Dooyeweerd’s *Encyclopedia of the Science of Law:*

Problems with the Present Translation

by

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**Note:** The following review is based on a line-by-line review of only the first 100 pages of the present translation. This review has been forwarded to the Dooyeweerd Centre, and they have informally advised me that they agree that this volume of the *Encyclopedia* will have to be reissued. It is unclear whether all of the corrections I have suggested will be taken up in the revised edition. I believe that there needs to be a full and open discussion of these problems of translation. Dooyeweerd is a most important philosopher, and in my view, the highest standards of translation ought to apply to the publishing of his *Collected Works.*

I. Introduction

As a lawyer and a philosopher, I am interested in the present translation of Volume 1 of Herman Dooyeweerd’s *Encyclopedia of the Science of Law,*¹ which is included in his *Collected Works.* I will refer to it as the ‘2002 Translation.’ Dooyeweerd was a professor in the faculty of law at the Free University, although he is better known for his philosophy than for his legal writings. But the application of Dooyeweerd’s Christian philosophy to the field of law is very important. Dooyeweerd himself said that his *Encyclopedia,* although never completed, was especially near to his heart.²

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There are some things that I like very much in this first volume of the Encyclopedia. It gives us new information about Dooyeweerd’s view of humanity’s task before the fall, how the fall disrupted this task, and how Christ’s incarnation as the New Root, in whom we participate, allows that task to proceed again (2002 Translation, 47). There are also some important references to how the Gegenstand-relation is essential for relating temporal theoretical thought to its supratemporal ontical conditions. And some of the comments and footnotes by Editor Alan Cameron are helpful in comparing Dooyeweerd’s legal ideas, which derive from a civil code tradition of law, to the common law tradition of English-speaking countries. For myself, it is in some ways easier to apply his reasoning to the Civil Code in Quebec than to English common law. More of such comparative work needs to be done.

But my reading of the 2002 Translation also troubled me. In many ways, the Dooyeweerd presented in it does not correspond with what I know of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy from his other writings. Alan Cameron, editor of the 2002 Translation, does say that Dooyeweerd never completed the Encyclopedia, and that it was not revised to take into account later developments in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. But that did not satisfy all of my concerns. I therefore wondered whether it had been translated properly, and so I obtained a copy of the 1967 SRVU Edition, on which the 2002 Translation is based.³

A line-by-line comparison of the 1967 SRVU Edition has in fact raised serious questions about the 2002 Translation. It has revealed many omissions from the text, several additions to the text, and many errors in translation.

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³ Cameron says that the edition used for the present translation was printed by the Students Council of the Free University (SRVU) in 1967:

The version of the notes which has been used as the basis for the English translation and publication of this first introductory volume was printed by the Students Council of the Free University and bears the date 1967, two years after Dooyeweerd formally retired from his university position (2002 translation, 2).
There are also many statements in the Introduction and in the footnotes to the text that attempt to "correct" Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. These statements are based on philosophical ideas that are not Dooyeweerd’s own. For example, some footnotes refer to criticism of Dooyeweerd by D.F.M. Strauss, the General Editor of the *Collected Works*. As discussed below, these footnotes are especially objectionable because we know that Dooyeweerd himself rejected in the strongest way the criticisms that Strauss made of his philosophy. To put forward these same ideas again, in the form of footnotes to the text, is to argue with the text. There is certainly a place for arguing with the ideas of Dooyeweerd—or any philosopher, for that matter—but not in what is intended to be a faithful translation of his works.

To a large extent, these attempts to correct Dooyeweerd appear to be a result of the long-standing tendency in reformational philosophy to interpret Dooyeweerd’s philosophy in terms of the philosophical framework developed by his brother in law, Dirk Vollenhoven. But although Vollenhoven used many of the same terms, his philosophy differs from Dooyeweerd on every key point. When we properly distinguish their views, Dooyeweerd’s philosophy can be read on its own terms. Dooyeweerd can be interpreted consistently in a way that honours the integrity of his philosophy, without rejecting key parts of his philosophy.

Finally, the Glossary included in the translation does not form part of the original text. While it is certainly useful to have a Glossary, some of the definitions given reflect Vollenhoven’s understanding of these terms. While it may have been supposed that these definitions are in harmony with Dooyeweerd’s own intended meaning, it is now

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abundantly clear that Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd did not hold the same philosophical position. And the Glossary should not criticize Dooyeweerd’s philosophy from a standpoint that we know he rejected, as occurs for example in the revision that Strauss has made to this Glossary in relation to the meaning of ‘individuality structure.’

In this article, I have made some comparisons of the present translation with some other editions of the *Encyclopedia*. In Appendix F, I have listed all editions of which I presently have information. There are obviously more editions that do not appear in my list, particularly from the very early period in the 1930’s and 40’s. I hope that Dooyeweerd scholars will make further comparisons with previous editions, and eventually compile a critical edition of the *Encyclopedia*. By ‘critical,’ I of course do not mean an edition that is critical of Dooyeweerd, but an edition that shows the development of the *Encyclopedia*, comparing what is stated in the various editions.

In an interview given in 1975, Dooyeweerd criticized an edition of his *Encyclopedia* that had been published by students. At first I thought that the edition that he was criticizing must be the 1967 SRVU Edition on which the 2002 Translation is based. Although the issue is still not clear, I now believe that Dooyeweerd’s criticism may have been of the 1946 Edition, although some facts do not fit with that view either. In Appendix G, I have set out what I know so far in relation to the history of the various editions, including the curious history of the 1946 Edition.

Even though Dooyeweerd may have complained about its misprints, students in his classes used the 1946 Edition. My copy of the 1946 edition contains notes giving a schedule of required readings in that Edition. I also own typewritten *Errata* sheets, listing the errors in the 1946 Edition, compiled by one of Dooyeweerd’s students, and evidently used by the students. When these corrections are made, the 1946 Edition becomes a valuable source of information for understanding later editions of the *Encyclopedia*. The *Errata* sheets list only 9 minor errors listed for the *Introduction*, with which we are presently concerned. The importance of the 1946 edition is underscored by

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the fact that in 1963, two years before Dooyeweerd’s retirement, Dooyeweerd published another edition of the *Encyclopedia*, using the Hanenburg Press. This 1963 Hanenburg edition appears to be identical to the 1946 edition, except that the errors identified in the *Errata* sheets have been corrected (See Appendix G). If in 1963, two years before his retirement, Dooyeweerd re-published this much shorter edition, it does raise some doubt about whether the longer SRVU edition was authorized by him.

But my critique of the 2002 Translation is not based on whether it is based on an authorized edition. Nor is it based on Dooyeweerd’s criticism in the 1975 interview. Even if we were all convinced that the 1967 SRVU edition is the best basis for a translation, there is still the question whether the translation that has been published is adequate. My conclusion, sadly, is that it is not an adequate translation.

When we compare Dooyeweerd’s remarks about the 1946 edition with the *Errata* sheets showing the errors in that edition, we can see Dooyeweerd’s own high expectations for the way that his work should be published. This needs to be taken into account in evaluating the large number of errors in the 2002 Translation. Dooyeweerd’s own high standards of translation are also evident from the history of the English translation of *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*. Dooyeweerd experienced so many problems with the translation of the first two volumes that he himself took over the translation of the third volume.

### III. Translation Errors

The 2002 Translation says that it is based on a previous translation by Robert N. Knudsen. The reference should be to Robert D. Knudsen. Knudsen was a student at the Free University in the 1940’s, and later a professor at Westminster Seminary in Philadelphia. Marcel Verburg indicates that Knudsen sought permission to translate the

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9 Marcel Verburg: *Herman Dooyeweerd. Leven en werk van een Nederlands christen-wijsgeer* (Baarn: Ten Have, 1989), 337, 341 ['Verburg’].
Encyclopedia at the end of 1976 (Verburg, 405). But it is not clear which edition Knudsen used for that translation. This is an important fact that needs to be disclosed. It is clear that Knudsen did not use the 1967 SRVU edition, since Cameron says that there were “significant omissions of material from the 1967 notes which required translation” (2002 Translation, 2).

The General Editor, D.F.M. Strauss, translated some of these additional sections, and others were translated by the Editor, Cameron (2002 Translation, 3). It is of importance to know who translated which portions.

It is surprising to read that a thorough check of errors by Knudsen has not been made. Cameron says,

Despite extensive checking against the Dutch dictaat this publication is not a complete retranslation which might well have brought to light additional errors of translation (2002 Translation, 3).

Surely a complete check of the translation is something that should have been done for a project as important as the Collected Works.

There are in fact many translation errors in the 2002 Translation. It is not clear whether they result from the work of Knudsen, Strauss or Cameron. I have given a list of some of these translation errors in Appendix A. In some cases, these are mistranslations of single words. In other cases, whole sentences are mistranslated.

IV. Missing Words and Sentences

As already noted, Cameron says that the 2002 Translation says it is based on the 1967 SRVU edition. But the present translation omits many words and even entire sentences from that 1967 SRVU edition. A list of some of these omissions is in Appendix B.

V. Added Words

A review of the present translation indicates that some words have been added to the 1967 student edition. These are listed in Appendix C.

One example of words improperly added is the addition of the phrase ‘state of affairs’ when referring to the transcendental Ideas. There are three transcendental Ideas: Ideas of the Origin, of the Archimedean point, and of temporal coherence. Dooyeweerd makes a
distinction between subjective presuppositions [vooronderstellingen] and “that which is presupposed” [de vooronderstelde]. The Ideas, as “subjective presuppositions,” point towards “what is presupposed.” Subjective presuppositions are our Ideas as hypotheses, pointing towards the supratemporal a priori conditions that make our Ideas possible. These a priori conditions are “what is presupposed,” but they are not themselves Ideas or even propositions. The present translation does not always adequately distinguish between these two meanings of presuppositions. For example, the word for conditions [voorwaarden] is translated as ‘presuppositions.’

But the confusion in the present translation goes even further. Dooyeweerd says that for the supratemporal presupposed conditions of Origin and Archimedean point, “there is no criterion of truth other than the agreement of our subjective religious presuppositions with the self-revelation of God in his Word.” But with respect to the condition of temporal coherence (the third transcendental Idea), the subjective presuppositions related to them can appeal “to the structural states of affairs within temporal reality itself. By means of its investigations, philosophical thought must give a satisfactory account of these states of affairs…” (pages 78-79). Thus, it is only with respect to the third transcendental Idea (temporal coherence) where we can appeal to states of affairs. Unfortunately, the present translation of the Encyclopedia blurs this important distinction by adding (p. 78) the words ‘states of affairs’ to the ontical conditions, “that which is presupposed.” But states of affairs are always temporal naïve experiences of which we need to theoretically “give an account.” They are not supratemporal conditions.

The confusion between subjective presuppositions and what is presupposed is made complete when the 2002 Translation speaks of “the truly religious set of presuppositions, the religious ground-motive of thought” (p. 81). But what is religious is supratemporal, and what is supratemporally presupposed can never be “a set of presuppositions.” The original text says “the truly-religious presuppositions [De echt-religieuze vooronderstellingen]. There is nothing about any set! Dooyeweerd is not a presuppositionalist in that sense. In contrast to Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd did not even view Scripture as a set of propositions that could be used for philosophy (‘See ‘Dialectic’).
In the *Encyclopedia*, Dooyeweerd says that it is only by means of the *Gegenstand*-relation that our theoretical Ideas can relate to these ontical conditions ("that which is presupposed") while remaining within the bounds of theoretical thought. But this important insight into the importance of the *Gegenstand*-relation is obscured by the translation at pages 80-81, which even breaks up this discussion into two paragraphs, thus losing the connection. It should read,

> Therefore by maintaining the *Gegenstand*-relation, the theoretical Idea relates the theoretical concept to the conditions of all theoretical thought, but itself remains theoretical in nature, thus within the bounds of philosophic thought. It is just in this that its transcendental character resides. For in theoretical thought, the transcendental is everything that, by means of the inner (immanent) structure of the theoretical way of thought, first makes possible theoretical thought itself; the transcendental is everything that stands at the basis of every theoretical conceptual distinction as its theoretical presupposition.

The ontical conditions are transcendent, but we can obtain a transcendental Idea of them within theoretical thought by means of the *Gegenstand*-relation. Theoretical Ideas are always of totality and unity of the aspects that have been distinguished by theoretical thought. Mere theoretical concepts are directed only to the theoretically distinguished aspects. Our theoretical concepts therefore must be led by the transcendental Ideas of coherence, deeper transcendent unity and transcendent Origin.

It is only because of our supratemporal selfhood that we can enter into the *Gegenstand*-relation:

> The meaning synthesis of scientific thought is first made possible when our *self-consciousness*, which as our *selfhood is elevated above time*, *enters into its temporal meaning functions* (1946 edition, 12, italics Dooyeweerd’s).

Another example of words improperly added is with respect to the phrase ‘full temporal reality.’ The present translation frequently adds the word ‘concrete.’ Thus, page 15 reads, “…is abstracted from concrete temporal reality by the science pertaining to it.”

To say that the fullness of temporal reality is always concrete would seem to be an interpretation based on Vollenhoven’s view of the cosmos. Vollenhoven’s philosophy starts with the triad God–law–cosmos, where the law is outside of the cosmos. The cosmos for Vollenhoven therefore consists of concrete entities and events that respond to
a law outside of the cosmos. But for Dooyeweerd, law is a side of the temporal cosmos, and the temporal cosmos does not consist of concrete things that respond to a law outside of the cosmos. For Dooyeweerd, full temporal reality certainly includes concreteness. But full temporal reality also includes the modal aspects and modal structures, which are not concrete. Concreteness is something that occurs in the plastic dimension—the dimension of individuality structures. The modal aspects are an ontically prior dimension of our experience. As Dooyeweerd emphasizes in his last article, the modal aspects are not abstracted from concrete reality. Rather, the individuality structures in concrete reality function within the aspects:

But this opinion clearly depends on the thought that I have already rejected in principle—that the modal structures are only given to us in their supposed individualization within the individuality-structures of concrete things, event, social relations and so on, and that their universal modal character is only to be discovered by theoretical abstraction from out of these individuality-structures. (Gegentandsrelatie, 90)

The modal aspects are also created temporal reality, but they are not concrete. The modal structure does not concern the concrete ‘what’.10

VI. Inconsistent translations

Probably because there were several translators of the 2002 Translation, some inconsistent translations have appeared for the same word. Examples are shown in Appendix D.

A comment needs to be made here regarding Editor Cameron’s substitution of the word ‘jural’ for ‘juridical.’ The Dutch word used in the Encyclopedia is ‘juridisch.’ Its translation should be ‘juridical.’ We should not second-guess Dooyeweerd’s choice of words; he was not a sloppy thinker who did not quite know what he meant to say. Cameron’s new term is also departure from the usage in other writings by Dooyeweerd, and it is therefore unnecessarily confusing. Dooyeweerd’s terminology is difficult to

learn, and his ideas are interrelated. Introducing new terminology will only make it even harder to learn his difficult philosophy, especially when the terms ‘juridical’ and ‘jural’ are now used in the same sentence, but with different meanings (2002 Translation, 93).

In any case, the point that Dooyeweerd was making in the text to which Cameron’s footnote is appended, is that there are social analogies within the juridical aspect. Cameron’s reference to manifestation of the juridical in nonstate spheres of life is actually a reference to juridical analogies within other aspects, and not to analogies of other aspects within the juridical aspect.

Cameron’s reason for making the change is that he wanted to show the universal scope of the juridical aspect—that the juridical does not merely apply to conventional legal phenomena. He says, “…the jural aspect not only manifests itself concretely as state law but in nonstate spheres of life as well” (2002 Translation, footnote 1). Now it is true that the juridical aspect applies by analogy to other modal aspects. But in seeking universality, we must remember that Dooyeweerd’s idea of universality is that the universal meaning embraces all aspects (2002 Translation, 82). But ‘universal’ does not mean a kind of a generic concept, for generic concepts “only have a right of existence within the framework of the mutually irreducible aspects” (2002 Translation, 93). The universal meaning is to be found within the particular meaning of the modal aspect (1946 edition, p. 7). Thus, we should not seek for generic terms outside of the aspectual meanings. We do not need a term other than ‘juridical’ in order to show that the juridical aspect manifests in phenomena that are not qualified by the juridical aspect. We rather need to emphasize its analogous application to other facts, institutions and events.

Another important word that has been translated inconsistently in the 2002 Translation is the word ‘ingesteld.’ It is variably translated as ‘incorporated’ or ‘enmeshed.’ It should be translated in conformity with Dooyeweerd’s other works, where he speaks of our being ‘fitted into’ temporal reality. It means that, in contrast to an autonomous law or ‘stellen,’ we are ‘gesteld’ by God’s law.11 And by this law our supratemporal

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11 Verburg says that Dooyeweerd's first use of the law-Idea is in his February, 1923 address, “Advies over Roomsch-katholieke en Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde.” As far as
consciousness is also ‘*ingesteld*’ or fitted into the cosmos along with the rest of temporal reality.\(^\text{12}\) We then live in both the supratemporal and the temporal realms.\(^\text{13}\) In the *WdW*, Dooyeweerd sometimes substitutes the word ‘*ingevoegd*’ for ‘*ingesteld*,’ but the meaning is the same.\(^\text{14}\)

The 1946 edition uses this word in the sense of our being “fitted into” temporal reality:

> Now what is unique to naïve experience is that it does not set the functions of consciousness over against a reality that is foreign to it (the ‘*Gegenstand* of knowledge,’ as it is called by the Germans). Rather, with

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I can tell, this is Dooyeweerd’s first use of the word ‘*gesteld*’ which is translated “fitted into.”

> Al het bestaande ligt gebonden aan zijn objectieven zin, die zijn wezen uitmaakt. Het schouwen is gebonden aan zijn gezichtsvelden, het denken aan zijn kategorieën. In deze binding van schouwen en denken ligt hun objectieven zin. Waar nu het bewustzijn niets meer autonoom stelt, maar alles heeft ontvangen, in alles gesteld is, als objectieven zin, nu de wet der heteronomie onbeperkt in al het bestaande gaat heersen, ook in het zingeven bewustzijn, komt de vraag naar den wetgever, den ordenaar, den Schepper van zelf naar boven (cited by Verburg, 60).

[All that exists is bound to its objective meaning, which gives it its essence. Intuition is bound to its fields of view and thought is bound to its categories. In this relation of intuition and thinking lies their objective meaning. If now our consciousness no longer autonomously sets its own meaning, but rather has received everything, has been set or placed in everything, as objective meaning, and if now the law of heteronomy can rule unhindered in all that exists, even in the consciousness that gives meaning, the question then arises as to the lawgiver, the one who orders, the Creator].

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\(^{12}\) See, for example, the following use of “fitted in”:

> It is a temporal coherence. Man transcends it in his selfhood, it is true,—but within this coherence he exists in a status of being-universally-bound-to-time. Man is bound to time together with all creatures that are fitted with him in the same temporal order (*WdW* I, 36, as translated in *NC* I, 24).

\(^{13}\) Our simultaneous existence as both a temporal and a supratemporal being is expressly stated by Dooyeweerd in several places. See the discussion in my article *Objections*.

\(^{14}\) For example, *NC* I, 24. At *WdW* II, 401, Dooyeweerd uses both ‘*ingesteld*’ and ‘*ingeboegd*,’ with the same meaning. See my Glossary entry for ‘Fitted’ at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Fitted.html].
the functions of consciousness (the psychical and logical), our naïve experience is naively fitted into [in-gesteld] full temporal reality. That is to say, it understands the psychical, logical and the later spiritual functions as an organic part of and in full temporal reality (p. 9).\(^{15}\)

This view of our being fitted into temporal reality, while at the same time we also exist as a supratemporal selfhood, participating in the religious root, is essential to understanding the Gegenstand-relation. As already discussed, the Encyclopedia makes the point that it is because of our supratemporal selfhood that we can perform this relation.

One of the most variable translations in the Encyclopedia is with regard to the word ‘rechtsfiguur.’ It is translated as ‘legal figure,’ ‘legal pattern,’ and ‘legal configuration.’ The word ‘figure’ is probably the best, since it seems to be used in a special way in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. Sometimes it means the embodiment or expression within temporal reality. See for example, where he says that the logical prius and posterius are “real figures of time.” (Tijdsprobleem, 194 fn28). At other times, it indicates an anticipatory analogy, which is not yet found in closed or primitive legal societies. (Encyclopedia). A figure is a result of theoretical thought, and relates to theory’s intentionality, in the sense of being directed within, and to theory’s reliance on imagination. The figure remains merely intentional and inward until it is acted on.

**VIII. Problems with the Preface, Introduction and Footnotes**

These are the most serious problems in the Encyclopedia. Many comments made by Cameron as Editor, and by Strauss as Editor in Chief are critical of Dooyeweerd, and

\(^{15}\) Dooyeweerd’s idea of an ‘organic coherence’ among the aspects is one of the ideas rejected by General Editor Strauss. Strauss argues that Dooyeweerd replaced the idea of organicity with that of meaning. Strauss also sees any division of temporal reality into the spiritual and the natural as reflecting a view of nature and grace that Dooyeweerd rejected. See Strauss, “Intellectual influences upon the reformational philosophy of Dooyeweerd,” *Philosophia Reformata* 69 (2004) 151-181 [‘Intellectual Influences’]. Strauss says that the idea of an organic system is not to be found in Dooyeweerd (p. 169). But the 1946 edition of the Encyclopedia shows that Dooyeweerd used both ‘organic coherence’ and ‘meaning’ at the same time. And the 1946 edition makes many references to spiritual aspects in distinction from the natural aspects, and even speaks of spiritual things. See also my article, “Dooyeweerd and Baader: A Response to D.F.M. Strauss,” Online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Strauss.html] [‘Response to Strauss’].
raise viewpoints that are not supported by the text. In many cases, these comments are made despite the fact that Dooyeweerd specifically rejected them. These comments ought to be excluded from any scholarly edition of the *Collected Works*. Of course, Cameron and Strauss are free to criticize Dooyeweerd, but this should be done in other works of their own.

**A. The Foreword**

In his Foreword, D.F.M. Strauss refers to Dooyeweerd’s method as “the transcendental-empirical method.” If Dooyeweerd refers to his philosophy in this way, a reference should be given. Dooyeweerd does speak of experienceable [*ervaarbare*] reality. The 2002 Translation translates this as ‘empirical’ at p. 81. But Dooyeweerd opposed empiricism’s view of the nature of our experience. Dooyeweerd specifically rejected the inductive and abstracting method that is generally used in jurisprudence (1946 edition, 6). Dooyeweerd rejected empiricism’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities. And Dooyeweerd’s view of individuality structures is not at all the same as empiricism’s view of things. In the 1946 edition, Dooyeweerd puts the word ‘things’ in quotation marks, when he discusses the nature of a thing.\(^{16}\)

**B. The Introduction**

The Introduction to the 2002 Translation provides useful information about the nature of science in the sense of *wetenschap*. And Cameron provides a helpful discussion of Dooyeweerd’s use of the term ‘retribution’ as the nuclear meaning of the juridical aspect. But there are some issues discussed that are problematic; they should not be included in such an Introduction.

1. **The meaning of ‘Encyclopedia’**

Cameron’s Introduction provides some helpful discussion of Dooyeweerd’s meaning of the term ‘encyclopedia.’ He says that Dooyeweerd intends “an integrating theoretical perspective.” But we can obtain even more insight into the meaning of the term we look

\(^{16}\) See my article “Individuality Structures and Enkapsis: Individuation from Totality in Dooyeweerd and German Idealism,” (2005) [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Enkapsis.html] ['*Enkapsis*'].
at the 1946 edition of the *Encyclopedia*. There, Dooyeweerd relates the meaning of the word ‘encyclopedia’ to the distinction between central and peripheral. The *Gegenstand*-relation is connected to this central/peripheral distinction:

Therefore, the Encyclopedia as a philosophical science does not need to systematically discuss the concrete material of science as such, but much rather it needs to discover the universal framework in which the material science groups its subject matter, and on which it constructs its system.

In this regard, the direction of its research proceeds from the center to the periphery; it is *egkuklios* (pages 5-6).

What does Dooyeweerd mean? The word 'encyclopedia' comes from the French 'encyclopédie,' which in turn comes from the Greek *egkuklios paideia*. ‘*Paideia*’ means “education” and *egkuklios* means “in a circle.” So an encyclopedia involves teaching in a circle. Unlike a reference work like a dictionary, which is merely arranged alphabetically, an encyclopedia arranges human knowledge in a circle. In an encyclopedia, the article and its footnotes refer to other related articles, connecting all the articles inside a system.17 In other words, an *encyclopedia* is like an early version of hypertext, linking all concepts together. This is what I have done in my own translation of excerpts of the *WdW*, using hypertext links to interrelate Dooyeweerd’s concepts, but always with the understanding that these interrelated concepts on the periphery relate to the supratemporal Center.18 And this is why in my article “The Mystical Dooyeweerd,”19 I emphasized Dooyeweerd’s similarity to Baader, who says,

> Because true gnosis is a circle and not a row of concepts, it matters little from which concept we begin our theory; it is more important that each concept must be related to the Center, from which this concept then necessarily points to other concepts in a regressive [retrocipatory] or


18 See my translation of excerpts from *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/Prolegomena1.html]. I have linked this translation with over 13,000 links to a Linked Glossary of terms, which is also cross-linked. See [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/Glossary.html].

anticipatory way; this relation to the Center therefore shows itself in act and essence as the only systematic relation (Werke VIII, 11.)

So in the 1946 edition, Dooyeweerd says that the Encyclopedia has a peculiar ambivalent character.\(^2^0\) It has two contrasting attitudes: the philosophical meaning, which is \textit{egkuklios}, and its practical meaning of \textit{paideia}. The philosophical meaning takes its direction out of the center, for Dooyeweerd says that philosophy is a “science of totality” (1946 edition, 10). This relation of Center and periphery can also be found in Baader.\(^2^1\) To be sure, neither Dooyeweerd nor Baader agree with any merely immanent view of the Center. Dooyeweerd’s second transcendental Idea within his own philosophy is always in reference to a supratemporal totality.\(^2^2\) This second transcendental Idea is that of the deeper unity or Totality.\(^2^3\)

Page 4. Cameron says that there is a lack of clarity whether Dooyeweerd’s use of the word ‘\textit{recht}’ refers to the modality or to the sense in which an individual law functions in all modalities. Cameron seems to be suggesting that law itself can be an individuality structure. And yet Cameron admits, “nowhere does he [Dooyeweerd] address the issue

\(^{20}\) At p. 5 of the 1946 Edition, he says that the Encyclopedia has a “peculiar ambivalent character.” The Dutch is ‘\textit{tweeslachtig},’ which has a primary meaning of “bisexual or androgynous.” The word is also used metaphorically to mean “ambivalent,” in the sense of coexisting but contrasting attitudes. The contrasting attitudes in the Encyclopedia are the central philosophical Idea of law and the peripheral, practical concepts of law. But the original meaning of ‘androgynous’ might also be intended here. See Franz von Baader’s use of ‘androgynous’ to refer to the Center and periphery, the active and the reactive principle, in one individual essence, both nature and product. See Baader’s “Vorlesungen über Societätspseudophologie,” Werke 14, 141 ff. Also Fermenta, Werke 2, 326, and the index entry for ‘Androgyne,’ Werke 16, 71 ff.

\(^{21}\) Strauss has denied that Dooyeweerd ever uses the Idea of Center and periphery. Strauss says, “Dooyeweerd does not know anything of “peripheral points” where the “Center” stands over them” (\textit{Intellectual Influences}, 173). But Dooyeweerd clearly does use the distinction here, in the same way that Baader uses it. And see my \textit{Response to Strauss} for more examples where Dooyeweerd uses the Central/peripheral distinction.

\(^{22}\) See my article, “‘Dooyeweerd, Spann and the Philosophy of Totality,’” \textit{Philosophia Reformata} 70 (2005), 1-22. Online [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Totality.html].

\(^{23}\) See also the 2002 Translation, p. 80, where Dooyeweerd refers to philosophic Ideas of Totality and root-unity.
of the individuality of laws as concrete totalities.” If that is so, then the issue should not be raised in a footnote, although it might be of interest in a separate article. But page 96 of the Encyclopedia itself seems to show that Dooyeweerd rejects what Cameron is proposing. Dooyeweerd says,

…the law-type never attains the actual individuality that is inherent in the subject-side of reality. Law still remains a rule, an ordering, to which the subject in its unique individuality remains subjected. If the law itself were to become wholly individual, it would no longer stand above the subject but would merge into the latter (2002 Translation, 96).

And in the 1946 edition (p. 22), Dooyeweerd says that positive law is still on the law-side of the juridical sphere. So positivized law cannot be individual in the sense that Cameron is suggesting.

Furthermore, from the way that he formulates the problem, it is apparent that Cameron misunderstands Dooyeweerd’s idea of aspects. Cameron considers the possibility “that law itself was nothing more than a modal aspect of individual, concrete social realities such as courts, legislatures, and nonstate jural institutions.” These words betray a misunderstanding of the nature of aspects. Aspects are not of individual concrete realities. Aspects precede those concrete realities. Individuality structures function in the aspects, and not the other way around. In his last article, Dooyeweerd sharply criticized the view that aspects can be abstracted from things (Gegenstandsrelatie, 90).

Page 5. Cameron refers to Dooyeweerd’s legal philosophy as ‘pluralist.’ If Dooyeweerd uses the term, it would be nice to have a reference. What is the Dutch word for which it is a translation? If all that is meant is that there is a multiplicity of religious views within one state, then the term might be acceptable. But generally, the term, ‘pluralism’ is used in the sense that religions are historically relative, and that therefore all religions should be encouraged. While Dooyeweerd acknowledges truths in other religions and philosophies, and even speaks positively of a perennial philosophy, he does not accept any historicistic view of the perennial philosophy (NC I, 118). The idea of pluralism is also difficult to reconcile with Dooyeweerd’s Idea of religious antithesis. If ‘pluralism’ is not a term that Dooyeweerd uses, its use here is likely to cause confusion.
C. The Footnotes

Some of the footnotes by Cameron and Strauss provide useful background information to the meaning of the terms employed by Dooyeweerd. Other footnotes are helpful in comparing Dutch civil law with English common law. But there are many footnotes that are argumentative in nature and have the effect of criticizing Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. In other words, they set out ideas and interpretations that we know were rejected by Dooyeweerd himself. In addition to footnotes already discussed, the following footnotes should be revised or deleted from the text.

Page 14, Footnote 1. The Additional aspect

This footnote gives the helpful information of a fifteenth modal aspect that Dooyeweerd later added. However, the comparison with Vollenhoven should be omitted, since Vollenhoven’s very idea of aspects is different from Dooyeweerd’s (See Dialectic). The history of this development also incorrectly suggests that the beginning of this distinction may have originated when Vollenhoven first distinguished between the mechanical and the physical spheres in 1930. But already in 1922, Dooyeweerd had distinguished between the science of movement, phoronomie, grounded in the modality of movement, and the science of physics, grounded in the modal categories of movement, force and matter.24 So the history suggested in this footnote is not accurate.

Page 28, Footnote 1. “What is Abstracted?”

On page 28, Cameron says that Dooyeweerd is asking two questions: 1. What is abstracted in the theoretical act of thought? and 2. From what is the abstraction made? But Cameron’s distinction relies on a mistranslation of question 1. The first question is not “What is abstracted by theoretical thought from the fullness of given reality?” but rather “What is subtracted from full given reality by theoretical thought?” The answer to both questions is then the same: what is taken away, or subtracted, from full given reality is the continuity of cosmic time, and it is from that continuity of time that we abstract. When Dooyeweerd uses the word ‘abstraction,’ he makes it clear that it is from the

continuity of time, a subtraction or *af-trekking* from that continuity (2002 Translation, 29: “…theoretical thought abstracts from time”).

Dooyeweerd denies that aspects are abstracted from things. Aspects are refractions of cosmic time. Dooyeweerd says that that is a “serious misunderstanding” shared by certain adherents of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, who wrongly suppose that the modal structures can be discovered by a continued process of abstraction from out of our concrete experience of reality (*Gegenstandsrelatie*, 90). The truth is in fact exactly the reverse: “The modal structures *lie at the basis of the individuality structures, and not the other way around*” [Dooyeweerd’s italics]. The individuality structures function in the aspects, which have an ontological priority to those individuality structures. See my article *Objections* for more detail.

The issue of abstraction comes up in the account of the purchase of cigars (2002 Translation, 15ff). The 1946 edition is very short, and does not use the word ‘abstraction’ here but rather the words ‘*interesseert zich*’ [is interested in] (1946 edition, 7).

**Page 28, Footnote 1. Reference to D.F.M. Strauss**

(Also referred to at 39 fn1 and 90 fn1)

Cameron’s footnote goes on to say,


I shall refer to this article by Strauss as ‘Discussion.’ Criticism of Dooyeweerd ought not to form part of the *Collected Works*. Strauss’s criticism is especially objectionable since it is known that Dooyeweerd expressly and strongly disagreed with Strauss.

In his last article, *Gegenstandsrelatie*, Dooyeweerd criticized ideas in Strauss’s doctoral thesis, *Begrip en Idee*. In that article, Dooyeweerd refers to “logicism,” to “serious

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25 D.F.M. Strauss, *Begrip en Idee* (Assen, 1973). Strauss’s doctoral supervisor was Hendrik van Riessen, who had himself done his own doctoral dissertation under Vollenhoven. In my view, van Riessen and Strauss continue along the lines of
misunderstanding” and to “insoluble antinomies” in Strauss’s views. And Dooyeweerd says that Strauss’s ideas of the nature of theory reflect “the most current prejudices of modern epistemology” (Gegenstandsrelatie 97, 100). Insoluble antinomies are a sign of a religious dialectic, and Dooyeweerd normally uses such strong criticism against those who adhere to a different Ground-Motive.

But in 1984, seven years after Dooyeweerd’s death, Strauss published the article Discussion that Cameron references in the footnotes. In Discussion, Strauss refers again to his dissertation; he reiterates what he had said there. Strauss says:

In my dissertation I have raised a number of points against the formulation of the Gegenstand-relation by Dooyeweerd. In summarizing them, I may mention the following points… (Discussion, 40).

In Discussion, therefore, Strauss attempts to re-argue the very points that Dooyeweerd had so decisively rejected in Gegenstandsrelatie. Here are some of Strauss’s ideas that Dooyeweerd rejected, and that Strauss raised again in his article Discussion:

(1) Strauss rejects Dooyeweerd’s Idea of the Gegenstand-relation.

(2) Strauss refers to modal aspects as being abstracted from entities. In Gegenstandsrelatie, Dooyeweerd had already criticized this as a “serious misunderstanding,” which results in a confusion between ontological and epistemological states of affairs.

(3) Strauss sees abstraction as occurring within the logical subject-object relation. But Dooyeweerd had said that abstraction as an act, which breaks up the systasis, or continuity of cosmic time into a dis-stasis. This act occurs in all modal aspects. The dis-stasis is not caused by the logical function.

(4) Strauss substitutes the intra-modal logical subject-object relation for the Gegenstand-relation. Dooyeweerd had said that this (a) leads to logicism (b) threatens the irreducibility of the aspects, since what is intra-logical can only be analogies of those

Vollenhoven’s philosophy, which is very different from Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. Vollenhoven uses many of the same terms as Dooyeweerd, but he uses these terms in very different ways. See my article Dialectic. Strauss refers to van Riessen’s views with approval in Discussion.
aspects, and not their nuclear meaning (c) is a genuine insoluble antinomy, since although on this basis, Strauss cannot maintain irreducibility of the aspects, and yet he still wants to affirm it (d) that irreducibility of the aspects can be maintained only on the basis of the supratemporal religious root, the selfhood (e) that Strauss’s epistemology reflects “the most current prejudices of modern epistemology” (f) that Strauss’s view of theory as the subject-object relation blurs the distinction between naïve pre-theoretical experience and theoretical experience.

(5) Strauss says that we frequently abstract in everyday life, and that we there have an implied knowledge of the modal aspects. Dooyeweerd had denied this. Naïve experience knows nothing of abstraction in the sense of dis-stasis, and although it experiences the aspects, it has no articulated or even implied knowledge of the aspects.

(6) Strauss criticizes Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique. Strauss says that the transcendental critique has a rationalistic tendency. Dooyeweerd had already responded to this, saying that theoretical thought is an act that functions in all of the aspects. It is not like rationalism, which bases itself on the logical function (although Strauss’s own method appears to do just that!)

(7) Strauss interprets Dooyeweerd as saying that theoretical synthesis is of opposed elements, when Dooyeweerd stresses that the synthesis must relate back to the unity of our supratemporal selfhood, by means of our intuition.

(8) Strauss says that Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique is based on a ‘vicious circle.’ Dooyeweerd responds that this is a function of the transcendental Ideas. We could also refer to the 1946 Edition of the Encyclopedia, which, as we have seen, discusses the teaching in a circle involved in any encyclopedia.

In his article Discussion, Strauss therefore attempts to re-argue the very points that Dooyeweerd had so decisively rejected in Dooyeweerd’s own last article, Gegenstandsrelatie. The entire issue of the nature of theoretical abstraction was very much in dispute between Dooyeweerd and Strauss. This conflict should not be carried

26 Strauss says that Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique upholds a false Kantian opposition between synthesis and analysis (Discussion, 55).
into the *Collected Works*, especially when Dooyeweerd can be interpreted in a way that respects his philosophy in an integral way.

For a more detailed analysis of Strauss’s criticism of Dooyeweerd, and of Dooyeweerd’s rejection of this criticism, see my article: “Dooyeweerd versus Strauss: Objections to immanence philosophy within reformational thought.”

Page 30, Footnote 1.

Strauss says that Dooyeweerd’s usage is not consistent between biotic and biological. But the text in question refers to “The question as to when a living individual is born is clearly a question of biological time which can only be answered in a biological sense.” The reference here to ‘biological’ is correct, since it is a question of theory. When Dooyeweerd says the answer is a biological question, he means just that: it is a question to be answered by biological science. The 1946 edition makes this clear when it refers to the biotic aspect, but says that the biological is the answer to the question. The answer given is that the beginning of life is determined when the child is able to live on its own apart from the individuality of the mother (1946 edition, p. 10, fn 1). The special sciences investigate the aspects.

Page 90, Footnote 1

The Editor, Cameron sees confusion in Dooyeweerd between time as the common denominator and the Archimedean point as the common denominator. Certainly in the 1946 edition of the *Encyclopedia*, Dooyeweerd takes the position that the Archimedean point is the common denominator. It is the “deeper unity” of the temporal aspects (1946 edition, 14). Cameron’s citation from the *New Critique* (*NC* I, 47) refers to the cosmic time-order being the common denominator. But that page goes on to say that the cosmic time order “expresses itself” in the modal structure of each of the aspects. This is because “the cosmic order of time expresses itself alike in the modal structure of all


28 *Tijdsprobleem*, 46.
aspects…” (NC I, 79). Dooyeweerd sometimes refers to such ‘expression’ as ‘revelation.’ It always involves the expression of the supratemporal in the temporal. So the reference in the New Critique must also be understood in this way, as a supratemporal unity that expresses itself in time.

This is confirmed on the same page cited by Cameron, (NC I, 47), where Dooyeweerd contrasts his view with Greek metaphysics, which sought an analogical unity lying at the basis of the aspects. Dooyeweerd says that his view is “nothing but the vision of the abstracted modal aspects in the totality of their coherence.” The reference to totality is to the supratemporal root unity, which is the Archimedean point. This is confirmed elsewhere in the New Critique:

In the light of our transcendental basic Idea this denominator is found in the cosmic time-order, reflecting itself in the same manner in the modal structure of every aspect. But this time-order itself is to be viewed in its relation to the religious fullness of meaning. The specific modal aspect is incomprehensible outside of the transcendental Idea of its temporal coherence with all the other aspects, and outside of its reference to the totality and the Arché of all meaning. (NC II, 8)

Thus, the cosmic time-order itself must be understood in relation to the fullness of meaning, or totality (the Archimedean point), as well as to the Origin or Arché.

This is conclusively shown in the WdW, where Dooyeweerd relates the common denominator to the “deeper identity of meaning” just as he does in the Encyclopedia:

All diversity of meaning in our temporal cosmos presupposes a deeper identity of meaning. For if no common denominator existed under which all aspects of reality can be brought, how could I know their mutual diversity? (WdW I, 44).

It is true that in the NC equivalent of this passage, Dooyeweerd again refers to the transcendental Idea of time as a basic denominator. But he goes on to say,

But the temporal coherence of meaning of the aspects supposes their deeper identity in a religious unity of root. For we have seen, that without this latter, there would still be lacking the necessary starting-point for the comparison, and consequently for theoretical synthesis. The denominator of comparison cannot itself furnish us with this point of departure (NC I, 79).

So I would not speak of ‘confusion’ here in Dooyeweerd. What is happening here is the interrelatedness of his ideas, his encyclopedic “teaching in a circle.” When he speaks of
cosmic time as the denominator, he is relating it to the temporal coherence. But this coherence must itself be related to the religious root unity, otherwise there is no starting point for the comparison. So when he speaks of the Archimedean point as denominator, it is in this sense of the starting point of any comparison.

Immanence philosophy seeks an “immanent common denominator” (*WdW* I, 68; *NC* I, 103). The contrast is with the supratemporal common denominator, and it is because of a wrong choice of Archimedean point that such an immanent common denominator is chosen (*NC* I, 103). And this is what he says in the 1946 Encyclopedia:

> The first life- and worldview seeks philosophy’s Archimedean point *within* time, and is therefore to be characterized—in all its variations—as *immanence philosophy*. The second life- and worldview seeks the Archimedean point *above* time in the religious root of the human race in its subjectedness to the religious fullness of meaning of the law…(1946 edition, 14).

To the extent that reformational philosophy has rejected Dooyeweerd’s Idea of the supratemporal selfhood as religious root, reformational philosophy must seek to find the common denominator within temporal reality itself. That is what Vollenhoven does with his idea of a merely pre-functional unity of the selfhood, an idea that Dooyeweerd rejected (See ‘Dialectic’). A similar idea of a merely temporal selfhood is also found in Strauss (See my article *Objections*). So reformational philosophy that rejects the supratemporal selfhood is immanence philosophy! That is why in his last article, *Gegenstandsrelatie*, Dooyeweerd criticizes Strauss’s kind of reformational philosophy as reflecting “the most current prejudices of modern epistemology” and why he refers to “logicism” within such philosophy. Without the Idea of the supratemporal selfhood as religious root, we cannot even understand the Idea of the irreducibility of the modal aspects! (*Gegenstandsrelatie*, 100).

**Page 96, Footnote 1.**

The General Editor, Strauss, wants to replace the term ‘subject-side’ with ‘factual-side’, which then itself has a subject-object relation. He says that this is Dooyeweerd’s “mature conception.” But Strauss here misses Dooyeweerd’s distinction between modal structures, and the individuality structures that actually function within the modal structures. The way that these individuality structures function in the modal structures
indeed has a subject-object relation. But within the modal structures themselves, there is no factual side, although there is a subject-side, and the subject-object relation occurs within the modal structures. Strauss seems to be following Vollenhoven here, who denied a subject-object relation within the modal aspects, and restricted the subject-object to relations between things (See *Dialectic*).

Dooyeweerd does refer to the “factual side” (e.g. *NC* I, 174). But to say that this represents a new idea is to ignore all his statements about concrete reality being that of facts, events and societal relations. Such statements even occur within the *Encyclopedia* (e.g. 2002 Translation, 96), where Dooyeweerd discusses the subject-object relation within the modal structure.

**At p. 106, Footnote 1**, Strauss continues this error by referring to an analogy at the factual side of the spatial aspect. But factual sides of temporal reality function in the modal aspects. Functions are not the same as aspects. Analogies occur in the aspects or modal structures, and not in the factual side. Strauss’s discussion of Mac Lane’s views also does not appear appropriate as a footnote to the *Collected Works*.

**Page 106, Footnote 2**

Because of its critical nature, this footnote by Strauss should be deleted. But in any event, his criticism of Dooyeweerd is wrong. Strauss rejects Dooyeweerd’s usage of the word ‘wetmatige’ in relation to the law-side. Strauss says that ‘wetmatige’ must refer to the subject-side of reality, and by subject-side of reality Strauss is referring to the factual side, because he then starts speaking of entities, processes and societal relationships. For Strauss, ‘wetmatig’ refers to “the universal side of factual reality—evinced in the *law-conformative* (wetmatige) functioning of entities, processes and societal relationships.” He says that Dooyeweerd identifies this factual regular functioning with the law for those entities. So again, we see Strauss’s failure to distinguish the modal structures from the entities that function in those modal structures.

Dooyeweerd uses the word ‘wetmatig’ in relation to the law-side. Dooyeweerd’s usage here is consistent with his other works. Dooyeweerd specifically relates the modal aspects to such wetmatigheid:
In its general theory of the law-spheres, the Philosophy of the Law-Idea has as of this date brought to light fourteen of such modal aspects of temporal reality, which will here be named law-spheres in accordance with their law-regular \textit{(wetmatige)} structure. \textsuperscript{29}

Dooyeweerd also says this in the 1946 edition of the \textit{Encyclopedia}:

The \textit{gain} of scientific thought as compared to naïve experience is that it obtains for us an articulated knowledge of the particular law-spheres, and of their particular conformity to law \textit{(wetmatigheid)} (p. 9).

Thus for Dooyeweerd, the regularity is in the modal structure, and not, as Strauss claims, in the individual subject that functions in that structure. This is confirmed in another book edited by Cameron, where Dooyeweerd again links the \textit{wetmatige} to modal aspects, which he there calls ‘fields of vision’ \textit{(gezichtsvelden)}:

Human thought is bound to lawful fields of vision \textit{(wetmatige gezichtsvelden)}, which are given to us and each of which also delimits a field of formal categories and essential characteristics. \textsuperscript{30}

It appears that Strauss is again following Vollenhoven’s view instead of Dooyeweerd. The \textit{Divergentierapport} draws attention to Vollenhoven’s view of law as regularity \textit{(regelmatigheid)}. Vollenhoven’s view was that regularity is what is subject to the law:

Regarding point 2. On the other hand, the rules, or if you will, the laws in the cosmos concern the regularity of both that which abides by the norm as well as that which does not. \textsuperscript{31}

For Vollenhoven, the law sets out the structure of creation and then we look at regularities within certain functions. Science and theory investigate such regularity. \textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Tijdsprobleem}, 164.

\textsuperscript{30} Herman Dooyeweerd: \textit{Essays in Legal, Social, and Political philosophy} (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1996), 17.


\textsuperscript{32} See Vollenhoven’s “Schriftgebruik en Wijsbegeerte,” online at [http://www.aspecten.org/vollenhoven/53l.htm]. This is also the view of the Stichting voor Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte, which refers to philosophical reflection over created
Dooyeweerd did not share that view, and the *Divergentierapport* says that he emphasized the temporal refraction of meaning *[zinsbreking]*, an idea that Vollenhoven rejected.

In this footnote, Strauss, like Vollenhoven, regards the law-side as “the law for entities,” determining the regularity of that which is subjected to law. This seems to me to imply a view of entities that is somehow distinct from the law. That is not Dooyeweerd’s view of individuality structures. But then Vollenhoven did not accept the idea of individuality structures, either, but spoke instead of things (See *Dialectic* and also *Enkapsis*). Strauss also seems to object to Dooyeweerd’s view of individuality structures. This is evident in the Glossary entry to the *Encyclopedia*, edited by Strauss, in which strong criticism is made of the idea of individuality structures.

**VII. Misprints and Stylistic Matters**

There are many problems of style, grammatical errors, typos and misprints in the present translation. In comparison with the other errors, these can be considered minor problems. Nevertheless, I have made a list of some of these errors in Appendix E. If Dooyeweerd was so upset about the misprints in the 1946 edition, then he would presumably also be upset about misprints in the 2002 Translation.

Some grammatical errors include the use of double negatives. Others are errors of syntax, using word orders that are not used in English.

In general, the text is also hard to read. It seems that the Editors did attempt to break up long sentences into shorter ones. But more can still be done to achieve greater clarity and forcefulness. Sometimes the translator used the passive voice where the original text was active. And sometimes the choice of words was not for the simplest word, but a more obscure word. Of course, in the case of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, his technical terms cannot be simplified, and no attempt should be made to do so.

In several cases, references to ‘man’, ‘men’ and ‘his’ have been changed to ‘humanity,’ ‘humankind’ or ‘persons,’ with the pronoun ‘it’ and ‘they.’ Although this was apparently done for the sake of political correctness, it has sometimes resulted in a lack of clarity in the text. Sometimes the antecedent of the pronoun used is not clear. Elsewhere, the desire for political correctness has made the text less forceful, since impersonal pronouns like ‘one’ and ‘it’ (for ‘humankind’) are used. At other times, there is a lack of correspondence between singular and plural, as where ‘their’ is used to refer to a singular noun. Is political correctness an anachronism for the translation of Dooyeweerd? In the last interview of Dooyeweerd in 1975, he expressed opposition to the leveling of differences between the sexes.33

Sometimes foreign words are translated and sometimes they are not. I would suggest that all non-Dutch words used by Dooyeweerd be included in the text, with a translation shown in square brackets. Even Dooyeweerd’s Dutch terminology evidences a very Germanic influence. Already in 1928, Dooyeweerd was criticized for his use of imported German words (Verburg, 114-115). And during the lengthy investigation of Dooyeweerd by the Curators of the Free University,34 Valentijn Hepp remarked that he had even tried to translate Dooyeweerd’s Dutch into German, in order to discover the Ur-Dooyeweerd. These Germanic influences need to be shown in the translation of Dooyeweerd’s works.

Nor should there be any attempt to simplify Dooyeweerd’s terminology by rephrasing it in terms of English philosophical terms. Dooyeweerd rejected such attempts to substitute English terminology.35 Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is technical, and Germanic. Just as

33 Interview, 51.
34 See Dooyeweerd’s Responses to the Curators, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Curators.html].
35 See the letter dated Oct. 4, 1946 from the Intervarsity Fellowship of Evangelical Unions, London, where they advised Dooyeweerd against using the word ‘nomic’ in English. And they said, “The phrase ‘naive realism’ would cause the raising of eyebrows here if what you mean is simply ‘common sense.’” And their letter of Feb. 3, 1953: “We ordered a Dictionary of Philosophy for you (so that you would be better able to translate your books into English equivalents). (Letters in the Dooyeweerd Archives, Amsterdam).
much care needs to be taken in translating his work as in the case of philosophers like Heidegger, who also use many technical terms.

Finally, the Dutch word ‘zogenaamd’ or ‘zgn.’ raises specific problems. If it is translated as ‘so-called,’ this implies in English that what is being referred to should not be referred to by that name. But the Dutch usage is different, and often serves to indicate what the name really is. It is used more like our English equivalent, “the said ‘x’.” In those cases, ‘zgn.’ should not be translated as ‘so-called,’ and the reference should just be included in single quotes.

IX. Problems with the Glossary

The Glossary appended to the Encyclopedia was prepared by Al Wolters, and revised by the General Editor D.F.M. Strauss. Some of the entries need to be revised because they presently reflect Vollenhoven’s meaning for the terms and not Dooyeweerd’s.

An example of Vollenhoven’s influence appears in the definition of ‘object.’ It defines the term as “Something qualified by an object function and thus correlated to a subject-function.” That corresponds to Vollenhoven’s idea of the subject-object relation; Vollenhoven did not acknowledge a subject-object relation within the modal aspects themselves, but only between things. But this definition of ‘object’ conflicts with the definition for ‘Guiding Function’, which says that a structural whole is qualified by its highest subject function.

The difference between the two definitions can be explained by the fact that, although Dooyeweerd does speak of some things as qualified by object functions (NC III, 109) these are cultural things, or what Dooyeweerd calls ‘objective spiritual things’ in the 1946 edition of the Encyclopedia. These things involve an enkaptic interlacement of the physically qualified thing (like a tree) with the historically founded intentional object, which designs a specific cultural use for the object.
The definition for ‘Immanence Philosophy’ is not adequate. For Dooyeweerd, it is not sufficient for Christian philosophy to acknowledge a Creator. The Idea of Origin is only one of the three transcendental Ideas. The second transcendental Idea is that of the deeper unity, the supratemporal religious root. As discussed above, Dooyeweerd says that if philosophy does not recognize that supratemporal religious root, it is also immanence philosophy.

The definition of ‘Religion (religious)’ needs to include Dooyeweerd’s view that the religious dimension of our experience is supratemporal, and that is why religion is not a sphere of temporal life, but rather the root of temporal life, which gives direction to temporal life.

The definition for ‘Time’ needs to be revised. Not all created things are in time. The definition properly mentions the Heart as not being in time. But angels are also created, and they are also not in time.

I have already referred to the problems with Strauss’s attempt to view all subject sides as factual sides. So the definitions for ‘Factual Side,’ ‘Law-side,’ ‘Subject,’ and Subject-side’ need to be revised.

Other entries need to be revised because they contain criticism of Dooyeweerd, and suggest meanings that we know he rejected. In particular, the many criticisms included in Strauss’s revision of the definition ‘individuality structure’ need to be removed from this definition. We know that Dooyeweerd rejected the idea of ‘idionomy.’ As I have suggested in my article Enkapsis, the difficulty arises only because reformational philosophy continues to view individuality structures as structures for things, instead of...

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36 Dooyeweerd says that if the Christian Ground-Motive of creation, fall and redemption is not understood in its supratemporal root, it has not been properly understood. In other words, they have to also be understood in terms of the second transcendental Idea. See Herman Dooyeweerd: In the Twilight of Western Thought. Studies in the Pretended Autonomy of Theoretical Thought, (Nutley, N.J.: The Craig Press, 1968, first published 1961) ['Twilight'], 124, 125, 145.

viewing things as enkaptically intertwined individuality structures, enduring in time. The definition in the Glossary improperly defines ‘individuality structure’ as “the structure for the existence of individual entities.” But law and subject are two sides. There is no independent entity that is subject to the law. This is better expressed by the concluding part of the definition, from NC II, 79: “…the factual temporal duration of a thing as an individual and identifiable whole is dependent on the preservation of its structure of individuality.” But then a definition of individuality structure must be given that corresponds to that statement. I suggest Dooyeweerd’s statement that individuality structures are merely relative unities within temporal diversity, with a duration in time. (See Enkapsis).

The definition of ‘Transcendental’ wrongly suggests that the transcendental method is to be distinguished from the transcendent. In Dooyeweerd’s understanding, philosophy can be truly transcendental only because our supratemporal selfhood is transcendent. Thus, although Kant’s transcendental philosophy attempts to find the conditions of thought immanently within time, Dooyeweerd’s transcendental philosophy is based on the transcendent, and it is only because our selfhood is transcendent that we can have transcendental Ideas (see the discussion in the text above).

X. Conclusion

The Collected Works of Herman Dooyeweerd should be a scholarly, unbiased, and definitive edition of his works. But there are serious problems with the 2002 translation of Volume 1 of Dooyeweerd’s Encyclopedia of the Science of Law. The Volume should be totally revised, and reprinted, with the following changes:

1. The revised edition of the Encyclopedia should correct the translation errors identified in this article, include the passages omitted, and strive for more consistency in translation.

38 From the perspective of Vollenhoven’s emphasis on things and their relations, and the law standing outside of the cosmos, Dooyeweerd’s idea of an individuality structure appears too idealistic. I do not believe that it is idealistic, but this mistaken view has led reformational philosophers like Stoker to try to find other ways of attributing substance to things.
2. To the extent possible, the revised edition should be a critical edition, showing the changes made to the *Encyclopedia* over time, and using earlier editions to help understand it.

3. Those parts of the Editor’s *Introduction*, and those footnotes that attempt to correct Dooyeweerd, should be removed. They may be relevant to articles or books published from a different point of view which intend a critique of Dooyeweerd, but they should have no place in a scholarly edition of Dooyeweerd’s *Collected Works*. In particular, all mention of criticism of Dooyeweerd by the General Editor Strauss, or references to articles that he has published criticizing Dooyeweerd, ought to be removed from the text of the *Collected Works*.

4. The Glossary should be revised to remove any references to criticism of Dooyeweerd. Instead, the Glossary should attempt to give definitions that Dooyeweerd himself is known to have accepted. Care should also be taken to ensure that the definitions do not incorporate Vollenhoven’s philosophy. Vollenhoven used many of the same terms, but in very different senses from Dooyeweerd.

5. Care should be taken to retain the technical and Germanic nature of Dooyeweerd’s philosophical terminology, just as would be done in a translation of Heidegger. Although Dooyeweerd was criticized for the Germanic nature of his Dutch writing, he did not change his terminology. Nor did he simplify it by seeking for equivalents in English philosophy.

6. The translation of the *Encyclopedia*, and any notes or commentary, should be based on Dooyeweerd’s own key ideas, especially his mystical emphasis on our supratemporal selfhood, and its entry–by means of the *Gegenstand*-relation–into its temporal meaning functions within the cosmos.
Appendix A: Translation Errors

References are to page and line number [e.g. 1:8]

13:4 zwaarwichtig profound [should be ‘weighty’ or ‘ponderous’]

20: 40 opgesloten zijn theoretically captured [should be ‘are enclosed in’]

22:35 This presently reads

From the outset, it must be observed that philosophy can never take a neutral position when it appeals to reality in the interest of refuting a particular theoretical point of view.

Should be:

We must really begin by noting that an appeal to reality in support of [ter adstructie] a particular theoretical view can never be philosophically neutral.

23:12 Should read,

It is only in the scientific, theoretical approximation [benadering]

23:29 theoretisch geanalyseerd theoretically distinguish from each other [should be ‘theoretically analyzed’]

23:37 deze waarneming naïve experience [should be ‘this perception’]

26:38 mogelijk conceivable [should be ‘possible’]

27:11 geheel totality [should be ‘whole’]. Similarly at 67:36 and 70:36

28:18 The following translation does not bring out the emphasis on Ding an sich:

In epistemology it is understood that this theory involved the conception that in our consciousness there is reflected a photographic-like physical reality. As if temporal reality were able to be entirely composed of sensory impressions!

Should be:

Epistemology understands this to be the view that a physical thing-reality, closed up in itself, is reproduced in our consciousness like a photographic image. As if all of temporal reality could be reduced to sensory impressions!

28: 22 ontleeed separates [should be ‘analyzed’]

28:30 ongedeelde werkelijkheid unbroken unity [should be ‘undivided reality’]
28:33 afgetrokken abstracted [should be ‘subtracted’—the word ‘abstracted’ is used separately]

28:33 This sentence is mistranslated. It reads:

Of what is the abstraction made?

It should read,

From what are we abstracting?

29:21 getallenreeks system of numbers [should be ‘series of numbers’]

31:12 openbaart zich pregnant reveals itself pregnantly [should be ‘concisely reveals itself’]; 46:6 should be ‘concise summary.’ 99:15 should be ‘Rationalism concisely manifest itself…’ And 32 should be ‘is concisely revealed…’

32:15 This sentence gets the direction of expression wrong. The expression is not from the modalities, but the modalities are the expression of time. Instead of ‘ways of expressing time’, we need to translate this as

All the named aspects are merely particular modalities, particular ways in which cosmic time—which overarches the aspects in a cosmic continuity—expresses itself.

My translation also corrects the translation of ‘overspant’ from ‘embraces’ to ‘overarches.’ The New Critique uses the term ‘overarches’ (NC II, 3).

33:4 This sentence regarding the root unity is translated in a confusing way. It reads,

By contrast, it is the inescapable task of theoretical thought to grasp the theoretically differentiated aspects within their root-unity and according to their constant structure which lies at the basis of all changeable phenomena, that is to say, to understand the aspects in their mutual coherence out of their root-unity.

It should read,

As opposed to this, it is the inescapable task of philosophic thought to understand the theoretically distinguished aspects according to the constant structure that lies at the basis of all changing phenomena, that is to say, in their mutual coherence from out of their root-unity.

36:30 ervaringsgegevens data of experience [should be ‘the givenness of experience’] ‘Data’ is likely to be misunderstood in an empiricistic way.
The following sentence is confusing:

But immanence philosophy throughout has not reached this insight. That is the case, for instance, with the modern naturalistic movements.

It should read,

But not all of immanence philosophy has reached this insight [into the importance of beginning with reflection on one’s self]. For example, the modern naturalistic school has not reached this conclusion. It seeks to reduce the entire cosmos…

*opgaan in* subsumed by [should be ‘reduced to’]

*subjektiviteit* objectivity [*’objectivity’ may be correct, but there should be a note of an error in the text]*

*grote gegeven* very basis [should be ‘great givenness’]

*alzijdig* as a totality [should be ‘all-sidedly’]

*Het is immers* It is, in reality [should be ‘For it is’; the word ‘reality’ appears later in the sentence, so to translate ‘immers’ that way is confusing]

*ikheid* ego [should be ‘selfhood’ or ‘I-ness.’ Although the NC sometimes uses ‘ego’ to translate ‘selfhood,’ that word is confusing since it usually has a temporal meaning in English]. Also 46:6 and 76:17, 20.

The following sentence is translated incorrectly, since it is incorrect to say that functions diverge into aspects:

In the latter the individual center, or concentration point of all our functions that diverge into the various aspects of temporal reality, is discovered.

It should be:

In the selfhood is discovered the individual center or concentration point of all the diverging functions within the various aspects of temporal reality.

The following sentence is translated incorrectly:

…but only our ego, as the individual undivided concentration point of all our temporal existence, that is able to give thought to this concentric orientation.

It should be

…but only our selfhood, as the individual undivided concentration point of the whole of our temporal existence, can give this concentric direction to thought.

*geconcentreerd* focused [should be ‘concentrated.’]

The emphasis is not on a focus from the temporal to the supratemporal, but on the
temporal concentration in the heart radical root, “out of which are the issues of life.” The emphasis is on the reverse direction from focus.

The same mistake is made at 46:19 [should be ‘they are all concentrated’] and 46:34 [should be ‘and in which these functions are concentrated’] and 47:32 [should be ‘the entire temporal cosmos was concentrated in this religious root-community’]. And p. 96:31 should be ‘concentration’ and not ‘focus.’

46fn1 The following footnote is translated incorrectly and does not really relate the fall into sin in relation to the centrality of the heart. It presently reads:

> From this it is evident that the “heart,” in this pregnant, scriptural sense, may not be identified with the temporal function of thought or the temporal function of feeling. Those who read the Holy Scriptures in this way utterly fail to understand the radical significance of the fall into sin and redemption in Christ Jesus-in relation to themselves.

It should read:

> It is therefore self-evident that the “heart,” in this significant Scriptural sense, may not be identified with the temporal functions of either thinking or feeling. Whoever reads Holy Scripture in that way understands nothing of himself, nothing of the radical meaning of the fall into sin, and nothing of redemption in Jesus Christ.

46:20 *verabsolutering* elevation [should be ‘absolutizing’]

47:40 *krachten* potentialities [should be ‘powers’]. The sentence should be translated:

> Apart from man, the temporal world could not independently direct itself to God and unlock the powers that were laid within it.

‘Krachten’ is correctly translated as powers at 98:14. In *Vernieuwing en Bezinning* (p. 58) Dooyeweerd also refers to the powers, which God has enclosed in His creation, and which man now must unfold. (“waarop de mens de krachten, door God in Zijn schepping besloten, gaat ontsluiten.”) This has Kabbalistic overtones, and was probably for that reason also translated in *Roots of Western Culture* as ‘powers and potentials.’ The word ‘potentials’ is not in the original text. To “develop potentials” is a much less radical way of looking at this issue than what the text here says, “unlocking (or even unleashing) the enclosed powers.” A similar mistranslation is in the *New Critique* where the word ‘powers’ [krachten] has been mistranslated as ‘faculties.’ (NC I, 119).

51:3 *geloofsvoorstellingen* articles of faith [should be ‘notions of faith’; to say ‘articles of faith’ sounds anachronistic for religions of nature]

51:5 *fluiditeit* movement [should be ‘fluidity.’ The flowing nature of reality is one of the ideas in Greek philosophy.]

51:5 *periodiek* periodical [should be ‘periodic’]

51:5 *vervloeing* rhythm [should be ‘flowing out’]
51:9  godheid godhead [should be ‘Divinity,’ as it is correctly translated on p. 58]

51:10  gestalte figure [should be ‘form,’ in view of the special meaning that Dooyeweerd attaches to ‘figure.’] Similarly, ‘mathematical configuration’ should be ‘mathematical form’ at 54:30.

51:16  rad der geboorten cycle of birth [should be ‘wheel of births,’ as it is correctly translated later at 52:23; “the wheel” is an important idea not fully captured by ‘cycle’]

51:43  duistere somber [should be ‘dark’–correctly translated on p. 52]

52:24  kerker mausoleum [should be ‘prison,’ especially since the reference is to the idea of “the prison of the soul.” And similarly 57:12, where kerker is wrongly translated as ‘tomb.’

52:26 (ziels)verhuizen transmutate [should be ‘transmigrate’ since the reference is to reincarnation into other bodies.]

52:3  het doodslot van de stervelingen humankind’s fate which is to die [should be ‘the fate of death for mortals’].

52:33 The following sentence is mistranslated. Homer and Hesiod did not undermine; they were undermined.

Even after the religion of culture, in its mythological manifestation, had been undermined in the popular imagination by Homer and Hesiod, the actual religious ground-motive that emerged out of its encounter with the ancient religion of life continued to dominate the entire attitude of life and thought of the Greeks.

Should be:

Hesiod and Homer gave a mythological form to the religion of culture. But even after that mythological form had been undermined in the consciousness of the people, the actual religious ground-motive that emerged…etc.

56:11  De Delphische spreuk the Delphic oracle [should be ‘the Delphic saying’–“know thyself.” The reference is not to the oracle, but to what the oracle said]

59:33  bespiegelende theorie contemplative theory [should be ‘speculative theory’] Also at 60:3. The emphasis is on the mirroring nature of the theory, and ‘specula’ is a mirror. The word for ‘contemplative’ is rather ‘beschouwend.’

60:30  principieel nieuwe wegen new directions [should be ‘fundamentally new ways’]

61:19  kerkelijke eenheidscultuur medieval synthesis [should be ‘ecclesiastically unified culture’]

64:4  bovenredelijk supernatural [should be ‘suprarational’]
The transcendental critique of philosophic thought introduced here has been completely ignored through the influence of the dogma of the autonomy of science. Yet it is only in the light of the entire course of development of thought examined above that this critique acquires such significance and becomes so necessary.

It should read as follows, emphasizing that there were transcendental critiques prior to Dooyeweerd’s own:

It is just in the light of this whole course of development that we can see the current relevance and necessity of a transcendental critique of philosophic thought, such as we have introduced, but which until now was completely confused under the influence of the dogma of the autonomy of science.
but itself remains theoretical in nature, thus within the bounds of philosophic thought. It is just in this that its transcendental character resides. For in theoretical thought, the transcendental is everything that, by means of the inner (immanent) structure of the theoretical way of thought first makes theoretical thought itself possible; it is everything that stands at the basis of every theoretical conceptual distinction as its theoretical presupposition.

86:42 *onrechtmatige verrijking* unlawful enrichment [should be ‘unjust enrichment’ to correspond with common law usage]

87:29 *v.z.v.* in which case [should be ‘insofar as.’ The point here is that financial obligations in an extra-marital agreement may be enforceable even if they are not enforceable in law. The distinction here is something like English common law’s distinction between legal obligations and obligations enforced in equity. The translation does not make this clear.]

91:26 *staatsrecht* civil law [should be ‘constitutional law’]

94:28 This sentence now reads

The aspects of reality are modes, particular ways of revealing a religious root-unity that transcends the diversity within the order of time.

But revelation is always from a higher dimension of experience to a lower, and from a root unity to a diversity. Dooyeweerd speaks, for example, of the supratemporal selfhood revealing [*openbaar* itself in its temporal functions. The sentence should read as follows, in order to bring out that it is the root-unity that reveals itself.

The aspects of reality are modalities (particular ways of revelation) of a religious root-unity, which really transcends all diversity within the order of time.

96:32 *subjectieve wending* subjective dimension [should be ‘subjective side’ in this context, because ‘dimension’ has a special meaning for Dooyeweerd].

97:21 *verwezen* dismissed [should be ‘relegated’]

98:28 The following sentence is mistranslated. It presently reads,

Yet it is also the case that the central religious commandment cannot by itself be the root-unity of the normative aspects of the divine law-giving.

The present translation entirely misses the emphasis that all of temporal reality, and not just the normative aspects, fell with humanity’s fall into sin. The sentence should be:

The basic religious commandment is the root-unity of not only the normative aspects of the divine law-giving.
overspant de grenzen bridges the boundaries [should be 'overarches.' Although it is true that a bridge also spans, here the wrong implication is made that there is a bridge between aspects instead of overarching them.]

niet alle momenten none of the moments [should be 'not all of the moments']

besloten determined [should be 'enclosed']

gestalte configuration [should be 'form']
Appendix B: Missing Words and Statements

References are to page and line number [e.g. 1:8]

Missing words or sentences are shown in bold.

12:30 A translation of the entire following sentence is missing:

Vaak werd de wijsgerige grondgedachte, waaraan in de idee van de Universalwissenschaft vorm was gegeven, niet eens meer begrepen.

22:37 A translation of the entire following sentence is missing:

Om dit duidelijk te maken moeten wij ons een ogenblik nader rekenschap geven van de verhouding van wetenschap en werkelijkheid.

32:24 A translation of the entire following sentence is missing:

Zo wordt een gebeurtenis als het uitbreken van een brand in een woning niet beleefd naar zijn afzonderlijke geabstraheerde aspecten, maar in de continuité van zijn tijdsbevinding, waarin alle tijdsaspecten onverbrekelijk samenhangen.

42:23 en het logische aspect

The sentence should read

For this reason he [Kant] does not acknowledge any other aspects of empirical reality with the exception of the sensory (the psychical, in our sense of the word), and the logical aspect.

44, fn 1 A translation of the entire following sentence is missing:

Daarom kan van een verabsolutering van de religie geen sprake zijn.

49, fn1 Missing the concluding sentence:

Hierover nader hieronder in de tekst.

48:6 drives all temporal human activity

51:22 idealized in personal appearance

51:25 The following entire paragraph is missing:

Zoals in het oude materiemotief van de natuurreligie het organisch levensaspect van de tijdelijke werkelijkheid werd vergoddelijkt, zo werd in het nieuwe vormmotief van de cultuurreligie het (historisch) cultuur-aspect vergoddelijkt. Cultureel is (dit kernmoment hiervan zullen zij later nog onderzoeken) vormgeving aan een materiaal naar een vrij, redelijk ontwerp, in tegenstelling tot de vormgeving die wij in de natuur opmerken.
and the conflicting motives

...”human nature” was conceived of as a “rational nature” composed of the material body and the anima rationalis as a substantial form.

‘...the autos, man’s selfhood, lies in the nomos’

‘...of the individualistic and rationalistic thinking...’

‘...of the individual nature of a people, an individual ‘national spirit,’ which has brought forth the whole national culture, ...”

‘...led him to fundamentally misconceive...’

The following sentence is missing:

Men mene echter niet, dat zij het dus als vakwetenschap verder buiten beschouwing kan laten.

‘not founded merely in subjective consciousness’

‘appear to be unbreakably correlated.’

‘tracking down, if only in part, the unchangeable natural laws of economic activity.’

‘in order to form an articulate scientific concept of the distinguished modal aspects of reality.’

concept-formation (cf. p. 93). [the original reference is to p. 52 of the 1967 text.]

...which comprise the anticipations of movement of the modal meaning of space.

‘The nontheoretical concept is still bound...”
Appendix C: Words Added to the Text

References are to page and line number of the English translation [e.g. 1:8]

Words improperly added are shown in bold


15:5: ‘abstracted from concrete temporal reality’ [should be ‘full temporal reality]. Also
25:36, 28:15. 40:27 has ‘concrete reality.’ 27:27 correctly has ‘full temporal reality.’ 75:32 has “concrete reality’

24:4 ‘it is simply naïve experiencing of reality without any further refinement.’ [should be ‘and nothing more’ (zonder meer).

55:5 de goddelijke vormgever is translated ‘demiurge.’ But Dooyeweerd uses the word ‘demiurge’ when he wants to, as on p. 57. Here it should be just translated as ‘the divine form-giver’ especially since the reference is not to a person but to the nous.

58:14 independently potent cause

60:21 [Augustine] ‘who was destined to put his stamp

62:15 in a dangerous, pantheistic, pagan direction

62:40 ‘…by also including “pure matter” under what was created…’

63:32 ‘…gradually became secularized.’

78:12 ‘…they will all be related to these states of affairs which are presupposed…”These words are also added at 78:16: ‘…they always relate to those states of affairs which are presupposed…”

81:15 ‘the truly religious set of presuppositions’

94:19 ‘this is just the very state of affairs that ought not to exist.’ To add the words ‘state of affairs’ here is confusing for Dooyeweerd’s use of that term. The sentence should just read ‘this is just what ought not to exist.’
Appendix D: Inconsistent Translations

References are to page and line number of the English translation [e.g. 1:8]

13:5 “rekenschap geven” is mistranslated as ‘give a brief account of.’ This misses Dooyeweerd’s important idea that theory needs to “give an account of” naïve experience. The word is used later in the Encyclopedia in this way: “It must be able to give a proper theoretical account of the nontheoretical experience of reality.” (26:12). Other mistranslations of this in the Encyclopedia are 13:16, which translates it as “give an answer to the question.” Also 79:19, where it is translated ‘give our account.’ See my Glossary entry for ‘Give Account’ at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Definitions/Fitted.html].

13:9 ‘rechtsfiguur’ is translated here as ‘legal configuration.’ Similarly at 18:14. Elsewhere it is translated as ‘legal pattern’ or ‘juristic notion’ (18:12) and correctly as ‘legal figure’ (15:16, 19:35) and sometimes as ‘jural figure’ (15:29). 88:16 has ‘pattern.’ 95:9 has ‘legal configuration.’ And 99: 19 has ‘legal patterns.’ 102:11 translated ‘rechtsfiguren’ as ‘legal phenomena.’ That is surely incorrect. It should be ‘legal figures’ to preserve Dooyeweerd’s meaning of ‘figure.’

20:18 ‘samengang” which means ‘coherence’ is sometimes translated as ‘interconnection.’ (20:18). 24:21 has ‘mutual relationships.’

28:10 ingesteld is translated ‘incorporated.’ 32:30 translates it as ‘enmeshed.’ It should be translated as ‘fitted into’ to correspond with other works. At 102:34, the word ‘gevoegd’ is translated as ‘incorporated.’ The word ‘ingevoegd’ is a word that Dooyeweerd later substituted for ‘ingesteld’ and so the same translation of ‘fitted into’ should be applied, as it is in the NC I, 24. At WdW II, 401, Dooyeweerd uses both the words ‘ingevoegd’ and ‘ingesteld,’ showing that they have the same meaning.

30:27 The word ‘tijdsfiguur’ is translated ‘temporal configuration.’ For the reasons stated, ‘temporal figure’ would be better.

47:40 The word ‘ontsluiten’ is here translated ‘develop.’ It should be translated ‘opened up’ or ‘unlocked.’ That is a much more powerful expression of unfolding latent powers
[krachten]. Also 108: 29 and 109:9 ‘ontsloten’ should be ‘opened up’ and not ‘disclosed.’ And 109:13 9 ‘ontsloten’ should be ‘opened up’ and not ‘developed.’

48:14 grondmotief basic motive [should be ‘ground-motive,’ as it is translated a few lines later]. 54:14 translates this as ‘fundamental motive.’

109:25 de stof matter [should be ‘the material’, as it is translated a few lines further down, or even better, as ‘subject matter.’]
Appendix E: Misprints and Stylistic Matters

References are to page and line number [e.g. 1:8]

Double Negatives

9:23 “prevented the then prevailing legal theories from being unable…” [should be ‘able’]

54:27 The text says, ‘no true reality can then be ascribed to becoming without its oppositions’

This should read (substituting ‘with’ for ‘without’):

‘no true reality can then be ascribed to such becoming, with its oppositions’

Typos and Misprints

28:23 aspects as Gegenstand ['aspects’ needs to be plural]

50:40 ‘uranic’ should be ‘ouranic’ as it is correctly spelled in the footnote on the same page.

53:18 ‘metaphysics’ needs to be hyphenated as in the original, ‘meta-physics,’ since the emphasis here is on penetrating behind the forms of reality perceptible to the senses into the absolute ground of things.

73:37 ‘determining’ should be ‘determination’

79:37 ‘Volkgeist’ should be ‘Volksgeist’

82:41 ‘sensory, perceptible’ should be ‘sensorily perceptible’

90fn1 ‘iteslf’ should be ‘itself’

93:41 ‘a conventional, a social’ should be ‘a conventional social’

108:13 ‘sensory impression’ should be ‘sensory impressions’ [indrukken]
Syntax issues

33:36 The sentence reads:

Only in this fashion is a theoretical conception of temporal reality possible which presents itself in its many-sidedness within naïve experience.

It should read

Only in this way is it really possible to obtain a theoretical conception of temporal reality, which presents itself in its many-sidedness to naïve experience.

5:32 ‘to take the form principle back to the matter principle as the origin…’ should rather read ‘to derive the form principle from the matter principle as the origin…’

86:37 This presently reads,

This first case on the point decided by the Hoge Raad is very instructive.

It should read

This first decision by the Hoge Raad on this point is already very instructive.

87:16 ‘it is a nullity’ should read ‘they are nullities’ [agreeing with the plural antecedent ‘gift agreements’]

92:37 ‘that in principle differ’ should be ‘that differ in principle’

94:14 ‘misleading, not to say, wrong in principle’ should be ‘misleading, or even wrong in principle’

So-called

Examples where ‘so-called’ should not be placed in the text, since to do so is confusing:

26:16 ‘so-called antinomies’

37:1 ‘so-called autonomy of science.’

43:21 ‘so-called Marburg school’

45:26 ‘so-called totemism’

52:9 ‘so-called mystery worship’

54:20 ‘so-called Eleatic school’

55:36 ‘so-called natural law’
61:19 ‘so-called medieval synthesis’ [should be ‘ecclesiastically unified culture’]

63:41 ‘so-called Christian humanism.’

67:30 ‘so-called practical reason’

69:31 ‘so-called categorical imperative’

72:31 ‘so-called natural history’

83:24 ‘so-called accidents’

92:1 ‘so-called Konventionalnorm’

58:26 gives the correct solution. Instead of saying ‘so-called Christian Gnosticism,’ it places ‘Christian Gnosticism’ in double quotes. Similarly, p. 70 puts ‘transpersonalism’ in double quotes. I think that single quotes are better, to preserve the use/mention distinction.

**Use of a more difficult word in place of a simpler one**

64:40 The use of ‘apotheosized’ instead of the simpler word ‘deified’ to translate ‘vergoddelijkte’

**Foreign words used by Dooyeweerd**

54:5 The original Greek, cited by Dooyeweerd, should also be included.

67:41 theoretical reason. The word ‘Vernunft’ should be in brackets. Similarly, on the next page, ‘Verstand’ should be after ‘understanding.’

83:3 The words ‘Ding an sich’ should be added in brackets.

**Examples of difficulties caused by political correctness**

73:22 The word ‘themselves’ does not agree with its singular antecedent ‘anyone’

74:1 Difficulties with determining antecedents for pronouns. It is now translated as:
‘…human being’s overestimation of itself, which thinks that the entire cosmos is related to itself as a goal, and which has the illusion that, in its “free personality” and its “reason,” it is radically exalted above the animal.’

Note how much clearer and more personal it becomes when we use ‘man’:

‘…man’s overestimation of himself, in seeing the entire cosmos related to himself as its goal, and who has the illusion that, in his free personality and reason, he is radically exalted above the animal.’ [the original has no double quotes around ‘free personality’ or ‘reason.’]
Appendix F: Different Editions of 
The Encyclopedia of the Science of Law

There must be early editions of the Encyclopedia going back to the 1930’s, as reported by Verburg (Verburg, 276). I have not been able to locate any that are indexed in the catalogues of the libraries of either the Free University or the Institute for Christian Studies. Perhaps such editions are located in the Dooyeweerd Archives in Amsterdam.

Here is a list of all editions that I have been able to locate. Most editions appear to have five chapters: I. Inleiding  II. Historische Gedeelte. III, Analyse van den zin des rechts, Chapter IV: Rechtsbegrip en Rechtsidee and Chapter V: De Bronnen van het stellig recht.

Chapters I and II are usually included together in one volume and III and IV in a second volume. Sometimes there is added a separate volume for V. De bronnen van het stellig recht

I have copies of the 1946 and 1967 editions.

1. Editions that I believe were published by Dooyeweerd for student use

1. As described by Verburg, many mimeographed editions authorized by Dooyeweerd, and dating from the 1930’s, and revised from time to time until about 1957.


3. 1963 edition published by Hanenburg, Amsterdam. (VU reference RA.05102) Two volumes. Hanenburg was also the publisher of the Correspondentiebladen of the Association for Calvinistic Philosophy, so I believe that we must assume that Dooyeweerd authorized this edition. What is remarkable is that the 1963 Hanenburg edition appears to be identical to the 1946 edition, except that the errors identified on the Errata sheets (see below) have been corrected. But in contrast to the 1946 edition, the Hanenburg edition is not printed in hardbound format, but is a mimeographed edition of this Dictaat. Words that the 1946 edition puts in italicized type are merely underlined in the 1963 Hanenburg edition. Whereas the 1946 edition of the Introduction was 35
printed pages, the mimeographed edition is 38 typewritten pages. This is a much smaller work than the 1967 SRVU edition on which the 2002 translation is based. It raises the issue why Dooyeweerd is republishing the shorter work, and whether he authorized the longer SRVU editions.

2. 1946 edition

This edition may have been published by students who not authorized to do so, but was still used by students, together with Errata sheets. Drukkerij D.A.V.I.D., Amsterdam (VU reference RA.00194) Two volumes. “Niet in de handel” [not for retail sale]. The importance of the 1946 edition is shown by the fact that it was republished in the 1963 Hanenburg edition. The Introduction to the 1963 Hanenburg edition of the Encyclopedia appears to be identical to that in the 1946 Edition, except that the errors in the Errata sheets have been corrected.

3. Editions published by the Students’ Council of the Free University (SRVU).


1962 (VU reference RA.05099) Chapter V only: De bronnen van het stellig recht

1961-64 (VU reference BN.05009) Three volumes: I and II and Chapter V in the third volume.

1966 (VU reference RA.05027) Three volumes: Chapter V in the third volume, reworked by Prof. H.J. van Eikema Hommes from paragraph 6 onwards.

*1967 Copy at Institute for Christian Studies, RHC Pamph. Five separate volumes. “Niet in de handel” [not for retail sale]

1968 (VU reference RA.05144) One volume.
Appendix G: Historical Background to the 1967 SRVU edition

1. Some Earlier Editions

In Appendix F, I have listed all the Dutch editions of the Encyclopedia of which I am aware, as listed in the libraries of the Free University, and the Institute for Christian Studies. But I know that this list is incomplete; there are for example versions of the Encyclopedia going back to the early 1930’s and 40’s.

According to Marcel Verburg, the first copy of Dooyeweerd’s Notes [Dictaat] for the Introduction [Inleiding] was prepared around 1935. This copy included two extensive mimeographed volumes. The first volume included two Chapters: I. The Introduction and II. The Historical Part. The second volume was called the Thetic Part, and it included three more chapters. Chapter III was called, “Analysis of the meaning of law.” Chapter IV was entitled “Law-Concept and Law-Idea.” And the final Chapter V was entitled “The sources of Positive Law.” These five chapters form the basis for all subsequent editions. Sometimes, they were included in editions of two volumes. And sometimes, as was the case in 1967, each chapter was included in a separate volume.

Verburg says that the Encyclopedia received its definitive form during the Second World War (Verburg 276, referred to but not cited at p. 2 of the 2002 Translation). Verburg also says that Dooyeweerd wanted to publish the Encyclopedia and even entered into a contract with the publisher H.J. Paris (Verburg 279). Dooyeweerd began a total revision of the Introduction, not only revising the text, but also expanding it. But this revision was never completed, because Dooyeweerd instead had to devote his time to the publication of the New Critique. If, as Strauss reports (2002 Translation, 2), H.J. Paris sent out copies of the Encyclopedia, these could not have been completed revisions. After 1957, Dooyeweerd hardly revised the Encyclopedia at all (Verburg, 275). In the 1960’s, the Students Council of the Free University printed various editions. To the extent that these versions are based on revisions after World War II, they are based on editions that were never completed.

After his retirement, Dooyeweerd continued to revise the Encyclopedia, but this work was not completed. Rather, it remained as a 659-page typescript (Verburg 279).
The present translators acknowledge the incompleteness of the *Encyclopedia*, and one of the intended future projects is to publish Dooyeweerd’s draft work. But what has not been sufficiently recognized is the incompleteness of the present work also shows the need for a critical comparison with earlier editions.

2. The 1946 Edition

In an interview in 1975, two years before his death, Dooyeweerd referred to problems with a student edition of his *Encyclopedia*:

Ook de *Encyclopedie* is nooit uitgegeven. Wel hebben studenten een gedrukte uitgave verzorgd in twee delen, maar daarvoor hebben ze mij geen toestemming gevraagd. Het was schandalig, want zelf had ik een dictaat verzorgd waarin geen fout meer stond. En de door de studenten verzorgde uitgave stond vol met de grofste fouten en misstellingen. Het was meer dan verschrikkelijk, en ze durfden het mij nog toe te sturen ook. Ze dachten dat ik daar blij mee zou zijn!

Intussen werden de wel behoorlijk verzorgde gecyclostyleerde exemplaren, ofschoon er duidelijk ‘niet in de handel’ op stond, door de uitgevers op vrij grote schaal aan belangstellenden ook buiten de universitaire kring van mijn studenten, met name ook in het buitenland, verzonden. Zo kon de president van het Hoog Gerechtshof van Zuid-Afrika, die ze met enthousiasme had bestudeerd, er een inleiding op schrijven, bestemd voor de juridische studenten aan de Zuid-Afrikaanse universiteiten. (*Interview*, 55).

[The *Encyclopedia* [of Legal Science] has also never been published. It’s true that students brought out a two-volume published edition of it, but they never asked my permission to do so. It was scandalous, because I myself had prepared a version of the lecture notes in which there remained no error. And the edition prepared by the students was full of the grossest errors and misprints. It was beyond even terrible, and they even dared to send it to me. They thought that I would be happy about it!]

Meanwhile, the reasonably well-edited mimeographed copies, although they were clearly marked “Not for the Retail Market,” were sent out by the publishers on a rather large scale to interested persons even outside of the university circle of my students, even to foreign countries. In this way the president of the High Court of South Africa, who had studied it with enthusiasm, was able to write an introduction to it, intended for the law students at the South African universities.]

Now is Dooyeweerd criticizing editions published by the Students Council? That was my initial view, but in view of further information, I have revised my view. One
argument against the reference being to the 1967 SRVU edition is that that is a 5-volume work, whereas Dooyeweerd was criticizing a 2-volume work. But that is not in itself conclusive, for as I have shown in Appendix F, there were SRVU editions that were also in the 2-volume format.

It is more likely that the edition that Dooyeweerd was criticizing was the 1946 edition published by Drukkerij D.A.V.I.D. At first I thought that this 1946 edition could not be the one Dooyeweerd criticized, since it is clear that students used this edition. This is shown by my own copy of that edition. It is probably the most marked up book that I own, containing a large number of student notes and a great deal of underlining. It includes notations of a schedule of required readings from the book, referring to the page numbers in that edition. That seemed to me to indicate that it was an approved text. And like other lecture notes that Dooyeweerd published, the 1946 edition is marked “not for the retail market” [niet in de handel]. There is a notation by the student that the Introduction, Chapter I of Volume I of the 1946 edition, was no longer used [vervallen], and that notation also refers to a separate set of lecture notes [dictaat] for the Introduction. That seems to imply that the Chapter in this edition had at one time used, but then replaced by another Dictaat. Finally, the Students Council was not even formed until 1947. That seemed at first to suggest that the D.A.V.I.D. publication was not even formed until 1947. That seemed at first to suggest that the D.A.V.I.D. publication was not published by students. But students acting on their own, prior to the formation of a Students Council, could also have published it. What is strange is that Dooyeweerd, in his 1975 interview, would not have made mention of the fact that it was published by D.A.V.I.D.

My reasons for now believing that the 1946 edition may be the unauthorized edition that Dooyeweerd refers to are as follows:

1. In the 1975 interview, the edition that Dooyeweerd complains about is a ‘published’ edition [een gedrukte uitgave]. He distinguishes it from 'mimeographed' [gecyclostyleerde] editions. And yet Dooyeweerd himself appears to have published the 1963 Hanenburg edition, so this distinction, of an outside publisher, is not decisive of the issue of which edition Dooyeweerd was referring to in 1975.

2. The 1946 edition is a hardbound copy, published by an outside publisher, D.A.V.I.D.
The initials stand for “De Algemene Vrije Illegale Drukkerij” [The Common Free Illegal Press]. This was a publishing company started by Marten Toonder, the famous cartoonist.\textsuperscript{39} It operated as an underground press from 1944 and then continued after the war.

3. The nature of the D.A.V.I.D. Press does not mean that Dooyeweerd would not have used it, since D.A.V.I.D. was also publishing newspapers like T\textit{rouw}. But I would have expected to find other editions of Dooyeweerd’s \textit{dictaten} also published by D.A.V.I.D., but there are none listed in the catalogue of the Free University library.

4. There is a typewritten list of \textit{Errata} included with my copy of the 1946 edition, prepared by a student, Ch. de Graaf. The listed errors for both volumes run to 26 typewritten pages, although there are only 9 minor errors listed in relation to the \textit{Introduction}. An example is its reference to ‘comic’ time instead of to ‘cosmic time.’ I at first thought that this list of \textit{Errata} was then used by Dooyeweerd to edit the edition that he refers to in the 1975 interview, an edition “in which there remained no error.”

But if the 1946 edition is the one that Dooyeweerd was referring to, the edition “in which there remained no error” must be one pre-dating 1946. The fact that Dooyeweerd still referred to it so proudly in the 1975 interview shows its importance for interpreting his work, especially where it contains information that was not carried forward in later editions. And in view of Verburg’s comment (already cited) that the \textit{Encyclopedia} received its definitive form during the Second World War, this earlier edition remains important for interpreting the \textit{Encyclopedia}.

Since it appears from the \textit{Errata} sheets that there were no serious errors in the \textit{Introduction} to the 1946 edition, but only a few misprints, the 1946 edition is a good indication of the contents of the earlier error-free version referred to by Dooyeweerd. We can therefore use the 1946 edition, with the \textit{Errata} sheets, to interpret the meaning of the later 1967 SRVU edition. Of course, if copies of those pre-1946 editions are located,

\textsuperscript{39} Toonder is famous for his cartoons of \textit{Heer Bommel en Tom Poes}. The D.A.V.I.D. press was housed in Toonder’s studio. Toonder had previously worked at \textit{De Telegraaf}; he left in 1944 when it obtained a new Editor, who was a member of the SS.
they could also be used for the same purpose of interpretation and a critical edition of the *Encyclopedia*.

The importance of the 1946 edition is underscored by the fact that in 1963, two years before Dooyeweerd’s retirement, the Hanenburg press published another edition of the *Encyclopedia*. This 1963 Hanenburg edition appears to be identical to the 1946 edition, except that the errors identified in the *Errata* sheets have been corrected. Whereas the 1946 edition was printed as a hardbound copy, the 1963 Hanenburg edition is mimeographed. Words that are italicized in the 1946 edition have had to be emphasized with underlining in the mimeographed version. Whereas the 1946 edition of the Introduction was 35 printed pages, the mimeographed edition is 38 typewritten pages. This is a much smaller work than the 1967 SRVU edition on which the 2002 translation is based. Hanenburg also published another *dictaat* by Dooyeweerd, *Oud-Vaderlands Recht*. And Hanenburg was also the publisher of the *Correspondentiebladen* of the Association for Calvinistic Philosophy. I therefore believe that we should presume that Dooyeweerd himself authorized the republication in 1963 of this corrected version of the 1946 edition. The fact that Dooyeweerd re-published this much shorter edition in 1963 raises the issue of whether he had authorized the longer editions published by the SRVU.

So in view of this information, what is the status of the 1967 SRVU edition used for the present translation? It is probably not the edition that Dooyeweerd criticized in the 1975 interview. But neither is it the edition “in which there remained no error.” At most, the 1967 SRVU would appear to be an example of what Dooyeweerd calls “reasonably well-edited mimeographed copies.” The fact that he describes them that way again points towards the importance of looking at what he considered to be his own well-edited version. It seems to me that the error-free edition must be either a pre-1946 edition, or else the corrected Hanenburg edition of 1963.

We also need to be aware of the fact that the 1967 SRVU edition may also have added material. As noted in Appendix F, Prof. H.J. van Eikema Hommes, Dooyeweerd’s successor in the faculty of law, re-worked some parts of the *Encyclopedia* in the 1966 SRVU edition. Those re-worked parts also need to be identified.
So apart from the errors in the present translation, further historical research is required to compare the text on which it is based, the 1967 SRVU edition, with previous editions.

Revised May 27/08