Het Tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee
[The Problem of Time in the Philosophy of the Law-Idea]
by Herman Dooyeweerd

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Translated by Dr. J. Glenn Friesen

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Note by translator: This is an important article, written by Dooyeweerd a few years after publication of his De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee. Although some of what he says in this article was incorporated into the English translation and revision of that work, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, many ideas seem to be more clearly and succinctly expressed in this article. In particular, it clearly expresses Dooyeweerd’s emphasis of the importance of the experience of our supratemporal selfhood, and the relation of that experience to theoretical thought.

All footnotes with arabic numerals are by Dooyeweerd himself. I have included endnotes with my own annotations, which are clearly marked with my initials, and referenced with lower case roman numerals. I have translated some passages from other languages; these are shown in square brackets. I am grateful to Janet Danielson for her comments and editorial advice.
Part 1 [*]

I

The experience of time and the boundaries of concepts and definitions in theoretical knowledge

“Quid est tempus? Si nemo a me quarat, scio, si quarenti explicari velim, nescio.”¹ [What then is time? If no one asks me, I know; but if I want to explain it to a questioner, I do not know.] This well-known saying by Augustine contains a truth of universal validity, which again and again seems to have been forgotten in philosophical discussions about the problem of time, as soon as people seek an understanding of time as such in a theoretical concept.

It is not open to contradiction that we have a sense of time. But the question now arises, whether this sense is not rooted in a deeper layer of our experience than the level that is accessible to our theoretical concepts. That such a deeper level is present in our experience is something that must be evident to everyone who gives an account of the separate boundaries of the theoretical attitude of thought in contrast to the immediate experience of reality of a non-theoretical character. Each theoretical analysis and each definition has its internal boundaries, which first make possible such analysis and definition. That which is irreducible in theory is at the same time indefinable,

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and each true definition rests in the final analysis on such irreducible moments. Without immediate insight into the indefinable, a real concept of what is definable is excluded. And “insight” itself remains rooted in a final foundation of experience [beleving], which oversteps the boundaries of the theoretical attitude of knowledge, and which excludes an absolute split between theoretical and pre-theoretical experience. Only in experience does the knowledge of reality become our own, and the sense of it being our own is the first condition for real knowledge.¹ That which is foreign in principle to our knowing selfhood also then in principle falls outside the boundaries of the human ability to know.²

*Note by Dooyeweerd: In this paper, which also appears separately in the publications of the Gereformeerde Psychology Study Group [Geref. Psychologische studievereeniging], readers of Philosophia Reformata will find for the first time a completed [afgeronde] view written by me concerning the problem of time. In particular, I have not previously published my view of the problem of the measurement of time. Apart from this article, I hope that a continuing series of historical studies about the problem of time in immanence philosophy will be published in this journal.

¹ Augustine: Confessions, XI, 17.

² Cf. my extensive discussion of this in De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee II, 414ff.
When reading the above, those who are trained in modern philosophy will be immediately inclined to think of the role of intuition or of “intuition of essences” [wezensaanschouwing], or of “empathy” [invoeling] or “experience” [beleving] as these ideas are put forward by phenomenology or vitalist philosophy [levensphilosophie] respectively, which they regard as an immediate mode of knowledge in contrast to merely mediated or symbolic knowledge.

Now as we shall see, true insight into time in fact involves true insight into how our concrete experience of time is outside the boundaries of theoretical abstraction. In other words it involves true insight into how theoretical abstraction necessarily takes away from [afrekt] the full experience of time.

But in the philosophical investigation of time, as long as one holds to the self-sufficiency or the complete autonomy of theoretical knowing, there will be a characteristic vicious circle in any attempt to use intuition or experience to overstep the boundaries of the abstract theoretical concept. And this is done by modern phenomenology by its demand for the theoretical reduction or for the methodical epoché of the whole “natural worldview,” with its pretension of thereby being able to grasp in an adequate manner the essence of what is given in experience. This assumption of self-sufficiency is also made by the metaphysical vitalist philosophy of Henri Bergson, with its demand to eliminate everything that falls outside of the évolution créatrice of the psychical durée, in order

in this way to place oneself in the metaphysical essence of true time. For this whole elimination or reduction is only possible by means of the path of theoretical abstraction, and this becomes absolutized whenever it carries the pretension of disclosing in an adequate manner the essential givenness of the experience of time.

In order to give an account of this, we need to first briefly pause to consider the characteristic distinction between the theoretical and the non-theoretical or naïve attitudes of thought.

The former, which is a conditio sine qua non not only for the special sciences, but also for philosophy itself, is characterized by the theoretical distance taken by logical thought over against its field of research, through which this field really becomes the “Gegenstand” of thought.

From out of this theoretical distancing is born the characteristic consciousness of problems [probleem-bewustzijn], which is proper only to theoretical experience.

In contrast, naïve experience as such does not know any problem in this theoretical sense, because naïve thought has no “Gegenstand.” The “Gegenstand” is the product of a theoretical splitting apart of temporal reality. In its logical side, naïve experience remains wholly fitted into [in-gesteld] temporal reality; it knows no dualism between knowing and what is known; it understands both the logical and the post-logical functions of things—in what I later describe as the structural subject-object relation—essentially as elements [bestanddeelen] of full reality as it is given to us. It experiences reality as held together and not split apart [in-een en niet uit-een]. Temporal reality is first split apart by theoretical analysis and synthesis, without which it is not possible to have real theoretical knowledge of what is being investigated.
And in this said analysis, our logical function of thought is active in the *theoretical attitude of thought*, which as such can never free itself from the spell [*ban*] of theoretical concepts.

Since theoretical analysis always works by *abstraction*, it is only by means of theoretical concepts that it can split apart temporal reality, as that reality *gives* itself to our naïve experience. Theoretical analysis *takes* something *away* [*trekt af*] from the full temporal reality, and such abstraction is necessary in order to obtain articulated insight into a *definite structure* of this reality, which in naïve experience never comes *explicitly* to consciousness, but only *implicitly*.

*The two basic structures of temporal reality.*

We will call this determined structure the structure of the *modal aspects* of temporal reality. As we shall see, this is not the only structure displayed by temporal reality, but it is *implied* in a second, more concrete structure, in which this reality gives itself immediately to naïve experience.

We will call the latter structure the *individuality structure* of temporal reality. In it, concrete things, events, actions, acts and social forms reveal themselves as *individual totalities*, which only *function* [*fungeren*] in the modal aspects.

As we shall see, insight into the fundamental distinction between these structures, as well as their mutual coherence, is of fundamental importance for a true view of the problem of time. Therefore we need to subject them one after the other to a closer investigation.

When we do this, it will be self-evident why time *as such* is inaccessible to theoretical concepts, and why time is an essential *presupposition* of all theoretical knowledge, a presupposition that is accessible as such only to the depth dimension [*diepte-laag*] of experience, which oversteps the boundaries of theoretical concept formation.

But we shall at the same time be on our guard against the wrong point of departure of phenomenology and vitalist philosophy, which, although perhaps unintentionally, have tried to twist into the framework of *theoretical abstraction* either the intuition of time or the experience of time.

*The modal aspects of time and time’s cosmic continuity.*

Temporal reality *functions* [*fungeert*] in a variety of modal aspects, which are not themselves subjected to change within time, but rather form a constant and foundational modal
In the modal structure, what is revealed is not the concrete what (as is the case in the individuality structure), but rather the how of reality. The modal structure is a functional mode of being, a modality or a modal aspect of reality.

In its general theory of the law-spheres, the Philosophy of the Law-Idea has as of this date brought to light fourteen of such modal aspects of temporal reality, which will here be named law-spheres in accordance with their law-regular \[wetmatige\] structure. They are: quantity, spatiality, the aspect of movement, the biotic aspect, the feeling (or psychical) aspect, the analytical (or logical) aspect, the historical aspect, the aspect of symbolic meaning, that of society, the economic, the aesthetic, the juridical, the moral and the aspect of faith.

In the theoretical-philosophical analysis, these modalities are really split apart from each other in a theoretical dis-continuity.

However, in temporal reality they are instead fitted together into a continuous cosmic coherence and this cosmic coherence is, as we shall see, a coherence of time.

As modal aspects of temporal reality, they are implicitly modal aspects of time. That is to say, in each modality of reality, time comes to expression in a separate way, but it cannot be reduced \[opgaan\] to any of these modalities. The modal structure of reality is itself enclosed within cosmic time.

The current opposition of time and space and the general theory of relativity. Is the opposition between time and the measurement of time a purely logical one?

This statement will appear to be highly problematic for those who are used to the abstract visions of reality in current philosophy.

Now one of the most deeply rooted presuppositions of the current view of time is that time only reveals itself in motion and in change. In this way, time and space are set over against each other, whether as equal in value and sharply distinguished ordering schemas of experienceable reality that are already related to each other in movement, or as reciprocally excluding each other as a “stream of experience” contrasted with a “mathematical conceptual construction.”

It is true that the current view, that space as such is nontemporal, is regarded as a serious problem in the general theory of relativity.

But until now, the current philosophical view of time appeared little inclined to give itself over to Minkowski’s and Einstein’s view that time and space cannot be separated. One tried to save himself from this view with the apparently logically irrefutable distinction
between time and measurement of time. The general theory of relativity would then only concern the measurement of time, but not be able to teach us about the nature of time itself.

The view of time as a “fourth dimension” would then only be a perspectival-mathematical way of understanding, which could in part be explained from the circumstance that the general theory of relativity has accepted the transmission of light as the physical measurer of time and thereby has accepted the ray of light for time itself.\(^3\)

Can in fact a measure of time be anything other than a definite duration of time, and can the “measurement of time” occur outside of time?

If not, then the opposition between time and measure of time, or between time and the measurement of time, loses its unity of meaning and its exclusive character, and without further precision it becomes logically unusable.

If one nevertheless assumes a mutually exclusive contrast between time and measurement of time, then he confuses himself, as we shall see, in insoluble contradictions.

As we shall see, the opposition between time and measurement of time is not in the least logically irrefutable, because the word ‘time’ must have a more limited meaning in the second term than in the first, if the whole concept of measurement of time is not to dissolve into internal antinomies.

In any event, the fundamental distinction between time and measurement of time does not at all mean that we should accept the current view of classical physics concerning the non-temporality of space.

On the contrary, in this view, time appeared to be a necessary presupposition in the definition of space itself\(^4\), whereas it was evident that one could not really define time itself. Rather, in this supposed definition of time, we are only able to mathematically approach the modal aspect of movement, in which time is again presupposed.

Now whenever the difference between time and space is represented as a continuous flowing of succeeding moments of equal duration over against a static continuous extensiveness, then it is clear that the concept of motion is included in the concept of flowing. For its part, such movement is only possible in time. And in the concept of the

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\(^3\) Cf. for example, J.A. Gunn: The Problem of Time (London, 1929), 206.

\(^4\) Even before Minkowski, this was brought to light by the Hungarian thinker Palágyi (Ausgewählte Werke III Zur Welt-mechanik, 2), who moreover was later known as a principal opponent of the general theory of relativity.
static continuous extensiveness, there is hidden the idea of spatial simultaneity, which presupposes time just as much. Moreover, simultaneity is possible not only in the static sense of space, but just as much, although in a different way, in the modal meaning of movement, in that of organic life, in that of feeling, in that of logical analysis, in that of historical development, etc. etc.. [In all these modalities], as we shall see, spatial simultaneity is presupposed.

Finally, the view that space as such is non-temporal, was dependent from the very beginning on the metaphysical conception of matter as an extended substance, which, since it was timeless, could only in its “operations” [werkingen] be subjected to time. And it is just this view that was fundamentally affected both by the general theory of relativity, which no longer physically separates space and time, as well as by quantum theory concerning the transmission of energy.

In truth, all so-called definitions of time appear to be only definitions of modal aspects of time, in which time itself is always presupposed as indefinable. And from the very start, it must be regarded as impermissible to give a modal definition as a definition of the time.

This holds then just as much for Newton’s “absolute” mathematical time, as for Einstein’s relative physical kinematic time; just as much for Bergson’s “feeling duration” as for Spengler’s or Heidegger’s “historical time,” just as much for Kant’s view of time as “transcendental sensory form of perception” as for Hobbes’ empirical-sensory conception of time as phantasms of movement.

In each of the modal aspects, time expresses itself in a particular meaning.

The Philosophy of the Law-Idea has indeed demonstrated that time comes to expression in all modal aspects of reality in separate ways. I will now parade in procession, one after the other, the modal aspects of time that have been distinguished. I can here only give a summary indication of the characteristics of modal time.

In the aspect of quantity, time takes on the modal meaning of numerical relations. In the series of numbers there is an irreversible order of time of earlier and later, which is in no way dependent on our

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6 This modal order of earlier and later is, as we shall see below, necessarily related to the subjective duration of time, and reveals just in this fact its essential time character. It is not correct that the order of succession in the series of numbers, which we here understand as a real modal order of time, is reversible.

Of course we can just as well count from the front to the back as from the back to the front. But in this is presupposed the irreversible modal order of time of the numbers themselves. Counting backwards remains counting backwards, and it cannot be regarded
subjective counting, but much rather is implied in the law-regular structure of the modal numerical aspect itself. Earlier and later do not in the least express a succession of movement in the series of numbers, but they express a relation of the quantitative value of time. To say, “2 is earlier than 3 in the series of numbers” means that 2 is less than 3.\footnote{Herman Cohen, in his Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, p. 155, calls the + sign in arithmetic “the symbol of anticipation” and the “herald’s staff of time.” According to him, anticipation is the characteristic of time, and he has therefore, in contrast to Paul Natop, acknowledged the time character of the series principle for numbers, although he has logicized the arithmetical time order. Kant saw in number a schematization of the categories of quantity in time as “transcendental forms of intuition.”}

In the spatial aspect, time takes on the modal meaning of continuous extension. The static simultaneity of spatial relations is modally distinguished both from the time order of numbers as well as from that of the succession of movement.

Spatial simultaneity has nothing to do with supra-temporality or timelessness, with which Parmenides already confused it in his conception of timeless “being.” It is only understandable within the cosmic order of time (which encloses all aspects of time), and it has a temporal coherence both with arithmetical time as well as with the time of movement. (Spatial simultaneity can approach the succession of movement in its “anticipatory function”).

Without a static spatial time, we would not be able to speak of a time of movement. This is so true, that Newton’s conception of “absolute motion,” to which his mathematical view of time was oriented, needs the static simultaneity of spatial coordinates for a concept of the equal duration of moments of motion.

In the aspect of movement, which must certainly not be understood in the mechanical sense of classical mechanics, and in which e.g. the qualitative electro-dynamic phenomena also function, time reveals itself in the modal sense of succession of movement, in which as such no static spatial simultaneity is possible, and in which all simultaneity—according to the modal meaning of movement itself—can carry only a relative character. “Absolute rest” is only understandable in its original sense of spatial extensiveness. However, movement presupposes as counting forwards. One may also not interpret the said order of succession in a logicistic way as a purely logical interpretation. The logical order of prius and posterius, as we shall see, is just as much a modal order of time, but as such it is not an order of succession in the meaning of quantity.

The view that the series of numbers is timeless leads to an obvious antinomy in the so-called measurement of time.

Temporal duration cannot be measured by the timeless, and yet in each measurement of time the order of numbers plays an essential role. The same holds for the order of spatial relationships [ruimtedeelen; See NC I, 31, fn1].
this static spatial simultaneity. It is not in spatial extensiveness\(^8\), but it is possible as an irreducible new aspect of temporal reality only on the basis of the spatial extensiveness.\(^9\)

In the biotic aspect, time reveals itself in the modal meaning of organic development of life, in which the biotic phases of development play an essential role. This biotic time of development cannot in any way be reduced to the modal time of motion. Development of life is not the same as “motion,” but can only take its course on the basis of the modal functions of movement. Mathematical-physical measures of time necessarily retain an external character over against the internal biotic order of time. They do not concern the internal modal nature of the biotic phases of time of birth, maturity, aging and death, which carry no homogenous character and do not allow themselves to be mathematically delimited from each other.

The question, “When is an individual born?” is an intrinsically biological question of time, which can only be answered from a biological standpoint, although undoubtedly there are boundary questions [grensvragen] that arise here that are difficult to answer.

In the psychical aspect, time reveals itself in the modal meaning of the life of feeling.\(^10\) The modal order of time, to which the life of feeling is subjected, gives its own character to the succession of movement of feelings, in that earlier experience feelings or sensory impressions do not, like the moments of movement, simply disappear in the later ones. They either continue in the totality of a mood lasting a longer or shorter time in my consciousness, or they are suppressed in the bottom layer [onderlaag] of consciousness, what has been called “the subconscious,” or respectively “the unconscious,”

from where they can continue to work\(^11\) through into the conscious life of feeling, and from where they can also be reproductively taken up anew in our conscious stream of feeling in dream or memory—although perhaps in modified form. This modal order of

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\(^8\) Each attempt to eliminate the modal boundaries between space and movement, by reducing the dynamic course of movement to a static line, necessarily leads to the antinomies of Zeno the Eleatic. Each attempt to reduce a modal aspect to another must lead to typical antinomies, as I have demonstrated in the \(WdW\).

\(^9\) Spatial extensiveness and motion are here intended in their original sense of separate modal aspects. One should therefore not confuse them with the sensory awareness of space and the sensory image of movement; these are analogies of space and motion in the psychical aspect.

\(^10\) “Feeling” must not be understood in the current psychological sense, but in the sense of a modal aspect, of a modal nature. Cf. here note 33 of this article.

\(^11\) As is known, the same also holds for the logical life of thought.
time reveals itself just as much in the order of feeling-associations, which are not in the least to be explained in a mechanical way\textsuperscript{12}, but which possesses its own feeling nature.

Regarded from the subjective side, the time of feeling is a non-homogenous feeling of duration\textsuperscript{13}, in the sense intended by Henri Bergson. In this duration, feelings push themselves through in a continuous stream, which cannot be mathematically divided anymore than we can divide the biotic duration of development. Furthermore, in the subject-object relation of duration of feeling, which presents itself in awareness time (discussed in more detail below), the subjective moments of feeling are not points of time, like the moments in spatial time, but rather indivisible phases of time (cf. what has been called ‘presence time’ or the ‘specious present’\textsuperscript{14}), which are actually phases of the movement of feeling in the perception of sensory objects in the space of awareness\textsuperscript{15}).

In the logical aspect, time reveals itself in the modal-analytical meaning of the logical prius and posterius, and in logical simultaneity.

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The order of time here takes on a normative modal character, which it also retains in all post-logical aspects. The current view that we should not speak here of a real order of time, is burdened by the presupposition that logical relations as such should be timeless.

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. A. Prandtl: \textit{Assoziations-psychologie} (Einführung in die neuere Psychologie), ed. E. Saupe, 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed. 1928), p. 88 ff.

\textsuperscript{13} With respect to the relation of time order and time duration (whether subjective or objective), see the discussion below.

\textsuperscript{14} Cf. J.A. Gunn: \textit{The Problem of Time} (London, 1929), 391:

From the point of view of mathematics the present is a point without duration; it is the last instant of a series going back into the past and first of a series into the future. But from the point of view of psychology the matter is very different. The present is essentially a duration, brief but having an extension in time, a breadth of a temporal character. The moment of experience or the specious present is always a definite slice or span of duration.

\textsuperscript{15} That the “specious present” is really a current time of feeling, or a time of sensory awareness, and not something that can be brought back to memory as Reid thought in his \textit{Essays on the Intellectual Powers}, is forcefully brought to light by Wildon Carr in a conference of the Aristotelian Society held in 1915/-16, and mentioned by Gunn. He gave there a critical analysis of our awareness in the seeing of a shooting star. In this he remarks,

The line is sensed, not memorized. The whole series is within the moment of experience, and is therefore a present sensation.

Bergson has also placed all emphasis on this in his opposition of the “duration of feeling” and the mathematical concept of time. In a similar sense W. James and Gunn, \textit{op. cit.} p. 394 and others.
One then expressly sets the logical earlier and later over against the temporal earlier and later.

But the logical prius and posterius is, just as much as the order of logical simultaneity, a real modal order of time, which in the logical movement of thought, or of the thought process, retains its normative character over against the psychical and pre-psychical aspects of time.

Just as logical simultaneity (the logical characteristics) holds for each subjective conceptual synthesis and for each logical predicating, so does the logical earlier and later (of grounds and conclusion) hold for each logical argument.

Although the abstract discursive form of the syllogism is revealed only in theoretical thought, this certainly does not exclude the order of the logical prius and posterius from playing any role in pre-theoretical thought. Whoever wants to maintain that will have to demonstrate that the principle of sufficient ground finds no application in everyday thought, which is naturally impossible.

The principle of the sufficient ground cannot be applied outside of the modal order of time of the logical prius and posterius.\(^{17}\)

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\(^{16}\) Cf. A. Messer: *Psychologie*, 5th ed. (1934), p. 259:

Daß das Schließen sich in underem gewöhnlichen Denken in der Regel nicht nach Ober-, Unter- und Schlußsatz vollzieht, wie es nach der Lehre der Logik scheinen könnte, das bringt kaum noch betont zu werden.
Meist erfassen wir die Relation der Gedanken-inhalte unmittelbar, ohne uns erst eines Mittelberiffs bewußt zu werden.

The further statement of this writer, “Über das Denkgeschehen selbst sagt sie (scl. die Logik) nichts aus” is burdened by the criticalistic view of reality with its fundamental separation of “sollen” [ought] and “sein” [is].

\(^{17}\) Schopenhauer saw in the principle of the sufficient ground itself the unifying origin of time, which he with Kant only allowed to hold as a form of consciousness for phenomena. In agreement with the foundations of his philosophy, which viewed temporal reality as merely a “representation,” he actually immediately falls into an overextension of the mode of time that reveals itself in the logical movement of thought, and which for him as a consequence takes on not a modal-logical, but a knowledge-theoretical meaning. In his *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* I, s 4 (Sämtliche Werke, 12 vols., Stuttgart und Berlin: Cotta’sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, Vol. 1-2, p. 35), we read,

Wer die Gestaltung des Satzes vom Grunde, welche in der reinen Zeit als solcher erscheint und auf der alles Zählen und Rechnen beruht, erkannt hat, der hat eben damit auch das ganze Wesen der Zeit erkannt. Sie ist weiter nichts, als eben jene Gestaltung des Satzes vom Grunde, und hat keine andrer Eigenschaft (!). Succession is die Gestalt des Satzes bon Grunde in der Zeit; Succession ist das ganze Wesen der Zeit.
The logical ground *precedes* the conclusion, and not the other way around. The naïve thinker also knows that.

In the *historical* aspect, time reveals itself in the modal meaning of development of culture.\(^{18}\) The historical “periods” are periods in the execution of the human task of forming and of having dominion. These periods are not mathematically delimited from each other; the living cultural factors from an earlier period are taken up in those of later periods in the total form of the new image of time. In tradition, the historical time of development fuses past, present and future. Just like all aspects of time still to be discussed, this order of time also carries a normative modal character. It sets before the human race a normative task of forming; with its demand of the future, it opposes any inert resting in the historic present or any vegetating in the past. Historical “reaction” is the anti-historical reaching back towards a past that has died away; it turns itself in a reactionary way against the historical norm of development.\(^{19}\)

In the linguistic aspect, time reveals itself in the modal meaning of symbolic meaning. The pause between two acts of speech, the slowing down or speeding up of the tempo of speech or of a gesture, all have symbolic meaning, as does also the objective duration of a signal of sound or of light. The subjective duration of a symbolic meaning, or of the objective duration of a sign are subjected to the normative order of time of the linguistic aspect. The normative meaning of this modal order of time is evident whenever we consider that it can also be applied in an inaccurate way, that is, in conflict with the linguistic norms.

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In the social aspect, time takes on the modal meaning of social forms. To let someone precede you who in a social sense is a higher placed person has the meaning of social politeness or courtesy. *Tact* in society requires that one should not make a certain visit at an inopportune time. *Politeness* forbids a guest from appearing too late at a meal. Festival days carry an express social character, in which the demands of conviviality come to be held in force. The normative character of time is also immediately evident in this modal aspect.

In the economic aspect, time takes on the modal meaning of saving of values. The businessman says “Time is money,” and this proverb is more than purely metaphorical. Indeed the economic order of time is the normative weighing of the value of the passing away of the saving of time. The whole economic phenomenon of interest rests on a higher valuation of present above similar future goods. The distinction between wages based on time and those based on piecework, between fixed capital and liquid capital, expressions such as “futures market” and “discounted rate of interest,” etc. have meaning only within the modal framework of the economic order of time, which as such cannot be reduced to any other modal aspect of time.

\(^{18}\) According to the subject side of its modal meaning, “culture” is viewed as “formative control” [beheerschende vorming].

\(^{19}\) For the normative character of the historical aspect see my *Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, Vol. II, and my *Recht en Historie* (1938).
In the *aesthetic aspect*, time reveals itself in the modal meaning of *beautiful harmony*. The classical form of unity of time (and place) for drama had only *aesthetic* meaning. The aesthetic order of time does not tolerate any aesthetically empty moments. Whenever a novelist loses sight of this separate modal character of the aesthetic order of time, and confuses this order of time with the historical, then he may well be able to write a more or less faithful historical story, but he can give no real work of art.

In the *juridical aspect*, time reveals itself in the modal meaning of *justice*, or *retribution* that harmonizes interests. Lateness or delay as a form of nonperformance, superannuation as a way of receiving rights, or the coming to naught [over time] of claims and contracts, determinations of time in agreements, the age of majority or minority, etc. etc., are real modal-juridical figures of time of a normative juridical character. The same can be said for the time of coming into force of a law or order (cf. [page 174]

also the figure of “retroactive force” in transitional laws).

Whenever a merchant in Amsterdam makes an order by telephone or telegraph from London or New York, which is then accepted, there is then the question, *when* the relevant agreement came into existence. This is a true *juridical question of time*, which can only be answered in accordance with *juridical* norms, because only in the juridical order of time is there a place for *juridical* consequences.

In the *moral aspect*, time reveals itself in the normative modal meaning of moral love of neighbor. Supposedly, the failure to give help or support within one’s reach, where this is urgently required, is loveless and immoral. In its moral aspect, all of time is filled by the demand for love. One’s fatherland calls in times of danger to the duty of love of country; the duties of love for one’s elders or one’s children, the love of marriage, comradeship, etc. etc., *require our time*. Jesus’ saying, “The poor you have *always* with you, but you do *not always* have me,” is a succinct illumination of the *time of love*, which especially requires sacrifice in face of death.

Finally, in the *faith aspect*, time reveals itself in its *transcendental boundary function*, in its pointing within time to that which lies hidden behind time, in its pointing to eternity. In the majestic beginning words of the book of Genesis: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,” the time of faith refers to God’s creative act, which first called time into existence.

Whenever we as Gereformeerde people believe that rebirth precedes conversion, then what is intended is certainly not a temporal succession in the sensory perceptible side of clock time, but much rather an order of time, which only has meaning in the boundary function of faith. If the heart, the religious centre of existence, is not first reborn through God’s Spirit, conversion can also not reveal itself in our temporal expressions of life. But rebirth itself can only be understood in the time of faith, as the mystery of God’s work in the heart of the sinner, which is hidden behind his temporal existence.

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20 This temporal aspectual meaning of love may not be confused with the religious fullness of love, which is the “fulfillment of the law.”
II

The necessity in the theoretical attitude of thought of an abstraction from the continuity of time. The difference from the naïve attitude of thought.

In the foregoing summary description of the modal aspects we have really done nothing other than to give a theoretical explication of what one already can know implicitly in the pre-theoretical view of time. The current philosophical views of time, which attempt to identify time with a modal aspect of time (e.g. the physical aspect of movement, the psychical aspect or the historical aspect) are definitely in conflict with what is given in naïve experience. In order to avoid confusion, we shall from now on refer to the full time, in distinction from its aspects, as cosmic time.

In our theoretical analysis we must really cut off [uitschakelen] cosmic time itself in its continuity that overarches all the aspects, in order in an articulated way to be able to split apart its modal aspects from each other, and in order to obtain them in the grasp of a theoretical concept. And this is what the naïve experience of time cannot do. The naïve experience of time remains wholly fitted within [in-gesteld] time, even in its logical-analytical aspect. It does not set itself in its logical function of thought over against abstracted modal aspects as its “Gegenstand” or problem.

And just because it [naïve experience] lacks every setting-over-against attitude of thought, and also because it remains wholly fitted within the cosmic continuity of time, the modal diversity of the aspects of time remains wholly implicit in the continuous unity of the cosmic experience of time. The continuity of time covers up [overdekt] the diversity of modal aspects in the naïve attitude of experience.

Whenever I look at my watch, I experience—perhaps in part only in my subconscious—uno intuitio [an intuition] of cosmic time in its various modal aspects, without these aspects delineating themselves in an articulated distinction in my experience. The normative aspects in particular cannot be set outside of our consideration without making time a theoretical abstraction that is foreign to our life. That the clock urges me to

my duties is one of the most elementary givens of naïve experience. Only a scientific theory that fails to recognize its boundaries can arrive at the thought of denying these normative aspects of time.

But why then must the theoretical attitude of thought shut out from the contents of its concepts the cosmic continuity of time, and with it time itself? Because time is a transcendental presupposition for theoretical analysis and synthesis; in other words because it determines and first makes possible theoretical conceptual forming itself.
Cosmic time and the problem concerning the possibility of a knowledge-acquiring synthesis. Why Kant could not bring a real solution to this problem.

In Kant’s critical question, “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?”, the epistemological problem concerning theoretical synthesis was brought forward for the first time.

From his standpoint he could not really find a solution. The synthesis of our theoretical act of knowing is always a synthesis between the logical-analytical conceptual function and the non-logical modal aspects of reality that are set over against it, and which are theoretically analyzed in the concept. How is such a connection possible?

Undoubtedly due to his critical point of departure, Kant set out the problem in too narrow a way—concerning purely the so-called transcendental-logical categories\(^2\) and the psychical sensory manifold. The sensory manifold was to deliver to us only the brute “matter of experience,” ordered in the transcendental sensory forms of perception of time and space. But he thereby proceeded from the presupposition of the self-sufficiency of the theoretical attitude of thought.

In relation to this, he limited time to the modal structural function of an a priori sensory form of perception, whereas, according to him, the logical “forms of thought” as such were timeless.

He now sought a “third” outside of the sensory matter of experience and the category, in order to make possible a synthesis between these completely differing modal aspects of consciousness—differing always according to their nature. And as the third “third” instance, he put time on the stage, in which the categories, with the help of the “transcendental power of imagination” were to schematize themselves.

But “time” in the sense of a purely modal aspect of sensory forms of perception can certainly not fulfill this role of mediator between “reason” and the “sensory manifold.” Since the structure of the logical forms of thought are themselves supposed to be timeless, they remain irreconciled both over against the “sensory matter of experience” as well as over against “time as the sensory form of perception.”

Only when all modal aspects without exception, including the logical-analytical, are enclosed within time can the time really be understood as the transcendental condition for theoretical synthesis.

\(^2\) From his standpoint, Kant could certainly not admit that in these categories there was already hidden a synthesis between the logical aspect and non-logical aspects (quantity, space and motion). To acknowledge this would have meant the giving up of Kant’s transcendental-logical point of departure, which seeks the origin of all determination of the “matter or experience” in the free formative activity of the so-called transcendental subject of thought.
The immanence standpoint in current philosophy

But this state of affairs can only be seen and acknowledged by giving up the immanence standpoint in philosophy. This standpoint is characterized by the fact that man seeks the point of departure for philosophy—from out of which the diversity of aspects is to be understood, and which the Philosophy of the Law-Idea calls the “Archimedean point” of philosophy—immanently in theoretical thought itself. When we critically consider this thought, it is seen to be irreconcilable with the acknowledgement that theoretical thought in its transcendental-logical structure is enclosed within time, and thus determined by the cosmic order of time. Rather, this standpoint implies the postulate of self-sufficiency, of the autonomy of theoretical “Vernunft.”

From out of its Christian point of departure, the Philosophy of the Law-Idea has radically broken with this immanence standpoint, and has demonstrated the uncritical dogmatic character of the postulate of the supposed autonomy of theoretical thought. It is also true to say that

the immanence standpoint is no purely theoretical standpoint; the postulate of the self-sufficiency of theoretical thought is a dogmatic presupposition of current philosophy, a presupposition that in its deepest sense has a religious character, but one which is in flagrant conflict with the whole structure of the temporal cosmos. The postulate of self-sufficiency, even if the limitation “in its own area” is added, implies a primary absolutionization of the theoretical synthesis, i.e. of a theoretical thought abstraction through which all of reality is theoreticized and the great givenness of naive experience is falsified.

The said postulate [or self-sufficiency] is only seemingly given up in the modern irrationalistic vitalist philosophy.

Bergson’s psychical “durée” is in fact itself a theoretical abstraction, the product of a theoretical analysis of the feeling aspect of time according to its subjective side. By virtue of the primary absolutionization of the theoretical (in this case psychological) synthesis, this is then represented as the true and complete time. The same holds for Heidegger’s (phenomenological) “historische Zeit” [historical time] as the “horizon” that also applies to thought. For in this case there is an absolutionization of a “phenomenological” abstraction, which itself can only be the product of theoretical analysis and synthesis.

Heidegger also proceeds from out of the self-sufficiency of the theoretical attitude of knowledge—more precisely, the phenomenological attitude, twisted around by him in an irrationalistic sense. He rejects each acknowledgement of a supra-theoretical determinateness (“Bedingheit”) of the phenomenological investigation.
Only in the religious center of his existence does man transcend time. The uncritical character of the immanence standpoint.

Why is this presupposition of the “self-sufficiency of theoretical thought in its own area” uncritical and dogmatic? Because theoretical thought in its modal-logical aspect (and that is what is here intended) cannot by its own power [eigenmachtig] determine its relation over against the remaining modal aspects of reality. In the “cogito” [Descartes’ “I think”], the thinking selfhood is active, which as such functions not only in the logical-analytical aspect, but equally in all aspects of reality. At the same time, this selfhood is the concentration point of temporal human existence. If all aspects are equally enclosed by cosmic time and thus have an intrinsically temporal character, then the concentration point of human existence, in which all temporal aspects come together in one focus (brandpunt), cannot itself be of a temporal, but must be of a supratemporal, transcendent character. The theoretical synthesis is determined both by cosmic time as well as by the supratemporal transcendent selfhood.

The immanence standpoint can only seemingly be maintained, by–following the so-called critical philosophy–unexpectedly identifying the thinking selfhood with the so-called transcendental-logical subject of thought (in Kant, “the transcendental-logical unity of apperception”). In this identification, the selfhood is shriveled up into a transcendental-logical formal unity, which is then again sharply distinguished from the individual, temporal so-called empirical psychological selfhood. This “transcendental subject of thought” then serves as the theoretical-logical point of concentration, which as “the immanent subjective pole of thought (Theodor Litt), could never be made into the “Gegenstand” of thought, because it should be the necessary universally valid condition for all thinking that is directed towards a “Gegenstand.”

The dogmatic character of the “transcendental-logical” conception of the selfhood is really apparent whenever one considers that it is a theoretical abstraction and as such is itself the thought product of the thinking selfhood. The thinking selfhood identifies itself in an uncritical way with its thought product.

A “transcendental-logical” selfhood exists even less than an “empirical-psychological” selfhood. The selfhood certainly has modal psychical and logical functions, but it is itself the necessary transcendental concentration point, not only of the psychical and logical, but equally of all its temporal modal functions.

A transcendental-logical unity above the theoretical diversity of thought categories, such as Kant wanted to find in his transcendental subject of thought, does not exist. Within the modal structure of the logical aspect there exists only logical unity in the logical diversity. This unity cannot be of a transcendent character.
The doctrine of the transcendental subject of thought is nothing other than the nominalistic, epistemological formalizing of the old doctrine of scholastic psychology concerning the anima rationalis [rational soul] as substance. In this metaphysical psychology, man sought for the “unity and simplicity” of the soul in the intellect as its essence, its centre of being, which would also overprint [opdrukken] a rational character on the other human “faculties of the soul.”

This idea itself of the soul came from out of Aristotelian psychology, and corresponded with the Aristotelian view of divinity as “pure nous” (actus purus). The scholastics tried in vain to fit this view to the Christian doctrine concerning the simplicity and indivisibility of the soul.22

In vain I say. For the “anima rationalis” intrinsically lacks the simplicity of being that the Christian doctrine correctly accepted for the “soul.” As a metaphysical abstraction, it [anima rationalis] remained caught in the diversity of the temporal functions. Thought, which was supposed to comprise the essential character [of the soul], is in the final analysis only one of its modes of revelation [openbaringswijzen].23 Neither willing nor feeling allow themselves to be reduced to mere modalities of thought. Only in the religious concentration point of existence are all temporal functions and acts brought together in their deeper unity.

But because of its point of departure, immanence philosophy is forced to seek the centre of being of temporal existence in thought itself.

And because of its view of the concentration point of human existence, immanence philosophy could also acquire no insight into cosmic time. In Aristotelian-Thomistic scholasticism, time was understood merely as the” measure of motion.”

According to this view, the “anima rationalis,” to which “immortality” was always attributed, is only “accidentally” subjected to time, in its connection with the “material body.” According to its substantial “rational being,” it is “supratemporal,”

and is only measured by the “aevum”24 (Thomas Aquinas).24

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22 Cf. for further information my article “Kuyper’s Wetenschapsleer,” Philosophia Reformata 4 (1939), 203.

23 The “aevum” has since Boethius been distinguished both from time as well as from eternity, and has been understood as a sort of intermediate state between both. According to Thomas, time has both an earlier and a later; the aeum however has in it no earlier and later, but the later can be linked to it; eternity has neither earlier and later, nor can it be combined with them (Summa theol. I, qu. X, art. V).

A real sense of time supposes a transcendent centre of experience of time. Kuyper’s understanding of the transcendent centre.

Now it is indeed correct that we could have no true sense of time unless we did not go above time in the deepest part of our being. All merely temporal creatures lack a sense of time.

All absolutizing of time rests on a lack of critical self-reflection.

But we cannot learn to know of the true concentration point, the supratemporal root of our existence, from a self-empowered philosophy, which necessarily remains closed up within the horizon of time. We can only learn it from the divine Word revelation. Only this Revelation discovers us to ourselves. As Calvin remarks in his Institutio, we can only come to true self-knowledge through true knowledge of God. I call this the religious law of concentration of human existence.

The “soul” of human existence, which according to the testimony of Scripture is not affected by temporal death, but which continues to exist even after the putting off of the “body,” i.e. of all of the temporal forms of existence closed up in individuality structures, is the religious root of human existence. Scripture also calls it the “inward man” or the “heart” of man, “out of which proceed the issues of life” and “in which eternity is laid.” It is, as Kuyper expresses in his Stone Lectures, “that point in our consciousness in which our life is still undivided and lies comprehended in its unity…”

According to Kuyper, that concentration point is

...not in the spreading vines but in the root from which the vines spring. This point, of course, lies in the antithesis between all that is finite in our human life and the infinite that lies beyond it. Here alone we find the common source from which the different streams of our human life spring and separate themselves.  

And then Kuyper uses not only the image of the religious root, but also that of the focus [brandpunt]:

Personally it is our repeated experience that in the depths of our hearts, at the point where we disclose ourselves to the Eternal One, all the rays of our life converge as in one focus, and there alone regain that harmony which we so often and so painfully lose in the stress of daily duty.

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25 Cf. here my article “Kuyper’s Wetenschapsleer,” 211.

26 This understanding of the religious centre of existence is irreconcilable with the traditional scholastic idea of the soul, which however Kuyper maintains in his scientific-theological works, nor with the traditional view of dichotomy.
This religious root of individual human existence can however not be understood atomistically as an “autarchic individual,” but rather as created by God in the *religious root community of the human race*, which fell away from God in its first head Adam, but in the second head Jesus Christ was again *restored* in its religious community with God. That religious root community of humanity is the true *supratemporal concentration point of the whole* temporal cosmos. This also explains how Adam’s fall did not only drag with it the human race, but also the *whole* of the temporal cosmos, just as in Jesus Christ the *whole* cosmos is saved *in the root*.

A real *Christian* philosophy of time is then also not possible whenever theoretical thought is not directed to the true supratemporal concentration point of the temporal cosmos. Theoretical thought is never self-sufficient in philosophy, but, because of the structure of creation itself, it is necessarily *religiously determined*, whether in an apostate direction, or in the direction to the true Origin of all things, as revealed itself in Jesus Christ.

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**Part 2**

**III**

*Law and subject-side of cosmic time.*

*Time as time order and as duration.*

The time-transcending character of the religious concentration point of the temporal cosmos also reveals itself in that it also transcends the diversity of the modal aspects that are enclosed in the horizon of time. The deeper root-unity of the modal aspects can never be found *within time*. And time itself in its cosmic continuous character cannot be the root-unity of these aspects.

In order to have good insight into the aspects, we must begin by sharply distinguishing between two *sides* of time, which mutually presuppose each other and which therefore are never to be *separated* from each other, namely the *law-side* and the *subject-side*.

According to the law-side, (cosmic) time is an *order of time*, which modalizes itself in the modal structures, and which typifies itself in the individuality structures. According to its subject-side, time is individual *duration*. And so each creature, insofar as it now has a temporal mode of being, is subjected to the order of time, which in its *cosmic* character, that encloses all modal aspects and individuality structures, is always *the same* for each subject.

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27 JGF: There is no footnote 27 in the original document, due to a numbering error in the original text.
But the individual and subjective time duration is different for each individual temporal existence.\(^{28}\)

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\(^{28}\) Also within the modal aspects! In this way the arithmetical and spatial relations first acquire subjective differing durations within concrete things, events, etc. For example, five people find themselves at the same time for a period of five minutes in the same square space. After the five minutes have elapsed, one leaves to go to an adjoining room, so that after this first departure now four remain. The first numerical and spatial relation lasted only five minutes. The modal aspects of this duration of time follow the modal orders of time: the duration of number follows that of the numerical aspect; the spatial duration follows that of the spatial aspect (of simultaneous extension).

In the structures of the modal aspects of number and space we find only modal time order, and no subjective duration. The same holds for the logical aspect of time. That some do not hold the logical prius and posterius to be real figures of time, can be explained in this way: they have thought that they could understand the subjective logical movement of thought, in which the logical aspect of time reveals itself as logical duration in subjection to the logical order of time, completely separately from the logical time order, as a kind of “psychical natural event,” which only asks for a “causal explanation.” In a logical discursive process of thought there is however implied a subjective logical time duration, in which the logical order of time subjectively differently realizes itself (one person makes logical conclusions faster and more accurately than another), and in which one can also argue non-logically (but not a-logically). Whenever one cuts off the logical meaning from the subjective duration of the thought, one is in fact eliminating the thought process itself, and one can no longer speak of a thought duration. And such logical meaning is eliminated whenever one thinks he can separate the thought duration from the logical order of time.

Things have a logical duration in an objective sense (compare p. 17 following in the text) \([\text{JGF: p. 218}]\) in accordance with their objective-logical characteristic, which in their temporal individual existence in fact come into existence and disappear with things, in contrast to the constant individuality structures (with the therein implied logical types), in which they function.

The objective-logical function of a thing may in no way be identified with the subjective logical concept, nor with the constant individuality structure, which first makes possible the individual coming into being and disappearance of the thing in time, or with the constant structure of the logical aspect, in which it functions with its objective-logical characteristics. Of course the subjective concept that I have formed of a certain thing, is independent of the continued existence of it. Moreover, this holds just as much for sensory representation. But the current logical object function of a thing is with the thing as a whole just as perishable in time as its objective historical, economic, aesthetic or juridical function. Just as a thing by its perishing ceases to be beautiful, economically valuable, a cultural article or object of law, so also and just as much does it thereby lose its objective-logical characteristics. A building that collapsed into a heap of rubble no longer retains the logical characteristics of a building.
A real order of time is necessarily related to a subjective (or respectively to a subjective-objective) time duration; it is an order of time duration. Each order of before and after or of earlier and later, which according to the subject side of created reality necessarily holds itself to be in force in a duration of time, is an order of time. Where this necessary relatedness to a duration of time is lacking, no real time character can be ascribed to the before and after. So for example it certainly does not apply to the relation of priority of the Creator with respect to His creation.viii

This is the proper criterion of the order of time, by which of course no definition of any kind is given.

In immanence philosophy, which always seeks its Archimedean Point29 in theoretical thought, this necessary two-sidedness of time is not seen, because from this standpoint, the true meaning of law and subject cannot be understood.30 Law and subjectivity can in their mutual relation only be understood from out of the Christian standpoint, which seeks the Origin of creation in God’s sovereign creative will. God has set each creature as subject under His law. The subject is in this sense ‘sujet,’ subjected to God’s creation order.

The subjective concept has it its subjective-logical duration and is just as perishable in time. In human society, the contents of such a concept are objectified in linguistic symbols, whereby it also remains preserved for posterity. A concept objectified in this way, in its acceptance by a relatively constant community of things, receives a social-logical duration of validity, which is independent from individual acceptance, and ends only when the community changes its manner of thinking. However, a concept is never timeless, as idealism supposed.

The matter stands totally differently whenever we bring into play the truth validity of judgments. The Truth is essentially not of a logical, but of a supratemporal religious character, since it carries a totalitarian and central character. The judgment “Socrates was a man,” is not true “in itself.” Its truth depends on the meaning in which one understands the word ‘man.’ It is certainly untrue whenever one has a false unbelieving view of “being a man”—for example when one understands him to be merely a higher kind of animal. And the judgment “2 X 2 = 4” is also not true in itself, since it immediately acquires a false meaning whenever we separate the truth validity of this judgment from God’s creative sovereignty.

29 The Archimedean point, as we have seen above, is the concentration point for thought, from out of which the thinker must understand the modal aspects of reality in the theoretical view of totality. This Archimedean point is the point of departure for philosophical thought and must transcend time and its modal points of refraction.

30 Also the identification of subject and substance in scholastic metaphysics has disturbed the idea of subject.
The law belongs to creaturely reality as its
determination and limitation of being. Therefore there is no subject without law. But the converse is also true. The law only has meaning as determining and limiting of the subject that is subjected to it. And therefore no law without subject. Only God is not a subject, because He is not subjected to the law, which always itself finds its origin in His holy creative will. Law-side and subject-side are thus both sides of created reality, without which no creaturely existence is possible.

Now since all of temporal reality is closed up in time, the two-sided nature of law and subjectivity must also find its expression in that time.

Rationalistic and irrationalistic views of time.

It is therefore an error in principle to allow time to become one-sided, whether in the law-side or in the subject-side. The conceptions of time of immanence philosophy have all in turn fallen into this fundamental error. The absolutizing of the law as universal order or rule was always characteristic for the rationalistic currents of current philosophy. On the other hand, the absolutization of individual subjectivity was characteristic for the irrationalistic currents.

And so it should not cause surprise that with regard to views of time, we have also seen conceptions arise that are in turn rationalistic and irrationalistic. For example, Newton’s conception of absolute “mathematical” time is truly rationalistic. In contrast to so-called empirical time, “mathematical time” would, for the objective order of earlier and later of movement, imply a completely equal duration\(^3\) of its flowing moments, and in its course would be completely independent of all subjective occurrence.

Here time as the mathematical order of uniform motion is completely separated from the subjective duration of reality.

We may contrast this with Bergson’s view of time as a subjectively experienced duration of feeling with its “élan vital,” over against which all law-regularity is opposed, which is regarded as

a conceptual abstraction that falsifies true reality. This is a standard example of an irrationalistic conception of time of a typically modal-psychological character, whereby the boundaries between the biotic and the psychical aspects are wiped out.

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\(^3\) “Duration” is here simply made into a dependent reflex of the mathematical time order.
Time as the horizon of temporal reality.

Whenever I now regard time according to its law-side, that is to say, time as order, then in its determining and limiting character—enclosing all of temporal existence—it is the horizon of temporal reality and of all of our temporal experience; it is the horizon that first makes these two possible.

In this horizon of time, both structural orders of reality are grounded—the earlier named modal and individuality structures. We will later deal separately with individuality structures.

The time order of the aspects as a law of refraction. The prismatic character of this order of time.

As the horizon of the modal aspect structures, the order of time is really a law of refraction. The totality of meaning of our temporal cosmos, which is the real unity and fullness of the meaning of creation for all modal aspects, cannot be given in time. It is of a transcendent, supratemporal character.

This holds both for the law-side as well as for the subject-side of reality.

With respect to its religious fullness and meaning-totality, God’s law is one and indivisible; it is the requirement to serve God with one’s whole heart. With respect to the religious fullness and meaning-totality of its subject-side, the temporal creation has since the fall into sin been concentrated in the religious root community of restored humanity in Jesus Christ. However, within time, this religious fullness refracts for its law-sides and subject-sides into the modal aspects, in which the wisdom of God’s creative plan differentiates itself into a rich diversity of modal ordinances and subject functions. Just as the unrefracted light is refracted into the many-coloured riches of the sun’s spectrum, so the religious fullness of meaning of creation according to God’s creative plan is refracted in time in its richness of modal aspects, which do not find their transcendent root-unity in time itself.

The individuality structures of time lack this prismatic character.

In the second place, the religious fullness of meaning differentiates itself according to its law-side and subject-sides in the individuality structures of temporal creation. As we have already seen, the modal structures are implied in these individuality structures. And the individuality structures, which are in essence structures of individual totalities that in principle function equally in all modal aspects, are also essentially structures of time [tijds-structuren] which are enclosed by the horizon of time. However, as we shall still see, they are not refracted points of time like the modal aspects.
The idea of time as an element of the transcendental Ground-idea (Law-Idea) of philosophy.

In its general theory of the law-spheres, the Philosophy of the Law-Idea has, by the path of theoretical analysis, demonstrated that the modal aspect structures are real *structures of time.*

As we have seen, since cosmic time itself, in its continuity that encloses and overarches all aspects, withdraws from theoretical analysis because it is a transcendental presupposition of all such analysis, philosophical investigation has no other theoretical access to the order of time than along the path of an analysis of its *modal structures.* Thereby cosmic time itself is set as the foundation in the transcendental Ground-Idea (Law-Idea) of philosophy.

This Ground-Idea or Law-Idea is the foundational *limiting concept* [*grensbegrip*] of philosophy, in which philosophic thought, by means of critical self-reflection, gives an account of its necessary pre-suppositions or prejudices, which, even though of a *non-philosophical nature*, first *make* philosophical investigation *possible.* In this Ground-Idea, apart from an idea of the Origin and of the deeper root-unity of the modal aspects of temporal reality, there is contained just as much an idea of the mutual relation and coherence of the modal aspects.

It is evident that these three transcendental Ideas, which are together summed up in the Ground-Idea, are found at the basis of each philosophic system, irrespective of whether the thinker is himself *critically aware* of it. However, from the immanence standpoint, it cannot be admitted that the philosophic Ground-Idea is determined by non-theoretical prejudices. [unreferenced citation from Dooyeweerd’s own work].

The method of theoretical investigation of the time order of the modal aspects.

If the modal aspects are themselves aspects of *time*, then their mutual *order of succession* in time is a real time order. And this order of succession must then also express itself in the modal *structure* of each aspect.

When one has properly grasped the earlier explained distinction and correlation between time *order* and time *duration*, then one will have no more difficulty in seeing the essential *time* character of this order of succession. Although the order of the modal aspects themselves is *constant* in time, just like the aspects themselves according to their modal structure, this does not detract from the *temporal character* of this order as such. It is always an element of the temporal world order, contained in
God’s plan of creation, and may in no way be regarded as having the
*character of eternity*, or in any way as an order that would *transcend* time.

In the subjective duration of time, this time order was related to the
genesis of the temporal world, and it is still in the most universal sense
related to the development process of the human individual in social life.
This development process is indeed a *cosmic* temporal process and it
cannot be understood as purely biological.

It is undeniable that life can only develop *after* the physical-chemical
conditions for it have been formed in time, that feeling first develops *after*
a period of completely unconscious embryonic life, in which all *actual*
[actueele] independent feeling processes are lacking, that the logical
function of thought first develops itself after the coming into existence of
an actual sensory life of feeling, that the historical cultural function first
can actualize itself after a rudimentary unfolding of logical thought, that
the linguistic function displays its first development before the social
function, etc. etc.

But it should be remembered that the time order of the modal aspects is
only related to subjective duration within the individuality structures of
concrete creatures, and that these individuality structures themselves
determine and first make possible the individual development process.
Time duration is proper not to the modal aspects and individuality
structures themselves, but only to their subjective realization. They
themselves are only *orderings* of time.

The said relation to subjective time *duration* undoubtedly characterizes the
*before* and *after* in the order of the aspects as an order of *time*. Time order
and time duration are always necessary correlata. [unreferenced citation
from Dooyeweerd’s own work].

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32 That the linguistic function first unfolds itself after the rudimentary logical
development of the child is also acknowledged by A. Messer: *Psychologie*, 5th ed (1934),
p. 245, where he remarks:

…daß verschwommene Vorstellungen, die beim Erkennen als Begriffe
funktionieren, im Kinde schon vor dem Besitz der zugehörigen Worte in
großer Zahl vorhanden sind.

[…that indistinct representations, which function as concepts in knowing,
are present in large numbers in the child even before the possession of the
related words.]

Even in adults, it can happen that

…der Begriff schon da sein, während er auf das Wort sich noch besinnt.

[The concept can already be there, while he is still thinking of the word]
In the general theory of the law-spheres, this cosmic time order of the aspect structures (law-spheres) is investigated in the following way. In the analysis of these modal structures, it appeared that in each of them there is present a modal meaning nucleus, which in its original meaning is proper only to the related law-sphere, and which guarantees the modal irreducibility and the modal sovereignty in its own sphere of this aspect of reality. The same cosmic time order, which externally holds the aspects in a continuous coherence and correspondence, also brings this coherence and order of succession to expression in their internal structure. All law-spheres that precede other law-spheres according to the cosmic time order, display in their internal modal structure meaning-moments which refer back, and which in the general theory are called modal retrocipations or analogies. These retrocipations or analogies, unlike the meaning nucleus, do not carry an original modal character, but in them the modal nucleus of meaning rather refers back to the modal nuclei of the modal aspects that are earlier in the cosmic time order. On the other hand, law-spheres that are followed by later law-spheres in the cosmic time order display in their internal modal structure meaning-moments that refer forward, and which in the general theory of law-spheres are called modal anticipations. These anticipations as such do not carry any original meaning character, either, but rather the modal nucleus in them refers forward in time to the meaning nuclei of the later aspects in the cosmic order.

It is apparent that in this state of affairs there must exist two boundary aspects of temporal reality, of which the first has no analogies [retrocipations] in its modal structure, and the second displays no anticipations.

These boundary aspects are those of quantity and of faith, since there is no law-sphere that precedes the aspect of quantity, and no law-spheres that follow the aspect of faith.

The point of refraction and the two directions in the modal time order.

In all other modal meaning structures, the modal meaning nucleus is really the internal point of refraction of cosmic time, in which two time directions are delineated: the referring back and the pointing forward. The Philosophy of the Law-Idea calls the first direction the foundational and the second direction the transcendental direction of time.

The modal meaning nucleus qualifies the retrocipations and anticipations within the same aspect structure. The retrocipations and anticipations therefore do not take on the meaning of the modal meaning-nuclei to which they respectively refer either backwards or forwards.

In this way, the (physical) space of movement of the general theory of relativity is not space in the original modal meaning, but rather an analogy of the original modal meaning of space in the meaning of movement, which [analogy] is founded in the original meaning of space. It is because of this that in the general theory of relativity the properties of this space are dependent on those of “matter” as a function of gravity. This is something that would certainly have no meaning for geometrical (non-physical) space.
In this way we also find in the irrational and differential functions of number modal *anticipations* to the meaning of *space* and *movement*.

*The time structure of the psychical and of the logical aspects.*

In this way we find in the modal structure of *feeling*, in the

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33 The modal meaning of feeling definitely includes more than psychology general understands under it. Undoubtedly what has been called ‘Empfindung’ or sensory awareness also falls under it. Sensory awareness of a visual, tactile or other typical structure, according to its *modal* character, is viewed just as pleasure or displeasure are viewed—a phenomenon of feeling. Ever since Tetens, the prejudice has worked its way into psychology to deny the nature of feeling to sensory awareness, merely because of its normal subject-object relation. Only the apparently pure subjective feelings of pleasure and displeasure are acknowledged as having this character [of feeling]. As is known, Tetens was himself not consistent in his distinction of “Gefühl” and “Empfindung,” insofar as he ascribed both to the same faculty of feeling or “Empfindung.” Kant was the first to be consistent in this line, when he no longer classified “Empfindungen” under “feeling,” but under the “faculty of knowing.”

Undoubtedly, a one-sided epistemology and doctrine of reality oriented to the natural sciences played an essential role in this. The modern psychological view of “Empfindung” as “(relative) einfache Wahrnehmungsinhalt” [(relatively) simple content of awareness] (cf. A. Messer, *Psychologie*, 5th ed. (1934), p. 152) derives from the atomistic association psychology, which sought to build up all of consciousness from out of elementary elements.

It has however still not succeeded in providing a real *modal* difference between “feeling” and “Empfindung.” Just as there is also no mention of this in the naive experience, as it has found its expression in what has been called “the psychology of everyday life.” Neither the criterion of subjectivity, nor that of polarity and affectivity, nor that of the so-called actuality (Külpe) is suitable to really *modally* delineate feeling from “Empfindung.” The first and the third of these criteria are already excluded from consideration since they are not oriented to the aspect structure, but in general to the subject-object relation. The second criterion is also not usable in this regard. One need only to think of the awareness of pain and of temperature, which are classified as “Empfindungen,” although they undoubtedly have a polar and affective character.

Moreover, the *modal* feeling moment of emotionality (movement of feeling) may not, as does Messer for example, be confused with the *typical* affectivity of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. In a modal sense the subjective feeling of colour is also proper to the moment of movement of feeling. Otherwise we could not be aware of the greater or lesser *intensity* of colours, for this awareness presupposes a sensory movement of feeling. On the other hand, logical feeling for instance is only with difficult able to be classified in the schema of the affective feelings of pleasure and displeasure.
moment of sensation [zinnelijheid], an analogy of the meaning-nucleus of organic life. And we find in the moment of emotionality or movement of feeling (to which in awareness are ordered the objective images of movement in the “external world”) an analogy of the original meaning-nucleus of the aspect of movement. And in the subjective feeling of space, which is objectively answered by the sensory space of awareness, there is an analogy of the original meaning nucleus of space.

And in the moment of sensory multiplicity (both in a subjective as well as objective sense) there is an analogy of the original meaning-nucleus of quantity. In contrast to this, in logical feeling, historical feeling, linguistic feeling, societal feeling, aesthetic feeling, juridical feeling, love feeling and faith feeling (the feeling of trust in a fixed ground, and, in coherence with the logical anticipation, the feeling of evidence or of certainty), we find clear anticipations in the modal psychical sense.

The lack of insight in the modal structure of feeling is also the cause that in the schema of spiritual feelings (or essentially normative feelings), as they have been worked out by Messer following Jodl, such as formative (cultural) feeling, the linguistic feeling, the societal feeling, economic feeling etc. have been left wholly outside of consideration. And except for what are called “Persongefühle” [personal feelings], only the logical, aesthetic, ethical and religious (Sachgefühle!) [objective feelings!] have been included.

34 See the discussion at p. 17 of this text concerning the modal subject-object relation.

35 Schopenhauer: Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I, section. 11, (Sämtliche Werke, vols. 1-2, p. 87), 86 sums up such anticipatory feeling functions next to the retrocipatory (sensory), in order to show that the concept “feeling”

...durchaus nur einen negativen Inhalt hat, nämlich diesen, daß etwas, das im Beübtsein gegenwärtig ist, nicht Begriff, nicht abstrakte Erkenntnis der Vernunft sei: übrigens mag es sein, was es will, es gehört unter den Begriff Gefühl, dessen unmäßig weite Sphäre daher die heterogensten Dinge begreift, von denen man nimmer einsieht, wie si zusammen kommen, so lange man nicht erkannt hat, daß die allein in dieser negativen Rücksicht, nicht abstrakte Begriffe zu sein, übereinstimmen.

If Schopenhauer had recognized the principle of modal sovereignty in its own sphere (see p. 25 below), then he would have held this statement in his pen.

A. Messer (op. cit.) p. 127 approaches close to the negative view of Schopenhauer:

Man darf also in Scherz sagen: Was man nicht definieren kann, das sieht man als ein Fühlen an.

[One may also say in jest, “What cannot be defined is regarded as a feeling.”]
In this way the philosophical analysis of the modal structure of logical thought has just as irrefutably demonstrated the *time* character of this structure, and thereby has also demonstrated the internal untenability of attempts to find in the logical aspect an Archimedean point for philosophic thought that transcend time.

We find in this modal structure [of logical thought], in accordance with the cosmic time order of modalities the following:

A. the following *analyses* [retroceptions]:

1. the *analogy of number* in the moment of *logical ambiguity*, which is inherent in each concept as *synthesis noematoon*;

2. the *analogy of space* in the moment of *logical thought space*, wherein we juxtapose the logical multiplicity of conceptual characterizations, in order to thereafter sum up these characteristics in the unity of a concept;

3. the *analogy of movement* in the *logical movement of thought*, to which we earlier directed our attention;

4. the *analogy of the biotic meaning nucleus* in the *logical life of thought*;

5. the *psychical analogy* in the *conceptual representation* (the pre-theoretical *image* of thought), which is still inertly bound to the sensory feeling impressions, but nevertheless fixes logical characteristics in the image.

B. the following *anticipations*:

1. the *historical anticipation* in logical *formative control*36, which can only reveal itself in *theoretical* thought because of its systematic-theoretical character (in contrast to naïve, pre-theoretical thought, which in its concepts still inertly depends on sensory impressions);

2. the *linguistic anticipation* in logical *symbolic thought* (whereby theoretic thought frees itself from being restrictively bound to the sensory representation);

Why the *meaning nucleus* of the feeling aspect does not allow itself to be more closely defined is made clear in the theory of the law-spheres. The modal meaning nucleus is always as such the *irreducible* moment of meaning in the modal structure. But in this respect the aspect of feeling is not at all an exception. The same holds even with respect to the meaning nucleus of the logical aspect! On the other hand, the lack of insight into the modal structure of the feeling aspect is avenged where men acknowledge to feeling an internally undefined “universality” and in the line of Felix Krueger’s developmental psychology accepts that feeling is the original undifferentiated origin of all other ‘experiences” such as thinking and willing (See Messer, *op. cit.*, p. 119).

36 The modal meaning nucleus of the historical aspect (as to its subject-side) is analyzed in the theory of the law-spheres as “free formative control.” (culture).
3. the social anticipation in the moment of the opening up of logical intercourse, in which the logical process of thought has to continually defend itself in its arguments over against counterarguments (which is just as much proper only to theoretical thought);

4. the economic anticipation in the moment of logical economy of thought (which is lacking in naïve thought, and which according to its structure may only be understood as a theoretical deepening of the principle of sufficient ground);

5. the aesthetic anticipation in the moment of logical (systematic) harmony;

6. the juridical anticipation in the moment of the logical ground of justification (which in argument and counterargument in the intercourse of thought must justify itself);

7. the moral anticipation in the moment of theoretical eros (Plato);

8. the pistical anticipation in the moment of logical certainty, as this reveals itself in the logical axioms, which points forwards to a presupposition of faith.xvii

In the coherence of the meaning-nucleus and the analogies [retrocipations], the modal aspect structure still only reveals itself in a closed or restrictive function; in contrast, the anticipations reveal themselves in a deepened or opened up function.37 The opening up process is itself a process of cosmic time.

The criterion for distinguishing the directions of time referring back and referring forward within the modal structure of an aspect.

The opening up process carries an essential time character within the modal structures of reality. Because of this time character, we also possess a criterion to determine whether the non-original meaning moments in this structure are of either an analogical or an anticipatory character.

As we have seen, if they are to hold as real directions of time, the directions of referring backward and referring forward in the order of succession of the meaning moments must always be related to a genetic duration of time.

Well now, it can be demonstrated that in concrete temporal reality, the modal meaning structure still reveals itself in a closed function, before the opening up process begins in the anticipatory direction of time. And on the other hand, the opening up can never begin before a modal function has realized itself in its “closed form [gestalte].”

So in inorganic things, the modal function of movement is realized in a still closed structure. On the other hand it reveals itself in an opened up structure in the “directed”

37 This also determined the correct relation between naïve thought and theoretical thought. Theoretical thought cannot be separated from naïve thought, but is in essence a deepening or opening up of pre-theoretical thought. However, this opening up, according to the nature of logical analysis, is only possible by the path of theoretical abstraction and detachment [distantieering].
movements within a living organism, which can develop itself within the time order of creation only after the inorganic created things. However, even in movements that are still closed, a temporal relation of meaning with the numerical and spatial aspects is still expressed. In the movements that are directed, or led by the destination of life,

the unfolding process takes hold of the whole modal structure in its closed function, that is to say, the unfolding concerns both the meaning nucleus as well as the modal analogies.

In this way the feeling function is first opened up in a “closed” form in the sensory feelings, before the life of feeling opens itself out to the normative aspects. The animal-like life of feeling certainly knows a greater or lesser differentiation in being restrictively bound to the biotic differentiation of the sensory organs, but it knows no real unfolding of the normative feelings. By this, the order of succession between the analogical and the anticipatory moments in the modal structure of the aspect of feeling is also established. xviii

Similarly, the modal structure of the logical aspect first realizes itself in a closed function, and this is in pre-theoretical thought, in which we meet with all the analogical meaning moments, but not yet any single modal anticipation to the later aspects. xix

In naïve logical thought there is no mention of logical control of the content of thought by a systematic concept, nor of a symbolic thought, nor of an economy or logical harmony of thought, nor of a juridical anticipation in the weighing of logical grounds for justification and their counter-grounds, nor of a theoretical eros (moral anticipation), nor of a logical axiomatics. xx

In the same way we can establish in the historical aspect, in the linguistic aspect and the later aspects, which modal meaning moments are of an analogical and which are of an anticipatory character. So for example in a primitive order of law, the whole analogical structure of the modal juridical aspect is realized, including the economic analogy (cf. the legal action against each excessive prosecution of subjective legal interests in the primitive talio principle). xxviii

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38 The economic analogy is also essential to the structure of the aesthetic aspect. No beautiful harmony can reveal itself without taking into consideration the principle of aesthetic economy. To lay it on too thick is ugly even in a primitive work of art. On the other hand, the temporal meaning relation with the economic aspect can only reveal itself in the anticipatory direction in the logical, historical, social and linguistic aspects. Primitive language for example lacks any symbolic economy. In the subjective development of the child the linguistic function undoubtedly comes to its unfolding before the economical.

39 This is the economic analogy according to the law-side (normative side) of the juridical aspect. On the subject-side, this analogy reveals itself in subjective law and the figure of the legal object. The legal object is nothing more than the juridical objectification of an economic valuation (from which it follows for example that the free air cannot be a legal object). [JGF: the talio principle, literally “the law of the tooth,” is represented by “an eye
But this *talio* principle still lacks any moral anticipation. Primitive law is ruled by the principle of “*Erfolgshaftung*” [liability based on consequences], which looks only to the external consequences of the deed. The anticipatory juridical idea of fault, in which the juridical causality and injustice deepens itself, is still unknown.

That the whole primitive society moves in such a closed form [*gestalte*] in all of its modal aspects, in spite of the undeniable fact that here life stands under a *typical* undifferentiated leading of faith, is a state of affairs that is subjected to a detailed investigation by the *WdW*.

The key to explaining this fact can be found in the transcendental boundary character of the pistical [faith] function. This means that in the truly primitive society, the falling away of faith has reached a transcendental boundary point in the deification of the unopened up natural forces (cf. the belief in *mana*). By the leading of such an apostate faith, all earlier normative functions necessarily remain in a “closed form,” because through the deification of the natural forces, they remain rigidly bound to their pre-logical substrate functions. We may for example compare the rigid binding of contracting parties to the words of an agreement (think of the stipulations of the primitive Roman *jus civile* [civil law]), without a place remaining in any sense for the application of the opened up legal principles of good faith, fairness, moral cause, etc. Here the magical view of the spoken word–by which one can put someone in his power–plays the all-controlling role!

Compare here also the rigidifying power that tradition exercises over culture.

Each change from the old morals is regarded as a “*sacrilegium*” [sacrilege]. [unreferenced citation from Dooyeweerd’s own work].

*The universality in its own sphere of each modal aspect of time.*

And so each modal aspect in its modal time structure is in fact a mirror of the whole cosmic order of time in all of its modal points of refraction.

The Philosophy of the Law-Idea calls this state of affairs

the *universality in its own sphere* of the said aspects, which is merely the other side of their *sovereignty in its own sphere* or modal irreducibility.

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for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” Dooyeweerd’s point is that this principle limited the extent of revenge]
This also explains the apparent success of all –isms of immanence philosophy such as mathematicism, mechanicism, biologism, psychologism, logicism, historicism, etc., etc.

All such –isms essentially sprout forth from the implied necessity in the immanence standpoint of seeking the root-unity of aspects in a definite aspect of temporal reality that has been abstracted by theoretical thought and absolutized.

The meaning character of temporal reality.

Above all, the meaning character of created reality reveals itself in this state of affairs.

Nowhere in time do we find an absolute resting point, a self-sufficient point to hold on to.

In the whole of temporal reality, each aspect refers outside of itself towards the temporal coherence of the modal aspects, which already expresses itself in the modal aspect structure. And in the transcendental boundary aspect of time, that of faith, faith points above time towards its religious root, which in turn demonstrates its non-self-sufficient character by its religious attitude of dependence with respect to its Divine Origin.

The meaning character of created reality guarantees the tendency to the Origin of all of creation, and through which the creature finds no rest in himself. This tendency towards the Origin is concentrated in the human heart. Augustine said, “Et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requescat in te” [Our heart is restless until it rests in Thee].

To the words “cor nostrum” [our heart] we could add “et mundus in corde nostro” [and the world in our heart].xiii

The perspectival structure of cosmic time and the sense of the transcendent.

Only by this meaning-full relatedness of temporal reality to a supratemporal creaturely centre and to the Divine Origin does the perspectival structure display itself in cosmic time, which is experienced by man in relation to concrete events as past, present and future.

This perspectival structure presupposes a directedness of time, which as we have seen, already comes to expression in the modal structure of temporal reality, and which according to God’s creation order can only find its final point of direction [richtpunkt] above time.

To the degree that man's understanding of the transcendent is weakened, so also is weakened his self-consciousness and his ability to experience the perspectival structure of time.

40 Confessions L. I c. 1.
Among the so-called primitive peoples this is revealed to an even stronger degree. The lack of an opened up *historical* sense of time in primitive people has been sufficiently demonstrated by ethnological investigations.\(^{41}\)

And yet the perspectival structure of time may not be limited in the historicistic manner to the *historical* aspect. It is proper to cosmic time *as such* and expresses itself in the historical aspect of past, present and future only as a separate *modality*.

IV

The subject-object relation in the time duration.

We have here described *meaning character* of temporal reality—and therewith of time itself—which meaning character is not to be closed off. In order to throw even more light on this meaning character, it is necessary to go into more detail with respect to the *subject-object relation within time*, to which current philosophy cannot do justice. Witness the fact that one here meets in turn with both *subjectivistic* and *objectivistic* conceptions of time.\(^{42}\)

The subject-object relation is a fundamental relation in the structure of temporal reality, and it may by no means be confused with the epistemological relation of subjective theoretical thought and its *Gegenstand*.\(^{43}\) From the time of Kant, this confusion has generally worked its way into immanence philosophy.

Furthermore, in a truly rationalistic way, the *object* in the sense of “*Gegenstand*” has then frequently been identified with the *law-regularity* in our knowledge (cf. Kant’s description of the “*Gegenstand*” of our experience).\(^{x_{xiv}}\)

In order to demonstrate the impermissibility in principle of such identification of object and “*Gegenstand,*** it is sufficient to point to the fact that the subject-object relation is completely trusted in naïve experience, whereas an abstract “*Gegenstand*” remains completely foreign to the naïve attitude of thought.

The subject-object relation appears both in the *modal structure* as well as in the *individuality structure* of temporal reality.\(^{x_{xv}}\)


\(^{42}\) The irrationalistic conceptions of time are always subjectivistic and view every *objective* duration of time as a conceptual abstraction that falsified reality.

\(^{43}\) Just as fatal for insight into the subject-object relation is the identification of the idea of the subject with the metaphysical idea of substance. See p. 21 following in the text. [JGF: p. 213].
We will first look at this relation within the modal aspect structures.

So already in the spatial aspect such a relation exists between a subjective spatial figure and its points. The spatial point has no subjective (actual) extensiveness in any dimension, but is nothing other than an objective analogy of the irrational (infinite) numerical function within the aspect of space. The modal spatial time order reveals itself in the points as an objective moment (point of time) of simultaneous extensiveness. Objective magnitude (a numerical analogy) of a spatial figure also applies to points.

We similarly find the subject-object relation in the aspect of movement in the relation of the subjective (actual) movement and its actual path towards its objective space of movement, which latter exists merely in the relation to possible subjective movement, and whose characteristics are dependent on that of movement. (Cf. the “curving of space” in the general theory of relativity).

In the biotic aspect, the relation between the subjective function of life and its biotic object, which itself is only the object [voorwerp] of the operations of life,

is that of subjective life to the objective living space. Cf. the relation of eating to what is eaten; of breathing to the inhaled air.

In the psychical feeling aspect, e.g. in the relation between the subjective feeling of space and the objective sensory awareness of space (space of seeing, touching and hearing), in which the sensory objects appear to awareness.

In the logical aspect in the relation between the subjective concept and the objective-logical characteristics of a thing, etc., etc.

In the historical aspect in the relation between the subjective cultural work and the object of culture (e.g. the soil).

In the linguistic aspect in the relation between the subjective signification and the objective sign (e.g. a letter, a light signal, an auditory signal, a flag), etc., etc. [unreferenced citation from Dooyeweerd’s own work].

In truth, full temporal reality has in all aspects that succeed the first boundary aspect, both modal subject functions as well as object functions.

In the modal structure of the subject-object relation we find a one-sided (not reversible) relation of dependency between the object functions and subject functions. That should be well understood. The modal object is in its existence in no way dependent on a concrete, individual subject function within the same law-sphere. The objective-sensory properties of a blooming rose in their real existence do not depend on an individual subjective awareness from A to B. But they are certainly dependent on possible
subjective awareness. In other words, the said relation of dependency is a structural one, and not an individually subjective one.

The modal object functions are then not in the least a product of the subject functions. In that case they could not have any objective existence. A dreamed colour is fundamentally different from an objectively perceived colour. The former has no real, but only what we may call an intentional or subjective supposed objectivity. In the final analysis it remains of a subjective character.

The said subject-object relation necessarily comes to expression also within time, and indeed in the relation between subjective and objective time duration. Objective time duration never coincides with subjective time duration.

So for example, the duration of what is called ‘presence time’ (the ‘specious present’) in subjective sensory awareness is different than that of the objective sensory phases of the perceived event which correspond with present time, e.g. in the caving in of a house, the falling of a stone, the firing of a shot, etc. What is simultaneously perceived in the present time (as a momentary duration of feeling), can objectively take place in succession. Yet we can perceive the objective duration of an event in the psychical aspect of reality only by means of the sensory feeling of duration or our subjective awareness, on which occasion the so-called measurement of time serves to establish as nearly as possible its objective duration.

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44 The same state of affairs presents itself in the relation of subjective spatial extensiveness and a point. From this is derived the internal antimony of the attempt to construe actual extensiveness as “a continuum of points.” The subject-object relation is here turned around in an internally contradictory manner.

45 In the final analysis, the reflection of a subjective mood or feeling on the objects of our environment remains just as much of a subjective character. A. Messer, op. cit. p. 129 classifies these objects as “Objection der Gefühle” [objects of feeling; the reference should be to ‘Objekten’]. This clearly appears from the fact that the qualities of feeling that are reflected in this way on these objects vary completely with our mood. However, a living room or a landscape are examples that can also possess an objective mood that works upon our subjective mood. Finally, subjective feelings can really objectify themselves in facial expressions, in words or gestures, in a cry of jubilation, in crying, etc., etc. This really does not primarily concern a subject-object relation within the modal feeling aspect, but much rather in the linguistic aspect. Such an objective expression of feelings functions as a symbolic sign and must be interpreted.

46 As is known, the term “specious present” was introduced by E.R. Clay and popularized in the language used by psychology, especially by W. James in his Principles of Psychology (vol. I, pp. 609ff). According to recent experiments, the objectification of present time in clock time gives a variation of from one half a second to 4 seconds, from which it is apparent that the duration of this awareness time greatly differs in various individuals and is strongly influenced not only by the intensity of attention and interest, but also by fatigue, alcohol, narcotics, etc.
We can also for the sake of the so-called measurement of time objectify a subjective duration of feeling in the mathematically approached duration of time of the sensory object function of an event. An example of doing this whenever we “measure” the subjective duration of a feeling of pain by means of the objective-sensory duration of the images of movement, which the hands of a clock describe on the face of the clock. From dream psychology it is known that the objective (or rather the objectified) pace of a dream is usually exceedingly fast, while it does not make this impression at all in the subjective duration of feeling.

We are not really measuring the inner subjective duration of feeling itself, but only its objectification in the psychical aspect of clock time. The subjective duration of feeling does not allow its inner character to be measured. That is the kernel of truth in Bergson’s view of time. For all measurement of time (i.e. measurement of duration) rests on objectification, in contrast to subjective estimation of time. And therefore it does not concern a purely modally objective measure of time, but much rather an objective measure of time in an individuality structure, which as such can never carry an exact, i.e. abstract, mathematical character.

By this we have made the transition to the individuality structures of time, and in this what we have called ‘clock time’ will ask for our special attention.

V

The individuality structures of time
and the metaphysical idea of substance.

In contrast to modal structures, the individuality structures of temporal reality are not structures of the how or the mode of being, but rather of the concrete what of reality.

As we have earlier remarked, they are structures of time of individual totalities, such as things, concrete events or actions, social forms (like family, state, church, business) etc. etc.

However, unlike the modal aspects, they are not points of refraction of cosmic time, but rather true structures of totality, which overarch and enclose the modal aspects in their cosmic continuity.

In that regard they are found on a deeper level of the horizon of time than the modalities.

A concrete thing, like this tree in front of my house, is more than the sum of its modal functions in number, space, motion, organic life, etc., etc. It is above everything an individual temporal whole of relative durability, which lies at the foundation of all its modal functions. As of old, metaphysics usually spoke here of substance.

The Philosophy of the Law-Idea has however broken in principle with the philosophical idea of substance, and and has done this for good reasons.
The idea of substance wanted to philosophically account for an undeniable given of naïve experience, namely that of the relative durability or constancy of a thing, in spite of the exchange of its parts and of its sensorily perceptible shapes and qualities. But in its idea of substance, metaphysics was misled by the immanence standpoint, and turned itself against the true given of naïve experience. It went searching for an abstract “essence” of things that could only be accessible to theoretic thought.

In this way metaphysics came to its truly theoretical construction of “substance” as a “Ding an sich” [thing in itself] closed in on itself. Over against this was then posited the subjective perception and apperception of human consciousness.

The metaphysical idea of substance, which moreover led to the most differing conceptions—all according to the closer theoretical precision of the immanence standpoint—was therefore in all of these forms nothing other than the absolutization of a theoretical abstraction.47

This idea always rested on the shutting off of the cosmic horizon of time, and in a theoretical breaking apart of reality into a noumenon and a bare phenomenon.

The “Ding an sich,” however more precisely it may be understood, is nothing except a theoretical abstraction from out of temporal reality, an abstraction, which was “hypostatized” to a self-sufficient substance. This appears already in the definition of substance that was current in medieval scholasticism and that was accepted by Descartes, as a “res, quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum” [the thing which exists and does not need anything else for its existence].

Since the Philosophy of the Law-Idea has now broken with the immanence standpoint and the absolutization of the theoretical synthesis that is rooted in it, it can also not maintain the philosophic idea of substance. For it is just this idea of substance, and its closing off the “true” reality of a thing in a defined modal aspect of reality, which, in the development of

immanence philosophy, has appeared to be one of the great obstacles to theoretically doing justice to the real time structures of reality.

It really speaks for itself that modern functionalism, which in an anti-metaphysical spirit wants to replace the idea of substance with the idea of function, has not in the least brought any gain in this regard. In the idea of substance, metaphysics intended at least to give an account of the totality structure of things. In contrast, the anti-metaphysical functionalism remains wholly caught in the modal aspect structure of temporal reality, and furthermore thoroughly misinterprets this structure from out of the immanence standpoint (cf. e.g. the transcendental-logical functionalism of the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism, etc.).

47 Here again the theoretization of reality avenges itself, which finds its origin in the philosophic immanence standpoint, the seeking of the Archimedean point of philosophy in theoretical thought.
In order to acquire a correct insight into the givenness of naïve experience concerning the relative constancy of a thing, in spite of the exchange of its parts and of its sensorily perceptible shapes and qualities, it is above all necessary to give an account of the fact that all individual totalities given in time can only exist in a typical time structure. This structure is however the structure of an individual whole and not only a mere modal structure. A modal structure as such is indifferent with respect to the individual totalities which together function in it.\textsuperscript{xviii}

The idea of causality in classical physics was a truly modal idea of function, insofar as it was indifferent with respect to the individual nature of things, whose actions this physics wanted to understand in the law of causality according to the physical aspect. In respect to its extent, Newton’s law of gravity held both for a falling pencil in my room as well as for the movements of the heavenly bodies.

It is just this that distinguished this modal idea of causality from Aristotle’s physica, which sought to explain motion from out of the internal nature of things. And the internal nature was sought in the “substantial form” as the internal teleological principle of a thing, by which is naturally seeks to reach its perfection.

The individuality structure of temporal reality is

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already hereby radically distinguished from traditional metaphysics in that it, as a time structure of an individual whole, in principle overarches and encloses all modal aspects of reality without exception, whether in their subject-functions or object-functions.

Therefore the radical difference between minerals, plants, animals and humans (as to their temporal existence) cannot be sought in the supposition that these creatures function in a mutually differing number of modal aspects.

A purely material “substance” is found in temporal reality just as little as a purely “spiritual” one is found in the sense of “anima rationalis” [rational soul].

The horizon of time allows no break [caesuur] between the modal aspects, and also no dichotomy between “material body” and “spiritual soul” in the current metaphysical sense.

There is in reality only one fundamental dichotomy [principieele caesuur], that between the whole temporal existence and its supratemporal religious root, a dichotomy that comes into effect in the temporal death of man.\textsuperscript{xxviii}

The individuality structures and their typical grouping of the modal aspects.

So what is the basis of the fundamental difference in the individuality structures of temporal reality?

Undoubtedly, this difference is based in an internal totality nature of these structures, which in its deepest ground remains inaccessible to theoretical analysis for the same reason that cosmic time in its continuity does not allow itself to be theoretically analyzed. The internal nature of an individual totality simply forces itself on our experience. As
soon as one tries to theoretically analyze such a totality, he is referred to the modal aspects, in which this totality functions, but to which it can never be reduced [opgaan]. The totality, just like cosmic time, remains presupposed; as a whole it precedes and can never be constructed retrospectively out of “elements!”

The philosophic idea of substance has then only seemingly penetrated to a deeper level of reality behind the modal horizon of theoretical analysis.

As soon as metaphysics tried to theoretically define the “substance” of things, it had to take refuge to modal distinctions, whereby the modal aspect in which the essence or the being of the substance was sought, was then absolutized to the unifying ground of determination for the thing. ⁴⁸

Also the dialectical idea of totality, as it was applied in German idealism, led in the final analysis—because of its immanence standpoint—to an absolutization of a certain aspect of totality.

One need only think of the concept of the “spirit of the people” [volksgeest], which was viewed in its essence as the historical potential of all of “culture,” whereas “culture” then included all normative aspects of temporal society.

Can theoretical analysis really teach us nothing about the individuality structures of temporal reality? Undoubtedly it can, just as theoretical analysis of the modal aspect structures can, in the final analysis, give us theoretical insight into the cosmic order of time, insofar as the latter reveals itself as an order of its modal points of refraction. But the conditio sine qua non for a really fruitful and accurate analysis is that one sets at the basis of such an analysis the idea of individual totality as a transcendental limiting concept. The issue is namely this, that, just as the comic time order of aspects expresses itself in the modal aspect structures, just so does the individuality structure of a thing or of a concrete event or of a concrete social form come to expression in the modal aspects of the individual whole.

The first thing that we notice here is the fact that the modal functions are grouped in a typical manner. This typical grouping does not detract from the cosmic time order of the aspects,

which also maintains itself within an individuality structure of reality. The individuality structure of reality has just as little effect on the modal irreducibility, the modal sovereignty in their own sphere of the aspects. Even within the individuality structure of a tree, the modal numerical function is irreducible to the spatial function and the

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⁴⁸ Cf. e.g. the Aristotelian distinction between anima vegetiva, anima sensitiva and anima rationalis, whereby the substantial difference between the plant soul, the animal soul and the human soul was sought in respectively the biotic aspect, the feeling aspect and the logical aspect of reality, whereas the higher function then included the lower function in itself and stamped a new character of being on the lower function. Cf. also Descartes’ definition of the body substance as res extensa and of the soul as res cogitans.
movement function, and none of these three functions allows itself in a so-called “holistic sense” to be reduced to modalities of the organic life function or the (objective) psychical function of the thing.

However, when in our theoretical analysis we follow the cosmic time order of the modal aspects within the internal structure of the tree, then we notice that it first makes sense to speak of the tree in the biotic aspect, and at the same time that the organic life aspect is the last modal aspect in which the tree still functions as subject. In all of the later aspects it has no subject-functions, but only modal object-functions. The organic life function is the typical destination function or the qualifying function in the internal structure of the tree. This destination function also opens up within the individuality structure the earlier modal functions of the thing in an anticipatory direction towards the typical life destination. Thereby we can speak of internally directed movements within the movement aspect of the tree (e.g. the movement of metabolism and growth), in contrast to the external movements that are carried out by the tree, whenever it for example is struck by a gust of wind.

But these internal movements as such have not themselves become biotic movements. They have only opened up their biotic anticipations under the typical leading of the destination function of the tree.

It is the individuality structure of the tree and not the time order of the modal aspects that guarantees this typical grouping of modal functions within an individual whole.

The individuality structure is a typical structure of cosmic time. If the tree is affected in its subjective life function, then it can no longer exist as an individual whole. However, one cannot say that this life function as such is the essence or the substantial being of the tree, for the modal biotic function is not the totality principle of the tree, but just the reverse: the totality structure has determined the life function to be the directing and guiding function for all other functions. The totality is in other words not itself of a modal-biotic character, but it spans all aspects of the tree equally in their typical grouping. None of these aspects can be lacking without the tree ceasing to be a tree. The individuality structure also gives a complete account of the relatively durable character of the tree in the changing of its parts and sensory qualities.

As long as the tree functions in its typical individuality structure, it remains the same thing. If it loses this structure, for example if it is felled and sawn into planks, then there come into existence a number of other things of a radically different structure.

*Why the individuality structures are also really time structures of reality.*

But it is not the structure itself that comes into existence and that perishes in time. For it is as such constant, a foundational law-regular framework within which individual totalities exist in a definite individual time duration. It nevertheless remains a time structure of individual totality, since it has no meaning without a relationship to
subjective (respectively objective) time duration. The individual time duration, to which it is related, is determined by it in a law-regular way.

So for example the duration of existence of a plant, by reason of its structure type is bound to the typical life duration of a plant, or consider the duration of existence of a plastic work of art in its possession of its typical aesthetically qualified objective form, or the duration of existence of a state in its possession of an independent public legal organization founded on an independent organization of the power of the sword, etc., etc.

The differentiation of individuality structures and the enkaptic structural interlacement.

In the theory of individuality structures, the Philosophy of the Law-Idea has demonstrated the undeniable diversity of structural types of a totality character in time.

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Just like the modal structures, these structural types do not stand separately next to each other, but they are grouped in a vast order by the cosmic time order, and are interwoven with each other in what we have called ‘enkapsis.’ We can distinguish radical types, genotypes [stamtypen], and variability types.

In the radical types, which delineate whole “realms” of individuality structures, are what are called ‘radical functions’; they are the typical structural functions that characterize the individuality structure, but are merely modally determined.

49 Differing radical types do not have one, but two of these radical functions. Apart from the typical qualifying or destination function, they have a typical founding function. A typical founding function is present in all individuality structures whose destination function does not possess any original typicality, but which refers back to an original typicality within an earlier modal aspect of reality. The natural individuality structures that are typically founded include all those that are interwoven in such a way with other structures that without these other structures they could not exist. So the psychically qualified animal body is typically founded in a biotically qualified bodily organism. The former may temporally cease to operate while the latter remains functioning; the reverse is not possible. In Volume three of my De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, where the theory of individuality structures and structural interwovenness is extensively discussed, is therefore incorrectly denied a typical founding function to the radical type of the animal realm.

All things formed by man are typically founded. [JGF: i.e., they exist in a relation of enkapsis] So for example, a plastic work of art like Hermes by Praxiteles is typically founded in an objective material form, which is realized in free historical giving of form by the artist. The aesthetic individuality of this Hermes is always that of this incomparable form of a god, which has been represented in marble material by free controlling forming.

All human social structures are also typically founded. Marriage, household and family are typically biotically founded in sexual relations and respectively blood ties. State and
So we can say that the radical type of the plant realm is biotically qualified [or destined], that of the animal kingdom is psychically destined with a typical biotic foundation, that of the realm of art works is objectively-aesthetically qualified and founded in a typical objective cultural form, etc. etc.xxx

In the “genotypes” of a realm, these radical types are differentiated in an ever further descending [afdalende] individualization.

Radically different individuality structures are interwoven in the cosmic time order in what I have called “enkapsis.”xxxi This “enkapsis” leaves unaffected the internal character of the interwoven structures, and in this respect enkapsis is fundamentally different from the simple part-whole relation, which is ruled by a single structural principle. So for example, the marble material that the artist uses to represent his aesthetic conception retains its internal characteristics even in the enkaptic relation in the work of art. But it is not merely a natural material part of the artwork. The only “parts” of Hermes are the different bodily forms in the aesthetically destined marble [e.g., an arm of the bodily form; the physically destined marble is not itself a “part” in this sense]. In the internal structure of the natural material (i.e. the aggregate of limestone crystals), the physical-chemical functions retain their leading and qualifying role. The enkaptic relation of the work of art concerns only the external form of the marble, in which the physical-chemical actions must be bound so that they no longer play the leading role here, in order that the marble can become the material expression of the aesthetic conception in this enkaptic function. One can certainly speak of an “enkaptic” of “interwoven totality,” built up out of radically differing structures, provided that one does not in this way apply the part-whole schema in a wrong way by calling the natural material a part of the work of art. Rather, both natural material and work of art are parts of the enkaptic structural whole—a marble image, whose (cultural) form serves as the junction of the interwovenness.

In the variability types we see the typical characteristic that have their origin not in the simple internal structure itself, but in the interwovenness with other individuality structures. These include for example, the wood and marble variability types of the plastic work of art. The ecclesiastical state and the state church are variability types of church on the other hand are typically historically founded in an historical organization of power (respectively an organization of the power of the sword, and that of the power of the Word and sacraments). Cf. regarding the things mentioned my Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee Vol. III.

49a [Dooyeweerd's numbering] The nervous system and the whole sensorial apparatus clearly fall outside the internal boundaries of the biotically qualified (vegetative) soma-structure. They belong in part to the second, and in part to the third structure of the body. [JGF: Note: Dooyeweerd does not intend to distinguish here between ‘soma’ and ‘body.’ The three individuality structures are all of the body. Dooyeweerd later adds a fourth individuality structure: the act structure. See his “32 Propositions concerning Anthropology.”]
the genotypes state and church respectively. The arctic fox and the polar bear are variability types of the already well differentiated genotypes fox and bear.

*The enkaptic construction of the human body.*

According to the Philosophy of the Law-idea, the human body is also enkaptically built up out of an interlacement of individuality structures.

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It [the body] is in this sense the enkaptic structural whole of man’s individual *temporal* existence, which is itself interwoven with many social structures. In place of the distinctions of “body,” “soul” and “spirit,” which is often defended in modern psychology, and which in the final analysis are nothing other than abstract complexes of functions of man’s temporal existence, we then see three mutually interwoven individuality structures of the body (the biotically qualified *soma*, the psychically qualified *soma* and the pistically qualified *body*), in which the *individual structural whole of all modal functions* can always be seen. The soul, as the transcendent spiritual religious centre of human existence, remains simple, indivisible and imperishable. The soul animates [*bezielt*] and impresses the human character on the entire body in its temporal structure.  

But the soul as such cannot be grasped by theoretical investigation, but only in its temporal revelation in the perishable body, because it is the *presupposition* of all theoretical activity. However, it is clear that the enkaptic structure of the human body in our sense can give an account of the fact of experience that we are able to govern—and also able to lead in a definite direction—our psychical feelings and perceptions, biotic impulses and physical-chemical movements only within definite structural boundaries. For in this structural interlacement, the bodily structures we have distinguished also retain their internal sovereignty in their own spheres. We govern the pre-logical functions of the biotic, and psychically qualified soma structures only insofar as they enkaptically function in the so-called spiritual structure of the body (qualified by the faith function).

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*The meaning for psychology of the distinction between modal and individuality structures.*

*The distinction between “act” and modal function.*

The distinction between modal and individuality structures is of fundamental value, particularly for psychology as a special science. Knowing, willing and feeling are still frequently coordinated by psychology as functions (or in the terminology of faculty psychology, “faculties”) of the “soul”. By viewing the acts of knowing and willing as faculties or functions [instead of acts that function in all aspects], any possibility of an objective delimitation of the area of research for psychology is lost, and the door is opened wide for “psychologism” in all possible forms.
The Philosophy of the Law-Idea begins by sharply distinguishing between the particular modal aspect that is psychology’s field of research as a special science, and the individuality structures, which express themselves within this modal aspect. The modal aspect provides the objective delimitation of the field of research. However, this aspect possesses at the same time “universality in its own sphere,” so that the modal delimitation never forces us to refer what are really psychological issues of investigation to other special sciences.

The first benefit of the said distinction is the insight into the correct relation of “acts” and their “modal aspects.”

Feeling is not an “act,” but a modal function of an act. In contrast, knowing and willing are really acts, which as such are not limited to a particular modal subject function, but are immediately related to the central root of temporal existence (the “selfhood”).

Real “acts” of the selfhood always reveal themselves in time in individuality structures, and function equally in all aspect of temporal reality. Whenever we know or will, this concrete action concerns not only an abstract “soul” (as a supposed substantial complex of rational-moral functions), but much rather our whole temporal existence in its enkaptically interwoven individuality structures, although we always proceed from out of the selfhood as centre of our existence.

However, psychology as a special science can only investigate these “acts” in their individuality structures only according to the modal psychical aspect, just as for example jurisprudence as such can regard a social structure like state or church only according to the juridical viewpoint. And yet the special sciences also need to put the idea of the totality structure at the foundation of their investigations.

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50 “Act” and “action” can be distinguished as internal and internal-external activity. Therefore “act” does not differ from “action” in that an act takes place in the internal life of a [supposed] abstract “psyche,” or of an abstract “psyche” and “spirit.” For even in the “act,” our biotically qualified soma is also active. The distinction I [internal and external] is based only on the fact that the act according to its temporal side takes place wholly in the internal enkaptical structural whole of the animated [bezielde] body, whereas it is first projected “outwards” [naar buiten] in actions. [JGF: the qualification that this description is with respect to the “temporal side” of an act is due to Dooyeweerd’s view that all acts come forth from out of our supratemporal heart centre].

51 This state of affairs also explains how for example it is that the will is understood differently in jurisprudence and ethics than it is in psychology. On the other hand, feeling as such never has different modal aspects. Feeling as such is a modal function.
VI.

*The problem of so-called measurement of time.*

In the present connection and on the basis of the preceding discussion, we want to give throw more light on the problem of the so-called *measurement of time* and *its place in the whole problem of time*.

Now the neo-Platonist Plotinus is the first one who pointed to the internally contradictory character of the concept “measurement of time” in the then current objectivist view of time. As we have earlier seen, Aristotle had tried to define time as the measure of motion (*arithmos kineseos kata to proteroi kai husteron*).

However, if time itself were really only the measure of motion, how could it then [itself] be measured by motion?

In modern time this problem came to a critical stage by the appearance of the theory of general relativity.

It is indeed impossible to bring this to a satisfactory solution so long as immanence philosophy does not properly distinguish between the modal and individuality structures of cosmic time, and does not see them in their mutual coherence.

From our previous considerations, it is evident that the cosmic time order as such does not allow itself to be measured. For all measurement occurs in this time order and is first made possible by the time order.

We can only measure time duration in the subject-object relation, and there the measure of time is itself a duration of time in the subject-object relation. For the measure of time must be objective in relation to all subjective measurement.

As time duration, an objective measure of time cannot exist “in itself,” but only in a structural relatedness of possible subjective measurement of time duration, whereas each real action of measurement itself has its own subjective time duration.

It is very imprecisely expressed when one describes the measure of time itself as a measurer of time. An objective measure cannot function as a subjective measurer.

Real measurement of time duration is an action, which presupposes the subjective concept of measure and of number; an objective measure of time is merely an object of this concept.

However, all concrete time duration is time duration in an individuality structure. A purely modal time duration does not really exist. Even the modal aspects of a concrete time duration remain aspects of a duration of time in an individuality structure. As a consequence, a concrete time duration can also only be measured by means of a measure of time in an individuality structure.
An experimentally useful measure of time must be objective-sensorily (objective-psychically) perceivable and must necessarily include an objective-sensory image of movement in an image of space that is provided with a numbered division of distance.

This modal sensory object function of the measure of time is concretized by the individuality structure of the measure of time.

What does this mean? In everyday life we as modern westerners measure “time” with the help of a clock, while we derive the division into days, months and years from the time duration of the revolution of the earth around its axis and around the sun. With this measure of time we construct our time calculation, whereby not the measure of time itself, but merely the free mathematical operation carries with it an exact mathematical character. We thereby simply follow the time order in the modal meaning of number, in accordance with which the division of the images of movement is ordered. In this way arises our modern clock time. The various clocks, as particular measures of time are then regulated in accordance with the universal measure of time of a chronometer, and it in turn is regulated by the most universal measure of time—by what is called the ‘sidereal day,’ which rests upon astronomical perceptions.

It is clear that this clock time, as well as calendar time, has been formed by man himself for the sake of the needs of

human society. We use them in practice as a universal objective ordering schema, in which we localize all events and actions in past, present and future according to their simultaneity or degree of succession. The artificial objective measure of time, although as a sensory perceivable measure of an objective sensory character, functions in an individuality structure of time, which itself includes all modal aspects of reality.

This individuality structure of our societal time (measure) is however enkaptically interwoven with a natural individuality structure of what is called ‘astronomical time,’ i.e. the daily duration of the movement of the heavens, and this latter structure remains the typical foundation of the former, and upon which the former is based.

The measure of time of our societal time is read off an instrument, a cultural object, and this subjective measurement is naturally related not only to our sensory perception, but no less to our logical function, our historical, our linguistic function—yes, the whole complicated structure of human existence, including the transcendental selfhood.

As we have seen, the objective (experimental) measure of time is one-sidedly dependent on possible subjective measurement by a person. It exists only in structural relatedness to measuring.

Can such an objective measure of time possess a purely modal mathematical exactness? Of course not. The sensory perceivable side of a clock face with its numbered divisions of distance is not a spatial figure in the original (geometric) sense, but an objective sensory image of space, in which the objective sensory images of the clock hands, brought into correspondence with the mechanism, describe the images of movement. The subjective paths of movement of these clock hands are sensorily objectified in a spatial image, which is bound to the instrument itself. As we earlier saw, in original space as simultaneous extensiveness in
dimensions, there can be no place for movement in its original meaning. On the contrary, in the objective sensory image of the clock face and the clock hands moving themselves thereon, there are only objectified sensory analogies of space and movement, and only in the sensory space of perception can we see images of movement. The sensory image of space is indeed a structural condition for the sensory image of movement, because in the cosmic time order the aspect of movement is founded in the spatial aspect and not the other way round. Neither the images of division of distance, nor the objective sensory duration of the moments in the images of movement of the clock hands carries as such an original mathematical character. In the objective sensory duration, the moments are originally subjective moments of movement that have been objectified, and whose mutual equality of duration is broken by a minimal increase in speed of movement. Even less is the objective-sensory duration of the revolution of the earth a precisely equal one [to other revolutions].

One can aim at a definite degree of exactness in the measure of time, but its objective-sensory perceivability already excludes that one will reach an exact, i.e. a purely modal mathematical character.

Naturally this also holds in the use of universal measures of time, such as the chronometer and the ‘sidereal day’ used in astronomy (i.e. the duration of the revolution of the earth on its axis compared to the fixed stars), or of more primitive measures of time such as hourglasses, sundials, etc., etc. The fact that the duration of time that is being measured, functions in the individuality structure of a real event, and that the experimental objective measure of time must be a sensory (objective-psychical) perceivable measure, disallows in principle that physics—as an experimental mathematical natural science—should work with a theoretically constructed, purely modal objective-mathematical duration of movement in the formulating of the mathematical-physical laws. This is of course not to say that physics should give up its mathematical foundation. What Newton referred to as ‘absolute, mathematical time’ was such a constructed, objective-mathematical duration of movement of an abstract modal sense. It was not time itself, but an objectification of a

punctual constructed mathematical duration of time in the modal sense of movement, a purely modal objective possibility in the sense of movement, which formed the foundation for the classical principle of inertia.

The said objective-mathematical duration of movement is in the whole no real duration of time, but a mere thought, a theoretical abstraction, which is constructed from out of the modal time order of movement in synthetic relation to that of number and space.

Newton’s absolute mathematical time stood and fell with his conception of “absolute space” and “absolute movement,” whereby the three dimensional Euclidian space functioned as the completely static system of coordinates of absolute motion.

From the outset, mathematical time was not useful as an experimental measure of time since it was theoretically abstracted from each individuality structure of time. The discrepancy that this caused between the formulation of physical laws of motion and the
The physical time of motion is now as such a pre-psychical modal aspect, but the experimentally useful measure of time remains a sensorily perceivable on an individuality structure.

This individuality structure naturally expresses itself in the aspect of motion and the spatial and numerical aspects, so that the mathematical formulation of the measure of time must also take account of these typical structures of time. The general theory of relativity has done this by its relativizing of the measure of time in relation to its acceptance of a constant in the speed of travel of light, and by giving up a privileged coordinate system. This also relativized the concept “simultaneity” in the modern meaning of movement. In the mathematical foundations of this physical theory it was not the time that was geometrically anticipated, but only the subjective duration of travel of light as a fourth dimension in what has been called ‘Minkowski-space.’ Similarly in the ‘curving of space,’ the dependence of objective-physical world space on the fields of gravity came to expression in a geometric way.

The Thomistic natural philosopher Dr. P. Hoenen, professor at the Gregorian University in Rome has tried to show a logical error in Einstein’s relativizing of the physical concept of objective simultaneity. He posits to two systems of relativity theory, which move in each other’s direction. To each of these is bound a system of unmoving coordinates. According to Hoenen, absolute simultaneity is given by itself in the moment that the arbitrary points P and Q as arbitrary moments of movement, become congruent with each other. Einstein has confused a clock, a carrier of time, with the movement itself of his two systems. And, if we look at this in the light of “the evident principle of the instantaneous resulting of distances,” then it will in fact appear that there exists an (absolute) objective simultaneity.

For this proposition he gives the following example: Suppose that a material point moves itself along a path that is perpendicular to a line AB. We take that moment in which the point in motion crosses the line AB in a point P, that lies at a distance a from point A. We now see that the moving point immediately, in the same moment, finds itself at a distance a from point A, and also conversely, that A finds itself at the same distance from the moving point. Just prior to this, the distances were different, but by contact with the moving point with P, there results a new distance momentarily from that contact.

This same is now supposed to hold with respect to points P and Q in the example first referred to, of systems moving towards each other of relativity theory in the moment in which point P of the first system coincides with Q of the second system.

If we now take an arbitrary point A from the second system, then according to the “principle of the instantaneous resulting of distances,” point P has in the same moment the distance QA from A (QA is constant) and conversely A has the same distance from P,
all in this one moment. The distance does not have to be measured; it is there. And what holds for an arbitrary point of the

second system holds for all points.

The writer [Hoenen] admits that this objective simultaneity cannot be measured by anyone perceiving from a distance, because for that signals are necessary, which come from a distance.

That is not supposed to detract from the existence of an absolute objective simultaneity, but only to concern our subjective possibility of perception. However he says that we do have intellectual insight into the existence of absolute objective simultaneity.

*Critique of Hoenen’s critique.*

In light of our preceding discussions, this argument is to a high degree instructive of the consequences of the objective “idea of time” of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, and of the modal shiftings of meaning of which it is guilty. In the example of the moving material point, which intersects a line AB in a point P, it seems that it is proceeding from the objective sensory spatial awareness, in which the path of movement and spatial lines function only in objective analogies. For no movement is ever possible in space in the original meaning, and therefore *a fortiori* there is no spatial intersection of a path of movement and a perpendicular line standing on top of it.

It has however been forgotten than an objective sensory measure of time has no existence “an sich” [in itself], but only in a structural relation to possibly sensory perception.

The whole subject-object relation has here been shut out.

Now it cannot be objected that the complete objective simultaneity, which presents itself in the intersection of lines in a spatial plane, is carried over to the objective simultaneity in the aspect of movement and in the objective sensory image of movement. The question is really whether it is possible for there to be an objective absolute measure of time in the aspect of movement, independent of a moving system. Only in that case could we then speak of a complete simultaneity in the meaning of motion. And this holds in a corresponding way for the objective sensory image of movement in the psychical aspect of reality.\(^\text{52}\)

Hoenen, following the tracks of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, is of the opinion that this is the case.

In this he proceeds from the view that time is “possible numbering of motion according to its topological and metrical structure,” or even a system of concrete numbers with ordinal and cardinal values, which is given by reality itself in the succession of elements

\(^\text{52}\) Of course there exists mutually objective simultaneity of sensory parts of space in an objective sensory plane. But this simultaneity remains relative to the plane.
of a movement, which make possible a numbering according to the series of successive number.\footnote{Philosophie der anorganische natuur, pp. 283-84.}

So from this standpoint he can say that in each arbitrary movement–even according to Augustine, in the revolution of the wheel of a potter–absolute objective time realizes itself, although the one universal time realizes itself only in the daily movement of the heavens.

Hoenen says,

> If the movement of the clock is not completely uniform–and in practice it is not–then it is imperfect as a measuring instrument; but its motion remains the possible carrier of a different numbering (even a changeable numbering), in which a true uniform movement may correspond to equal differences of succeeding numbers. Throughout, the motion remains a real time, although it is imperfect as a measuring instrument, like all our instruments.\footnote{op. cit., p. 292.}

What do we make of all of this? From the system of concrete numbers, which is given in reality itself in the succession of the parts of a motion, which as real movement can never take place outside of an individuality structure of time, we are unexpectedly taken over to a merely thought system of numbers, serving for the numbering of the mathematical equal parts of a “truly equal” movement, the mathematical concept of a pure modal possibility of movement that, as we have seen, can never serve as an objective measure of time for concrete movements.

A true equal or uniform movement is according to Newton’s conception a movement in which no forces from outside operate and

in which therefore the principle of inertia can reveal itself completely independently of the force of gravity.

However in reality, the ‘inert mass,’ i.e. the resistance against acceleration, is never without heavy mass, i.e. gravitation. As is known, in the relativity theory both are identified and this implicitly means the giving up of the so-called absolute motion as a real movement. What physics allows to hold as real uniform motion is in reality never an exact simultaneity, but only one whereby the deviations from the mathematical concept of simultaneity, at least in macro-events, can be disregarded because of their inconsiderable measure.

In micro-events (e.g. the motion of an electron), exact measurement of time is impossible in principle because of Heisenberg’s “uncertainty principle.” [unreferenced citation from Dooyeweerd’s own work].
It cannot be denied that we have a concept of a mathematically defined motion, just as little as we can deny the concept of complete objective spatial simultaneity of points in spatial extensiveness. These are however modal concepts, in which there is a conscious abstraction from the individuality structures of reality. They may in that sense be structural conditions for the physical measurement of concrete motions, but as an objective measure of time of real duration of movement they are in principle unusable.

As we saw, Hoenen acknowledges the impossibility of measuring with a measure of time (the abstract “numbered movement”):

We find enclosed in Einstein’s formulas themselves that if we had signals of “infinite speed,” i.e. if we momentarily could perceive from a distance, we should be able to establish absolute simultaneity; in the same way, now that distances result with “infinite speed,” i.e. instantaneously, this simultaneity exists; we have intellectual insight of it, although we cannot experimentally establish which events are simultaneous. Just as we cannot absolutely precisely perceive the existing accurate relations of length.

The existence of a structurally modal, i.e. merely possible simultaneity, is however something fundamentally different than the existence of an absolute individual simultaneity of concrete events. We can have intellectual insight into the former from out of the modal structure of the related aspect, independently of experimental measurement. But we can never have this insight into the latter, because it is never a mere modal aspect, but rather concerns a concrete event within an individuality structure of time. In the latter case it is evidently false to draw conclusions from the modal concept to the concrete reality, because it rests on a fundamental confusion of structures of time.

The movement of the heavens as a universal measure of time is given as such only in physically qualified individuality structures (which moreover, as we know, have their typical object functions in the post-physical aspects); the instrumental clock time of our modern society, although enkaptically interwoven with this “natural” individuality structure of time, has nevertheless its own internal individuality structure of a normative-social qualification, and a typical historical foundation.

For this reason, its objective measure of time is also normatively established, so that all clocks must direct themselves to that measure of time, and the physical relativity of the measure of time is compensated practically by a normative universal measure.

The positivistic conclusion, “what in principle can not be measured does not exist” is in its universality undoubtedly incorrect. This we can concede to Hoenen without reservations.

Undoubtedly, Einstein also went too far when he later gave up any limitation to the physical aspect of movement of his relative concept of simultaneity.

\[55\] op. cit., p. 306
But in the present case, the “in principle” in fact relates to the numbered simultaneity of motion itself, which was proclaimed to be the measure of time. And as a mathematical concept of an objective mathematical analogy in the modal aspect of movement, this can in fact not exist as a measure of time for concrete movements within an individuality structure of time.

After the foregoing discussions, it will now be clear that the “clock time,” in which as we have seen, two individuality structures are interwoven with each other, simply does not affect the internal nature of the other structures of time, and a fortiori cannot be identified with cosmic time.\(^5\)

Insofar as it appears as empirical special science with a modally delineated area of investigation (and not as a speculative metaphysics), psychology will have to give an account of both the modal time aspect, in which the psychical phenomena it investigates function, as well as of the individuality structures of time, which express themselves within this aspect.

And in its use of clock time, it will have to remain conscious of the internal boundaries of the latter.

Discussions like the one between Einstein and Bergson simply pass each other by, since the one party absolutizes the objective-physical and the other the subjective-psychological aspect of time.

The one cosmic order of time, which equally holds for all things and events does not imply, as Newton supposed in his rationalistic view of time, a real uniform objective duration of time, separate from any individuality structure of reality. All concrete time duration, even that of the measure of time, remains bound to an individuality structure, and is determined by it.

The problem of time can first be set on the correct foundation when one has seen that it essentially encloses within itself the problem of creaturely reality, and that the manner of posing the problem is wholly determined by what is in the deepest sense the religious point of departure of the thinker.

\(^5\) This is implicitly also conceded by Hoenen, where he (op. cit, p. 279) remarks that:

\[
\text{…the time, in which an event takes place and which is the measure for that event’s duration…is something extrinsic, in contrast to the intrinsic flowing duration of the event.}
\]

This holds however only for the measure of time. Hoenen’s error is in identifying the measure of time with “time.”
JGF: Dooyeweerd’s use of the phrase “our own” relates to our appropriation of temporal events by our supratemporal selfhood. Dooyeweerd says that we have an immediate enstatic experience of temporal reality as our own (WdW II, 414; NC II, 479). The aspects are our own "cosmically" (WdW II, 409; NC II, 474). Even the identification of a sensation such as a sweet taste would be impossible without intuition:

How could I really be aware of a sweet taste, if I could not relate this sensory impression to myself, by means of my intuition entering into the cosmic stream of time? (NC II, 478).

ii JGF: This is a remarkable statement. It also occurs in Dooyeweerd’s response to the Curators of the Vrije Universiteit. If there is no dualism between knower and known in naïve experience, then it is for Dooyeweerd a kind of nondual experience.

iii JGF: The term ‘figure’ [figuur] is important in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. A figure is an anticipation of what an individuality structure in the temporal world may become, but which is presently only a potential reality. In finding the figure within the temporal world, and in realizing it and embodying it, we form history, and we fulfill the reality of temporal structures. God’s law or Wisdom gives the connection between this internal figure of our imagination and the modal aspects in which our body and other temporal structures of individuality function. See my extensive discussion of these issues in my article, “Imagination, Image of God and Wisdom of God: Theosophical Themes in Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy,” (2006), online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Imagination.html]

iv JGF: Rebirth is therefore supratemporal; conversion is its temporal consequence.

v JGF: Vollenhoven denied Dooyeweerd’s whole idea of cosmic time, including Dooyeweerd’s view of time as a prism refracting the meaning nuclei of the aspects. And Vollenhoven denied that our selfhood is in any way supratemporal. For him, the selfhood was totally within time, and merely pre-functional. Dooyeweerd vigorously opposed such a view. See NC I, 31-33, fn 1. See my article, “Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven: The religious dialectic within reformational philosophy,” (forthcoming) Philosophia Reformata 70 (2005) [‘Dialectic’].

vi JGF: Dooyeweerd uses the word ‘revelation’ [openbaring] to refer to the temporal unfolding of our life, directed from our supratemporal central heart and root. This use of the term ‘revelation’ to refer to the unfolding from a higher to a lower ontical level, is also found in Baader.

vii JGF: This is a concise distinction between modalizing in the aspects and typifying in individuality structures. Both are structures of cosmic time.

viii JGF: As Dooyeweerd later says, God creates time, so the act of creation cannot itself temporal, and when we say that God as Creator is “before” his creation, this cannot be meant in the “before and after” of cosmic time.

ix JGF: Note the use of the idea of God’s Wisdom differentiating itself into the aspects! True, the reference is to the “wisdom of God’s creative plan,” but that is nevertheless God’s Wisdom. From this it follows that when we discern the relations among aspects
and when we form individuality structures and act in conformity to those aspects, we are dealing with aspects of God’s Wisdom. The parallels with Orthodox theology have been made here by Michael Morbey.

x JGF: See my article, “Enkapsis and Individuality Structures: Individuation from Totality in Dooyeweerd and German Idealism” [http://www.members.shaw.ca/herandooyeweerd/Enkapsis.html] [‘Enkapsis’]. In that article I analyze this view of things being structures of time as opposed to substances.

xi JGF: I am not aware of Dooyeweerd making this point elsewhere. I think it is significant in distinguishing individuality structures from aspects. And if the individuality structure is not refracted like the modal aspects, this would be a strong argument against viewing the aspects as merely properties of things, as many reformational philosophers tend to do. For how could an aspect, which is a refracted point, derive from something which is not refracted? As Dooyeweerd says in his last article Gegenstandsrelatie, there is an ontical priority of aspects before individuality structures, and not the other way around. [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/Kentheoretische.html].

xii JGF: The modal aspect structures are the law-spheres, as opposed to the aspects themselves in their nuclear meaning, the refraction points of cosmic time. In his last article Gegenstandsrelatie, [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/Kentheoretische.html], Dooyeweerd says that the aspects differentiate first, then the law-spheres, and then individuality structures, which are based on the law-spheres. The modal structures are not the same as the individuality structures.

xiii JGF: This passage is important in view of the fact that so many reformational philosophers deny that the modal aspects can ever be understood in a genetic way.

xiv JGF: This is important for our view of individuality structures. Duration occurs only in individuality structures, and that duration is, as Dooyeweerd seems to say elsewhere, what constitutes the individuality structure (See “Enkapsis”). Here he says that duration occurs only when the individuality structures are realized.

xv JGF: Dooyeweerd initially referred only to retrocipations as analogies. Later, he extended the term ‘analogy’ to include both retrocipations and anticipations in time.

xvi JGF: As I have shown, Vollenhoven denies such analogies in the pre-physical aspects. See “Dialectic.”

xvii JGF: This pointing “forward” to a “pre”-supposition is characteristic of Dooyeweerd’s thought. The “pre” is to be understood in the sense of the supratemporal ground. It differs from the looking back of retrocipations, which look back to the “foundation” in the sense of what is disclosed in the unopened or closed experience.

xviii JGF: Note that in this process of realization and opening up, Dooyeweerd is speaking of the functioning of individuality structures in the aspects. He is not referring to the aspects themselves as functions.

xix JGF: Dooyeweerd slightly revised this view in response to criticism. But he still says that most naïve experience is retrocipatory. And one wonders whether the examples that
he gives of exceptions are not the incorporation in naïve experience of theoretical thought (in other words, of the deepening of naïve experience by theory).

xx JGF: It is interesting that Dooyeweerd relates axioms of logic to the faith aspect. This is because these axioms are an anticipation of certainty.

xxi JGF: As Dooyeweerd explains in the WdW, the problem is his view of faith as opening up our naïve experience. Why is primitive society not opened up? It, too has faith. Dooyeweerd’s answer here is that the kind of faith that it has does not perform this function.

xxii JGF: this is because in Dooyeweerd’s view of created reality as “meaning,” created reality refers beyond itself. It does not rest in itself, and so it is restless. This is one of many ideas in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy that Vollenhoven rejected.

xxiii JGF: Dooyeweerd did add the words (See NC I, 11; WdW I, 13). The Latin phrase is not translated in the text. It means that our heart is restless, and that the world is restless in our heart! So the phrase includes the fact that the temporal world has its meaning and existence in our heart, the supratemporal center or totality.

xxiv JGF: This appears to be Vollenhoven’s view. From his later Divergentierapport [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Divergentierapport.html], it is clear that there was a disagreement regarding the importance of law-regularity [wetmatigheid]. Vollenhoven seems to regard theory as abstracting the regularity of law from temporal things and their relations. Dooyeweerd seems to regard this as rationalistic.

xxv JGF: Vollenhoven denied that the subject-object relation takes place in the modal structure. For him, the relation applied only between things. See ‘Dialectic.’

xxvi JGF: Note that the totality is the foundation of its functions, and not of the modal aspects. The difference has been overlooked by reformational philosophy, but is crucial to Dooyeweerd’s argument.

xxvii JGF: Note the distinction here between modal aspects, and individuality structures that function in those aspects. Dooyeweerd makes the same point in his last article “Gegenstandrelatie.” See [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/Kentheoretische.html].

xxviii JGF: Note again the disagreement of Vollenhoven, who believed that all of man perishes at death, including what for him was a totally temporal pre-functional centre.

xxix JGF: Dooyeweerd does not mean ‘plastic’ as a kind of oil-based product, but rather a formed work of art. Individuality structures are in what he calls the “plastic dimension” since they can be formed and worked on.

xxx JGF: The distinction between “qualifying” (“leading” or “destination”) functions and “founding” functions makes sense only within the relation of enkapsis. A work of art is an individuality structure qualified by an aesthetic function, but founded in another individuality structure (the marble), which is qualified by the physical function. But because almost everything is built up from a number of enkaptically related individuality
structures, we can speak of almost everything in our experience as having both a qualifying and a founding function.

xxxi JGF: By ‘enkapsis,’ Dooyeweerd means the “insertion” of individuality structures within one another in an interlaced or interwoven manner. He appears to have obtained the term from the German philosopher Max Wundt (1879-1963). See my article “Individuality Structures and Enkapsi: Individuation from Totality in Dooyeweerd and German Idealism (2005). Online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Enkapsis.html].

xxxii JGF: Dooyeweerd here does not hesitate in applying these traditional ideas of the soul to the heart. As I see it, the distinction from traditional ideas of the soul is that (1) the heart is supratemporal, not eternal (2) it is not substantial (3) it is not a hypostatized function or complex of functions like intellect (4) temporal reality has no existence except within this religious root and (5) there is a reciprocal relation between the heart and its nature, in this case temporal. After death, there is a supratemporal nature in which the central heart will express itself.

xxxiii JGF: I am not aware of Dooyeweerd having explained elsewhere the faith qualification of the third enkaptic structure. To link “spiritual” or “normative” with faith is very interesting for the further understanding of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy.

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