Concerning the conflict of religious faith and knowledge as the spiritual root of the decline of religious and political society in our time as in every time

[Über den Zwiespalt des Religiösen Glaubens und Wissens als die geistige Wurzel des Verfalls der religiösen und politischen Societät in unserer wie in jeder Zeit]

by Franz von Baader

(1833)

Translation and Notes by Dr. J. Glenn Friesen ©2004

Translator’s Introduction

Baader’s style of German is notoriously difficult. I have broken up his very long sentences into many shorter sentences. Words in round brackets are Baader’s own parenthetical remarks. Those portions of the text in square brackets are either the original untranslated text, or additional words that I have inserted to make sense of the text. In my own footnotes (which are distinguished from Baader’s), I have also made comparisons to the neo-Calvinism of Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) and to the Christian philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977). Baader influenced both Kuyper and Dooyeweerd.

Baader’s Text

In every era of time, the conquest of errors and lies, like the conquest of crime and revolt, does not only have the goal of restoring the pure teaching, morality as innocence and social order to the old threatened or wounded status quo, but it also has the task, by weakening those powers, to enrich us with new powers, as the spoils of victory. And it has the task to set up that which is strong in place of what proves a failure, i.e. shows itself to be weak. One therefore sees that the true preservation in each era can only be obtained by an unrestrained further development (growth)–something that is already included in the concept of temporal life. Its preeminent function is not just the removal of obstacles, but rather in the subjugating\textsuperscript{1} transformation of them into serving and

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beneficial agents. Only in such a way can one maintain himself in the center of each
time, i.e. above it (the spirit of the age or Zeitgeist). And only in this way can one hold
within the bounds of a lawsuit or trial—(Reformatio fiat intra ecclesiam²)—the necessary
and continuing strife within and with time, between the past and future, between the old
and the new, as well as that between the good and the bad. And it also allows us to guard
against a its breaking out in state that is lawless and law-opposing, i.e. anarchistic or
revolutionary.³

What has here been said in a general sense, also applies in a special way to
religious society, and to Christian Doctrine. Therefore one would be mistaken in
thinking that by means of a mere repair, i.e. through a mere restoration of the status quo
of the old Doctrine (perhaps of three centuries ago or even one century ago), one could
remedy the present disbelief prevailing in Christendom or the general ignorance in
knowledge of religion.⁴ For this disbelief and this ignorance are of a totally different
nature than they were in earlier times, and the new illness cannot be repelled with the old
prescription.

In reference to this aim it must first be observed that the decline of religious belief
and knowledge of which we are speaking, necessarily makes itself known as a conflict
between them. As is known, this conflict [between faith and knowledge] was brought
about by the so-called Reformation, just as it has now established itself in her, so that the
illness cannot be radically remedied except through the restoration of the old normal and
harmonious relation between religious belief and knowledge.⁵

As one knows, and as is also shown historically, every conflict is by virtue of its
nature related to a conflict between beliefs and actions in that the actions separated from
beliefs are not the correct actions, beliefs separated from actions are not the correct
beliefs, just as knowledge separated from beliefs is not true knowledge, and , beliefs
separated from knowledge are not the right, true (i.e. strong⁶) beliefs. Whether in single
humans or in whole nations, religious faith and knowledge can therefore only arise
together in equal measure, go forwards or backwards together, or decline together. So in
our time, we truly cannot rejoice about an increase or progress of true and fundamental
knowledge in comparison with the decline of faith among faith-adverse rationalists, nor

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over the increase in faith in comparison with the decline of knowledge among
knowledge-averse believers. But we must lament just as much over the general religious
ignorance as a consequence of the decline of faith, as we must lament the universality of
disbelief as a consequence of the decline of knowledge.

Now wherever a conflict has occurred, one must not hope to be able to cure the ill
by merely externally or in a one-sided way coming to the help of one of the contraries.
Rather it is only by reviving and strengthening both sides together and from out of their
common center. That is, it is no less important to clarify religious knowledge everywhere
and in all branches of knowledge, as it is to revive faith. There are those who are of the
opinion that one can free humans from their current partly bad, partly criminal wills by
means a bare non-knowing, instead of by means of a good, thoroughgoing knowledge, in
a battle with new errors and new lies as well as with old stupidity and knowledge
obtained in indolence. But those who hold such an opinion will find themselves caught
in the same dangerous errors as those who are of the opinion that one can not free
humans from criminality and from sin by the acquisition of virtue, but rather through
returning them to a state of innocence, which innocence is at the same time without
blame and without virtue. But such innocence, although it can and should not be lost,
nevertheless only becomes incapable of being lost by the acquisition of virtue.

No individual human, just as no single nation, can stand still in religious faith and
knowledge without regressing in both \( \text{non progresdi est regredi}^8 \). The lack of this
insight has brought forth the bad and pernicious opinion, which hides under the cloak of
orthodoxy, that religious knowledge is necessarily and by its nature something that stands
still and does not need and is it not capable\(^9\) of any progress. This opinion can only be
held by putting a stop to growth. This wrong opinion is chiefly supposed by our
rationalists, St. Simonists, or however the opponents of Christianity and the Christian
Church may call themselves. It is as if this opinion is one of the premisses granted them
by the theologians themselves. In this way they want to explain both (Christianity and
the Christian Church) as antiques, belonging to history as something from the past, and
therefore now dead—all in order to recommend to us their surrogates. That is why in our
times it is so much more necessary and dutiful to disseminate and to hold fast to the
insight into the inseparability of true ‘orthosophy’ (right knowledge) with true orthodoxy (right faith), as well as the insight that wherever an opposition appears and is maintained between them, both have entered into a wrong position with respect to each other, a position that is ruinous to them, to the extent that both find themselves deformed. This deformation [*Entstellung*] has increased at an accelerating rate since the beginning of the Reformation. That is why if one could hypothetically suddenly dissolve the external phenomenon of Protestantism, but without eradicating its cause in the root—namely this deformation and the conflict of which we are speaking)—the Church would not as a result become better but rather worse. Whereby I must nevertheless remark, if Protestantism has in fact come forth from the dispute between religious knowledge and faith, it must necessarily remain in existence as long as this dispute continues to exist. But one must in no way consider Protestantism to be a necessary, that is unavoidable event, or a necessary moment in the history of the development of the Church, just as little as one may assert this of the rationalism that has set itself against this Church in place of the older Protestantism. A Church, which moreover in accordance with its mission, unites as little with liberalism (rationalism) as with servility (obscurantism). The divine Word is the Principle of all true evolution, and as such assists it everywhere. But in each region where revolution has actually broken out (attaining socially usurped power), this is only to be understood as the consequence of a non-assisted, or badly assisted, or resisted good evolution.¹¹

In fact this illusion of a necessary and irreconcilable conflict between religious faith and knowledge is really rooted in the logical ignorance and the lack of clarity regarding knowledge, non-knowledge and faith in general. These three must accompany, complete, guard and protect each other—neither less nor more than in every other branch of human knowing and acting than is the case in religious knowing and acting. In fact it would be just as unreasonable to separate faith and knowledge from each other in history, in politics, in industry etc. as in religion,¹² or to set faith and knowledge in an absolute antagonism, or to view them as necessarily placed in such antagonism. Whereby it must be remarked, something that even modern politicians seldom or never notice, that when such a dispute between faith and knowledge has entered a nation in its religion, it does not remain there, for the same dispute is like an infection imparted to all remaining
spheres of its knowing, believing and acting. So an individual human, just like an individual nation, in whom such a dispute between his religious faith and knowledge has established itself, must already be declared to be rotten at the core. For just as Man stands trusting, believing and knowing in relation to God, so he also stands to other humans (above and below), as well as to nature. And it would not be hard to demonstrate, that the measure of harmony or of discord of religious faith and knowledge in a nation, as well as the strength or weakness of both, is its true measure of life (‘Zoometer’), instead of the stock exchange, where the political materialist supposes it to be found.

We have asserted an almost universally present lack of clarity about the relation of faith to knowledge among philosophers and theologians. If this assertion is doubted, then one need only consider that these philosophers and theologians have certainly been able to say a lot to us about the relation of believing to knowing, but less of the relation of believing to willing, although the word ‘to believe’ [Glauben] shows a direct relationship between believing and willing in its kinship with the words ‘to promise’ [Geloben] and ‘to betroth to’ [Verloben], so that the apostle explains the knowledge of God as the reward allotted to those who believe in and who seek God. And in the same sense, Augustine says, Nemo credit nisi volens [no one believes except voluntarily].

For faith has the same relation to intuitive vision [Schauen] and knowledge [kennen] as the relation of touching the ground (self-support) to our free movement, or the relation of our motivation (entering into the ground of movement) to our willing. And just as one cannot move freely without touching the ground, and cannot touch the ground without free movement, so one cannot use reason [Vernunft] without being free to believe, and cannot believe without making use of his reason. From this it follows that everywhere that faith and knowledge [Wissen] appear to conflict with or to retard each other, it is really only one belief that is fighting with another belief if a person has already used, and has had to use his knowing (‘raison’) as a weapon to defend or to attack this other belief. In this sense, Paul says that the wisdom or reason [Vernunft] of the believers in God and those who have been enlightened by God appears as foolishness and absurdity [Unvernunft] to the wisdom of the world or the reason of the world. And in
the same sense one says that each passion [Lust] seeks and makes its own cunning [List]. For example, just as, because the irreligious spirit has no reason holding himself in position, he is continually busy trying to make one, and he is in this sense necessarily engaged in sophistry [vernunftelnd] or being rationalistic. In this same striving of Tantalus he is an unbeliever, i.e. one who is deficient in belief. Furthermore, the will of man, or the willing person does not, like God, make his own ground of movement, and he does not even first acknowledge this as something distinguished from him. Whereas the choosing person in the true sense of this word knows that he is not solitary [all-ein], but rather he chooses from among several grounds of movement that are offered to him, and he decides among them. Just in this way the seeing, intelligent person does not himself make his faith (namely the object of his faith), although he certainly decides for or against the one of the other. That means, that the Spirit cannot see other than with and in his eye, and the finite spirit with his partial eye does not see otherwise than through his being placed into a central or universal eye. This being placed into [Eingerückt-Sein] and being held may occur in a direct way or may also take place through the help of another partial eye, or through both at the same time. And so the individual person, living within time, may close his Central Eye as little as his partial eye; but he may however choose between the one and the other, the Central and the partial eye, before he freely subjects [sich subjizierend] himself to and enters one or the other of his lights, guides, or pointers (wisdom). This act of entering into must be called free belief, which therefore also coincides with the act of free subordination, just as one must call unbelief the act of closing oneself up or of going out again [from oneself].

Many paradoxes may appear because of what has been said about the choice of an eye as light; this is because one must already see in order to choose his eye or his vision. I must say that just herein lies that old error of the philosophers and their misunderstanding with the theologians: namely that they do not want to know of any other vision and knowing excepting the kind that that they have without their cooperation, yes a kind of knowing that comes against their will with compelling force and at the same time a knowing that is compelled with force, and which arises from out of a mere outward vision. This mere outward seeing is possessed by humans in common with animals and which seems to belong to the mechanical part of our knowing. It is the kind of knowing

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that the French call ‘exact’: a knowing that, as is said, comes and goes to a man without his will, and for which coming and going he is really not responsible.

As against this we have referred to that double eye of the spirit, which offers itself to humans in temporal life across and through this involuntary [exact] seeing.20 Humans actually give themselves in faith to one or the other [of these eyes]. This giving is successive [in time], and informs that person, so that temporal death does not place him in one or the other kind of vision, but only takes away the veil that had covered that vision. And what had appeared in time to be an indefinitely continuing line is formed to a closed sphere apparently around him. That is, the temporal concept-less and present-less one thing after another and one thing out of another [Auseinander und Nacheinander] will become instead a non-temporal, permanent, and simultaneous Presence. This Presence will be either above this external periphery as an absolute center expanding in its periphery, or it will be below it as the absolutely contradictory center, compromised with its periphery.21

Moreover, when the Scriptures refer to this twofold eye of the spirit22 as the eye of light and the eye of darkness (as heavenly and as infernal),23 then one must not as is generally done, understand by the word ‘darkness’ merely a lack of vision, but rather the entrance of an abnormal vision, which opposes itself to the normal vision and which is therefore excluded from it. The correct concept of such a negative spiritual vision is only correctly understood when it is distinguished not only from the positive spiritual vision but also from the merely external vision. In the perfected positive spiritual vision, the inner and the external vision completely correspond. But the dark or negative vision remains in its Tantalus-like striving, wanting to make itself inwardly and externally valid at the same time, but finding itself always caught in the conflict or the non-identity of subjectivity and objectivity (the being-collapsed-into-each-other and the becoming of the center and of the periphery). This negative vision thus also is distinguished from the merely external vision (peripheral or temporal), which does not correspond to any inner (central) vision, but which also does not contradict it, since it is merely external. Because of this, the origin and continued existence of such merely external vision can be understood only by the imperfectedness (or the suspension of completion) of the positive
or negative visions.\textsuperscript{24} That is, in its succession of one thing after another and one thing out of another of its centrality and its peripherality. In contrast, by joining this [centrality and peripherality] together in a coherence, the one kind of vision as well as the other reaches its completion and thereby goes from out of time.

The problem that must be solved by the philosophers and theologians (in order to restore a satisfying theory of faith and knowledge), is none other than to demonstrate [1] whom or rather on (in) whom a person really believes in each case, [2] whom he may or may not believe (especially in relation to his knowing [\textit{Wissen}]), and finally, [3] on whom he should or should not believe, making use of his reason [\textit{Vernunft}]. I say “on whom” and not “in what” because at its basis, each belief is personal (moral), and one cannot believe in a non-personal thing, and cannot truly unite (promise) himself to the non-personal. For example, for a person who says that he believes in and trusts in an impersonal [\textit{selbstlosen}] nature, it is not the so-called laws of nature that he believes in, but rather in a personality and morality that he demands or wishes of nature. If law is considered in and of itself, abstracted from a law-Giver, it is then for Man an irresolute and unfeeling law (\textit{lex est res surda et exorabilis}\textsuperscript{25}), accordingly something inhuman. This view of law applies even more to moral law than for natural law, as our moralists have for a long time taken it as their first principle and have taught it to us as the exclusive motive\textsuperscript{26} of morality, but have hereby only demonstrated their being separate and empty of God, or the Godlessness of their moral system.

The support of my power of motion is itself something moving and forceful, because my power can rest neither on something powerless nor on something that is merely a resistance and which, without giving me rest [\textit{Halt}] only retards me [\textit{aufhält}]. And each normal resistance, as negative assistance, must at the same time show itself as positive assistance (as help). And furthermore, the real ground of my willing can only itself be a will, because I can take nothing to heart in either a good or bad sense that does not come from a heart, and which itself is heart. Therefore, the support (the Ground-Principle) of the free movement of my intelligent nature must itself also be intelligent nature. And man (like every creature who knows himself and others) only knows, in that he knows himself to be known from one who is above him. His knowing (his certainty as
well as his conscience)\textsuperscript{37} therefore does not, as the rationalists suppose, come to him \textit{per generationem aequivocam} or from himself alone, but \textit{per traducem}, which means “by being informed” (not by being a part of),\textsuperscript{28} and by entering into an existing, completed or finished vision \textit{[Schauen]} and knowledge \textit{[Wissen]} that stands \textit{a priori} in relation to him.\textsuperscript{29} In this sense Malebranche was correct to assert that we see everything in God, at least (to use this expression in the more narrow sense that accords with the Scriptures) we ought to see them in God, namely in that divine or heavenly eye (of which we have spoken). In the Fall, man was certainly deprived of this eye, but it was again opened to him, But this also made it possible, through the merely external eye to enter into the infernal or to come out from it again.

Descartes opposed this, and paved the way for atheism with his “\textit{Cogito ergo sum}” [I think, therefore I am], in that Descartes placed the reflection of the creature prior to the primal thought of God. As against this, man can and should say nothing but:

\begin{quote}
I am seen, seen through, known, thought, understood,\textsuperscript{30} therefore I see, know, think, and understand. I am willed, desired, loved, therefore I am willing, desiring, loving or hating. I am acted on, therefore I act.
\end{quote}

The logicians, ethicists, physicists, who speak to us of the laws of thought, willing and acting, should above all have explained to us the meaning and the sense of the word ‘law’ \textit{[Gesetz]}. They should have shown us that by ‘law’ we may not understand anything except the being placed or located \textit{[Gesetztsein, Lociertsein]} of the thinking, willing, acting humans from and in a higher being (the primal Spirit). Man was to continue this thinking, willing and acting\textsuperscript{31} only in a reflected way and in a more inferior, external region, just as this was originally shown to him. These logicians, ethicists and physicists should have shown us that the more carefully that man reflects on this primal thought, the more forgetful of himself he wants to be in following this primal will, and the more obediently he follows the actions of the primal action, and he will to the same degree think more clearly, will more freely and act more powerfully and without ceasing. But with their abstract, nonliving and mechanical understanding of the law,\textsuperscript{32} they [the logicians, etc.] have to a large extent done the opposite of this, and they have thereby dissuaded people from making this act of the heart—of entering in faith into this primal thought, primal will and primal act—the religious act as a whole. They have made it
difficult, if not impossible, for people insofar as they believe their [the logicians, etc.] teachings, to make the prince of life free within them, as the Scriptures say. Instead of externally binding the murderer (Barrabas), the most important consequence of their teaching is that they have instead made him free and have bound people in him. How can one however reasonably hope to remedy the disputes between faith and knowledge, and the decline of religious and civil society, if one cannot set a better teaching of the law against this teaching of the law that is partly empty of God and partly opposed to God? How can one, I say, especially in our time, hope for example to become free of the burdensome supervision of students when one does not seriously and in renewal take the trouble to ensure the supervision of and the insight into these studies? Is not the tendency towards base acts (to servility) of no less evil and irreligious nature than that of the absolute autonomy and of shameless liberalism? And if these two corruptions of human nature, expressing themselves in two directions, are innate and inherited, it is still not to be denied, that especially the youth are capable of awakening what is opposed to this nature: the religious affects of humility and nobility, and that for some time the dominant teachings have been qualified and intended to accomplish exactly the opposite of this.

1 JGF: Baader coins the word here ‘subjicierender’—subjugating, from ‘subject,’ ‘make subject to.’

2 JGF: I am not sure of the reference, but the meaning seems to be “let there be reformation within the church.” It therefore refers to self-reformation.

3 Baader’s note 1: The conscious and voluntary bringing about of such a lawless and law-opposing state of society is always (as is its complicity) an offence against the confessed Sovereignty of the Constitutional State, and the so-called Droit d’insurrection [right of insurrection] is absurd. JGF: Baader’s ideas, opposing a right of revolutionary, are later echoed by the Anti-Revolutionary Party in the Netherlands.

4 Baader’s note 2: Where this religious science [Wissenschaft] remained standing still, it became superficial and without spirit. And where it moved forward, it became destructive, so that our knowledge of religious things today has become partly one with too little or too narrow a content, and partly one with a bad content.

5 Baader’s note 3: If now many Catholics and Protestants today consider such a restoration to be impossible, their disbelief in its feasibility serves the Antichrist, more than they believe.

6 JGF: Baader likes to argue from presumed etymologies. He here compares true [wahrhaft] with strong [wehrhaft].

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7 Baader’s note 4: Whose agreement and sympathy are falsely taken to be a proof of an invisible Church.

8 JGF: *non progresi est regredi*: not to progress is to regress.

9 Baader’s note 5: Those who do not see any possibility of new discoveries in religious knowledge, since these would not be reconcilable with the permanence of dogmas, should be asked to consider that these dogmas are principles of knowledge, from which we should continually make new and further use, just as the mathematician makes use of axioms, or as a gardener makes use of the seeds entrusted to him.

10 JGF: Although ‘Rechtswissenschaft’ means ‘jurisprudence,’ he here uses the term ‘Rechtswissenschaft’ or ‘right knowledge or science.’

11 Baader’s note 6: In this sense Tertullian already observed that each heresy has the goal to either invite the teaching of the Church to a new advance (in knowing and believing), or to punish it for its neglect of such an advance. The enormity of today’s heresies therefore discloses both the size of the demand and that of the omission.

12 Baader’s note 7: As is known, the Scriptures equate the relation of faith to sight with that of hope to experience. Yet the comparison is not in the sense that the one merely dissolves the other, but rather that both limit each other, or so that faith arises from out of sight as well as that sight follows upon faith. From this one can see the truth of our assertion, that faith and knowledge can only decrease and increase together in temporal life.

13 Baader’s note 8: Just as one must say, *Nemo vult, nisi videns* [No one wills unless he sees], because blind faith in the narrow sense of the word would be a blind will. Faithful is the one who sees [*Trau, schau, wem*] or *vide, cui fidas*. The expressions “blind faith” and “blind will” obtain their correct meaning if one takes the word ‘to believe’ [*Glauben*] in its most general sense as ‘to promise’ [*Geloben*] or to enter in [*Eingehen*]. For it is namely correct that a person may inwardly become aware of the solicitation for such an entrance into or giving of oneself, as a willing that is separated from knowledge just as much as an action that is separated from both, although in normal circumstances this separation should only show itself as a distinction within a unity.

14 JGF: Similarly, Dooyeweerd says that if there were not this battle of faiths, it should just be a matter of using logic and reason to convince each other (NC I, 36).

15 Baader’s note 9: One can therefore say, “Show may what you do not believe in, and I will then show you in what you do believe in; show me what you do not know, and I will then show you what you know or purport to know; show me whom you do not serve and I will show you whom you serve.”

16 JGF: The reference is to 1 Corinthians 3:19:

> For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God.

17 Baader’s note 10: The insight is still lacking that it is just this rationalism, as a making of one’s own reason [*Vernunft*], that is the root of modern making of constitutions, kings, religions and churches, etc.

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JGF: There is a play on words between pointers [Weiser] and wisdom [Weisheit].

Baader’s note 11: In regard to which one can say that these philosophers try to preserve themselves from the truth as much as possible.

Baader’s note 12: Just as this freedom of choice of the ground of movement is not to be confused with the freedom or lack of freedom of the will after entering into such a choice, so is the freedom of choice of eye not to be confused with the freedom or lack of freedom of vision in and with this eye.

Baader’s note 13: In Vol. IV of my Fermenta Cognitionis, I have already shown that the concept of nature is not to be separated from that of a supernature and an infranature, the abyss [Abgründigkeit]. The first is that which is freedom of nature. The latter designates being that is absolutely unfree of nature, when the creature falls into it. I have moreover shown that this freedom of nature and lack of freedom coincide with freedom of time and space, as well as lack of freedom of time and space, as well as with a being that is supra-material and one that is infra-material. Finally, being in space and time expresses itself in a nature, which finds itself placed and maintained from out of both centers.

JGF: The reference is to Matthew 6:22-23,

The light of the body is the eye: if therefore thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light.
But if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness. If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great [is] that darkness!

JGF: Cf. Kuyper, who says that after man’s fall, the earth sank below the level that it originally had. A part of the beauty of the earth was taken away. Thereafter, the unsightly, the ugly and even the demonic and the horrible began to reveal themselves as powers, both in their spiritual as well as material existence. Kuyper differentiates between mere ugliness and the truly horrible:

Where there is only the retreat [moving backwards] of former beauty, we have the beginning of ugliness. But as soon as an antithetical principle begins to work actively, there arises the sporadic anticipation of the hellish and the horrible; this really finds its own true region in the things that are under the earth, in the [katachthonia]…[‘Het Calvinisme en de kunst,’ pp. 12 and 64 ft. 32.]

Baader’s note 14: In the Silberblick of ecstasy, as an anticipation of this integrity, the heavenly eye glances through (if only momentarily) the merely external vision, or the infernal eye may also glance through the merely external vision. Shakespeare uses the significant term for these moments. “Eternal moments.”

In our temporal life the inner and the outer Heavens, and the inner and the outer Hell, only come together in a momentary way. But when they do come together, it is most often the case that this coming together is damaging to temporal life. So for example one can find the cause of many suicides in this meeting of the inner and external Hell.

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JGF: The maxim should read, *lex, res surda, inexorabilis* [law is a deaf, inexorable thing–incapable of being moved by entreaty].

JGF: ‘*Triebfeder*’–mainspring or motive.

JGF: [*Gewissheit wie Gewissen*]

JGF: [*durch Mitteilung (nicht durch Teilsein)*]

Baader’s note 15: What is called ‘Light’ in each region is itself only the seeing of a primal seeing [*Ursehenden*], and the philosophers should have considered, in accordance with the proverb *accidentia non migrant substantiis in substantias* [particularised qualities have a unique bearer in which they inhere; no such quality then can inhere in two different entities]. Therefore the one who sees cannot give away his seeing, nor one who wills his willing, nor one who acts his acting; therefore he can make another one participate in these only if that other participates in and remains in his nature. In passing I would say that the statement touched on here of the inseparability of the gift from the giver is of special importance in the teaching concerning the sacraments.

Baader’s note 16: As is known, Fichte with his “I” [*Ich*] and Hegel with his Idea [*Begriff*] took the same point of departure as Descartes. In Vol. 5 of the *Revue Européene* it is said of Hegel, that he achieved great profit from anatomy in philosophy or of philosophy. This expression is suspicious, since the spirit of our age, having outlived his spirit, shows itself to have busied itself for a long time with this anatomy (as critic), because of which such dissection reports can be found in all branches of knowledge. *Ubi cadaver–ibi aquilae* [wherever the carcass is, there will the eagles be gathered together].

JGF: Cf. Dooyeweerd’s three kinds of acts.

Baader’s note 17: Our liberals, too hold to this abstract concept of law. After they, as true purists, have distanced themselves from all living and embodied carries and holders of it, they have underlain it with their own individuality as a surrogate. Therefore the more recent political doctrines of absolute autonomy and anomie are only consequences of such abstract philosophical teachings about the law. Moreover in order to find fault with just one of the many examples of silliness that our moralists, in renouncing religion, have let themselves come to be responsible for, let me say that they completely overlook the coincidence of the setting of the law [*Stelling*] with the form, and of the moral law with the image of God. Or they completely overlook or fail to realize that the moral imperative is really the advancement of the image of God in Man.

JGF: The reference seems to be to Acts 3:15

And killed the Prince of life, whom God hath raised from the dead; whereof we are witnesses.

Baader’s note 18: Whomever I admit within myself and my powers, his manifestation is made free, in and through myself.