New Research on Groen van Prinsterer and the idea of Sphere Sovereignty
by
J. Glenn Friesen

Important note: This is not the final peer-reviewed version of my article, which has been accepted for publication in the journal *Philosophia Reformata*. The anticipated publication date is some time in 2019 or 2020. That is a very long time between date of acceptance (March 15, 2018) and date of publication. When finally published, the article can be ordered from: https://brill.com/view/journals/phir/philosophia-reformata-overview.xml

*Philosophia Reformata* is published by Brill, which is a RoMEO yellow publisher. This permits me to self-archive by placing on my website the submitted (pre-peer-reviewed) version of my article. The final peer-reviewed version is even stronger in its conclusions than the article as archived here. Perhaps the most important addition to the final article is the discussion of how sphere sovereignty is *not* based on the idea that God’s reign extends to every area of life. It is true that Calvinism valued secular work, as opposed to a spiritualistic flight from temporal life. This has been shown by Max Weber in his influential work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1930, originally published 1905). But the idea of a vocation in a secular sphere does not give any basis for the sovereignty of one sphere *vis à vis* another sphere. Nor does this idea of vocation delineate the spheres in the same way as does the idea of sphere sovereignty. The idea of sphere sovereignty has its source in non-Calvinistic ideas.

Abstract

Historians of reformational philosophy often claim that Abraham Kuyper obtained the idea of “Sovereignty in its own sphere” from Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer. But very little historical research has been done on Groen’s sources for and development of this idea. The first use of the Dutch phrase “souverainiteit in eigen sfeer” is much earlier than previously thought; it was used in 1853 by J.I. Doedes, an associate of the “ethical theologian” Chantepie de la Saussaye. Groen became aware of the ideas of Franz von Baader through journals founded by them, and by reading and corresponding with them and others like J.H. Gunning, Jr. and Friedrich Fabri. Groen himself owned copies of some of Baader’s books. Groen also relied strongly on the work of the jurist Friedrich Julius Stahl, who was 37 years younger than Baader, but taught for a while at the same Munich university, and shared Baader’s anti-revolutionary ideas.
Keywords

Sphere sovereignty or "souvereiniteit in eigen kring"; church, state and school; G. Groen van Prinsterer; Abraham Kuyper; Friedrich Julius Stahl; Anti-Revolutionary; Franz von Baader; Herman Dooyeweerd

I. Introduction

Why is it that reformational philosophers resist historical research into the sources that influenced neo-Calvinism? Why do they insist that these ideas were original, unrelated to what came before? Is it because they want to preserve the simplistic narrative according to which reformational philosophy developed in a straight line from Calvin? Are they afraid that outside influences will undermine their theological beliefs? But that kind of subservience to theology is contrary to the very principle of sphere sovereignty that they purport to follow. Philosophers should be eager to trace sources and influences across the centuries in order to better understand the philosopher whom they are studying. Thankfully, some historians are starting to do this work.¹

In my book *Neo-Calvinism and Christian Theosophy* (Friesen 2015), I showed the influence of Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye and J.H. Gunning, Jr. on Abraham Kuyper. From these theologians, Kuyper learned of the ideas of Franz von Baader. We know that Kuyper read Baader’s work, including *Die Welalter*, and that Kuyper expressed appreciation for Baader’s work and recommended that others “must read him.” And we know that Kuyper was planning to open a Christian university with Gunning, but Kuyper changed his mind and opened the Free University without acknowledging Gunning’s influence. The cover of my book sets out four major claims: That the ideas of (1) a Christian worldview (2) sphere sovereignty (3) opposition to the autonomy of thought (4) a Free University and (5) our supratemporal selfhood can all be found in earlier sources.

Yet in a review of my book (Nijhoff 2015), all five of these major claims were ignored. Instead of any historical examination of the sources I cited, Nijhoff concentrated on other details in my book, some of which he then misstated.² Nijhoff’s review falls within the third type of response that I anticipated in the conclusion to my book. His major argument is that Dooyeweerd almost never refers to Baader (Nijhoff does refer to one explicit reference). But we know that, for whatever reason, Dooyeweerd did not acknowledge his reliance on certain key

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¹ See, for example, the 2004 book *Groen van Prinsterer in Europese context*, edited by Jan de Bruijn and George Harinck.
² Nijhoff says (p. 3) that Dooyeweerd did not accept the idea of a fall into time. Yet I stated the exact opposite in my book (Friesen 2015, 189, 477 citing NC II, 564 and WdW II, 496).
sources. However, I do appreciate Nijhoff’s acknowledgement (p. 4) that Dooyeweerd probably did read Okke Norel’s article on Gunning and “maybe even that it created in him an interest in Gunning, Chantepie de la Saussaye and Baader himself.” And I also appreciate Nijhoff’s conclusion that my book is “a steppingstone towards further investigation of similarities and differences between neo-Calvinist philosophies and the broader tradition of Christian thought.”

R.D. Henderson’s recent article is a merely defensive response to my research (Henderson 2017). He does not examine the historical sources that I cite for the ideas of Kuyper and Dooyeweerd. Incredibly, he says (p. 94) that Kuyper’s solution “was not theoretical, not gained by reading books.” That is an unhistorical approach. And it is not true. Inconsistently, Henderson then argues the standard view that Kuyper obtained the idea of sphere sovereignty from Groen. But he does not examine the sources behind Groen’s ideas, either!

Henderson refers (pp. 85-6) to Kuyper’s speech Het Calvinisme: Oorsprong en waarborg onzer constitutionele vrijheden (published 1874). And Henderson provides some interesting commentary. But Henderson makes several serious errors, and he does not explain the development of Kuyper’s thought.

1. Henderson says (p. 85-86 and 86 fn4) that the Dutch phrase “sovereignty in its own sphere” [soevereiniteit in eigen kring] first appears in this 1873 speech by Kuyper, and that Kuyper “represents” this as a quotation from Groen’s Nederlandsche Gedachten (1873). But Kuyper does not cite Groen with respect to “sovereignty in its own sphere.” On p. 9 of his book, Kuyper says “In the Calvinistic Reformation according to Holy Scriptures is found the origin and guarantee [oorsprong en waarborg] of blessings, of which the 1789 [Revolution] gave a deceptive promise and a pathetic caricature.” In footnote 6, he refers to Groen’s thought of October 22, 1873 in Nederlandsche Gedachten. Kuyper is citing Groen’s use of the same words oorsprong en waarborg. Contrary to Henderson’s claim, Kuyper is not representing the Dutch phrase “soevereiniteit in eigen kring” as a quotation from Groen’s Nederlandsche Gedachten (1873).

2. Kuyper’s focus is on constitutional freedoms, as stated in the title to his speech. It is the issue of when we are able to overthrow a tyrannical government. On p. 46, Kuyper refers to the case of the Netherlands revolting against Spain. On pp. 47-50,

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3 Dooyeweerd did not acknowledge taking the key ideas of individuality structures and enkapsis from Max Wundt, and he did not acknowledge using Max Scheler’s idea of animals being ex-statically absorbed in time (Friesen 2015, 342-48, 353-5, 462-67). Neither Nijhoff nor Henderson have responded to these very obvious examples of non-attribution of sources. The fact that Dooyeweerd also did not acknowledge Baader or Norel’s article on Gunning (Friesen 2016) should therefore not surprise us. What is important is understanding Dooyeweerd’s philosophy within the context that these sources provide, not trying to defend some notion of originality. This is especially so since Dooyeweerd himself denied originality for his philosophy.
he cites Beza for this principle. It is not individuals, but rather parliaments, deputies, superiors of the people, *magistratus inferiores* that have the right to overthrow a tyrannical government. Bruts as an individual was wrong to murder Caesar. But Beza is in favour of a constitutional monarchy. In the outline of the speech, which he sent to Groen, Kuyper also refers to Hubert Languet who wrote a book about Defenses against Tyrants.

3. Henderson cites Kuyper’s reference (Kuyper 1874, 6) to independent institutions such as the province, the city, family, court, educational entities, corporations and guilds. But Kuyper refers to these institutions as “autonomous.” The idea of autonomy is different from sphere sovereignty. And yet Kuyper says these institutions are “clothed with sovereignty in their own sphere” and as such provide a standpoint to resist a unified, indivisible state. While this is indeed an important reference, it is not attributed to Groen. Nor does Henderson explain how Kuyper developed the idea. It does not relate to sovereignty in the sense of the constitutional right to overthrow a government. Kuyper is confusing two different ideas here—sphere sovereignty as related to, and the idea of sovereignty in the sense of overthrowing the entire state.

4. Kuyper confusingly links sovereignty in its own sphere to constitutional delegation of powers. Henderson quotes Kuyper

> It is still this same concept of sovereignty in [one’s] own sphere, which allows the boundary line to be drawn between popular rule and our constitutional form of government.

Kuyper’s use of “sovereignty” here is opposed to the idea of “popular rule” in revolutionary thought, which relied on sovereignty of the people to overthrow a government. Kuyper is in favour of constitutional government, by which a tyrant can be overthrown. But this kind of constitutional government is not at all the same as sovereignty of each institution (family, church, business) in its own sphere. Constitutional delegation is an internal division of powers *within one institution*, the state. It does not concern sphere sovereignty in the sense of the relation of

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4 The powers of *magistratus inferiores* have nothing to do with sovereignty in its own sphere, either. These are officials who have *taken an oath* to use their authority properly. Their authority is delegated by the state. Families and schools do not take such oaths. So this reasoning cannot apply to institutions like the church or family whose authority is not delegated.

5 Kuyper says that Languet’s theory had impure mixtures, in that he relied on German law of the people [*volksrecht*] and on natural law. Yet in the outline, Kuyper says that Languet is the “pure line of sovereignty in [its] own sphere.” There appears to be a contradiction here. Perhaps Kuyper means that Languet is in the pure Calvinistic line, in contrast to Stahl’s Lutheran ideas that he refers to at the beginning of his article. In any event, Languet’s ideas apply only within one sphere—the state and its delegated authorities; they relate to constitutional ways of resisting tyranny. They do not refer to the kind of sphere sovereignty that we have come to know in Dooyeweerd—sphere sovereignty of one sphere with respect to other spheres.
these institutions vis à vis each other (for example, families or schools with respect to the state). Henderson correctly says that the issue that concerns Kuyper is one of (constitutional) delegation of powers by the state. But as we shall see, Dooyeweerd adamantly opposes any attempt to identify delegation of powers with sphere sovereignty.

5. Henderson then discusses an 1876 reference in De Standaard, where Kuyper refers to “sovereignty in its own sphere” that is “not granted by the state, but comes directly from God’s provision without intervention from the state.” That is a very different idea from what Kuyper expressed in 1874 about delegation. In this new idea, the delegation is not from the state, but from God. Henderson does not explain this important development in Kuyper. Even so, Kuyper later confuses this idea of God-given sovereignty with a hierarchy of delegated powers—home, village, regional government, other regions, national government, and other governments (cited by Henderson, 90). The fact that Kuyper concludes this list by praising God as sovereign over all the earth does not take away from the fact that, insofar as it is hierarchical, this is not sphere sovereignty, but delegated state authority.

6. Henderson cites at p. 92 an 1891 reference by Kuyper to “different spheres of life.” But he does not look at the sources for this idea. Already in 1847, Friedrich Julius Stahl wrote about the ordering that is set by God for the spheres of life and for the consecration of vocations [vom Gott gesetzte Ökonomie der Lebenskreise und für die Weihe des Berufs]. This divine ordering has set up the diversity of occupations [Berufstellungen] in social life, and has granted to each its own hallowing [Weihe], and has instructed man to remain faithful in these limited spheres [abgegrenzten Kreise] (Stahl 1847, 14-15). In 1868, Stahl refers again to this: the goal of governance of church and state is to be the upholding of God-given truth and a God-given order for all spheres of life [Lebenskreise] (Stahl 1868, 19). 6 We will look at the influence of Stahl in more detail. And in Baader’s Die Weltalter (which we know Kuyper read), Baader refers to the different realms [Bereiche] of religion and church, of science and art, or of civil society and of the state, in which Christian religion encourages us to grow and progress. Baader says that each part of systematic knowledge is like the limb of an organism, an individual sphere [Kreis] of the combined spheres [Gesamtsphäre] of the organic system (Hoffmann 1868, 23, 104). Power is not by individuals, nor by an aggregate of individuals, but rather where humans form themselves in social organizations, family, tribe, people or the church. Each societal organization has its own laws to which it is subjected. Baader refers to institutions of the church, the state,

6 Kuyper cites this work by Stahl in Kuyper 1874. And in Die Weltalter (p. 232), Baader says that every creature when it comes into existence receives its law [Gesetz], whereby it is placed [gesetzt] in a region or place.
universities, as well as to guilds and corporations—almost the same list of institutions that Kuyper referred to in 1874 (see Friesen 2015, 290-292).

7. Henderson is wrong that Kuyper's 1874 book is the first time the phrase is used in Dutch. We can find the Dutch phrase "souvereiniteit in eigen sfeer" used almost 20 years earlier by J.I. Doedes, a colleague of Ch. de la Saussaye, writing in the journal *Ernst en Vrede*, a monthly journal founded in 1851 by Ch. de la Saussaye, J.I. Doedes and Nicolaas Beets for the Hervormde Church. And this usage is with respect to the independence of church and state, and not with respect to overthrowing the state.

By focusing only on traditional Calvinistic sources, Henderson is unable to explain the development of these ideas in Groen and Kuyper. Kuyper’s references to “souvereignty in its own sphere” are all after 1871, when Kuyper was reading Baader, and when he was recommending that others read Baader, too (Friesen 2015, 76-105). I will not repeat those arguments here. Instead, my focus is on examining the sources that influenced Groen, who died in 1876, while Kuyper was still trying to put these ideas together.

As we shall see, Groen was deeply involved in discussions with both Ch. de la Saussaye and Gunning. Groen approved of a reference to Baader; he also said that his own views are similar to those in a book by Ch. de la Saussaye that has extensive references to Baader. The other main influence on Groen was the Bavarian jurist Friedrich Julius Stahl. Henderson makes no reference at all to Stahl! Stahl lived in Munich and was a contemporary of Baader at the university; he was very much aware of Baader’s ideas. Both Stahl and Baader were anti-revolutionaries; both opposed the rationalism of the French Revolution. Both are relevant to an understanding of reformational philosophy.

II. Some historical background

Soon after independence of the Netherlands from Napoleonic France, King Willem I convened a body to reorganize the national church. The new General Regulations [*Algemeen Reglement*] of 1816 renamed the church as De Hervormde Kerk. Article 9 sets out the concerns of the state for the church, including maintaining its teachings. Article 9 caused much controversy, since the state continued to exercise a degree of control over the church, such as naming of persons to Synods and also with respect to public education. Catholics thought public education was too Protestant. Some of the Reformed, like Groen, thought that it was not Christian.

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7 See below. The word ‘sovereignty’ is spelled in various ways in the Dutch and German sources that I cite: “sovereiniteit,” “souvereiniteit,” “Souverainität” “Souveränität” and “Souveränetät.”
enough. Groen was a member of the House of Representatives [*Tweede Kamer*]; we will look at some of his speeches.

**III. Jacob Isaac Doedes (1817–1897)**

Doedes was a preacher in Rotterdam who later became a professor of theology at the University of Utrecht. Doedes defended the right of Hofstede de Groot to say that education belonged to the state. De Groot’s views were incorporated in Article 194 of the Constitution--public education was deemed a concern of the state. But in 1850, Doedes wrote a work with the remarkable title, *75 Theses for the first October 31st of the Second Half of the 19th Century.* Doedes says that separation of church and state is preferable to an ecclesiastical state or a state church (Thesis 34).

Theses 38 to 41 concern schools. Parents have the right to bring up their children; they can’t be forced to accept religious principles with which they disagree. Both church and state are involved in the Christian education of youth. Parents have the right to seek a school that agrees with their convictions. Thesis 44 says the state is obliged to check the academic qualification and moral character of teachers. But Doedes also warned that a denominational school could lead to partisanship and intolerance whereas a mixed school will encourage love and tolerance (Thesis 48). Doedes hoped that eventually the various Protestant groups would reunite and that there would even be reunion with Roman Catholics (Theses 22–24).

Groen was happy to have a theologian as an ally in the battle for separate schools (Vree, 241).

This desire for church unity was the motivation for Doedes, together with Ch. de la Saussaye and N. Beets, to found the journal *Ernst en Vrede* in 1852.\(^8\) The journal was intended for the Hervormde Church. The title means “ethical sincerity and peace.” This position was sometimes referred to as “ethical-irenical.” Ch. de la Saussaye said that the journal rejected all interference of state authority in order to maintain the uniqueness [*eigenaardigheid*] of the Hervormde Church. Any state interference belongs to a bygone age, and is in conflict with the independence [*zelfstandigheid*] of the Church. Nevertheless, the State could and should enforce those principles that can be found in the public conscience [*publieke Conscientie*]--the sum of Christian convictions and principles, without which no morality is possible (*Ernst en Vrede*, vol 2, 17–18).

In a later article in *Ernst en Vrede*, Ch. de la Saussaye argued for this public conscience, and said that we need a government that in the “sphere of its own

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\(^8\) Groen corresponded with all three editors of *Ernst en Vrede* (see Honders 1963). I have not examined this correspondence except as noted between Groen and Ch. de la Saussaye.
qualifications [bevoegdheid], would go to work in the expression of this conscience (vol. 4, 299). He did not agree that separate schools were needed.

By letter dated Aug. 30, 1856, Groen responded to this article by Ch. de la Saussaye. Groen’s letter is reproduced in his 1876 book detailing how the education law of 1857 came into being. Groen thought that the general kind of Christianity advocated by Ch. de la Saussaye was close to deism. He said you cannot have Christian principles without Christian doctrine [leerbegrip]; you can’t have ethics without dogmatics. Both church and state need to be subordinate to God’s Word, each in their own sphere and calling [eigen sfeer en roeping]. This is the only mention of “own sphere” in this entire book. Groen does not use the word “sovereignty” at all in this book.

But sovereignty in its own sphere had already been stated elsewhere. On March 23, 1852, there was a revision to the General Regulations of the Hervormde Church, giving it more independence from the State. Doedes wrote about it in the first volume of Ernst en Vrede. He quotes from several sources, which unfortunately he does not identify. One quotation concerns the duty of the state to care for the interests of the church. This comes from article 11 of the Regulations, and it is basically unchanged from article 9 of the 1816 version. But Doedes says that the church should be concerned that it will not be considered to be just one particular society within the State. Doedes hopes that that the state will agree with the proposition that

Kerk en Staat zijn onafhankelijk in eigen kring, zoodat noch de Kerk onderworpen zij aan den Staat, noch de Staat aan de Kerk.

[Church and State are independent in their own sphere, so that neither is the Church subjected to the State, nor the State to the Church]

Now this quotation, unidentified in Doedes’s text, comes from Groen’s advice to the House of Representative on Dec. 3, 1851, as found in the transcript of discussions in that House (Verslag der Handelingen, vol. 4, 385). Groen’s statement is reproduced in a volume of Groen’s advice to the House (Adviezen 2, 147). Was this an original idea of Groen’s? No. In that second volume of advice, he makes reference 18 times to the jurist Friedrich Julius Stahl. And as we shall see, this emphasis on the independence of different spheres is found in Stahl (just as it can be found earlier in Baader9).

A third quotation from Doedes’s article is most interesting. He refers to separation of Church and State,

9 See Friesen 2015, 290-92.
...waarbij er voor all gezindheden op zuiver politiek terrein gelijkstelling, op zuiver kerkelijk terrein onafhankelijkheid, dat is souvereiniteit in eigen sfeer, en bij zamenvlechting der belangen, ter voldoening aan den eisch der Godsvereering, gemeen overleg met het Gouvernement is.

[whereby all denominations are placed on an equal footing in the political area, have independence in the purely ecclesiastical area, that is, sovereignty in its own sphere, and by the weaving together of their interests [with the state], in order to satisfy the requirement to worship God, which is common ground with the Government]

I cannot find the source of this quotation. It is not from Groen’s speech in 1851. If it does come from some other speech by Groen, then it is odd that Groen does not use the term “sovereignty” until about ten years later, and even then only in relation to Stahl’s work. Instead, Groen continues to speak in terms of the independence of the societal spheres. But whatever the source of the quotation, it is likely derived from Stahl (see below).

IV. Groen van Prinsterer and Friedrich Julius Stahl (1802-61)

Friedrich Julius Stahl was born into a Jewish family; his original name was Julius Jolson. In 1819, he converted to Christianity in order to obtain a job. It is impossible that Stahl did not know Baader’s work. He personally knew him, although Baader was 37 years older. Both lived in Munich, and for some time, Stahl was a lecturer at the same university. Baader’s academic work was in full bloom, and had attracted the attention of almost all of Germany (Bluntschli, 279).

Despite his admiration and sympathy for the great Catholic restoration in which Baader played a role, Stahl refers to Protestant philosophers like Schelling as the source of his inspiration (Masur, 184). Schelling was of course himself extensively influenced by Baader. Perhaps it was because of his conversion to Lutheranism that Stahl did not mention Catholic sources like Baader.

Groen was a follower of Stahl. In fact, Groen was referred to as “The Stahl of Holland.” Groen acknowledges that this was not meant as a compliment, but as a way to associate him with someone whose reactionary views were thought to be like the fanaticism [dweeperij] of the Middle Ages. Groen says that he considers himself to be, like Stahl, anti-revolutionary (Groen 1862, 19). What similarities are there between Groen and Stahl?

Independent in its own sphere

10 Ch. de la Saussaye says that Baader influenced Schelling far more than Schelling influenced Baader (Ch. de la Saussaye 1871-75, Vol 2, 366 fn1).
We have already seen that Doedes used the phrase “sovereignty in its own sphere” in 1850. In 1853, Groen responded to an amendment by Thorbecke, and spoke of church and state being “independent in their own spheres” [onafhankelijk in eigen sfeer]. But Groen did not use the term “sovereignty” at that time (Otterloo, 292). Even in 1856, Groen did not use the term “sovereignty” in relation to the separate spheres. Groen speaks of the church as an independent corporation [zelfstandige corporatie]. It is entitled to the state’s protection for everything that belongs to its own sphere of work [werkkring]. And he refers to independence in each sphere [zelfstandigheid in eigen sfeer]. He says the churches have the right to set up special schools. To deny this would be against their rights just as much as if the state could dismiss deacons, or place the church under authority of the state (Groen 1856, II, 191-2). And in 1857, in response to the new law, Groen again only refers to church and state being “onafhankelijk in eigen sfeer.” He does not use the term “sovereignty” (Wet van den 13 Augustus 1857, 431).

In Groen’s book Ongeloof en revolutie [Unbelief and Revolution] he speaks of the state as “master in the sphere of its own rights.” Klink points out the great similarity to Stahl’s idea of “die Selbstregierung der verschiedene Kreise” [the self-government of the various spheres] (Klink 2004, 57).¹¹

But there are many more references in Stahl to the independence in their own spheres of church and state. Already in 1840, Stahl referred to the separate spheres of state and the church. He sought the right relation of church and state to the Kingdom of God. The church should not be the servant of the State, nor the State the servant of the church. He rejects the Catholic view, but points out how the Lutheran view, which allows power to the state princes over some affairs of the church, can lead to some of the same problems.

Haben sie auch geschiedene Sphären, so kann doch nur entweder die eine oder die andere Macht die oberste Entscheidung darüber haben, ob in einem gegebenen streitigen Falle die Grenze des Gebiets von der Gegenseite überschritten worden (Stahl 1840, 106 fn3).

[Even if they have separated spheres, neither of these powers can have the supreme decision if in a given disputed case the boundary of the area of the opposite party has been overstepped.]

Stahl says that the church has its own freedom in the undisturbed power of its own ordinances [Anordnung], independence [Selbständigkei], and its unique [eigenthümlichen] power. The state’s power does not include the morality and religion of the church. A ruler has “independence in a defined sphere”

¹¹ Klink erroneously refers to Friedrich Johann Stahl instead of Friedrich Julius Stahl. They were different people.
Selbständigkeit in bestimmter Sphäre, but communal morality is completely outside the sphere of the State (Stahl 1840, 106 fn, 107, 123 fn7, 269, 277)

Stahl’s use of ‘sovereignty.’

In Stahl’s 1840 work Die Kirchenverfassung nach Lehre u. Recht der Protestanten, he also refers to “sovereignty” in connection with the rights of the church. He says that the state princes [Landesführsten], acting as individuals and not as the state, are quasi-bishops of the Protestant church. This highest power in the Protestant church is a part of sovereignty, but it is not a part of the power of the State. He refers to his Philosophie des Rechts, vol. II, 40 where he had already said that the idea of state power can be distinguished from the idea of sovereignty. The princes have sovereignty over and in the church, but they do not have the right of lawgiving, governance and judgment [Gesetzgebung, Regierung und Gericht (Bann)] of the church. These powers are inseparable from the sovereignty of the church.

Because of the princes, the (Lutheran) church does not have a sovereignty that is separate from the state, unlike the Catholic and strongly Reformed churches. But it does have a right to the completely separate and independent giving of law. This right inheres in the church’s nature, and is not the result of devolution or delegation of powers from the state (Stahl 1840, 141 fn 25; 149).

And in 1847, Stahl says there is a separation between the spheres [Sphären] of Church and State. They were formerly combined, but the Rule of Law [Rechtsstaat] requires that they be distinguished and set apart [Auseinanderlegung]. But they are not torn apart. For if we say there is no relation at all between church and state, it would divide the population in half. What is separated are the independent spheres of individual morality from the sphere of law [Rechts]. Emancipation of the State from the Church does not mean emancipation from Christianity. The bearers of ecclesiastical power can no longer determine the affairs of State. Rather, it is, Christian motives and requirements [Anforderungen] that determine the state (Stahl 1847, 287).

Van der Vijver says that Groen first used “souvereiniteit in eigen sfeer” in the 1862 work Ter Nagedachtenis der Stahl, pp. 30-1 (Van der Vijver, 2004, xli, fn230). Van der Vijver is right in that there is a comment about the sovereignty in its own sphere of the church, but the reference is in relation to the ideas of Stahl. Groen says there that time and again [weêrkeerig], Stahl has worked for freedom of conscience, personal rights, and the sovereignty of the church in its own sphere [souvereiniteit der kerk in haar eigen sfeer]. Stahl opposed the unitary idea of the State in which the Church is subordinate to the sphere of the State. The arbitrariness of the State has resulted in a failure to acknowledge the calling and independence of the
church in caring for the poor and in education [opvoeding] (Groen 1862, 45, 50). Groen’s reference to “time and again” indicates that he has seen Stahl’s use of ‘sovereignty’ in this way many times before.

V. Groen van Prinsterer, Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, and Organicism

Already in this 1847 work, Stahl uses the analogy of an organism. He says that the various spheres of a people unfold themselves in time, like a seed that contains its whole form in a compact unity, and then develops itself to its unfolded existence; then the different parts separate themselves for their own formation and tasks [Verrichtung], but they do not lose their reciprocal effects on each other (Stahl 1847, 287).

In the second edition of Kirchenverfassung (1862), Stahl retains those sections dealing with the independence and sovereignty of the spheres. But he adds a section on the church as organism. Both Church and State are organisms. In working together with the State, the church must not lose its own status as organism. The state is the community for the totality of moral goals; the church is the religious community (Stahl 1862, 35, 219, 266). This second edition was in Stahl’s personal library, with marginal notes.

VI. Groen van Prinsterer, Chantepie de la Saussaye and J.H. Gunning, Jr.

Chantepie de la Saussaye introduced the ideas of Baader to Reformed thought in the Netherlands, and he, along with J.H. Gunning, Jr. introduced Kuyper to Baader’s ideas. In Ernst en Vrede, the journal that he founded with Doedes and Beets, Chantepie refers to Baader in his article “Empirisch of Ethisch.” And he has an entire article on Baader “Franz von Baader, eene biographische schets” (both in vol. 6). He says that the term “theosophy” frequently causes fright among those who do not understand what is meant. We know that Groen read this journal, so he would have seen these articles on Baader.

Protestansche Bijdragen was a journal started by Ch. de la Saussaye in 1870. We know that Groen read it, even though he thought that it was directed against some of his ideas about the schools law (Vree, 545). In this journal, Ch. de la Saussaye frequently cites Baader, with sections devoted to thoughts from his work. There are also contributions from authors who write about the independence of various spheres of our society. The most interesting of these is an early article by J.J.L. van der Brugghen. He had been a member of the House of Representatives [Tweede Kamer], and had opposed Groen on the issue of the school law. Van der Brugghen wrote extensively about the matter of authority in the various spheres of our lives. Volume 2 of the journal includes an article written by him in 1860-61, “Studiën over de verhouding tusschen de beginselen van gezag en vrijheid van Staatsgebied.” Van der Brugghen refers to “each sphere of human life” [elken kring des menschelijken
levens]. He gives examples: the sphere of individual life, of the household, of parental (fatherly) power in the family. The only time that the state may intervene in these spheres is where those spheres, using their own internal means, cannot maintain authority in those spheres. He says

De Staat kan en mag in die kringen niet meer doen dan dáárt, ómdat in dezelve buiten hem, door Gods ordening, een gezag bestaat, ter voorziening in den toestand van onvatbaarheid voor vrijheid bestemd.

[In these spheres, the State can and may do no more than that, because in these spheres outside of the State, there exists by God’s ordering, an authority that provides for that situation of invulnerability, which is destined for freedom].

He gives examples of such state intervention in the non-state spheres, to protect freedom in those spheres. And he says that such freedom brings with it sovereignty [souvereiniteit]. We possess this sovereignty in our hearts [geweten]. The fact that he believed in sphere sovereignty, and yet nevertheless did not believe in separate Christian schools, indicates that these issues are not necessarily linked. On p. 118, he cites Ch. de la Saussaye about the “slogan” “separation of church and state.” Ch. de la Saussaye warns that this is sometimes taken to be a violent rejection of all beliefs. We have seen this in Stahl, too, who warned that the State should not be left without religion at all.

In 1871, Groen refers to a letter of June 19, 1871 from his “friend” J.H. Gunning, Jr., referring him to a book recently published by Ch. de la Saussaye, *Het Protestantisme als politiek beginsel.* Gunning says in his letter how happy he is about the principle stated in that book that the church is not subjected to the state, nor the state to the church, but that both are subjected to God and his law, which Calvin had already stated. Gunning says that this principle seems similar to that proclaimed by Dante, as he wrote in his book about that author.

In Thought 105, June 23, 1871, Groen comments on Gunning’s letter. He says that he has with exceptional interest both heard and read Ch. de la Saussaye’s lecture that Gunning referred him to. He says that the short theses concerning the calling of the Netherlands on the whole agree with his own views. Groen lists these theses, and makes extensive comparisons with his own work. The Dutch appetite for freedom, and the asylum it has given to so many who were religiously persecuted, is not the fruit of the revolution. Equality of rights of all religious

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12 This is similar to Jonathan Chaplin’s transformative model of the State—The State may intervene in other institutions in order to protect the freedoms within those institutions (Chaplin 2011, 287-95).
13 Except for (1) the disagreement on the schools question, and (2) that he thinks Ch. de la Saussaye is too “optimistic” about society. Ch. de la Saussaye thinks that society has not yet rejected Christ; Groen thinks that it has.
denominations is not in conflict with protestant-reformed principles. The Netherlands should opt for reformation, not revolution, and if it remains true to reformation, it will be powerful both against ultramontanism as well as the revolutionary spirit. Groen says

Dit Geschrift raakt zoo zeer het geheel van principieel-politieke beschouwing dat het (waar geen periculum in morà is) boven elk ander onderwerp de prioriteit heeft.

This publication touches so much on the whole of principled-political views that (provided there is no danger in delay) it has the priority over every other subject.

Groen says he is also an orthodox disciple of Calvin, and refers to his own advice given Dec. 3, 1851 that we have already noted, where neither church nor state are subjected to each other (Nederlandsche Gedachten, Vol. 3, 57).

It is worthwhile looking at this 1871 book by Ch. de la Saussaye in more detail. He refers to Baader and gives extensive quotations from his philosophy of history, and referring to Baader’s theory of time and the regions above and below time. He refers to Baader’s work Ueber den Evolutionismus und Revolutionismus, which we will look at again below in relation to Fabri and Groen. Baader says in this work that history can only be understood as [the temporal] plant in relation to its [eternal] fruit, as time to eternity. In the actual text, Baader goes on to cite Daub who says that the space-time ground [Grund], the Historical-positive, refers to an inner eternal Ground. Once we know this eternal Ground, then it shows history backwards. Harmony in history is given by revelation, especially in its center, the Word become flesh. What is not yet realized in a lower region already exists in a higher region. God does not do what he has not previously shown to his prophets. These prophets represent the youth of society, insofar as the temporal yet unborn is still younger than the most recent temporarily born [insofern das zeitlich noch Ungeborene doch noch jünger als das zeitlich jüngst Geborene ist] (Ch. de la Saussaye 1871, 16, 75-76).

Ch. de la Saussaye says that separation of church and state may have been Calvin’s teaching, but not his practice. It cannot be denied that the reformed confessions, including the Dutch Confession, in setting out the duties of the state with respect to the church, went further than the principles set out by Calvin. They gave rise to the improper mixing in political affairs and increasing authority of the ecclesiastics [kerkelijken] over the politicians, which the old-reformed church has made unpopular and Remonstrants have made popular. To exercise discipline over the magistrates will lead to a reaction; when the chance comes, they will rein in the church and limit her influence. The domain of the state is our external life. The
church has no jurisdiction here. Nor does the state have any rights of sovereignty [soevereineitsrechten] over the church. Between the ultramontanist principle, where the church is sovereign, and the revolutionary principle, where the people are sovereign, stands the Protestant principle, where God is sovereign over both church and state; God’s divine law stands above prince and subjects. The true Protestant principle is the independence of the state with respect to the church, the independence of the church in the state, and the subjection of both to the highest law (Ch. de la Saussaye 1871, 53-54, 67-70, 84 fn10).

VII. Groen van Prinsterer, Friedrich Fabri and Baader

In his Nederlandsche gedachten, vol. 4 (Thought number 20, dated May 11, 1872), Groen writes about the nature of true conservatism. He quotes extensively from Friedrich Fabri (1824-1891), an early follower of Baader.\textsuperscript{14} The quotation is from Fabri’s 1872 book Staat und Kirche [State and Church]. Fabri says that, 21 years after Article 15 of the Prussian Constitution had guaranteed the independence of the evangelical church, few steps had yet been taken towards such independence and de-nationalization [Entstaatlichung]. These were ideas taken from the Stahl. Fabri says that in Stahl’s view, the separation of church and state was the most far-reaching and earth-shaking achievement of liberalism (p. 8). Despite this separation, and with little compulsion, thousands of people have remained believers. Although it would be simple to enact a complete separation of church and state, this would result in a fragmentation of the church, and would result in individualism. Fabri says that the Conservative party became untrue to its principles, exchanging Stahl’s ideas for those of Bismarck, and that they had overthrown the principles of Stahl. Groen says that Fabri is not using too strong an expression here. Fabri asks whether one should return to Stahl, and says no, Stahl confused the “historical” [geschichtlich] with the “divine” [göttlich]. In other words, Stahl confused the status quo with God’s providence (p. 12).

Groen says this is a wrong interpretation of Stahl.\textsuperscript{15} Groen says that Stahl was too much a Christian to say that everything historical comes immediately from God, although he did lend the words “goddelijk en christelijk” to the existing order and he did not have not enough of an eye to development of the existing order—too much of a static vision (stationaire wijsheid). And he tended to call his opponents anti-Christian in his exclusivity (Nederlandsche Gedachten 4, 158)

On p. 159, Groen then cites the following from an article in the Algemeen Lutherische Evangelische Kirchenzeitung, which criticizes Fabri’s views of Stahl. It says that there are no unchanging situations, but only unchanging principles, and

\textsuperscript{14} See Mietus 2006 for the importance of Fabri influencing the reception of Baader by Ch. de la Saussaye.

\textsuperscript{15} It is similar to Dooyeweerd’s criticism of Stahl.
that this is the mark of true conservatism. There must be development [ontwikkeling] as well as conservation [behoud]. There should be a progression to this development; it is not a radical change or revolution. Fabri, who calls himself a ‘liberal-conservative’ forgets this one-sidedness of liberalism that becomes revolutionary by means of arbitrary abstraction and unhistorical systematization. The Lutheran journal then refers Fabri for true conservatism to Franz von Baader and Stahl. Groen quotes this in full:


Dr. Fabri calls himself "liberal-conservative"...We are surprised that Dr. Fabri has forgotten this characteristic of liberalism, which he, like Stahl in his lectures about “The present parties in church and state” correctly demonstrates that its basis is found in Rousseau’s ideas of abstract natural law, as well as in the character of the unhistorical, the abstract, and therefore also in its effects of radicalism, dissolution and unproductivity. Dr. Fabri certainly remembers very well from the time of his Baader studies that according to Baader, revolution can only be avoided and overcome by evolution. And it is especially in this sense that we understand conservatism and ally ourselves with it, not in the sense of an apotheosis of the historical, but in the sense of an evolution of the historical in movement, just as

\textsuperscript{16} JGF: Vincent of Lérins died circa 435 A.D. The full quotation is: 
\begin{quote}
Sed ita tamen ut vere profectus sit ille fidei, non permutatio. Siquidem ad profectum pertinet ut in semetipsum unaquaeque res amplificetur; ad permutationem vero, ut aliquid ex alio in aliud transvertatur.
\end{quote}

[However, let [progress] be had in such a way that it is truly a progress of faith and not an alteration. Since in fact it is the property of progress that a particular thing be strengthened in itself; but it is the property of alteration that something be transformed form one thing into another].
Vincentius Lerinensis expressed for the area of church dogma: *profectus non permutatio*.

The reference to Baader is likely to his 1834 work *Ueber den Evolutionismus und Revolutionismus oder die posit. Und negat. Evolution des Lebens überhaupt und des socialen Lebens insbesonder*” [Concerning evolution and revolution, or the positive and negative evolution of life itself, and of social life in particular (*Werke* 6, 73-108). As we have already seen, Ch. de la Saussaye’s 1871 book quotes from that book, and Groen expressed great appreciation for that book.

But there are even earlier references in Baader’s work to this idea. In 1833, Baader says that to be reactionary is also to be revolutionary. He warns against retrograde or petrifying movements as well as the revolutionary striving for dissolution and disintegration. They are both anti-evolutionary. Evolution is the mediation of past and future (*Werke* 8, 310, 318). He wrote about the French Revolution in 1832 (*Werke* 6, 291-328). And in 1831 he wrote *Ueber das Revolutioniren des positiven Rechtsbestandes* concerning Rousseau’s theory of revolution (*Werke* 6, 73). Not stagnation nor revolution, but only evolution is the right direction for all politics. Involution is required for all evolution: an opening up of oneself, unlocking (*Werke* 4, 12).

Groen evidently approves of this reference Baader in the Lutheran journal. He says that it is surprising that Fabri could have overlooked this fundamental one-sidedness in liberalism.

Again in 1872, Groen says that he is glad to agree with Ch. de la Saussaye about the importance of Fabri’s book *Staat und Kirche* (*Nederlandsche Gedachten*, vol 4, 279). Fabri wants independence [*zelfstandigheid*]-- but a true independence, not false. This is what he means by the de-nationalization of the church [*Entstaatlichung*].

Zelfstandigheid eener Kerk, die vereeniging met den christelijken Staat waardeert, maar zich van den niet-christelijken los maakt.

Independence of a church, which values unity with the Christian state, but which separates itself from the non-Christian one.

And Groen refers to the *All. Lutherische Evang. Kirchen-Zeitung* which also weighs in on this question. And he says

Zelfstandigheid van Kerk en Staat, beiden in eigen kring en, zooveel doenlijk, in gemeen overleg, naar de geboden Gods en ter zijner eer werkzaam.
[Independence of church and state, both in their own sphere, and as much as possible, in common agreement, working for the laws of God and to his honour]

On p. 65 of volume 4, Groen quotes from the journal and then says that this is also the theocracy of Calvin.17 It is not the subjection of the state to the church, but subjecting both to God’s eternal law. As a footnote here, he refers to Ch. de la Saussaye’s book *Het Protestantisme als politiek beginsel*. As already discussed, that book contains extensive references to Baader.

**VIII. Groen van Prinsterer’s Library**

From the above, it is clear the Groen, in addition to relying on Stahl’s ideas, had knowledge of Baader and his ideas as transmitted by Ch. de la Saussaye, Gunning, and Fabri. Furthermore, we know that Groen’s library contained works not only by Stahl, but also by Fabri, Ch. de la Saussaye, Gunning (including his most theosophical work, *Blikken in de Openbaring*). As well, Groen owned copies of several works by Baader, including *Gesammelte Schriften zur Societätsphilosophie* (1854), his *Grundzüge der Societätsphilosophie: ideeën über Recht, Staat, Gesellschaft und Kirche* (1865) and *his Blitzstrahl wider Rom. Die Verfassung der Christlichen Kirche und der Geist des Christentums* (1871) (Catalogus 1879, 237).

**IX. Dooyeweerd’s critique of Groen van Prinsterer**

*Groen’s idea of organicism*

Henderson cites examples of Groen and Kuyper referring to church and state as “organisms” in the sense of each having its own distinct life and nature, an “expression of life” (Henderson 80, 83, 89). We have seen how this idea derives from Stahl, which he got from Von Savigny. Dooyeweerd later criticized this use of the term “organism” as applied to the state (*NC I*, 234). For one thing, “life” is itself one of the modes of consciousness, and Dooyeweerd opposed neo-vitalist worldviews that elevated that aspect. A living organism is an individuality structure (*NC I*, 109, check). Dooyeweerd relied on a different kind of organicism, which relied on the head and limbs analogy of an organism. This is found in Baader and his interpreters. The self is the supratemporal root of all temporal functions; the modalities as modes of consciousness require such a root. And the body of Christ is the supratemporal head or root of all temporal institutions, such as church, state and family, which are temporal limbs relating to that head. The center is always supratemporal (*NC II*, 418; III, 535; Friesen 2015, 41, 82, 289-92).

In some of his writings, Kuyper does refer to this kind of body and head organicism (see citation by Henderson, 85). But Kuyper is not consistent. Sometimes he speaks

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17 As already noted, Ch. de la Saussaye was of the view that in practice, Calvin did not carry this out.
of each institution as a separate organism (a view that Dooyeweerd certainly rejects). Nor is Kuyper always clear about a supratemporal center for the various limbs. Dooyeweerd would later express appreciation for the famous quote from Kuyper where he refers to that part of the selfhood in its undivided unity. But Dooyeweerd also criticized other parts of Kuyper as being remnants of scholastic thinking (Friesen 2015, 15, 180-82).

**Groen’s idea of sphere sovereignty**

Groen and Kuyper refer not only to church and state as organisms, but also to municipalities, provinces, and boards for waterworks. Some of these are political powers delegated from the state (Klink 57-8; Groen *Adviezen* 2, 247, 342). Dooyeweerd says these are not true examples of sphere sovereignty. Dooyeweerd disagreed with any attempt to view sphere sovereignty in terms of delegated powers or political pluralism (or what is now known as “subsidiarity”). A delegated autonomy should not be confused with inner sphere sovereignty.

Dooyeweerd criticized Groen van Prinsterer as not understanding that sphere sovereignty had been given at creation itself. Instead, Groen’s view is that authority had been delegated to other bodies by the state in a process of historical and cultural development. Dooyeweerd criticized the equation of sphere sovereignty with the idea of delegated authority from the state to other institutions. Dooyeweerd asks how sphere sovereignty could be misunderstood in such a fundamental way (Dooyeweerd 1971b, 7; *Vernieuwing and Bezinning*, 47-8, 57, 242; NCIII, 464-65, 599; Friesen 2015, 81). Henderson’s article makes this confusion; the title of his article refers to sphere sovereignty in terms of “distributed authority.” And on p. 79, he refers to the independence of the church in terms of “decentralization” of state power. That is not the same as sphere sovereignty!

**Opposition to Groen’s idea of historicism**

Dooyeweerd says Groen was too much indebted to the Historical School and its idea of the organic development of culture. Groen didn’t see that sovereignty in its own sphere is founded not in organic growth, but is based on creation, and that the inner nature of spheres is given with their leading principles (love in the family, law in the state, faith in the church (Klink, 56). Here, Dooyeweerd has more similarity with Baader’s view of creation, fall and redemption as the governing idea.

**X. Is the idea of sphere sovereignty Calvinistic?**

Can the idea of sphere sovereignty be linked to classical Calvinism? I have addressed this issue to some extent in my book, showing the difference between neo-Calvinism and Calvinism, and how some key doctrines of classical Calvinism were changed (Friesen 2015). In this article, we have seen that Groen was influenced by Stahl (who was Jewish but converted to Lutheranism) and Baader (a
Catholic with strong Christian theosophical beliefs). Neither were Calvinistic. We have seen various attempts to link the idea of sphere sovereignty to Calvinism. All of them need further discussion.

1. It is argued that sphere sovereignty is related to the Calvinistic idea of the sovereignty of God over all institutions. But just because institutions A and B owe ultimate sovereignty to God does not logically give any reason for supposing that they have sphere sovereignty with respect to each other. Nor does it give any basis for differentiating separate institutions A and B.

2. Nor is sphere sovereignty based on the idea that God’s reign extends to every area of life. While that idea rejects a spiritualistic flight from our temporal life, it does not delineate what these areas of life or spheres are (Friesen 2015, 82).

3. Kuyper seems to trace the “pure line” of sphere sovereignty to Languet and Beza and their idea of resistance against a tyrant. This is classical Calvinism, but it deals only with divisions within the sphere of the state--enacting a constitutional monarchy that has provisions to address the removal of a monarch. It does not give any basis for sovereignty of institutions A and B in relation to each other, or even why other institutions should exist apart from the state.

4. Even the separation between church and state is more a development of liberalism than it was of classical Calvinism. Calvin’s Geneva did not make a clear distinction. Stahl criticizes the Calvinistic idea of the authority of magistrates, which tended to confuse ecclesiastical and political power.

5. Some have argued that the various institutions exist by delegation of power from the state. This is sometimes called the principle of “subsidiarity” or “political pluralism.” Dooyeweerd strongly opposed any confusion of such delegated institutions with the principle of sphere sovereignty.

6. In the Netherlands, the schools issue was of importance in forming the idea of sphere sovereignty, relying on ideas of the independence [zelfstandigheid] of Church and State (as found in Stahl and Baader). But why should schools be denominational? Does that not confuse the institutions of church and school? Later, the principle would be developed of a “Free University--free from control of both church and state, using the ideas of Baader and Gunning. But in practice, the Free University that was founded by Kuyper was controlled by the theological faculty and the church (Stellingwerff 1987).

7. Can we link sphere sovereignty to Stahl’s idea of institutions as organisms that unfold in history? But this view tends to support the status quo by including only those institutions that presently exist. Dooyeweerd said we need a creational basis for the sphere sovereignty.
8. How do we base sphere sovereignty on creation? Some point to the idea of creation according to “kinds” as stated in Genesis. But even if it is granted that Scripture may be used in this way, the idea of “kinds” refers to species of creatures, and not to institutions. There is certainly no biblical list of institutions that were given at creation. And in ancient Israel, there was no distinction between priestly and state governance, between religious cult and political power; it was a theocracy.

9. Some have argued that sphere sovereignty comes from the Calvinist jurist Johannes Althusius (1563-1638) and his conception of the state and its parts. But this idea of parts has to do with divisions in one sphere (the state), and not relations between separate spheres.

10. A different argument from Althusius is that every type of social relationship has its proper laws peculiar to it, according to the requirement of the inner nature of each, and that there is a symbiotic relation between these associations. He regarded these associations as organisms, and he refers to the organic nature of all species, including trees, rivers, plants, insects, crocodiles and plover birds, and their symbiotic relationship. But if we reject the idea of institutions as organisms, how do these ideas of Althusius help to found sphere sovereignty? And symbiosis is not the same as sphere sovereignty. Nor does Althusius explain why relations between these associations are not hierarchical. Furthermore, Althusius allows the magistrate to discipline impious people so they will not infect the faithful (Ossewarde, 8). This power of the magistrate is a confusion of church and state. Dooyeweerd acknowledges that Althusius “remained dependent on the historical conditions of his country at that time” (NC III, 662). References to Althusius therefore seem to be another retroactive attempt to link and to theologically justify ideas of sphere sovereignty that have their source elsewhere.

11. Baader is better at recognizing differences between the State and other institutions, and so is his idea of our being set [gesetzt] within temporal reality by God’s law [Gesetz], a view adopted by Dooyeweerd in his law-Idea. But the question remains, how do we identify and distinguish different institutions? Why do some institutions disappear, like trade guilds, which Baader (and later, Kuyper) recognized as institutions? How do we determine the laws that govern each institution? How do we know what laws or ordinances are given by God to govern a modern corporation? Or a university? Dooyeweerd says that we posit these laws from general principles. But what are those principles, and how can they be found? This is the kind of discussion that took place at the founding of the Free University. One of those principles was to seek the law in empirical phenomena. How is this to be done? (Friesen 2015, 84).
12. To say that institutions A and B have sphere sovereignty in relation to each other, we need some kind of organicist model of head and limbs, of center and periphery. Just as all modes of consciousness relate to a central selfhood or heart, all institutions relate to a central Body of Christ, or New Root. These ideas of heart and root are not found in classical Calvinism. They are found in Baader (Friesen 2015, 82-3).

13. Dooyeweerd, following Baader, insists that the organic center is above time so that it may (as supratemporal selfhood) govern the refracted temporal and peripheral modes of consciousness and (as supratemporal Body of Christ) govern temporal institutions. Classical Calvinism does not have Dooyeweerd’s distinctions of time, supratemporal and eternal. They are found in Baader (Friesen 2015, 36-38, 52-55).

14. Dooyeweerd would develop the idea of institutions as *enkaptic* individuality structures. But this relied on the development of his idea of modes of consciousness, and the functions of individuality structures within those modes.

15. By means of this idea of *enkapsis* (which Dooyeweerd obtained from Max Wundt but did not acknowledge), Dooyeweerd developed a view of sphere sovereignty that was quite different from that of Groen and Kuyper. He rejected the idea that non-state organizations were parts of the larger whole of the state (as in Stahl’s view). But, like Stahl, he said that there were only two organized institutions, the church and the state. All other organized social structures are dependent for their existence on the creation of the state in a differentiated society, and they exist in a one-sided foundational *enkaptic* relationship with the state, where the state has “priority”. This allows the state by means of its common private law to “bind” other social structures to the principles of inter-individual justice, legal security and equity, and to intervene in those other spheres on the basis of public justice or in the public interest (NC III. 379, 444-46, 451, 487-88, 572, 593-94, 657-70).18

**XI. Dooyeweerd did not rely on Kuyper to formulate his idea of modalities**

We have discussed the development of the idea of sovereignty in its own sphere in Groen and Kuyper. But it is important to note that Dooyeweerd did not develop his theory of the modes of consciousness from Kuyper’s idea of sphere sovereignty. Dooyeweerd developed the idea of modes of consciousness in 1922 in his dialogue with neo-Kantian thinkers, using arguments that he found in Norel and Baader. When he later went to work at the Kuyper Foundation, Dooyeweerd found

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18 Jonathan Chaplin is correct that Dooyeweerd allows the state to intervene on the basis of these principles. But Chaplin’s study of Dooyeweerd is flawed because he has an incorrect understanding of individuality structures and *enkapsis*. Chaplin rejects the idea of one-sided *enkaptic* binding, and he redefines subsidiarity as a horizontal way of mutual functional subservience and interdependence of spheres. In my view, Chaplin’s reinterpretation results in a more conservative reading of Dooyeweerd’s politics than is in fact the case. His reinterpretation allows less intervention by the state in the non-state societal spheres.
connections with Kuyper’s ideas (Friesen 2016). Or, as he stated in 1937 to the Curators of the Free University, who were investigating Dooyeweerd’s ideas:

For the Philosophy of the Law-Idea has certainly sought connections with essentially reformational-philosophical basic ideas, as they have been delivered over to us through tradition.

To “seek connections” is very different from basing his philosophy on such ideas. Dooyeweerd refused to disclose to the Curators the sources for his philosophy, so Valentijn Hepp tried translating excerpts from Dooyeweerd back into German to see if he could find Dooyeweerd’s sources in that way. Hepp said that Dooyeweerd’s appeal to Calvin and Kuyper was nothing other than “a flag, to cover a foreign cargo.” Dooyeweerd’s response was “Indeed, the criterion for Calvinistic philosophic thought is again in question!” Dooyeweerd denied that Kuyper ever had a philosophical conception of law-spheres. He didn’t even use the word “law-sphere.” He continues: “However this may be, the question whether I have “profited” from Kuyper’s basic ideas will be judged in different ways, depending on the standard according to which one sums up the basic ideas of Kuyper’s work.” Dooyeweerd attached to his letter an additional 15 pages of citations from Kuyper. That he made these connections, however, does not mean that he relied on them in order to develop his philosophy.

In his specific ideas of supratemporality, organicism, worldview, opposition to the autonomy of thought, and modes of consciousness, Dooyeweerd is closer to Baader than he is to Stahl (whom he criticizes). And he criticizes Groen’s idea of sphere sovereignty.

**Conclusion**

Henderson is wrong that his series of quotations from Groen and Kuyper decisively puts to rest the need for research as to any further influence. These ideas of sphere sovereignty did not come in a straight line from Calvin. This article provides additional research showing the historical context and sources for these quotations. Groen relied on the work of Stahl, as well as on Stahl’s older colleague and fellow anti-revolutionary Baader. In many ways, Baader was less reactionary than Stahl, or at least more open to the further evolution and opening-up of culture.

We know that Kuyper praised Baader’s work. And there are too many convergences between Baader’s ideas and those of Kuyper, and especially with the later work of Dooyeweerd, to ignore the influence of Baader.

This kind of historical research helps us to better understand the development of reformational philosophy. And it helps to prevent us from wrongly identifying
sphere sovereignty with delegated powers and political pluralism, and with the wrong kind of organicism. I hope that it will also encourage further research as to the origins of these ideas and how they may relate to today’s society.

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Wet van den 13 Augustus 1857 (STBL No. 103) op het Lager Onderwijs, met de daarover, vooral in de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, gewisselde stukken en gehoudene beraadslagingen (Nijmegen: H.C.A. Thieme).