued working of sin in the world is checked, and the complete demonization of the fallen humanity is held back, so that everywhere sparks of God's power, goodness, truth, justice and beauty can still glitter, even in cultures that are idolatrously directed.]

This same view of the law as a restraint on sin is set out in NC II, 33. Dooyeweerd says that he does not know what the effect of unrestrained sin on reality would be like. Thanks to God, in this earthly cosmos, the unhampred influence does not exist.

(4) Baader refers to the law as a restraint or **Hemmung**. Baader says that the law limits the creature; it is a Hemmung or limitation. The living creature finds himself or herself as living, acting and productive within such a limitation or boundary (Grenze). This boundary is given to the creature as a holding fast, placing, (Setzenden) bearing and holding or feeding. (*Werke* XIII, 165; Betanzos 87).

Baader also says that without the relation to God we would fall into nothingness. In our apostate direction against God, there is a denial of the center. But there can be no absolute distancing from the center, because that would be a Vernichtung, a nothingness (*Zeit*, 26).

#12 Notes regarding WdW I, 15

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 13.

(2) Postmodern philosophy would not acknowledge the necessity of an Archimedean point. But as mentioned in a previous note, postmodernism itself operates with an unacknowledged metaphysics, and an unacknowledged starting point.
Notes regarding WdW I, 16

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 13.

(2) Dooyeweerd sees metaphysics as exceeding the bounds of philosophic thought. It may be objected that Dooyeweerd's own ideas exceed philosophic thought. I believe that his answer is that this misunderstands the nature of philosophic thought—that it, like all creaturely reality, has a referring nature to that which is beyond it.

Notes regarding WdW I, 17

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 13

(2) Dooyeweerd distinguishes his view of immanence philosophy. He does not mean immanent in thought, but rather one that seeks its starting point in philosophic thought seen as self-sufficient.

(3) The NC translates this as saying that the theoretical is merely one of the many "aspects" from which we may view the cosmos. Apart from the fact that Dooyeweerd does not use the word 'aspect' in the WdW, this translation is misleading. The comparison is not with other aspects, but rather attitudes. The Dutch is 'gezichtshoek,' or viewpoint. Naive thought does not seek totality. But philosophy is the only viewpoint that seeks a (theoretical) view of totality.

(4). Rickert's view that is criticized here, that we first demolish the atheoretical to a chaotic material of consciousness, which is then to be ordered to a cosmos by our thought, is similar to today's emphasis on deconstruction and consequent constructivism. Dooyeweerd's criticism can be directed against these postmodern movements in a similar way.

Notes regarding WdW I, 18

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 15.

Notes regarding WdW I, 19

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 15.

(2) NC has ‘radical unity’ for ‘fullness of meaning.’ Dooyeweerd does speak of a coincidence of meaning in the supratemporal selfhood. But I prefer to see this as fullness of meaning instead of 'identity' or 'unity' of meaning. Identity and unity are after all mathematical analogies of meaning; these are themselves meanings that coincide within fullness.

(3) This coincidence of meaning is in the selfhood. The selfhood is not just the temporal coherence of functions.
(4) One of the consequences of self-reflection is the immediacy of revelation of the unity of the aspects. Dooyeweerd's emphasis on the immediacy of our knowledge in self-reflection is being denied by some Reformational philosophers today. They want to interpret Dooyeweerd as saying that all our knowledge is mediated. This is a postmodernist interpretation that cannot be reconciled with Dooyeweerd. He says that our knowledge is limited by, but not to the temporal. And passages like this affirm that we have an immediate, i.e. unmediated knowledge.

(5) NC refers to time as the medium of the breaking up of totality.

(6) Dooyeweerd emphasizes here that the fullness of meaning particularizes itself into the diversity of meaning. This is what he means when he says that the temporal is an expression of the supratemporal fullness. This view of differentiation has not been emphasized by Reformational philosophers who claim to be adherents of Dooyeweerd. I suspect that this is because they begin with a different view of creation, preferring to see creation of an original diversity and individuality of meaning, but Dooyeweerd emphasizes in *The Twilight of western Thought* that even the idea of creation must be understood using the key of knowledge of the supratemporal self being the root of creation. I also believe that this is the basis for Dooyeweerd's disagreement with Vollenhoven regarding the nature of individuality.

(7) The coincidence of the meaning-sides of temporal reality in the supratemporal fullness is really the reverse of the refraction of meaning by the prism of cosmic time. Meaning is not only from the Origin, but to the Origin. Baader says that sin is our unwillingness to want to return to the Origin.

(8) Van Eeden refers to the convergence of or focus in the Self of all lines that describe individual life:

\[
\text{maar zie toch, geen is eenzaam, allen houén}
\]
\[
te zamen in één Zelf, dat verre blijft
\]
\[
boven gescheidenheid, brandpunt der lijnen
\]
\[
die ‘t leven aller enkelen beschrijft} \left[ \text{Lied van Schijn en Wezen, I, VII, 80}\right]
\]

Van Eeden also refers to the image of the prism that splits white light into a diversity of colours of existence:

\[
\text{want alles wat bestaat wordt ook beschouwd door die ineindig fijne spleet, die \text{‘t Leeven}
\]
\[
splitst als wit licht, in kleuren meenigvoud} \left[ \text{Lied van Schijn en Wezen III, II, 43}\right]
#17 Notes regarding WdW I, 20b

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 16. The NC is quite different in many places.

(2) NC has “transcendental unity of apperception” and “transcendental logical ego.”

(3) This is one of many references where Dooyeweerd refers to the "function of thought." The NC adds "logical aspect." But it seems that initially, Dooyeweerd regarded thought as a function and not as an act. Even in the Gegenstand relation, it is the logical aspect that has this ability to oppose itself against the other aspects.

(4) Why does Dooyeweerd refer to "states of affairs" instead of to facts? It seems that states of affairs are what we learn in theoretical thought. Since theoretical thought involves a dis-stasis, its Gegenstand does not correspond to ontical reality. Therefore we cannot refer to what we discover as concrete facts. The concrete is reserved for non-theoretical naive experience. Even there, Dooyeweerd has a very different view of 'things' than is normally supposed. This is quite a different approach than Briths empiricism, which begins with things and facts.

(5) Dooyeweerd says in place of the cogito [I think], say "I believe."

Baader is also opposed to Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum." In place of it, Baader says, "Cogitor, ergo cogito et sum" (Werke 16, 31; Sauer 29) or "Cogitor, ergo cogitans sum" (Werke 12, 235). I am known by God, therefore I know and am. for Baader, our knowing is also dependent on a belief in God. He expresses it in that we are known by God first. The Cartesian cogito in contrast is a "Selbstsetzung" or autonomy--setting the law for oneself.

#18 Notes regarding WdW I, 22-23

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 18-19. This section has been extensively re-worded in the NC.

(2) Logical diversity is not cosmic diversity. Logical diversity depends on cosmic diversity. In our logical function, we make distinctions. but the aspects themselves are not distinguished by the logical aspect. The logical aspect is one of many aspects of the cosmic diversity of meaning. To confuse the two is to make the mistake of logicism. This is also the problem with Schelling, Ken Wilber and much Buddhist thought. See my thesis on Abhishiktananda. Dooyeweerd also indicates that the denial of the Gegenstand-relation in favour of a view of theory as the abstraction of universals falls into this same error.

(3) The synthesis of theoretical thought is a joining together again of meaning that has been split apart in the dis-stasis. See the excerpt that I have translated from Volume II for a more complete discussion of this.

(4) Rationalistic metaphysics only absolutizes thought as Arché, as ideas in the mind of God. Rationalistic metaphysics took its starting point or Archimedean point outside itself. It accepted that its thought conformed to laws outside of itself. But modern immanence philosophy also sees thought as the Archimedean point.
#19 Notes regarding WdW I, 24
(1) Corresponds to NC I, 20.

(2) Heteronomy means that we seek law outside of oneself, as opposed to autonomy. Baader also refers to God's law as heteronomous as opposed to autonomous.

(3) The sentence regarding falsification of meaning, and the Fullness of Truth is missing in NC.

(4) Dooyeweerd's statement about polytheism as the freedom to serve other gods anticipates James Hillman's psychology. Hillman opposes C.G. Jung's emphasis on unity and totality of the Self, and instead promotes a polytheism in psychology.

(5) NC has 'direction' from the heart instead of 'proceeds' from the heart. 'Uitgang' means is "departure from" It is related to Dooyeweerd’s emphasis that all acts proceed from out of our supratemporal center.

(6) The selfhood is "the invisible player on the instrument of philosophic thought." Thought is one of our temporal functions, which are an expression of our selfhood.

(7) Our choice of position is religious because it concerns the concentration point in our supratemporal heart.

(8) The Greek kai exochen means, "to cause to stand out, prominence, principal, to take possession out." See Acts 25:23 Paul was "brought up" before Festus.

The WdW has 'edzochen.' The NC corrects this to 'exochen' but does not translate it.

I believe that we can contrast this "standing out" of thought with standing within Truth.

(9) Limiting concepts show the non-self-sufficiency of thought.

(10) The next pages 26-33 of the WdW are replaced by a long section on time in the NC.

#20 Notes regarding WdW I, 25
(1) WdW 26-33 not in NC.

(2) In the fall, we lost our standpoint and our focus, and we became dispersed [verstrooid] in the diversity of meaning. I believe that Dooyeweerd is correct in emphasizing that this leaves us in confusion. Postmodernism, in its opposition to 'totalizing' tendencies, is in this same position of being dispersed in the diversity of meaning.

#21 Notes regarding WdW I, 26
(1) WdW 26-33 not in NC.
(2) Once we are dispersed in the diversity of meaning, we find our concentration point only in the absolutization of the temporal.

(3) We do not know our true selfhood any more.

(4) Dooyeweerd frequently speaks of the need to "give account." This is a transcendental direction of thought. When we absolutize the temporal, we can no longer give account.

(5) Why does he say that historicism is irrational? Because it chooses life instead of the logical as its Archimedean point. He also says that it involves an absolutization of theoretical synthesis. I believe that this explained later in the section, where he says that it explains all lawful regularity as a construction of thought. This same criticism can be leveled at much of today's postmodernist thought.

(6) Note Dooyeweerd's reference to the pre-logical aspects as the "natural" sides of reality.

(7) See the excerpts from Volume II (epistemology) for a priori levels of reality.

#22 Notes regarding WdW I, 28-30

(1) WdW 26-33 not in NC.

(2) This section seems to distinguish between modalities and meaning sides. See aspects for a discussion of Dooyeweerd's use of these terms.

(3) Note the reference to loss of selfhood. We lose sight of our true self. I, 31 says there is a fall from oneself.

(4) Apostate thought does not see the true structure of the world.

(5) In WdW I, 30, Dooyeweerd refers to Prov. 3:24. "Eternity is set in the heart of man." This is one of the exceptions to Dooyeweerd's avoidance of Biblical proof texts. He also quotes the words of Jesus, "Where your treasure is, there shall your heart be also."

(6) WdW I, 30 In the concentration point of our existence, all meaning coincides (meets together: tezamen treffen).

(7) I, 31 is another example where Dooyeweerd sees thought as a function instead of an act.

(8) Because there has been a fall in the root, Christ is required as the New Root. This is a different explanation for the necessity of the incarnation than Anselm's juridical view in Cur Deus Homo.

(9) The direction to the Origin must permeate our thought in an inner way.

(10) Christian philosophy is different from theology.
#23 Notes regarding WdW I, 34-36

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 22-24.

(2) WdW I, 35. Without thought, our human selfhood cannot reveal itself in the temporal coherence of the world. That is a remarkable statement. I think that he means that our acts within temporal reality always include the logical aspect. Dooyeweerd follows this up with the statement that our thought can never be disconnected from our (supratemporal) selfhood.

(3) WdW I, 35 Man transcends the temporal coherence in his selfhood. But we move [verkeren] within the temporal coherence in the state of being fitted into or bound to (cosmic) time. What is meant by this "movement?" Baader refers to our moving out of our supratemporal selfhood into the temporal world. This movement is usually caused by wonder. We move out of our enstasis. This moving out is an ex-stasis. It can be to either a higher realm or the lower temporal realm. Dooyeweerd also speaks of there being a descent to the temporal. But Dooyeweerd also speaks of the beatific vision of the higher realm.

(4) In WdW I, 36 he uses the interesting phrase of "orientation to the diversity of meaning." We need to be oriented to temporal diversity of meaning because Dooyeweerd begins with the unity of our supratemporal selfhood.

(5) WdW I, 36. Scientific thought explicitly or articulately distinguishes the aspects form each other.

#24 Notes regarding WdW I, 37

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 24. The NC has the heading: “The immanence of all modal aspects of meaning in time.”

(2) NC changes ‘root’ to ‘centre.’

(3) The phrase “the full temporal reality has a law-side and a subject-side” is not included in the NC.

(4) The NC adds the important statement “The idea of cosmic time constitutes the basis of the philosophical theory of reality in this book.” (NC I, 28.) This statement has been ignored by many who profess to be adherents of Dooyeweerd. but he regards the supratemporal selfhood as the key of knowledge. this Idea is not possible without the view of cosmic time.

(5) Dooyeweerd speaks of the aevum as intermediate state between eternity and cosmic time. See "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën," Philosophia Reformata, 1, (1936) 65-83, (IV) (1939) 4-5:

Ik zou nochtans den term 'aevum' in den zin van een tusschen toestand tusschen tijd en eeuwigheid, gaarne willen overnemen. Ik meen, dat daartegen te minder, bezwaar kan bestaan, omdat hij in dezen zin juist in den Christelijken gedachtengang is opgekomen, die behoefte gevoelde aan een onderscheiding
The aevum is the state of our supratemporal selfhood. It is not the same as God's eternity. But neither is it the same as cosmic time.

(6) Eternity, even the eternity of God, is not to be seen as static (NC I, 31, ft).

(7) Dooyeweerd planned to discuss time further in a fourth volume of the WdW. There is no fourth volume. The NC has an expanded section on time. NC I, 25-69, although there is some overlap with other sections of the WdW. Dooyeweerd also published a separate work Het tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee ("The problem of time in the Philosophy of the law-Idea"), Philosophia Reformata (1940) pp. 160ff and pp. 193ff.

(8) WdW I, 37 Immanence philosophy sees the temporal world as a world of things (Dingwelt) in contrast to noumenon. Dooyeweerd's philosophy does not begin with things.

(9) The NC adds (NC I, 24) that cosmic time has both a time-order and a time-duration. The order is the order of the aspects. Duration is related to things which appear and disappear in time.

#25 Notes regarding WdW I, 38

(1) Not in NC. The NC inserts a long section on time that is not in the WdW. It incorporates some parts from the WdW, but in a different order.

(2) Cosmic time is not "natural" time. These are the physical-psychical natural sides." Nor is cosmic time the same as mathematically founded time. Cosmic time is expressed in all of the aspects. In the logical aspect, for example, there is a priori and a posterior, both references to time.

#26 Notes regarding WdW I, 39

(1) Not in NC. the NC inserts a long section on time (NC I, 25-70) that is not in the WdW. It incorporates some parts from the WdW, but in a different order. some of this is in NC I, 70-71.

(2) Ground-Ideas are the foundation of philosophic thought. Postmodern philosophy tries to avoid all foundations. but the Ground-Idea does not seek its foundation within temporal reality. It points to the religious dimension. a Ground-Idea is an Idea, and not a concept. Ground Ideas answer the questions of Origin, totality, and coherence of meaning as to law-side and subject-side. Postmodern philosophy would probably say it was not interested in these questions. But that does not mean that postmodernism has not its own unacknowledged answers to these questions.
(3) The whole/part relationship is a biological concept. It is therefore based on a partial truth, and does not account for a true supratemporal coherence. In objecting to such a part/whole idea, Dooyeweerd's philosophy disagrees with contemporary holistic thinking, or the ideas of Ken Wilber, of the increasing complexity of holons.

(4) Ideas only approximate the totality of meaning. They are limiting concepts that point above and beyond themselves.

#27 Notes regarding WdW I, 40
(1) Corresponds to NC I, 74.

(2) Spinoza called the illusions of the anthropomorphisms an *asylum ignorantiae* - an asylum of stupidity.

#28 Notes regarding WdW I, 42-44
(1) Corresponds to NC I, 76-79.

(2) The argument is that Litt’s concrete ego is not the same as the full I-ness.

(3) WdW I, 43: General concepts, such as class or genus, refer to phenomena within a certain aspect. Such general concepts try to level the diversity of meaning.

(4) WdW I, 44 Philosophical knowledge cannot remain stuck within the particularized meaning of the logical aspect. It must be directed towards totality. We must elevate the aspects to the transcendent in order to reveal their common root. Theoretical thought therefore demands an ascent from the dis-stasis of the temporal to a synthesis in an Idea that points to the supratemporal.

(5) WdW I, 44 Diversity of meaning presupposes a deeper identity of meaning. This is the coincidence of meaning in the supratemporal root.

(6) WdW I, 44. Dooyeweerd makes the fascinating statement that unity may not merely be a negative "Indifferenz." How does this relate to Derrida's emphasis on différance. Is he not seeking a negative unity of Indifferenz?

#29 Notes regarding WdW I, 45-47
(1) Corresponds to NC I, 82-83.

(2) Naive experience is a given experience. Thus, it is not an experience that is constructed by theory.

(3) If naive experience has not been abstracted in dis-stasis, and if it is the given that philosophy works with, then why do we need theory? Dooyeweerd says that theory is required to give account of naive experience. Giving account is related to the transcendental direction in philosophy, relating our experience to the Origin.
Philosophy as transcendental thought opens up naive experience, which is restricted to the retrocipatory aspects. Naive experience is therefore a looking back in moments of time, a kind of anamnesis. Naive experience is naive and not deepened. Transcendental thought looks to the future in the opening up of anticipatory moments.

(4) Note the use of 'reveal' for the disclosure of diversity of meaning.

(5) There are naive concepts. All concepts, whether naive or theoretical, relate only to the restrictive, retrocipatory aspects of experience. But naive concepts, unlike theoretical concepts, do not rely on the Gegenstand-relation and the splitting apart of aspects in distasis. Naive concepts, because they have not split apart our experience, can also have no element of synthesis or joining together of meaning (WdW II, 404). It would seem therefore that, although we can have a naive concept, we cannot have a naive Idea.

(6) In the special sciences, naive concepts are broken apart. Different aspects of our experience are distinguished. But this distinguishing occurs only after the setting over-against of the Gegenstand-relation. The distinguishing of functionality (particular functional regularities) is also related to these special sciences.

(7) WdW I, 47. Science relies on the Gegenstand relation. It is totally foreign to naive experience. If it is totally foreign, then Strauss and Clouser are wrong in their view that theory is different "only in degree" from naive thought.

(8) WdW I, 47. The deeper that science penetrates into its Gegenstand, the more it shows a "lack" in comparison with naive experience. It is deeper, but it is also more distant from our experience. Dooyeweerd discusses this more in Volume II.

#30 Notes regarding WdW I, 48

(1) This is not a separate section in the NC. Some may be included in NC I, 84-85, but much is not included.

(2) The special sciences do not have a view of totality. In fact, they lose from their grasp the experience of reality itself. This statement is included at NC I, 84:

> By being bound to a special scientific viewpoint, a special science loses the vision of the whole with respect to empirical reality, and consequently the integral empirical reality itself is lost from its grasp.

I think that many scientists would be shocked by this statement, since they believe that they are the ones who in fact do know empirical reality. But "by being bound to a special scientific viewpoint" they interpret all the aspects from that viewpoint and tend to level the diversity of meaning (I, 43). Does this not mean that the special sciences of necessity engage in a kind of absolutization? They require a re-integration into the continuity of cosmic time.

If the view of integral empirical reality is lost in the special sciences, then to remain in that point of view can also impair our normal naive experience. To remain within the scientific view then represents a temptation. This has not been recognized by
reformational philosophers like Clouser, who has stated (in an online discussion) that he sees theoretical work as no more dangerous than naive thought.

(3) The special sciences remain stuck within the investigation of particularized meaning. They cannot give an account of naive experience. This is also in NC I, 84.

(4) Naive concepts are 'ingesteld' within the full temporal reality. This is contrasted with uiteen-stelling, the dis-stasis of theoretical thought. 'Ingesteld' here must mean enstasis, an integral experience.

(5) Naive experience does not have the articulated, ex-plied theoretical knowledge that distinguishes the aspects.

(6) The NC has this to say about naive experience:

Furthermore, so far as it is rooted in the ground-motive of the christian religion, naive experience also has the radical and integral view of temporal reality by which the latter is concentrically conceived in its true religious root and in its relation to its true Origin. But its view of the whole is a naive one, which for lack of a theoretical insight into the modal diversity of meaning does not satisfy the requirements of the transcendental ground-Idea as hypothesis of philosophic thought. (I, 84)

That is a difficult statement to understand. How can naive experience "concentrically conceive" of temporal reality? That is a good description of the necessity to see temporal reality as related to its center, concentrically. But is that not what is done by Ideas in transcendental thought? How can naive thought do it if it is restricted to retrocipatory aspects?

The WdW does not have this statement. It says that naive experience has a view of totality, insofar as in its religious attitude it views temporal reality in the light of God's Word from out of its creaturely relation to God. But this naive view of totality misses the theoretical focus that is required in the ground-Idea of philosophy.

(7) The distinction between naive and theoretical views of totality is better explained in the next statement of the WdW: "Naïve experience has an intuitive knowledge of the all-sidedness of things." Naive experience has an intuitive grasp of totality, but not an explicited theoretical Idea of totality. There is a distinction between intuitive and theoretical knowledge.

Van Eeden also distinguishes an intuitive knowledge ('weten') from theoretical 'kennen.' He says that the highest knowledge is a 'weten,' instead of 'kennis.' It is the ‘veritas sicuti se habet’ of thomas a Kempis, the incomprehensible understanding, the ‘Visio sine Comprehension’, the Mysterium Magnum of Boehme, the kennen in opposition to wissen of Von Helmoltz. (van Tricht, 84). This deepest knowledge is an inner knowledge related to the Self. The source of deepest knowledge is ‘Zelfschouw’ –the intuitive knowledge of Self. This kind of knowledge or 'weten' has of its own nature a tendency to be directed towards God. There is a spark within us directed to the light ("zelf-richtend licht, een vonk, oneindig klein (Lied van Schijn en Wezen, I, XII, 48). Our selfhood makes the choice:
Het Ik, dat doet de keuze, ‘t leidend weten, dat Richting geeft (I, XII, 55).

And yet van Eeden also appreciates theoretical knowledge. This is one reason that Dooyeweerd was attracted to his ideas. (Verburg, 20, referring to the second half of Dooyeweerd's article 'De neo-mystiek en Fr. van Eeden' Nov 27, 1914. The second half of the article is devoted to van Eeden).

#31 Notes regarding WdW I, 49

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 84. the NC does not have a separate heading for the section headed "methodological precedence."

(2) The unity of concrete things in the diversity of meaning is a problem for philosophy. That statement must come as a surprise to those reformational philosophers who want to begin with things as unproblematic. But Dooyeweerd does not begin with things. He says that methodologically the philosophic research of the abstract aspects must precede the philosophic analysis of the structure of concrete things. This seems to be a difference from Vollenhoven, who starts with things, facts and events.

(3) Dooyeweerd here contrasts the special sciences with "mere enstasis." ("de zich bloot in de werkelijkheid instellende denkhouding der naive ervaring." This statement does not appear in the NC. Elsewhere, Dooyeweerd speaks about not "falling back" into the naive attitude. These statements indicate that theoretical thought, while a distancing from our experience, is nevertheless a deepening of it.

We may perhaps compare it with Baader’s view of pre-theoretical experience as a "blind, unfree empiricism" (Werke 6,89 ft 1, 1,130). and in Über den Zwiespalt des religiösen Glaubens und Wissens he refers to the "merely outer seeing" (58, ft. 14).

I believe that for both Dooyeweerd and Baader, our naive experience is deepened when, after the dis-stasis of theoretical thought, we return to a deepened experience by theoretical synthesis, which relies on our intuition.

(4) Dooyeweerd contrasts ‘in-stelling’ [enstasis] to ‘uiteen-stelling’ [dis-stasis]. Here he also contrasts ‘in-stelling’ to ‘tegenoverstelling’ [opposition, standing over-against, Gegenstand]. These various uses of 'stelling' are not brought out at all in the NC translation in NC I, 85.

(5) I have translated 'aftrekt' here as 'abstract.' But this abstraction should be understood in the sense of the refraining from the full experience of cosmic time, willed withdrawal from that full experience.

#32 Notes regarding WdW I, 50

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 86, with changes in the NC. The WdW has a separate heading, "Naive thought is never gegenständlich"
(2) Philosophy also uses the Gegenstand-relation of over-against. It is distinguished from the special sciences in that it is directed towards totality. Dooyeweerd disagrees with the view that sees philosophy as "reflexive." But philosophic thought is not directed back towards thought, but towards the selfhood. It is critical self-reflection, but not reflexive.

(3) The WdW has an important passage that is not included in the NC. It concerns the objectifying in naive experience. We objectify when we include earlier aspects within later aspects of our experience. The earlier and later must be understood as successive moments in time. The earlier and later is not to be understood in a logical way. This is one of the differences with Vollenhoven.

Dooyeweerd gives an example, of our naive observation of a tree. In simple perception of a tree I objectify it. "I objectify the thing’s actual subjective reality-functions within the psychical perceptual representation of my senses." Now it is interesting that he refers to a "reality-function." As I discuss under aspects, Dooyeweerd initially saw "reality" as one of the modes. Later, this was incorporated into the physical aspect.

In this case, my perception in the psychical aspect objectifies the trees subjective physical functions. Within my subjective psychical function, the tree does not function as a subject, but only as an object. This is the subject-object relation, where we as subject see beings within other realms (inorganic, organic, animal).

(4) Objectifying is not the same as the "placing over-against" in the Gegenstand-relation.

(5) The NC translates 'over-against' as 'antithetical,' which gives it too logical a meaning. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the Gegenstand-relation is not a logical distinction.

#33 Notes regarding WdW I, 51-53

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 86-88, but many changes in the NC.

(2) WdW I, 51: "even more of a problem in philosophic thought." Dooyeweerd uses the philosophic term a fortiori.

(3) NC I, 87 has an important new statement. It distinguishes between the intentional structure of philosophic thought (the Gegenstand) and its ontical structure (its a priori conditions).

(4) The foundation (grondlegging) for philosophy is its hypothesis. The hypothesis is the ground-Idea. Much of postmodernism says it is opposed to all foundational thinking. But postmodernism has unacknowledged foundations. Furthermore, dooyeweerd's Ground-idea does not seek a foundation within temporal reality, but outside of it in the a priori conditions that make philosophy itself possible. Postmodernism will regard this as a reversion to Kantian transcendental philosophy. but Dooyeweerd criticizes Kant's philosophy, too. and, as Perovich has argued, much of postmodern constructivist thinking is in fact hyper-Kantian.
(5) I have translated ‘reflectief’ as ‘reflective’ thought, that is, meditative thought directed to the selfhood, and not ‘reflexive’ thought centered on thought itself. The NC mistranslates it as "truly reflexive thought" (NC I, 87).

(6) In this critical self-reflection we "turn into ourselves" because only in our selfhood do we transcend the limits of theoretical thought. There is an inward directed thought. The NC translates this as "retire into ourselves."

(7) The Ground-Idea of philosophy is less than the totality to which it points. Idealism fails to recognize this, and identifies the Idea with totality of meaning.

(8) Philosophy is transcendental in pointing towards totality, but it depends on a transcendent foundation. Thus, philosophy is both transcendent and transcendental. This view requires a central/peripheral distinction. Philosophy is made possible in the peripheral world of cosmic time, but it is directed out of the central supratemporal.

#34 Notes regarding WdW I, 53
(1) Corresponds in part to NC I, 89.
(2) Kant was partially correct in directing philosophy towards the self, but he absolutizes the Idea of freedom.

#35 Notes regarding WdW I, 54
(1) Corresponds to NC I, 91.
(2) The selfhood participates in the religious root. We participate either in the fallen root or in the New Root, Christ.
(3) Dooyeweerd uses ‘objective’ to refer to a higher realm. He refers to a "higher objective judge." This is similar to Baader’s use of the subject/object relation. An object is in another realm, either higher or lower than us.
The NC doesn’t like to use ‘objective’ and therefore says "ultimate judge."
(4) Dooyeweerd seems to be defending himself here against the charge of relativism. The temporal world is relative, but our knowledge is not relativistic.

#36 Notes regarding WdW I, 55
(1) Corresponds to NC I, 92.
(2) NC has cosmic time is the "pre-supposition" of philosophic thought. The text says cosmic time first makes philosophic thought possible. It is a presupposition only in the sense of an a priori ontical condition.
(3) Speculative metaphysics seeks the absolute and the supratemporal within the temporal. It results in absolutizations. Dooyeweerd gives many examples of this, including modern "values philosophy."
#37 Notes regarding WdW I, 56

1. Corresponds to NC I, 93.
2. The NC gives a longer quotation from Calvin, adding that although God is not subject to law, He is not arbitrary.
3. Some of the polemicism of the last paragraph not included in NC.
4. Dooyeweerd speaks of the “law of time.” Cosmic time is itself the law holding for the temporal cosmos. The NC does not have this phrase.
5. The place of the law was one of the disagreements with Vollenhoven. vollenhoven placed the law outside the cosmos. For Dooyeweerd, it is within the cosmos, as a side of it. And here he says it is the same as time.
6. Philosophy is not the servant of theology.

#38 Notes regarding WdW I, 57

1. Corresponds to NC I, 93.
2. Dooyeweerd's Calvinistic testimony in this section is omitted in the NC. Dooyeweerd moved away from referring to his philosophy as Calvinistic.
3. Dooyeweerd gives his account of how he arrived at the law-Idea. The reference to Leibniz is interesting. Van Eeden certainly refers to Leibniz with respect to modalities, and van Eeden also develops an idea of law. Dooyeweerd does not mention van Eeden. Nor does he mention Baader, with whom his thought seems even more deeply connected. As Verburg remarks, Dooyeweerd has nowhere given a detailed account of the development of his philosophy. See Notes on the Foreword.
4. Both law and subjectivity (being subject to law) reveal themselves in the relation and coherence of the aspects.

#39 Notes regarding WdW I, 58

1. Corresponds to NC I, 94.
2. Verburg says that Kohnstamm objected to the term 'law-Idea.'
3. One of the reasons that Dooyeweerd gives for retaining the term 'law-Idea' is that 'law' refers to limitation. As I have discussed elsewhere, the law limits and determines temporal reality. Part of the limitation is the restraint. Determination includes the differentiation and particularization of meaning.
4. Dooyeweerd's third reason for retaining the term is not included in NC. This is that there is no dimension of philosophic thought that does not have the a priori influence of the law-Idea. The law-Idea also keeps us from being stuck in the special sciences.
negative view of the special sciences is not repeated in the NC. The law-Idea forces us towards self-reflection about our enstasis (instilling).

(5) He mentions Stoker's criticism that philosophy must also give account of the intrinsic unity of things that cannot dissolve into their law-side and subject-side [Stoker wanted to maintain some idea of substance]. Note: the Dutch here says "law- and subject-aspects." I assume that this is a mistake, and I have translated it as "law-side and subject-sides." He says that Stoker may be right, but then he emphasizes that the law-Idea keeps us from falling back into pre-theoretical naive experience. Now it is in naive experience that we have an experience of concrete things. Dooyeweerd elsewhere says that philosophy does not begin with things. Here he does not want to fall back into that attitude, either. Dooyeweerd does not accept Stoker's call for an acceptance of some idea of substance.

(6) This is a somewhat negative view of both naive experience and of the knowledge of the special sciences. Our experience needs to be deepened. He believes that the law-Idea helps us to deepen this experience. and he does say that in the final instance, scientific thought must again appeal to naive experience. I believe that this is to the intuition that is within naive experience.

(7) The NC translates "subject-side" as "factual side." The same term "factual side" is used again at NC I, 174 (which does not appear in the WdW). It says that the law-Idea implies the Idea of the subject, which points toward the factual-side of reality. (NC I, 96). This idea of the "factual" is not prominent in the WdW. Within philosophic thought, Dooyeweerd speaks of "states of affairs." The WdW in this passage refers to the "subject-side" and not the "factual side." To speak of 'facts' seems to me to be more along Vollenhoven's philosophy which begins with things and facts, and places law outside the cosmos.

(8) Nevertheless, it is interesting that in both the WdW and the NC translation, subjectivity is known by Idea. We approximate even what the subject is.

#40 Notes regarding WdW I, 62

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 97.

(2) Dooyeweerd is bothered by Stoker's charge that the WdW is a meaning-idealism. His preliminary reply is that meaning-idealism posits a view of reality that is meaningless and to which we ascribe meaning. His view is that meaning is not ascribed to reality, but that it has meaning in the sense of its restless, dependent nature.

(3) Without the relation to the Origin, created reality would sink into nothingness. This view of creation is not the same as those views of creatio ex nihilo that posit a dualism between creature and Creator. Dooyeweerd makes this point:

But it is well known that the words *ex nihilo* have turned out to be not entirely harmless in Augustine's theological exposition of the doctrine of creation, since they foster the idea that nothingness would be a second origin of creaturely being bringing about a metaphysical defect in the latter (“Cornelius Van Til and the Transcendental Critique of Theoretical Thought,” Jerusalem and Athens, p. 460, fn15).
In opposition to such a dualistic view of creation, Dooyeweerd sets out his view of created reality as meaning, and as dependent on God. In his Response to the Curators, Dooyeweerd says that the idea of a boundary between God and creation is a reference to our deep dependence on God, and not a separation between God and creature:

The creature on the other hand stands under the law. That means the deep dependence and limitation of the latter. Calvin keenly carries through this basic idea with respect to human knowing, as in his Inst. I, 10, 2 and I, 5, 7 he takes the field against the “vacua en meteoria speculatie” about the substantial being of God (“quid sit apud se” in opposition to the “qualis erga nos”). The idea of a boundary breaks through here clearly and brightly.

And that Mr. Hepp should subscribe to the remark made from a certain side, that the law boundary is a separation [scheiding] between God and creature, which would be in conflict with the community with God in Christ, is just as unlikely to be accepted

(4) The reference to the Being of the Arché, is one of Dooyeweerd’s clearest expressions of an ultimate ontology of Being. "Only God’s mode of being is not meaning, because only He exists by Himself and through Himself."

(5) Again, Dooyeweerd shows that the mode of being of thought and the logical aspect are much the same.

(6) "Live, act, or move." Is this a reference to God "in whom we live and move and have our being?" (Acts 17:28).

(7) He again refers to the natural (pre-logical) sides of reality. The NC does not carry forward this word 'natural.'

#41 Notes regarding WdW I, 63

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 97.

(2) The law-Idea includes the Idea of subjectivity. This is because law and subject are both sides of the same reality.

(3) Our concepts of law and subject are dependent on these Ideas.

(4) Concepts are limited to particularity of meaning within the diversity of meaning.

(5) NC refers to concepts of law and subject as used in the special sciences.
#42 Notes regarding WdW I, 63b

(1) NC very different at NC I, 98.

(2) The NC has a good translation of "He dissolves the subject of the juridical aspect into a function of the juridical norm in a normative-logical way." The NC says, "as a complex of legal rules."

(3) The NC adds a paragraph referring to typical laws corresponding to structures of individuality.

#43 Notes regarding WdW I, 64-65


(2) Dooyeweerd's says that the temporal world has no reality in itself:

Our temporal world, in its temporal diversity of meaning and coherence of meaning, is in the order of God’s creation bound to the religious root of the human race, and has without this root no meaning, and therefore no reality.

This view is strongly contested by some philosophers who claim to follow Dooyeweerd. For example, Clouser wants to interpret Dooyeweerd as saying that the temporal world cannot exist apart from humanity, but that this does not mean it has no existence apart from humanity. However, Dooyeweerd's words here are very clear. Without the religious root, the temporal world has no meaning and therefore no reality. Dooyeweerd says that it is this religious rootedness in the supratemporal self, the central unity of our existence, that is the “key of knowledge.” *(In the Twilight of Western Thought, 125)*.

(3) It is because of this rootedness of the cosmos in humanity that the cosmos fell along with humanity in the fall. Everything fitted into the temporal world was cursed.

(4) In support of this, Dooyeweerd appeals to the Scriptures. This should be contrasted with his usual aversion to proof-texting.

(5) The NC refers to the transcendent religious root as also having no meaning in itself: “…but it remains in the ex-sistential mode of meaning which points beyond itself and is not sufficient to itself.” Even the religious root, in which the temporal world finds its existence, has no existence in itself. Everything created, whether temporal or supratemporal, is meaning, referring to the Origin.

(6) The very important last paragraph of I, 64 is not in the NC. "Zoo ging de breuk door in alle zin-zijden der kosmische werkelijkheid in de tijd." There is a 'break' in all the cosmic sides of reality in time ('breuk' as break, rupture). 'Breuk' can also mean refraction.

(7) The logos functions as a meaning-side of reality. It, too is fallen, and has become the "mind of the flesh." What does this mean in practice. I believe that it means we operate as if our logical function were autonomous, as if it were our selfhood.
#44 Notes regarding WdW I, 66-68

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 101-103.

(2) This section contains one of the most important passages in the WdW—the prism of cosmic time. It illustrates the differentiation of the supratemporal unity into the diversity of temporal meaning. The prism has been used as a symbol for this by others, including Baader and van Eeden. It is also found in Eckhart and Rudolf Otto.

(3) The differentiation from unity to diversity also applies to law and sin: "One law, one sin, one creation."

(4) In Christ, nothing in temporal reality can be lost. (NC I, 101). This is a strong statement. Has the temporal world already been redeemed, and is that redemption being carried out? That is what Dooyeweerd seems to say elsewhere. He acknowledges that the problem of evil is difficult, but he does not take the easy dualistic way out of positing a non-redeemed evil opposed to God. Even in his Idea of redemption, Dooyeweerd is nondualistic.

(5) The NC takes out the reference to Calvinistic. Dooyeweerd came to reject that terminology in favour of a more ecumenical view of his philosophy.

(6) This section refers to the Arché "through and to whom" our cosmos has been created. This emphasizes the genetic origin from and the anticipatory meaning towards the Origin.

(7) The NC adds "cosmic order of time" instead of "law order."

(8) The NC uses "modal irreducibility" in place of "sovereignty."

(9) Each sovereign aspect displays within itself the full spectrum. This is sphere universality.

(10) The final line of this section uses the word 'modality.' This is one of the first times that the word ‘modality’ is used. The NC has the awkward phrase, “each aspect in its modal structure.” For the difference between aspect and mode, see aspect.

(11) Dooyeweerd says that he will now refer to the meaning-sides of reality as law-spheres. He is not always consistent in this. He says that sphere sovereignty is related to an "enclosed functionality."

#45 Notes regarding WdW I, 69

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 104.

(2) It is interesting that Dooyeweerd regards the word 'religion' as deriving from 'religio' in the sense of a joining of meaning. This assumes an etymology of the word from 're-ligare,' meaning "to link back" (suggested by Lactantius in his Divinae Institutiones) and not "re-legere" (suggested by Cicero in his De natura deorum). Lactantius derived the word 'religion' from 'religare.' He said it meant the reunion of man with God. This reconciliation included the three ideas of an original unity, a separation by sin, and a restoration of the unity again.

(3) *ipse dixit*: “Because I say so.”

(4) Creaturely meaning and the Being of the Arché are not on the same level. This is a definite ontology, and despite Dooyeweerd's protests, it is a metaphysical view of the Origin. That does not mean it is not correct. It does mean that Dooyeweerd cannot avoid a metaphysics, either.

### Notes regarding WdW I, 70

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 104, with several changes.

(2) The NC changes 'a priori' to "transcendental basic principle."

(3) The reference to 'Calvinistic' is removed in the NC.

(4) The NC does not include the phrase "cosmic order of laws" [kosmische wetsorde].

(5) The paragraphs about refracted particularized meaning do not appear in the NC.

(6) The word ‘organism’ does not appear in the NC.

(7) Dooyeweerd's linking of the cosmic order of time to predestination is also not included in the NC.

(8) Dooyeweerd says that the coherence is a law-order of a horizontal nature. Verticality is linked to sovereignty in its own sphere. The horizontal relativizes the vertical particularized meaning of the law-spheres. This distinction horizontal/vertical does not seem to be included in the NC, unless it appears elsewhere.

### Notes regarding WdW I, 71

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 105.

(2) Sovereignty in own sphere applies to particularized meaning of the law-spheres. It has no meaning in totality because there is a coincidence of meaning.

(3) Dooyeweerd uses the word “elkander dekken” for the mutual congruence of the spheres. Baader also refers to congruency of meaning in this way:

> Each part of such a systematic knowledge-philosophy is, just like each limb of an organism, a whole, a sphere enclosed in itself; the one Idea is therein as a particular determination. Just like each individual limb of an organism, each individual sphere therefore breaks through the bounds of its elements or of its separation, because within it it is totality, and it represents the All in its mode,
in doing this it founds a further sphere, that is, it extends itself virtually in the combined spheres of the organic system. The system is arranged as a sphere comprised of other spheres congruent with each other, although distinguished by degrees among themselves and comprised in each other, of which each [sphere] is a necessary continuing moment. From its own elements or particularities, the system constitutes the whole Idea, which also appears in each individual part. "Everything in the whole, and the whole in each part." [Lichtstrahlen, 104]

The NC uses the word “coincide.”

(4) Dooyeweerd suggests meditation on the cross of Christ in order to have some Idea of the coincidence of meaning, the concentration point of our heart. this idea, the intersection of the vertical and the horizontal in the symbol of the cross, is also used by C.G. Jung with respect to the coincidence of "opposites." This suggestion about meditation on the cross of Christ does not appear in the NC translation.

#48 Notes regarding WdW I, 71b

(1) Corresponds to NC 106.

(2) There is a successive refraction of meaning. The aspects are in a certain order of cosmic time, an order of earlier and later. This temporal order is continuous. It becomes discontinuous when there is dis-stasis. The logical aspect is then discontinuous with the aspects to which it is opposed.

Vollenhoven did not agree that the order of the aspects was a temporal order.

(3) Because concepts are discontinuous, our theory can only approximate the continuity of time. This is done in "limiting concepts," or Ideas.

(4) The logos [in the sense of all meaning] is relativized by cosmic time into the various aspects. This is not a logical relativity, but a cosmological relativity.

(5) The logical aspect has laws of thinking that cannot be relativized; if we try to do so, it leads to antinomies.

(6) NC has 'logical function' instead of 'logos.'

#49 Notes regarding WdW I, 72

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 107.

(2) NC has “cosmic time-order”

(3) Much of the discussion of Kant has not been included in the NC.

(4) Baader makes similar criticisms of Kant.
(5) Immanence philosophy supposes it can have a self-reflexive view of thought. As discussed earlier, Dooyeweerd emphasizes not reflexiveness of thought, but reflection on the selfhood.

#50 Notes regarding WdW I, 73

(1) This section does not appear in the NC.

(2) There is no precedence in value of one aspect over another. Values philosophy is possible only on the immanence standpoint. Values philosophy absolutizes the normative aspects.

(3) I have changed the word 'sluitstuk' [breech-block of a gun] to 'sluitsteen' [capstone]. The first word makes no sense in this context.

(4) What does it mean that normative absolutizing in values philosophy is separated from the subject? I believe that this means that there can be no absolute values, because the subject must be is taken into account. There is a historical positivizing required for the law.

#51 Notes regarding WdW I, 74-75

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 108.

(2) The idea of the subject as sujet, sub-jected to law, is found in Baader.

(3) WdW I, 75. Dooyeweerd refers to the apostate attitude of thought. He hyphenates the word as 'apo-statische.' There is therefore a play on the word 'static' from 'sta' to stand. In naive experience we are in the en-static attitude, in full temporal reality. The apo-static attitude is then a moving from [apo] stasis. When we absolutize the temporal, we do not experience reality as it really is, in true stasis. apostasy is therefore not only an attitude against God, it is an attitude against reality. This is why Dooyeweerd can say that in apostate thought we do not understand ourselves, God or the cosmos. Later, Dooyeweerd makes a very interesting contrast between apostatic and anastatic (WdWI, 80).

(4) Dooyeweerd refers to the 'rational spheres of consciousness" in contrast to the 'natural' [pre-logical]. In Kant's philosophy, these natural spheres are seen only as "object." And the subject is not seen as "sujet" or "sub-jected."

#52 Notes regarding WdW I, 76-78

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 110-11

(2) The NC has an extensive discussion of irrationalist existentialism, and ancient Greek thought. It does not include the section on Aquinas.

(3) This section discusses rationalism and irrationalism.
(4) The idea of the *lex aeterna* subjects God to the law. The binding force of the law is brought back to God's will. But Dooyeweerd himself refers to the law which limits and determines as being dependent on the creative and sovereign will of God (II, 492). How is this any different? Dooyeweerd refers to Calvin's dictum that God is not subject to the law, but not arbitrary. What does "not arbitrary" mean if not some standard for God's actions?

(5) Similar questions must be asked about Dooyeweerd's criticism of natural law. He says that it contains particularized law in itself as *entelechia*. How is this different from Dooyeweerd's view that law is potential and must be actualized or positivized? Is it because his view allows for a changing of the law to fit different subjective historical circumstances? These questions are beyond the scope of the present commentary and study.

(6) WdW I, 78 [NC I, 101]: The important point is made here that the 'actuality' spoken of by phenomenology is actually the kernel of each subject-function. What does this mean? First of all, acts occur in the supratemporal. The kernel of each subject-function is therefore in the supratemporal. Elsewhere he says that we know the kernel only in its analogies. We have to form an idea of the kernel. But this goes even further. It is the kernel of the subject function that is the actual. Temporal reality has both a law and a subject-side. The kernel of both the law-side and the subject-side is therefore in the supratemporal realm, at least insofar as human subjects are concerned. This whole discussion requires further research. what is clear is that any view that sees the aspects as "properties" of things of which we can form concepts is not in line with Dooyeweerd's own philosophy.

(8) WdW I, 78 [NC I, 101]: Another important point here is made here that Heidegger's view of "Vorhandenes" assumes a static givenness in the subject-side of reality. As I understand Dooyeweerd here, if temporal reality is not static, but dynamic, then Heidegger's criticism misses the mark. The dynamism consists in the temporal coherence [with other aspects and other things], and in the restless nature of being. This restlessness is towards God as Origin, but also towards the heart of humanity, as the religious supratemporal root of temporal reality.

#53 Notes regarding WdW I, 80-82

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 114-118. The NC is quite different.

(1) The NC does not have the same emphasis on the Archimedean point.

(2) Dooyeweerd makes a remarkable contrast between apo-stasis and ana-stasis. As argued before, apostasy is a standing out of the coherence of time because of absolutization. It is no longer en-stasis, but apo-stasis. The idea of ana-stasis is contrasted with apo-stasis. Anastasis means 'resurrection'–it is a "standing again." In contrast to the apostate choice of Archimedean point, we can make the proper choice. This is resurrection, new life. This is the "standing in the truth" of which Dooyeweerd speaks later.
Dooyeweerd therefore uses 'resurrection' in a context that is achievable before death.

(3) The NC does not have this idea of anastasis.

(4) In this resurrection or anastasis, we "discover our self to our self." This is a remarkable phrase. It means, I believe, the re-discovery of our true self. In apostasy, we have fallen from our true self.

(5) The mathematical judgment is not true in itself.

(6) Philosophic thought develops historically. But this historical development must not be used in a historicistic way to relativize the religious choice of position that gives direction to this development.

### #54 Notes regarding WdW I, 83

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 119.

(2) This section of the NC does not emphasize sphere sovereignty as much as the original WdW.

(3) I have translated 'synthesis' here as 'accommodation' in order to distinguish it from theoretical synthesis or which Dooyeweerd approves.

(4) NC has ‘faculties’ instead of powers [krachten]. This weakens the dynamic view of reality that is described.

(5) NC has God’s 'guidance' instead of 'direction.' Both are correct translations of the word, but I believe that the stronger word is intended in this context.

(6) The reference to the thread is to the thread of Ariadne in the myth of the labyrinth. This reference is wholly missing in NC translation.

### #55 Notes regarding WdW I, 84

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 120

(2) Dooyeweerd emphasizes elsewhere that the line of antithesis runs through the hearts of each of us, even through the existence of every Christian personality (NC I, 524). Antithesis should not be used to draw lines between different persons or groups of people. Unfortunately, that is the way the idea of antithesis is frequently used in reformational philosophy.

Baader also speaks of the religious antithesis.

(3) The polar oppositions that arise from dualistic Ground Motives are also described by Baader.

### #56 Notes regarding WdW I, 86

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 123124.
(2) Polar tensions result from absolutizations. Baader also speaks of these polar opposites.

**#57 Notes regarding WdW I, 121**
(1) Corresponds to NC I, 153.
(2) NC says “sets the logical aspect of thought in contrast to the abstracted a-logical aspect of experience.” I believe that “over-against” better describes the Gegenstand-relation. The Gegenstand-relation is explained in more detail in the excerpts from Volume II.

**#58 Notes regarding WdW I, 122**
(1) Corresponds to NC I, 154.
(2) Most of this section is a critique of Litt. Many of Dooyeweerd's arguments are also applicable against postmodernist philosophy.
(3) NC 156 uses the term 'religious attitude' for 'ground-attitude.'

**#59 Notes regarding WdW I, 125**
(1) Corresponds to NC I, 156.
2. "Theoretical clarity" is the ex-plication of our pre-theoretical experience.

**#60 Notes regarding WdW I, 125b**
(1) Corresponds to NC I, 157.
(2) Worldviews are enstastic. Philosophy cannot be enstastic, but can only approximate enstasis. There is a 'residue' in worldviews that escapes any concepts.
(3) Scientific abstraction keeps a distance from life.

**#61 Notes regarding WdW I, 127**
(1) Corresponds to NC I, 158.
(2) NC has “standard of truth” instead of “concept of law.”
(3) This is an important critique of Kant's view of universal validity.
(4) Dooyeweerd's view of universal validity is the "agreement" of a judgment with the divine law for the cosmos in its particularized meaning, coherence of meaning and fullness of meaning.
#62 Notes regarding WdW I, 129-132

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 160-163.

(2) Like the NC, I have translated ‘ik’ here as ego. The reference is to an individual "I."

(3) Even laws of theoretic thought are not true in themselves, but only in the temporal coherence and in relation to the religious root unity of the divine law.

(4) Generally, Dooyeweerd reserves the phrase "state of affairs" for theoretical analysis. But here he refers to an individual, concrete state of affairs. It is interesting that he does not refer to "facts."

(5) Pre-theoretic thought is enstatic.

(6) Dooyeweerd says (WdW I, 131) that the truth of supra-theoretical religious assertions is based on whether they agree with the religious root unity. How would this agreement be determined? By one's intuitive knowledge? Could it be demonstrated to "others" or does that question not make sense in the religious fullness? Dooyeweerd makes clear that it is not to be judged by "normal consciousness" (I, 132).

#63 Notes regarding WdW I, 133

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 164.

(2) NC sometimes translates “algemeen” as ‘general,’ sometimes as ‘universal.’

(3) NC does not include that part of this section referring to s‘ingesteld’ [enstasis]

(4) Dooyeweerd says theoretical thought concerns the individual subject as well as the law. That is contrary to the way we often regard theoretical thought. It also seems to be contrary to those reformational philosophers who regard theory as the abstraction of universals from individual things.

#64 Notes regarding WdW I, 134

(1) Corresponds to NC I, 164.

(2) NC leaves out the word antithetical (‘anti-thetische’) in referring to the human community.

(3) In its historical development, philosophic thought is communal and social. It is not just individual. But this does not necessary mean that the supratemporal root is either individual or communal. It is supra-individual.

#65 Notes regarding WdW II, 399

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 467.

(3) The NC uses the words "inter-modal synthesis of meaning" whereas the original Dutch merely refers to "synthesis of meaning." Perhaps this was due to a fear of confusing theoretical synthesis with accommodation synthesis of Ground-Motives. But by adding more words, it makes the sentence more difficult to read, as well as confusing. It has prevented some readers from seeing that the synthesis is between our actual thought [an act from out of our selfhood] and the Gegenstand of abstracted aspects, which is not actual or ontical, but only intentional. See synthesis.

(4) Of more significance is the fact that the NC loses the impact of the question, "How is synthesis of meaning possible?" This is found in Kant.

(5) The second question is, "What is it that is set-over-against the logical aspect in this synthesis?" This is unclear in the NC because it uses the phrase "theoretical antithesis" for the "setting-over-against." Antithesis is a logical function. But the setting-over-against is an opposition of the logical aspect itself to the other aspects. The logical aspect has the capability of having a Gegenstand. Such a capability is not the same as the logical function's categories of logical analysis, distinction or contradiction.

(6) The NC adds a new paragraph regarding the raising of these questions in the Prolegomena.

(7) The NC adds that immanence philosophy cannot ask the questions "in a really critical manner."

(8) The NC re-words "in the "strict givenness" of that which is purified by the phenomenological reduction." I find the WdW clearer.

(9) Note that Dooyeweerd's own use of 'intentional' should not be confused with the phenomenological usage.

(10) Dooyeweerd expressly says that his use of the word 'Gegenstand' is different from the multivocal use of that word in phenomenology. He also says that his use of the word 'epoché' is also different (IKI, 402).

(11) Dooyeweerd uses the Idea of givenness. But his Idea of the given differs from phenomenology. For phenomenology, the 'given' is something that has been abstracted and purified by theoretical reduction. For Dooyeweerd, the givenness is an ontic a priori. Reality is given by God's law.

(12) The NC adds that Husserl says that the world is "constituted by the transcendental consciousness itself."

(13) The NC adds that pre-Kantian metaphysics saw substance as that which is opposed to our thought. The substance is the 'anticheimenon.' It was regarded as independent of human experience. That of course is not Dooyeweerd's position.
#66 Notes regarding WdW II, 400

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 467.

(2) The NC doesn’t use consistent terminology. Here it uses ‘disjunction’ of the cosmic temporal meaning-systasis instead of ‘dis-stasis.’

(3) Why does Dooyeweerd say that to speak of the "knowing subject" is so problematic? One reason must be that he has a very different view of 'subject' than does immanence philosophy. For Dooyeweerd, the subject is the supratemporal selfhood.

(4) Therefore the next question that he asks is whether the Gegenstand is set over-against our supratemporal selfhood. You would at first think that he would answer "yes" to this question. For our supratemporal selfhood is what is involved in every act of knowing. But he points out that the Gegenstand arises from the theoretical dis-stasis of the temporal systasis of meaning. Our selfhood is not found in this temporal systasis [Dooyeweerd emphasizes this 'not' with italics. This emphasis is not carried through in the NC]. Those reformational philosophers who see theory as the abstraction of universals have ignored this issue. They seem to assume that we still act out of our center, although they sometimes deny that it is supratemporal, adopting Vollenhoven's view of a pre-functional center. They then say that it is only a difference of degree of abstraction of universals. But their idea of abstraction is different than what Dooyeweerd means by dis-stasis

(5) If it is not our supratemporal self that is opposing, then this implies that we have opposed our logical aspect itself to the Gegenstand. How do we do this? This is the essence of the Gegenstand-relation, and it has not been commented on by adherents of Dooyeweerd. It is we ourselves who oppose the Gegenstand, but from within the temporal modal horizon. We intentionally move into the lower level of the temporal. We can do this because temporal reality has its existence in the religious root in which we participate. We intentionally choose a level of inexistence (Inexistenz). We choose to will a refraining from the continuity of cosmic time. (II, 402).

(6) Somehow the logical aspect has this relative autonomy, of giving us a temporary separate consciousness within temporal reality. Dooyeweerd says that dis-stasis is something given within the logical aspect of reality itself. Thus, the dis-stasis is not a result of the Gegenstand relation; theory only makes manifest a possibility in the logical aspect. (NC II, 472). No other aspect has the capability of allowing us to move into this level and be over-against another aspect.

(7) We may say then that the logical aspect does double duty. It somehow provides the basis for the setting-over-against relation. And it also is the function by which we analyze those split-apart aspects. For me the question now arises, "Why does Dooyeweerd think that the logical aspect has these double properties? Why is it so important in the Gegenstand process, and why do no other aspects have this capability? I believe that the answer has to do with some unacknowledged acceptance by Dooyeweerd of the logos doctrine. The logos is all of meaning, but it also functions in the analytical aspect. As logos, the analytical gives us the power of disclosing reality, of deepening our relation to
it. In saying this, I am aware that Dooyeweerd criticizes Kuyper for his teaching about the logos [logosleer] in the article "Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer." Nevertheless I believe that it remains in Dooyeweerd. However, it has been relativized to a merely temporary use of this logos. Perhaps what he objects to is using the logos doctrine to speculate on universals as the ideas of God.

(8) In any event, this partial autonomy is only temporary. We are tempted to see our logical function as actually independent. This is the source of the dichotomistic belief of a distinction between body and soul:

…the traditional dichotomistic conception of human nature as a composition of a material body and an immortal rational soul is doubtless connected with the misconception, that the antithetic relation in the theoretical attitude of thought answers to reality itself (NC I, 44).

(9) The Gegenstand-relation is accomplished by an epoché or refraining from the continuity of time. This refraining is by ourselves.

(10) The idea of the 'resistance' ['tegenstand'] to the dis-stasis by theoretical thought is not made clear d in the NC. The WdW says that the resistance is due to our act of setting-over-against. There is therefore resistance to our placing ourselves in the level of temporal reality.

Baader is helpful here. He says that this resistance is for our own good! That is because there is a temptation to remain at that level. Baader also speaks of moving into the temporal domain as a kenosis. From enstasis we move into the temporal reality, and this is an ek-stasis. Dooyeweerd uses ek-stasis in referring to temporal reality

(11) Dooyeweerd goes on to say that the setting-over-against is in essence the dis-stasis. The splitting apart cannot occur without this setting-over-against. The Gegenstand-relation is necessary to setting apart the aspects.

(12) The dis-stasis also involves analysis. The logical aspect is referred to for this analysis. Therefore, this part of the section is a reiteration of the special place of the logical aspect for the setting-over-against and the resulting dis-stasis of meaning. The logical aspect has a very special correlation with the Gegenstand.

(13) Of course once the aspects have by dis-stasis been split out from their temporal coherence, they are distinguished, compared, analogies are found, they are opened. All of this demands logical distinction and analysis of the logical aspect. But the differentiated cosmic diversity is not to be identified with this logical distinction.

(14) Dooyeweerd uses 'penetrating' [doordringen] and 'durchschauen' to describe analysis.

(15) After analysis, we have to re-enter the continuity of cosmic time in the theoretical synthesis.

(16) Dooyeweerd's use of the terms 'logos,' 'penetrating,' totality,' and 'center' will no doubt encourage some people to dismiss his thought as logo-phallo-centric or some such postmodern term. It would be better to reject Dooyeweerd than to pretend to be an adherent and to consistently misinterpret him. But before you dismiss his philosophy on
that basis, you should carefully consider the ideas, especially as they were previously
developed in Baader, that that we move into the world in theory because of wonder. And
in an act of loving kenosis, we gather up of sparks of God in a non-egotistical way, in
order to preserve them forever without loss of distinction.

#67 Notes regarding WdW II, 401

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 468.

(2) This section states that, unlike the analytical aspect, the psychical aspect does not
offer the possibility of a Gegenstand. It does not set itself over-against other aspects.

(3) There is a subject-object relation within the aspect of feeling. It is not to be confused
with the Gegenstand-relation.

(4) Now it is interesting that there is a subject-object not only with respect to things in
other realms, but relation within the aspects themselves. This has not received the
attention it deserves in interpretation of Dooyeweerd. I believe that the subject-object
relation can be looked at in two ways:

a) Our distinguishing of different realms of reality. Inorganic, organic, animal and the
supratemporal human realm.

b) a subject-object relation within the aspects themselves. See NC II, 369. In the
succession of the aspects, there is an earlier and a later. The earlier aspects are
"objectified" in the later.

(5) I do not believe that these two ways of looking at the subject-object relation mean that
there are two different kinds of relations. The distinguishing of our self from other realms
of reality occurs through the temporal aspects. Our the subject-object relation in our
psychical function "objectifies" the previous aspects that have already preceded it. This is
the sensory function, as well as the forming of images of the moments that have already
occurred (See NC II, 370). The logical subject-object relation then distinguishes those
images from each other and compares them.

(6) This has implications that have not been explored. The objectification by the sensory
aspect is a kind of empiricism. And the comparison of images implies a correspondence
theory of truth.

(7) But Dooyeweerd's 'empiricism' and 'correspondence theory' is different from normally
understood. His empiricism is different from British empiricism because he does not
believe in things in themselves that are unrelated to our existence. Things exist only
within their human supratemporal root. Similarly, his correspondence theory is not a copy
theory in the sense of copying a reality that is independent of us.

(8) The subject-object relation cannot be understood apart from Dooyeweerd's view of
cosmic time, and the aspects as successive moments in our experience.

(9) We act out of our supratemporal center. But within time, our experience is given
in successive moments. Our intuition makes that experience our own.
In restricting the setting-over-against attitude to one connected with the logical aspect, Dooyeweerd is reacting against the Romanticist emphasis on experience as feeling. This is also evident in that he does not allow feeling to be one of the acts of our supratemporal self.

Because feelings do not involve a Gegenstand, they also do not cause any resistance. Even the analytical function has no theoretical resistance as long as it functions within the enstatic continuity of time in naive experience. It is only when we consciously will or intend the Gegenstand relation by an epoché that we have the distasis and the resulting Gegenstand.

The post-logical aspects are founded in the logical aspect. This gives the logical aspect a great importance in Dooyeweerd's thought, so much so that some may consider it to be rationalistic. He would deny this.

The NC improperly refers to the Gegenstand relation as "antithetical." That is too logical.

The NC improperly translates naive experience as the "fullness" of individual temporal reality." But naive experience is not full. It is naive and needs to be deepened. The Dutch word here is "volle niet-uiteengestelde individueele tijdelijke werkelijkheid." The emphasis is on the completely not set-apart. That does not come through in the NC.

Our naive thought is an in-denken, an inward thought, in enstasis. The in-denken is not mentioned in the NC. It seems closer to imagining than to thinking. Naive thought is bound to sensory images.

This is the source of the great disagreement between Dooyeweerd and D.F. M. Strauss. Strauss thought that it was inconsistent to subject the analytic aspect as its own Gegenstand. He wanted to change the whole idea of Gegenstand to the logical subject-object distinction. Verburg reports that Dooyeweerd's copy of Strauss's thesis Begrip en Idee is filled with notes by Dooyeweerd commenting that Strauss did not understand him. Dooyeweerd wrote an article saying that Strauss's view, obliterating the differenced between the gegenstand relation and analysis, would destroy the irreducibility of the modal spheres.

As in earlier passages in the WdW, Dooyeweerd again refers to the function of thought (denk-functie). This identifies an act of thought with a function.

#68 Notes regarding WdW II, 401b

This section is missing from the NC.
(2) The Gegenstand-relation places the deepened analytical aspect over-against the other aspects. We ourselves refrain from the continuity of cosmic time. In doing so, the analytical aspect is deepened (its aspects are opened out).

(3) Can it be that the opened out analytical aspect is the logos as opposed to the closed up merely analytical function of naive thought? That to open up the analytical we need to anticipate the future coincidence of meaning, and so the logical aspect becomes logos? This is speculation on my part, but I am still trying to understand how Dooyeweerd says that it is within the analytical aspect that our capability to set ourselves over-against other aspects arises.

(4) The Gegenstand arises in the synthesis of meaning and over-against the other aspects.

(5) 'Things' exist in a systasis of meaning. They therefore cannot be the Gegenstand, which is part of a dis-stasis.

#69 Notes regarding WdW II, 402

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 468.

(2) The NC seems to translate this as if it were a deepening of meaning of the analytical aspect, instead of the deepening of meaning by the analytical aspect.

(3) The NC does not include the statement of choosing a position over against the cosmos. But this view of choosing a position against the cosmos fits with Dooyeweerd's idea of apo-stasis as being against enstasis. In choosing a position against God, we also choose a position against the cosmos. That is why we cannot then know it correctly.

(4) The word ‘aftrekken’ is here translated ‘refraining’ since that is what the NC uses in this subsection, although the entire NC subsection is quite different. Another translation might be a willed “withdrawal” or "reduction" from the fullness of temporal reality. What the NC does not emphasize at all is that this withdrawal and refraining is a refraining by the supratemporal self; it is a willing by the selfhood to enter the incomplete temporal reality by assuming merely the perspective of the analytical aspect, which has the ability to become separate from the others.

(5) The refraining from the continuity of cosmic time is something that we must will. It is intentional. This is not included in the NC translation. But it is essential to understanding the Gegenstand relation. The NC makes it appear that the epoché is merely theoretical.

(6) The NC improperly translates "primair" as "nothing but" [in the sense of 'primarily']. I have translated it as 'first.' The point here is that before there can be any other theoretical operation, we must first abstract from the continuity of cosmic time.

(7) Antithesis is an over-against the whole cosmos, as opposed to the over-against other aspects in the Gegenstand relation. If religious antithesis tries for complete autonomy, the theoretical over-against tries for a partial autonomy. That is why Dooyeweerd says that
the religious antithesis cannot be identified with the theoretical over-again. This sentence is missing from the NC.

(8) Abstraction is from the continuity of time.

**#70 Notes regarding WdW II, 403**

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 469.

(2) How is the Gegenstand understood as a greater or less degree of abstraction? We may abstract from the continuity of time when we look from the perspective of just one aspect. This is the perspective of the special sciences. Or we can look at the structure of the modal aspects themselves, in a kind of meta-science. That is the highest degree of abstraction, says Dooyeweerd.

Clouser has misunderstood this. He says that all theory is meta-theory, in looking at the structure of aspects. For him, theory is just a greater degree of an abstraction of the same kind as naïve thought. Dooyeweerd is vehemently opposed to this idea, which he opposed when it was proposed by Strauss (following van Riessen).

(3) What does Dooyeweerd mean that a law-sphere has its own internal (immanent) modality of meaning? The answer is that Dooyeweerd initially distinguished between law spheres and modes or aspects. So this internal modality is another kind of Gegenstand.

(3) The third kind of Gegenstand is when we abstract an individuality structure from a thing or human societal relation. The NC improperly translates the latter as 'event.'

**#71 Notes regarding WdW II, 403b**

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 469.

(2) Systasis is a resting, as opposed to the movement of theory [into temporal reality].

(3) The NC fails to bring out the fact that it is peculiar to the aspect of analysis itself to find no rest in systasis.

(4) The deepening is in the "mode of the analytical" [does this make a difference?]

(5) Naïve thought is limited to sensory perception (II, 404).

**#72 Notes regarding WdW II, 404**

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 470.

(2) The word ‘oogenschijn’ makes reference to appearance.

(3) Why does naïve experience use the sensory as its touchstone? Answer lies in difference between retrocipatory and anticipatory meaning. Naïve experience is restricted to the retrocipatory aspects ( ). I believe that this means it is restricted to a remembrance of what has taken place (an anamnesis) instead of an anticipation of the future.
(4) A substratum is an aspect that is earlier in the succession of cosmic time. The NC adds superstratum aspects.

**#73 Notes regarding WdW II, 405**

(1) Corresponds in part to NC II, 471.

(2) NC doesn’t refer to the *epoché* except in the heading of the subsection. It also does not refer to the inability of reality to break through.

(3) Emphasis on *epoché* as movement within the temporal. [not movement into the temporal here]

(4) The theoretical concept abstracts from the continuity of time.

**#74 Notes regarding WdW II, 405b**

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 471.

(2) Direction towards the Gegenstand cannot be explained from the analytical aspect alone.

(3) The logical sphere is the anticipatory sphere for pre-logical spheres. Pre-logical or natural spheres are opened by it.

(4) There is a pre-disposition to be opened. [a potential that needs to be actualized]

(5) The NC adds new paragraph at the end, contrasting this to the view of a thing-in-itself that has no relation whatever to human thought

**#75 Notes regarding WdW II, 406**

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 471b

(2) The logical object-side of reality is deepened. What does he mean by object-side? We know about law-side and subject-side.

(3) The object side is unfolded in the concept of function. Does that mean that we cannot speak of function in naive thought?

(4) The NC doesn't translate 'doordringen' [penetrate].

(5) The NC adds to the end of third paragraph: "Empirical reality is doubtless not *given* in analytical dis-stasis; the latter can only function within the continuous coherence of cosmic time. But this dis-stasis is an objective possibility in the logical aspect of reality itself."

(6) NC omits fourth paragraph.

Dooyeweerd is still trying to explain how the logical aspect has both the ability of *epoché* and the logical function of distinction. It is synthesis, not analysis, that causes the
Gegenstand to arise. So his next question is how synthesis is possible. synthesis cannot be explained from out of the analytical mode [This is Dooyeweerd's disagreement with Strauss].

NC has statement: "The modal analytical aspect cannot explain this possibility, because it has been theoretically abstracted itself."

Function belongs to theory, not naive experience. Naive experience is restricted to distinctions about things from the sensory perspective.

Epoché completes itself in deepened analysis abut it is not initiated there.

#76 Notes regarding WdW II, 407-408

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 472-473.

(2) The epoché is performed upon the continuity, the systasis, of cosmic time.

(3) The excess of analysis is that which cannot be theoretically isolated by the analytic aspect. But didn't Dooyeweerd criticize a similar view of excess or residue within immanence thought?

(4) Intuition is the temporal bottom layer of our act of thinking. Intuition is that which allows me to grasp the temporal coherence immediately, beyond all concepts. What does this mean?

(5) Elsewhere Dooyeweerd says that individuality is given by the bottom layer of time. Is intuition the same as my temporal individuality? Is it my coherence within temporal reality, my ego? Dooyeweerd does not say. But there cannot be two bottom layers of time, so this makes sense. It also allows us to understand why we would be able to immediately understand the temporal coherence in our intuition if that temporal coherence were our own ego.

#77 Notes regarding WdW II, 409

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 474.

(2) Making the temporal aspects as our own is an idea from Baader. If our selfhood is supratemporal, how do we recognize our temporal functions as our own?

(3) The foundational direction is described as “inert.”

(4) The NC translates “in-leven” as “Erleben.” I am not sure this is correct. It then uses the word “Hineinleben” which better captures the idea. But Dooyeweerd did not use ‘Erleben’ in the first place, so the NC makes appear that there is a contrast that is not there in the text. Dooyeweerd uses no German terms at all here.

(5) The "modalities of the law-spheres." Is there a difference? NC makes no distinction in the translation, but at one time Dooyeweerd did. See aspects.
(6) Intuition allows our analytical function to re-enter the continuity of cosmic time. Until then it has been separated by the epoché. NC does not include the words, "turn back to cosmic time in which it is embedded."

(7) What is meant by "free" synthesis? It is opposed to the resting state of systasis. So the closed state is not free. Dooyeweerd's idea of freedom is in some sense opposed to the "natural" functions. Is he thus not setting up a hierarchy of "values" between various functions?

(8) “Freedom of thought.” Does this conflict with the nature/freedom Ground Motive? I believe that Dooyeweerd means exactly that—our theoretic thought is free; it has a limited autonomy. But it must connect again with our intuition.

(9) As soon as we are not engaged in theory, we fall back into the naive attitude. From the transcendental direction of time we return to the foundational direction. Our naive experience should have been deepened. But the naive attitude can become impaired by theory. This has not been commented on by other Dooyeweerd scholars.

(10) NC doesn't do anything with the hyphenated word 'in-sight.' I relate it to penetration, "doorschouwen" [durchschauen].

(11) In the foundational [direction] of knowing is our intuition. Is that because it comes from out of our supratemporal selfhood?

(12) Idea as approximation.

#78 Notes regarding WdW II, 411b

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 475.

(2) NC duplicates part of the text in translation.

(3) It would be interesting to follow up Volkelt's idea of “traces” with the postmodern use of this term, especially in Derrida.

#79 Notes regarding WdW II, 412

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 477.

(2) Sensory impressions, even of a sweet taste, must be related to my own supratemporal selfhood. this is because it relates to a temporal function, which I in my supratemporal selfhood, must make “my own.”

(3) Different use of 'objective' here, although it is related to normal objectification.

(4) The phrase "weet kunnen hebben" is the idea of "weten" as a higher knowledge.

In *Encyclopedia of Legal Science* (1946), Dooyeweerd distinguishes between knowledge in the sense of *kennis* and knowledge in the sense of *weten*:

But naïve experience, although it possesses no articulated synthetic knowledge [*kennis*] of the law-spheres, does have an intuitive knowledge [*weet*] of its richness of meaning. (p. 8)
#80 Notes regarding WdW II, 413

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 478.

(2) Again there is a distinction between modal and law-sphere.

(3) Again there is an emphasis on freedom.

(4) The to-and fro movement is between the deepened analytical aspect and its Gegenstand. This is not the same movement as our entry into the temporal.

(5) Intuition is required for theoretical synthesis. In intuition I relate the meaning-synthesis to the transcendent identity of the modal aspect, which I experience in the religious root of my existence.

(6) Theoretical thought, led by belief in the transcendental direction, turns back [terugwendt] to cosmic time in which it is embedded. There must be a return to cosmic time. The Idea, with its anticipations led by faith, turns us back towards cosmic time.

#81 Notes regarding WdW II, 414

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 479.

(2) There is a pre-theoretical intuition that is active in naive or enstatic thought.

(3) He appears to relate the foundational direction is towards enstasis and rest. Theory is then movement from out of the foundational.

(4) In resting pre-theoretical intuition, I experience temporal reality as my own.

(5) In pre-theoretical intuition we think inwardly.

(6) Intuitive insight is founded in experience in identity. What does he mean? It is a believing in identity. Note the hyphenation. I believe he means our own identity. It may relate to the "identity" of the coincidence of the aspects, but that is less likely in this context.

(7) Only humans possess cosmic and cosmo-logical consciousness. What is the distinction between cosmic and cosmo-logical self-consciousness? Is the latter after logic has set apart the aspects and we have returned to a synthesis?

(8) Like the NC, I have translated 'persoonlijkheid' as 'selfhood.' But perhaps it should be translated as ego, the temporal coherence.

(9) Our selfhood through its intuition of time in the cosmos can think within [in-denken] and to theoretically understand its modal aspects as split apart and joined together.(II, 415). The NC translates 'indenken' as to "entering the temporal cosmos":

"Only his [man's] selfhood is able to enter into the temporal cosmos by means of his intuition of time and to set apart and combine the modal aspects in theoretical thought." (NC II, 480)
I believe that there is an entering of the temporal cosmos in theoretical thought. This "entering" of cosmic time in theory is the descent into cosmic time that Baader refers to as the kenosis. But I would translate 'indenken' as "inner thought" related to our intuition.

(10) Dooyeweerd contrasts man's selfhood, which is able to enter enstatically [en-statisch in-gaan] into the cosmos, with other creatures who have no self-consciousness. They are ex-statically absorbed in the cosmos. This implies that the theoretical entering into cosmic time is an ex-stasis, but our intuition allows us to re-enter the coherence of cosmic time. there is a returning [terugwending] to cosmic time (II, 414).

The NC translates this as entering enstatically into the coherence of cosmic time. It says that other creatures are ex-statically absorbed by their temporal existence.

this entering the cosmos [in-gaan] with creatures that have no self-consciousness. We can enter en-statically into time. Other creatures are absorbed [opgaan] ex-statically in the cosmos.

**#82 Notes regarding WdW II, 415**

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 480.

(2) Intuition is the temporal bottom layer of the modal analytical function.

(3) NC states that our intuition exceeds the analytical aspect. Do we also exceed concepts by this function? For it is intuition that enables us to anticipate in Ideas.

(4) He makes another reference to the "asylum of the ignorant."

(5) For Dooyeweerd, our intuition is not separated from the logical. But this is because he has the analytical aspect play two roles.

**#83 Notes regarding WdW II, 416**

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 480

(2) Dooyeweerd himself believes in an epoché from cosmic time. His disagreement is with a functionalistic interpretation of this.

(3) Note "falling back” into the naïve attitude. This is an odd use of phrase, since the theoretical epoché involves a descent from the continuity of cosmic time. But the naïve experience is naïve and needs to be fulfilled and clarified by theory, in order to also experience the anticipatory aspects.

(4) Dooyeweerd says that Bergson’s view is that the psychical stream of time is primary and that the other aspects of reality are only modalities of the psychical. This is not in the NC. Probably because it may have been confusing with Dooyeweerd’s own view that modalities are modes of meaning of a continuous cosmic time.

(5) Bergson’s idea of placing oneself in the mobile may perhaps be compared with Dooyeweerd’s idea of moving out from enstasis. The idea of “empathy” may also be found here, at least in Baader's idea of kenosis. This is the movement of love in moving into the temporal world from out of our enstasis.
(6) Doesn't Dooyeweerd himself have this view of a penetration of reality by means of the Gegenstand relation, which is possible only because of our intuition? He says Bergson refers to 'indringen.' Is that different from 'doordringen?'

(7) If Bergson emphasizes the fluid, so does Dooyeweerd, following Baader (starre und fliessende). Dooyeweerd contrasts the static with the dynamic.

(8) He says that in Bergson there is a painful passing to concepts. But Dooyeweerd himself speaks of a resistance in the Gegenstand!

(9) The idea of a "third possibility" is the dis-stasis. Baader speaks of such a third. But usually the third is the moment of synthesis.

(10) Dooyeweerd's distinction from Bergson is that the modes are not modes of a psychical stream of time, but rather of cosmic time.

(11) Dooyeweerd also thinks (some) strife would cease if people would see Ground Motives. But for Dooyeweerd the problem is not scientific thought as such.

#84 Notes regarding WdW II, 418

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 483.

(2) The idea of "attention" is interesting here. In naïve intuition, it is fixed to the psychical. Mesmer is referred to in support. Baader also refers to Mesmer in this connection.

(3) The retrocipatory spheres are the substratum. The NC does not translate this the same way.

(4) Oddly, the NC does not refer to the transformation of series, which clarifies Dooyeweerd’s statement.

(5) Dooyeweerd again emphasizes freedom in the "free turning of theoretical intuition."

#85 Notes regarding WdW II, 420

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 485. The NC translates the last paragraphs quite differently.

(2) The kernel is its anticipations and retrocipations. We do not know the kernel in itself. We only have an Idea of a modality

(3) The kernel expresses itself in the analogies. Note that Dooyeweerd uses analogy in the sense of retrocipations, which is how the NC translates it. Earlier works always referred to only retrocipations as analogies. Later on he viewed anticipations as also analogous.

(4) Door-schouwing is seeing through something.

(5) I prefer "laying open" rather than "laying bare" which is the NC translation.

(6) NC doesn’t refer to the intuition of essences [Wesenanschauung]
(7) Note the view of static clarity. An Idea doesn't achieve static clarity. This is because theory is in the movement of the unfolding process. It is not in the resting position of enstasis.

**#86 Notes regarding WdW II, 421**

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 486.
(2) Idea and *eidos*
(3) We also intend and point to the transcendent [thus intentional is not just to set up the Gegenstand].

**#87 Notes regarding WdW II, 422**

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 487.

**#88 Notes regarding WdW II, 482**

(1) There are levels of the ontical a priori conditions of reality. This has been disregarded by most philosophers who profess to follow Dooyeweerd. They are different levels in relation to time.
(2) NC improperly has “communal structure” of the religious root (NC here translates ‘instelling’ as ‘attitude.’ I have translated it as ‘enstatic placing’ since elsewhere he contrasts in-stelling and uiteen-stelling in this sense. It seems to me that the emphasis here is on ontical placement rather than an attitude, although that is also evident in the reference to “direction.”

It is the selfhood that experiences.
Selfhood is subject, in that it is determined and limited by law [within the temporal]
To be “limited and determined” is a kind of differentiation within time

**#89 Notes regarding WdW II, 482b**

(1) The movement to the realm of cosmic time is spoken of as a descent from the supratemporal. Even this level is not recognized by immanence philosophy. Next we descend to the level of the temporal aspects or particularized meaning. Even these are misunderstood by immanence philosophy. [the fourth level is that of the plastic horizon of individual things]
(2) Baader has this all-inclusive view of time.

**#90 Notes regarding WdW II, 483**

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 553
There is to some extent a representational and correspondence theory of truth.

We ourselves in our temporal individuality are also determined by this modal dimension.

The meaning-modalities guarantee the sovereignty in own sphere of the law spheres. Distinction between law spheres and meaning modalities. Modality as form of intuition? Law spheres as gezichtsveld?

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### #91 Notes regarding WdW II, 484

1. Corresponds to NC II, 554.
2. NC adds kinematic to mathematical.
3. Theoretical knowledge as a horizon? the synthesis.
4. Why is self-reflection transcendental?
5. Kant thought only certain theoretical syntheses were subjective a priori.
6. Law-idea directs both to the religious and to the temporal.
7. The individually determined can never be understood in an a priori manner, but must be experimentally. Experiment is within the physical gezichtsveld. After it has been fixed in a synthesis of meaning.

### #92 Notes regarding WdW II, 486

1. Corresponds to NC II, 555.
2. Dooyeweerd criticizes the creative view of the synthetic a priori. Some of this critique is also applicable to constructivism.
3. The modal structure of the law spheres is abstracted in synthesis. Their structure is not due to our creativity. Their structure is "read from the horizon of the structure of temporal reality created by God. Now this whole notion knowledge as gain from o "reading from" the structure of reality has of course been criticized by postmodernism. But does postmodernism have a hubris of its own?

### #93 Notes regarding WdW II, 487

1. Corresponds to NC II, 556.
2. It is interesting that Dooyeweerd refers to the law spheres as a "system" that he has "designed."
3. In this passage he refers both to "states of affairs" within the modes, and to concrete facts [feiten]. But the concrete facts are changing, and subject to history.
4. The concept of "function" in the special sciences must be oriented to the modal horizon when we speak of "functions" are we already in the realm of theory, and of the special sciences? Then function is not in the realm of facts, but only a state of affairs.
#94 Notes regarding WdW II, 488
(1) Corresponds to NC II, 557.

(2) The horizon of individuality structures plays the dominant role in naive experience. These are concrete things and social relations, whether created or formed by humans.

(3) Concrete things and social relations function in all la-spheres.

(4) The individuality of things cannot be comprehended by human experience. Note that it is not just for theory that individuality cannot be comprehended, but for our experience. Dooyeweerd's philosophy does not begin with things as self-evident.

(5) The internal structural principles of individuality is "peculiar" presuppose all the other dimensions or horizons of our experience. We do not begin with these structures.

#95 Notes regarding WdW II, 489
(1) Corresponds to NC II, 557.

(2) Individuality structures are plastic. They are capable of being formed. They are plastic because they are more concrete. See van Eeden, how concreteness is related to increasing complexity of modes of being.

(3) Dooyeweerd does use the word 'aspect' here. In this context, it is not the same as a mode.

(4) He says that Aristotle tried to apply a rigid metaphysical form-matter schema to the plasticity of the individuality structures of reality. He did this by conceiving form as a dynamic principle of development that is immanently operative in [plastic] things.

It seems to me that the a view of theory that abstracts universals from individual things follows Aristotle's reasoning here.

(5) There is a remarkable statement that immanence philosophy cannot understand any of the horizons. It is not only that immanence philosophy does not understand religious matters of God and Self. It also does not understand the temporal horizon, the modal horizon, or the structure of individual things!

That is why they (incorrectly) see a separate law for each thing!!

#96 Notes regarding WdW II, 489b
(1) Corresponds to NC II, 558.

(2) The plastic character of things is evident in their form-able interlacements and coherences.

(3) Dooyeweerd opposes an atomistic view of temporal reality. This is a rigid (star) view of reality, and not a dynamic one. See his earlier criticism of Heidegger's view of temporal reality as "Vorhandenes."
(4) Without the structural principles of individual reality we could have no real experience of concrete things and human social relations.

(5) These structural principles cannot in any way be construed a priori. They can be construed only in relation to the subject-side of reality, things and social relationships. There is no form that can be abstracted that is independent of the things!

(6) The human horizon of our experience is predisposed to experience the individuality of things. It is "that side of our horizon of experience that is turned towards things."

(7) He says that functionalism eliminates the structures of individuality. Why is that? Because functionalism assumes that the functionality can be separated from the "thing" that functions. I believe that the same danger is present in the view of theory as the abstraction of universals from things.

(8) He rejects the Kantian and constructivist view of a forming of a chaotic sensory manifold.

#97 Notes regarding WdW II, 491

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 560.

(2) He opposes realistic metaphysics, which supposes that universals exist in the mind of God and then also in temporal things. But such a view elevates or absolutizes reason. I believe that the main reason he rejects this realistic metaphysics is that it does not see the inter-connectedness of law-side and subject-side. It tries to get an idea of law that is separate from subjectivity.

#98 Notes regarding WdW II, 491b

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 560.

(2) This is a very important section. It describes the different horizons of our experience:

(i) the religious: the transcendent horizon of the selfhood. It encompasses the other horizons.

(ii) the temporal, the horizon of cosmic time, in which we experience the coherence as well as the modal refraction of meaning. The temporal horizon encompasses and determines the modal horizon. This horizon has continuity.

(iii) the modal horizon, experienced pre-theoretically as well as articulated theoretically, and

(iv) the horizon of individuality-structures. This horizon is encompassed and determined by the temporal and modal horizons.

(3) Individuality structures are determined by the temporal and modal horizons. Thus, it is not the case that the modes are abstracted from things. Dooyeweerd does not begin with things.

(4) Pre-theoretical "veils" the nature of the modal horizon. The modes are articulated and distinguished only in theory.
All temporal knowledge is religiously founded. This does not mean that it is based on theological propositions. The foundation is ontical.

All of our experience is rooted in the supratemporal self that participates in the redeemed root.

It is the selfhood that radiates perspectivally. Elsewhere he has said that the temporal functions are expressions of the selfhood.

Even the selfhood is nothing in itself. And the religious root does not exist "an sich."

The temporal dimensions (cosmic time, modal and individuality structures) relativize and restrict our knowledge. Our knowledge cannot be self-sufficient.

True knowledge of the cosmos is linked to true knowledge of the self, which is linked to true knowledge of God. He cites Calvin in support. That may or may not be a proper interpretation of Calvin. It is a breathtaking view of our experience and knowledge.

Our experience and knowledge, including knowledge about God, is relativized by but not to our temporal existence.

But like all human experience in this earthly dispensation, our knowledge of God, although directed to the absolute Truth, is also restricted and relativized by (but not at all to) our temporal cosmic existence (NC II, 561).

I understand by this that we do have experience of that which goes beyond the temporal, even if our theoretical articulation of that knowledge is limited. Our experience is not limited to our cosmic functions. Otherwise we could not know God, Self or cosmos (II, 493).

#99 Notes regarding WdW II, 493

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 561. But the NC translation misses the full impact of the meaning of "cosmic consciousness." It does correctly state that the awareness that temporal cosmic reality is related to the structure of the human selfhood. But the next statement of being fitted within the temporal structure is changed to being integrated into a religious community. I do not believe that that is the intention of the text. The relations are the temporal relations of the cosmos. Furthermore, the original WdW italicizes the word 'know.' We know that this relation between our supratemporal selfhood and temporal reality exists. This emphasis is missing in the NC.

(2) Dooyeweerd is opposed to spiritualistic views that try to separate our knowledge from the temporal. See Kuypers rejection of such spiritualistic views. Kuypers relied on Baaders emphasis on the necessity of embodiment.

(3) Our experience of the hereafter is hidden "as to its positive character." By this, Dooyeweerd means that we can say negatively that the hereafter is not temporal. We have an apophatic knowledge.

(4) Our temporal experience has a perspectival nature, in which the transcendent light of eternity must break through time.
(5) We know of the transcendent through Christ, who came in the flesh, and through the Word-revelation in its "garment" of human language. See van Eeden: We use temporal words to express the timeless. [Schijn en Wezen, 110 #144].

(6) Our experience is not limited to our cosmic functions. Otherwise we could not know God, Self or cosmos.

(7) In cosmic self-consciousness we know that the temporal cosmic reality is related to the structure of the human selfhood qua talis [as such]. We are fitted [gevoegd] into this temporal reality.

(8) We are this temporal reality, in its conformity to laws of universal validity, is essentially a religious structure of relations in which individuality is fitted [gevoegd].

(9) Knowledge concerning God is given by revelation. This is our "principle." by principle, he means our beginning, [in principio], our foundation.

(10) This knowledge of God is not obtained in a scientific or even in a theological way. For theology is itself theoretical knowledge, a synthesis of the logical function and the function of faith. this view of theology has been defended by James Olthuis. He uses the pairs, "transcendent-religious" and "immanent-cosmic." Generally, when he refers to cosmos, he is referring to the temporal world. But sometimes, he uses ‘cosmic’ in a sense that indicates experience of the religious horizon.

(11) True knowledge of God has its "point of contact" in the horizon of our experience. It is in our supratemporalheart that we have this experience.

(12) True self-knowledge involves a turning [a 'metanoia,' change of mind]. It is a making alive. It is not a separate mystical cognitive ability. It is seeing reality correctly, as it has been created. This perspective has been closed up by sin. but true self-knowledge "open's our eye." I believe that this is also a mystical experience, but not a spiritualistic mysticism.

(13) In his divine nature God has created all things through the Word of his power. this statement is interesting because it refers to the "nature" of God. Baader emphasized that even God has a nature. Second, it refers to creation through the Word. Word is more encompassing than Scripture, the Word in its garment of language.

#100 Notes regarding WdW II, 496

(1) Corresponds to NC II, 563.

(2) After the fall, the human selfhood lost its insight into the structure of reality.

(3) The fall was a misuse of religious freedom.

(4) In the fullness of meaning, the law is a law of freedom. See Baader, who says that it is only in its temporal form that the law is felt as a burden.

(5) In the fall, we lost this fullness of meaning, and the human selfhood "fell away into the temporal horizon." The fall of the selfhood into the temporal horizon has not been
adequately commented on by Dooyeweerd scholars. It is a fall of the selfhood from the religious horizon to the temporal.

Baader speaks of this falling away into the temporal. We have become 'versetzt' or displaced beings. Created as supratemporal, we now function in the temporal.

(6) this is apo-stasy, a turning away from enstasis.

(7) As a result of our falling away into the temporal, we absolutize aspects of the temporal.

#101 Notes regarding WdW II, 496b

(1) Corresponds to NC 564.

(2) "Standing in the truth" is participation in the fullness of meaning.

(3) If we presume self-sufficiency, we stand in falsehood.

(4) Standing in the truth frees us from the prejudices of immanence philosophy.

(5) He regards the division between faith and reason as due to nominalism.

(6) In our selfhood, our knowledge of God transcends the horizon of time. but temporally, we are bound by the function of faith.

(7) A Christian view of science does not substitute truths of faith for theoretical knowledge

(8) Dooyeweerd opposes Kant, but he also opposes any reversion to pre-Kantian rationalistic metaphysics.